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  • 51.
    Jensen, Eva
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Learning and transfer from a simple dynamic system2005In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 46, no 2, p. 119-131Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The amount of learning gained from being assisted in completing the task of bringing a predator-prey system into equilibrium by controlling the predator population was investigated. Learning was explored both by post-task questioning and by testing for transfer to another predator-prey task. Participants were 28 undergraduate psychology students, all female. They were randomly and evenly split into an experiment group that was subjected to a learning session with the first task before being tested in the second task, and a control group that only performed the second task. What was most needed in the first task was help in sticking to analytically derived conclusions by resisting "common sense" responses. There was a significant transfer effect on performance to the second task, stemming from learning shown by half the participants in the experiment group. The other half showed hardly any learning. Learning in about half the subjects has proven a stable finding.

  • 52.
    Jensen, Eva
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Mission design: fitting the solution to the problem2010In: Proceding of the 15th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2010Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 53.
    Jensen, Eva
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sensemaking in military planning: A methodological study of command teams2009In: Cognition, Technology & Work, ISSN 1435-5558, E-ISSN 1435-5566, Vol. 11, no 2, p. 103-118Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 54.
    Jensen, Eva
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Brehmer, Berndt
    Sensemaking in the fog of war:  an experimental study of how command teams arrive at a basis for action2005In: Proceedings of the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2005Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 55.
    Jensen, Eva
    et al.
    Örebro universitet, Avdelningen för psykologi.
    Brehmer, Berndt
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Understanding and control of a simple dynamic system2003In: System Dynamics Review, ISSN 0883-7066, E-ISSN 1099-1727, Vol. 19, no 2, p. 119-137Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study examined laypeople's understanding of a simple dynamic system, expressed in reasoning and strategies used by the subjects, and how it affected performance. Participants were 15 undergraduate psychology students. 4 male and 11 female; median age was 24 years, ranging from 21 to 31 years. The subjects' task was to establish equilibrium in a simple predator-and-prey system. A task analysis was performed to identify the problem structure, the vital aspects of the task, and the ideal strategies to perform the task. The subjects' actual performance was compared to these strategies. The results revealed that, even though the task was structurally simple, it was still difficult. Much of these difficulties seemed to stem from a low ability to apply indirect reasoning and thinking in terms of discrete time steps instead of in terms of continuous time.

  • 56.
    Jensen, Eva
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sawicka, Agata
    What is the use of basic dynamic tasks?2006In: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, 2006Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 57.
    Jensen, Eva
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Tehler, Henrik
    Avdelningen för brandteknik och riskhantering, Lunds universitet.
    Brehmer, Berndt
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division.
    Indikatorer på lednings- och samverkansförmåga: En förstudie på uppdrag av MSB2011Report (Other academic)
  • 58.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Chess as a research tool for the study of military command and control2006In: Proceedings of the 4th international conference: New challenges in the field of military sciences, 2006Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The author and his colleagues have for several years used chess as tool for research intended to be relevant for the improvement of military command and control. The paper summarizes the main results from this research and also discusses the external validity of the findings. The major finding is that the ability to benefit from an information quality advantage - in terms of more current information or longer range of vision of the board - decreases as the information quality for both sides is reduced, even if the advantage is left unaffected. If this result from experiments with chess should be valid also for military command and control it would contradict a current hypothesis in that area which implies that military information systems do not have to deliver perfect information, it is sufficient if they can deliver more and/or better information than those of the enemy. This, in turn, would mean that measures other than investments in advanced information technology may be needed in order to establish superior command and control under conditions of imperfect information. It is finally concluded that findings from experiments with chess can have external validity if there is a theory connecting them to the target situation, and that there are no reasons to believe a priori that findings from abstract laboratory research have less external validity than findings from field studies in natural settings.

  • 59.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Hur många ledningsnivåer behövs i Högkvarteret för ledning av IO 14?2016In: Operativ ledning: Slutrapport 2013-15 / [ed] Isabell Andersson, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2016Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 60.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Kan man få en snabbare ledningsprocess vid ledning av insatser med ledningsorganisation 14 (IO 14) om man ta bort en ledningsnivå i Högkvarteret?2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna rapport tar sin utgångspunkt i en fråga och några följdfrågor från Försvarmakten. Frågan är hur många ledningsnivåer det skall finnas i Högkvarteret vid insatsledning av insatsorganisation 14. Skall det som nu vara tre ledningsnivåer eller kan man ta bort en nivå? Skall en eventuell reducering av antalet nivåer ske genom att man tar bort en nivå eller genom att två nivåer slås ihop? Vilken nivå skall man i så fall ta bort, alternativt vilka nivåer skall slås ihop? Frågorna besvaras utifrån perspektivet att skapa en snabbare ledningsprocess utan att kvaliteten på de beslut som fattas försämras. Svaren grundas i organisationsteoretisk litteratur i kombination med vedertagen militär praxis. Ledningssystemets uppgift är att inrikta och samordna insatsen så att uppsatta mål kan nås (Brehmer, 2013a). Indelningen i olika ledningsnivåer har i huvudsak två syften. Det ena är att se till att varje ledningsnivå får ett lagom stort kontrollspann, det vill säga ett lagom antal underställda att samordna. Det andra syftet är att se till att varje ledningsnivå inriktas så att de får en lagom komplex uppgift att lösa med sina underställda enheter. Kontrollspannets storlek och uppgiftens komplexitet är "lagom" när såväl tillägg som borttagande av en ledningsnivå förlänger tiden för att samordna och inrikta. En analys av Högkvarterets organisation utifrån detta perspektiv leder fram till slutsatsen att det inte finns någon tid att vinna på att vare sig ta bort en ledningsnivå eller att slå ihop två ledningsnivåer. Rekommendationen ges därför att ha kvar tre ledningsnivåer. En tänkbar svaghet i underlaget för denna rekommendation är att det i huvudsak består av ett teoretiskt resonemang. För att kunna dra säkrare slutsatser krävs empiriska studier som jämför olika organisationsformer med varandra vid insatsledning inom ramen för scenarier av den typ som Försvarsmakten kan tänkas ställas inför. Sådana studier skulle också kunna ge svar på en mer fundamental fråga. Vilken kapacitet har egentligen ledningssystem av samma karaktär som det svenska? Kan de producera inriktning och samordning i rätt tid. Eventuellt avslöjade brister skulle sedan kunna läggas tillgrund för att inrikta ny forskning inom ledningsområdet.

  • 61.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Vad kan vi lära från ICCRTS om hur ledningssytem skall utformas för att kunna möta en resursöverlägsen motståndare?2016In: Operativ ledning: Slutrapport 2013-2015 / [ed] Isabell Andersson, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2016Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 62.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Vad är ett lämpligt kontrollspann vid militär insatsledning?: En litteraturstudie2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Utgångspunktenför denna uppsats är en fråga från högkvarteret om hur många ledningsnivåer detskall finnas i ett ledningssystem för militära insatser i ett läge när Sverigeskall försvar sig mot en resursöverlägsen motståndare som initialt harinitiativet. Försvarsmakten har idag tre ledningsnivåer – militärstrategisk, operativoch taktisk nivå. Mer specifikt gäller frågan om det skall vara två eller trenivåer, om någon nivå skall tas bort eller om några nivåer skall slås ihop. Ledningssystemetför en insats är till för att inrikta och samordna de underställda som deltar iinsatsen mot ett gemensamt mål.  Anledningentill att ledningssystem byggs hierarkiskt är att det finns en begränsning förhur många underställda en chef kan hantera. Han eller hon har ett begränsatkontrollspann. Lösningen är att dela upp det totala antalet underställda i mindreenheter som var och en har en chef. Dessa inriktas och samordnas sedan avchefer på en högre nivå. Om en nivå i ett hierarkiskt ledningssystem tas bortkommer kontrollspannet på återstående nivåer att öka. Avgörande för möjlighetenatt ta bort en nivå är därför hur mycket kontrollspannet kan tillåtas öka utanatt det får negativa effekter på förmågan att utöva ledning på de nivåer som äraktuella. Syftet med denna uppsats är att försöka ge svar på denna frågautifrån en genomgång av tidigare forskning på området. Resultatet av dennagenomgång visar att tidigare forskning inte har något entydigt svar. Den tidigaforskningen om kontrollspann ger visserligen rekommendationer på 3-6underställda, men senare forskning har rest tvivel kring denna rekommendation.Istället framhålls att kontrollspannets bredd är beroende av olika faktorer iden situation i vilken ledningen utövas. De faktorer det gäller kan antingenvara relaterade till den uppgift som skall lösas eller till kapaciteten iledningssystemet.  Exempel på uppgiftsrelateradefaktorer är komplexitet, tidskrav, osäkerhet, hur skilda funktionerunderställda enheter har samt hur många andra arbetsuppgifter än ledning somskall hanteras. Exempel på faktorer relaterade till ledningssystemets kapacitetär kompetensen hos chefer och underställda, samt tillgång till stabsresurseroch stödsystem.  Även omforskningsgenomgången inte ger ett entydigt svar på vad som är ett lämpligtkontrollspann så ger den ändå underlag för en diskussion om förutsättningarnaför att minska antalet ledningsnivåer. Strid mot en resursöverlägsenmotståndare kommer sannolikt att ställa stora krav på förmågan att hanterakomplexitet, tidskrav och osäkerhet. Enligt rådande uppfattning gynnas dennaförmåga av smala kontrollspann vilket talar emot att minska antaletledningsnivåer. För att komma vidare med frågan om vad som är ett lämpligtkontrollspann krävs empiriska undersökningar där olika organisationslösningarjämförs med avseende på förmåga att lösa uppgiften inom ramen för den typ avscenarier som kan förväntas bli aktuella för det svenska försvaret.

  • 63.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Informationslägets betydelse för hantering av osäkerhet vid ledning i NBF2005Report (Other academic)
  • 64.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Kommunikationsmediets betydelse för hantering av osökerhet vid militär planering2008Report (Other academic)
  • 65.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Tidspress och hantering av osäkerhet: Rapport nr 152004Report (Other academic)
  • 66.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    En befälhavares informationsbehov: Hur välja ut den tillräckligt bra informationen?, Rapport nr 82001Report (Other academic)
  • 67.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    En befälhavares informationsbehov: Rapport nr 41999Report (Other academic)
  • 68.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Forskningsprojektet Informationsbehov i framtida krig: Forskningsrapport 20002001Report (Other academic)
  • 69.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Forskningsprojektet Informationsbehov i framtida krig: Forskningsrapport 20012002Report (Other academic)
  • 70.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    The Commanders Need for Information: Some Experimental Findings2000In: Proceedings of the Defence Human Factors Special Interest Group Meeting, 2000Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 71.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    The Value of Information in War: Some Experimentel Findings2000In: Proceedings of the 5th International Command and Control Research & Technology Symposium, 2000Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 72.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Värdet av att ha begränsad realtidsinformation vid olika nivåer på osäkerhet om läget i stridsrummet: Rapport nr 62000Report (Other academic)
  • 73.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Värdet av att ha tempoöverläge vid olika nivåer på osäkerhet om läget i stridsrummet: Rapport nr 52000Report (Other academic)
  • 74.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Värdet av informationsöverläge vid olika nivåer på osäkerhet om läget i stridsrummet1999Report (Other academic)
  • 75.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Värdet av styrkeöverläge vid olika nivåer på osäkerhet om läget i stridsrummet: Rapport nr 31999Report (Other academic)
  • 76.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Informationsöverläge och val av tempo i striden: Rapport nr 92002Report (Other academic)
  • 77.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Fåhraeus, Tonie
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Överläge i rörlighet och val av tempo i striden: Rapport nr 102002Report (Other academic)
  • 78.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Betydelsen av överlägsen sensorräckvidd vid olika nivåer på osäkerhet om läget i stridsrummet: Rapport nr 122003Report (Other academic)
  • 79.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Hantering av osäkerhet vid militär insatsledning: Slutrapport2008Report (Other academic)
  • 80.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Kommunikationsmediets betydelse för urval av information vid ledning i NBF2005Report (Other academic)
  • 81.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Some research results obtained with DKE: A dynamic war-game for experiments2004In: Proceedings of the 9th International Command and Control Research & Technology Symposium, 2004Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 82.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Urval av information och tempo i striden: Rapport nr 132003Report (Other academic)
  • 83.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Betydelsen av överlägsen expertis och informationsöverläge för skapande av ledningsöverläge2006Report (Other academic)
  • 84.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Information och ledningsöverläge: Slutrapport, Rapport nr 172004Report (Other academic)
  • 85.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rollbaserad lägesbild kontra behovsanpassad lägesbild som stöd för fördelat beslutsfattande2006Report (Other academic)
  • 86.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rollbaserad lägesbild kontra behovsanpassad lägesbild som stöd för fördelat beslutsfattande (2)2007Report (Other academic)
  • 87.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Selection of information for command and control2006In: Proceedings from CIMI 2006, 2006Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 88.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Urval av information för militär ledning: Slutrapport2008Report (Other academic)
  • 89.
    Kuylenstierna, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sandström, Hans
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rydmark, Joacim
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Val av tempo och urval av information för ledning: Rapport nr 162004Report (Other academic)
  • 90.
    Larsson, Gerry
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Bynander, Fredrik
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Ohlsson, Alicia
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Schyberg, Erik
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Holmberg, Martin
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Crisis management at the government offices: a Swedish case study2015In: Disaster Prevention and Management, ISSN 0965-3562, E-ISSN 1758-6100, Vol. 24, no 5, p. 542-552Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    The purpose of this paper is to gain a deeper understanding of crisis management at the Swedish Government office level in an international crisis by using a multiperspective approach, and paying particular attention to factors contributing favorably to the management process.

    Design/methodology/approach

    The Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption on Iceland in 2010 was accompanied by an ash cloud that caused serious air traffic problems in large parts of Europe. Interviews were conducted with seven high-level informants at the Swedish Government offices and two informants at the Swedish Aviation Authority. An interview guide inspired by governance, command and control, and leadership perspectives was used.

    Findings

    A Crisis Coordination Secretariat, organizationally placed directly under the prime minister, coordinated the operation. A combination of mandate (hard power) and social smoothness (soft power) on part of the Crisis Coordination Secretariat contributed to confidence building and a collaboration norm between the ministries, and between the ministries and their underlying agencies. Preparatory training, exercises and a high level of system knowledge on part of the Crisis Coordination Secretariat – contextual intelligence – also contributed to a favorable crisis management.

    Research limitations/implications

    The study relies on retrospective self-report data only from a limited group of informants making generalizations difficult.Practical implications– The organizational positioning of the Crisis Coordination Secretariat directly under the prime minister gave its members formal authority. These members in turn skillfully used social flexibility to build confidence and a will to collaborate. This combination of hard and soft power is recommended.

    Originality/value

    The multiperspective approach used when designing the interview guide and when interpreting the responses was new as well as the focus on factors contributing to crisis management success.

  • 91.
    Larsson, Gerry
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Leadership and Management (ILM).
    Holmberg, Martin
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Redovisning av "bonusprojekt" ledarskap - ledningsvetenskap 20112011Report (Other academic)
  • 92.
    Lindström, Rickard O
    et al.
    Försvarets Materielverk (FMV), Sverige.
    Vretblad, Bengt
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division.
    Janzon, Bo
    Secrab Security Research, Sverige.
    Christensson, Anders
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Sjöland, Magnus
    Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademien (KKrVA), Sverige.
    En studie rörande nolltolerans mot förluster vid internationella insatser: Årlig redovisning från KKrVA Avd IV den 4 december 20132014In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, Vol. 1:Bihäfte, no 1Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, Division of Military Technology, presents its annual report on the theme "Zero Tolerance for Losses in International Operations". Focus has been on own personnel and losses by combat action.) The study primarily concerns the land arena and the time span 2020-2030. Weapons development continues. The availability of weapons – even advanced ones – increases, also for non-state belligerents. Zero tolerance will require more and more efficient protection solutions to be developed – and to be used to meet increasing threats. Available technology offers many options. Zero tolerance requires high skills of the planner and purchaser, to ensure long-term research and development, timely acquisition and training, and ability to understand potential, limitations, and to adjust tactics accordingly. Holistic systems thinking will be required before, during and after interventions, including staff recruitment, advanced leadership, adequate equipment and high quality training in order to be able to fulfil a difficult mission in the highly complex environment in which the operation will occur.

  • 93.
    Lindström, Rickard
    et al.
    Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien, KKrVA.
    Vretblad, Bengt
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division.
    Christensson, S. Anders
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Janzon, Bo
    Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien, KKrVA.
    Sjöland, Magnus
    Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien, KKrVA.
    En studie rörande nolltolerans mot förluster vid internationella insatser2013Report (Other academic)
  • 94. Ng, Ee Chong
    et al.
    Thunholm, Peter
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Cheah, Mervyn
    Tan, Kin Yong
    Chua, Nency
    Chua, Ching Lian
    Exploring alternative Edge versus Hierarchy C2 Organizations using the ELICIT platform with Configurable Chat System2008In: Proceedings to 13th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: C2 for Complex Endeavor, 2008Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 95.
    Persson, Mats
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Aspekter på ledning2009Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 96.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Rigas, Georgios
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Complexity: The Dark Side of Network-Centric Warfare2014In: Cognition, Technology & Work, ISSN 1435-5558, E-ISSN 1435-5566, Vol. 16, no 1, p. 1-13Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Military theoretical considerations suggest that a networked command and control architecture will provide a more effective form of command and control under complex operations that demand a high tempo of action. This article presents an experimental study with the purpose to examine team performance under different conditions of command and control architectures and their resilience to complexity. The experiment was performed with the task to extinguish simulated fires in a microworld. Three factors were varied in the experiment: command and control architecture, the number of simulated units, and tempo. The dependent variable was the number of lost cells in the microworld. Three command and control architectures were investigated; command by negation, directive command, and a control condition. The general conclusion from this experiment was that all command and control architectures performed equally poorly under the condition of many subordinate units and fast tempo. This was in contradiction to suggestions made in the military theoretical literature. Command by negation was presumably the more effective command and control architecture under the other conditions.

  • 97.
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    A Form to Collect Incident Report: Learning from incidents in the Swedish Armed Forces2013In: Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, ISSN 1479-4411, E-ISSN 1479-4411, Vol. 11, no 2, p. 150-157Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the modern business environment a greater number of organizations act worldwide and regularly meet with new cultures and environments. The change calls for a more rapid learning process than previously, in order to adjust to new situations. In order to prevent incidents from recurring, organizations put effort into collecting information after incidents. Learning from experience is often associated with incidents and accidents, however it can also concern positive occurrence. The purpose of the collection is to explore knowledge, analyse what happened and find the root-cause (basic contributions facts and circumstantial conditions) of the incident. If the root-cause is found, the organisation has possibilities to make changes in order to avoid similar incidents and to respond to crises. The collection is regularly done through pre-printed forms, but the reports are seldom sufficient as they often tend to lack vital information. We state, the answers in incident reports are closely related to the form design and the questions arising in the form. To improve the collection method, we designed a structured incident reporting form, using interview and questionnaire research and focused on the aim of the information collection. Our new form was compared to the unstructured form (at present used in the Swedish Armed Forces and NATO) in two experiments. Forty participants from the Swedish National Defence College were recruited to watch film sequences displaying incidents, and in the time that followed report and describe the incident they had observed in writing. The new structured form led to significantly improved results in both experiments. Structured incident reports, with a focus on the customers’ requests, appear to significantly improve after incident reporting. As incident reports become more complete, analysts have an enhanced possibility to find the basic contributing factors and circumstances and there will be a better possibility to learn in the organization and to avoid similar incidents in the future.

  • 98.
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    A New Incident Report Form Leads to Improved Foundation for the Lessons Learned Cycle2012In: International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, ISSN 1937-9390, E-ISSN 1937-9420, Vol. 4, no 3, p. 14-22Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 99.
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Acquisition of Experience-based Knowledge from the Swedish Armed Forces International Missions: A Comparison between Groups and Individuals2010In: Proc to 7th International Conference on Intellectual Capital, Knowledge Management & Organisational Learning, 2010, p. 360-Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The world is rapidly changing and industrial war has been replaced with "war amongst the people" (Smith 2007, p. 267). Today many armed forces are faced with new responsibilities and are operating in new environments, necessitating a higher ability to identify and implement improvements more rapidly than before (NATO SG, 2008). The Lessons Learned (LL) process helps to suggest solutions to identify shortcomings and facilitates in making positive experiences durable (French Air Forces, 2008). In organizational learning, there is a pronounced need to get hold of important experience, to reduce repetition of mistakes and facilitate for highquality experiences in purpose to improve. Those experiences represent an important input to the LL process, which in the end produces results that will be instilled back into the organisation. A serious weakness in several organizations seems to be that numerous experiences are poorly reported. Unfortunately there is little research conducted in the military field. On the contrary, there is a huge need in several organizations to get a LL-process implemented. This paper will focus on the initial parts in the LL-process, observation, report and some of the early analysis. The aim is to compare group performances with individual performances and ask if groups produce more mature experience-reports than individuals. The study was conducted within the Swedish Armed Forces and all participants were Swedish soldiers earlier deployed on international missions. The participants were asked to report experiences (problems, difficulties) from their assignment, using two different methods. Would method 1, with conditions that facilitate a united effort to generate thoughts and a critical discussion, improve the progress to produce additional or more mature experience reports, compared with individual performances? The results showed that groups produced somewhat higher scaled and more mature reports than individuals. No indication was found that any of the two methods used in the experiment produced an increased number of reports.

  • 100.
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Command & Control Studies Division.
    Experience-based knowledge from the Swedish Armed Forces: a comparison between groups and individuals2016In: Knowledge Management Research & Practice, ISSN 1477-8238, E-ISSN 1477-8246, Vol. 14, no 1, p. 69-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A serious weakness in several organizations seems to be that numerous experiences are poorly reported. Unfortunately, there is little research conducted in the military field; on the contrary, there is an urgent need in several organizations to get a lessons learned process implemented. The aim of this paper is to compare group performances with individual performances and to determine whether groups will produce more mature experience-reports than individuals. The study was conducted within the Swedish Armed Forces; all participants were soldiers previously deployed on international missions. The results showed that groups produced somewhat better reports than individuals; however, individuals produced a higher quantity of reports per person than groups. It therefore appears to be pointless to report in groups, at least as was done in this study, since the extra effort it takes does not justify the small improvement.

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