Governmental organisations often fail to prepare themselves adequately for complex problems such as natural disasters. This is remarkable because these threats are usually studied intensively and governments do develop plans for such situations. Christer Brown demonstrates in his thesis that the complexity of governmental systems and the mutual interdependence of various government organisations hinder the preparations for something like a natural disaster. This particularly applies to government organisations which have to operate in a many-layered administrative system. Brown investigated the case of the American Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which appeared to be insufficiently prepared to respond adequately during the disaster caused by hurricane Katrina in Louisiana in 2005. This was apparently due to a shift in political attention from natural disasters to terrorism within the FEMA, and this forced the agency to establish different priorities for its policies.

European armed forces still remain predominantly white, male organizations; their societies, however, are becoming more diverse and older. How will these armed forces be able to cope with this challenge? In order to answer this question, in the first semester of 2017, a group of scholars working within the framework of the European Defense Agency conducted an online survey among international experts in human and social sciences, defense managers, policymakers, and journalists specialized in defense issues. The aim of the survey, which followed a previous survey among young people on the attractiveness of the military as a job, was to measure their opinions and ask their suggestions concerning possible ways for increasing diversity in European armed forces. This paper presents some of the results of this multinational online survey.The unique feature of the study is that it is forward-looking and international: experts from various NATO and EU countries were asked how Defense organizations could deal with future challenges of demographic characteristics. The study, therefore, adds to our understanding of possible solutions for ensuring increased diversity in armed forces.

Crises are an integral part of our modern world; they are breaking points that disturb our sense of normalcy. While some of them are treated as ‘normal incidents’ that are bound to occur in a vast and complex array of governmental activities, others spark a blaze of media attention, public emotions, and political upheaval. This thesis explores how political office-holders respond to incidents that are perceived as blameworthy and how crisis-induced accountability processes affect their political careers. In an attempt to determine this, a series of case studies containing elements of high-pressure crisis-induced accountability were examined. Strategies employed by top political actors in coping with accountability and blame are identified and discussed. Crises often trigger discussions on accountability and top political actors engage in a framing contest over defining the causes of the crisis and who or what should be held responsible. This is a staged and dynamic process in which key actors employ different strategies in several arenas for managing and ultimately assigning blame for the unwanted event. These processes are shaped in relation to issues regarding causality, agency, and responsibility. In addition to the fact that crises can be managed on different ‘levels’ and arenas, we can also see that certain contextual and situational factors (such as personal experience and the constitutional framework of the cabinet) can constrain or enable how blame is managed and ultimately what the consequences will be for the careers of top political office-holders.

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post-crisis careers.

This article offers a conceptual framework that broadens and enhances our understanding of the role of 'history' in contemporary governance and the attempts by policy-makers to 'manage' critical issues. Building upon the literature on historical analogies in policy-making, we distinguish three dimensions that clarify how the past may emerge in and affect the current deliberations, choices and rhetoric of policy-makers. We apply this in a comparative examination of two cases of crisis management where historical analogies played an important part: the Swedish response to (alleged) submarine intrusions in 1982, and the European Union sanctions against Austria in 1999. We induce from the case comparison new concepts and hypotheses for understanding the role of historical analogies in public policy-making and crisis management.

Crisis management studies is a research area that analyzes how public and private actors respond to events that threaten individuals and society. There are many organizational and societal processes that enter this empirical space, and several social science disciplines have contributed to the development of this research area, such as sociology, political science, psychology, public administration, and international relations. A core question when studying the management of crises will always be: What characterizes high-stakes decisions made under pressing circumstances? When starting to answer this question, we need an understanding of both psychological and institutional forces that surround the situation in order to see the individual decision maker in context.

The major forest fire in the province of Västmanland, during August of 2014 was an unexpected incident. The environmental prerequisites for a firestorm type of development that is present in exempli gratia Greece, and California should not exist in the subarctic biotope that caught fire on July 31 at Seglingsberg in Sala municipality. The aim of this chapter, Swedish crisis management effort in response to a forest fire in central Sweden, in 2014. In order to do so, it probes a number of challenges that were posed to the crisis response system, such as situational awareness, formal responsibilities, coordination with local and national actors, information to the public and evacuation

This is a study of the complex problems faced by the authorities when coping with the first major submarine chase in Sweden during the 1980s. The incident was to establish a disturbing pattern for Swedish territorial defence that lasted for the rest of the decade. Having experienced a major `success' in the submarine defence area a year earlier in the so-called `whisky-on-the-rocks' crisis, the Swedish military and political leadership was caught in a credibility trap that closed forcefully as over 400 journalists reported the unsuccessful search-and-surface mission in the small bay of Hårsfjärden. This operative incident turned political crisis was the beginning (and perhaps the trigger) of what would become the number one security issue during the decade. It highlights the consequential interaction between organizations and different government levels in a high-profile security crisis. The framing of the problem confronting the decisionmakers was dominated by the incident handled a year previously.

The study takes a cognitive-institutional approach to the decision-making process. The nexus between individual actors, groups and organizations is the focus of analysis, which is conducted taking a sequential view of the decision-making process, the larger picture of the problem being split into decision occasions. This captures best the environment where vital choices were made and shows how the process of analogical reasoning becomes important for the under-standing of the crisis management effort and its consequential results.

This paper will use the Leadership Capital Index to develop and compare case studies of twoSwedish coalition leaders, Carl Bildt (1991-1994) and Fredrik Reinfeldt (2006 - present). Mr.Bildt and Mr. Reinfeldt represent the Moderates, a Centre-right party, which has been thesecond largest party, behind the long-dominant Social Democrats, since the 1970s. The twoleaders faced similar political problems, but with very different outcomes. Their respectivecoalition included three additional parties, challenging their relational skills, and both wrestledwith the dilemma of having the parliamentary equation disturbed by the emergence a rightwing populist party. Adding to the similarities is that they were confronted with economiccrises during their incumbencies. While Mr. Bildt, however, only lasted one term in office, Mr.Reinfeldt has managed to secure two consecutive terms for his coalition (although losing hismajority in 2010), a unique achievement in a country that has been dominated by Social Democraticgovernments. The paper aims to strengthen the operationalization of the LCI by addingtwo comparative cases and consideration for systemic factors to the analysis, such as type ofgovernment and parliamentary balance of power. The case studies will further clarify the relativeimportance of the leaders’ coalition maintenance efforts.

The processes of replacement of party leaders are well-published events in media outlets across the world's democracies, but are scarcely analysed by political scientists. In this article we examine the extent to which incumbent party leaders are able to control their own fate in the face of various types of challenges that herald a possible end to their rule. It discusses three related research questions derived from this main objective: (1) what makes incumbents quit? (2) How do incumbents respond to various types of triggers heralding a possible end to their rule? (3) To what extent does incumbent behaviour prior to and following succession affect the fortunes of their successors and their party? We draw on a four-country–eight-party data set of leadership successions between 1945 and 2005, and on findings of in-depth studies of Australian cases to show that not only do Australian leaders get challenged and replaced more frequently than do other leaders, but they are also forced to combat more internal rivalry than their counterparts elsewhere.

Leadership succession in democratic governments and political parties is an ubiquitous but relatively understudied phenomen, where the political becomes intensely personal and vice versa. This article outlines the puzzles that leadership succession poses to political analysts, reviews the literature, and offers a conceptual framework deconstructing the process in terms of a flow from succession contexts and triggers via the role choices of key participants (incumbents and aspiring successors) through to the eventual succession outcomes. It concludes by presenting a series of testable hypotheses to describe and explain leadership successions.

This study investigated whether re-usable soldiers, that is, those who performed well during operations (military capacity), and were able to readjust postdeployment (civil adjustment), could be identified at predeployment. Participants were 364 UN peacekeeping soldiers. Three hypotheses were posed: the selection system for conscripts cannot identify soldiers with low military capacity (H: 1); the selection system for conscripts cannot identify soldiers with poor civil adjustment after deployment (H: 2); and the two aspects of re-usability (military capacity and civil adjustment) would be intertwined (H: 3). Results showed that the selection system for conscripts was unable to identify soldiers' military capacity and civil adjustment. Results also showed that these two aspects were unrelated, and did not interact. Indications on possible consequences and improvements are discussed.

Aims: In response to the 2009 outbreak of A/H1N1 influenza, Swedish authorities decided on a programme for universal vaccination. Over 60% of the population received at least one dose of vaccine. This study examines demographic factors and perceptions related to the decision whether or not to become vaccinated. Methods: A combined web/postal survey was conducted (n = 1587, response rate 53%) in late spring 2010. Questions reported here concerned perceptions, precautionary behaviours and vaccination decision. Results: Main reasons for becoming vaccinated were concerns about spreading the disease to relatives or in the community and confidence in the good effect of vaccination. Vaccination rates were higher among women, those with young children or belonging to a risk group. Main reasons for abstaining were belief that the flu was not a serious threat, low risk of spreading the disease, concern about side-effects and perceived uncertainties in information. Three profiles representing different patterns of thought and beliefs were identified by cluster analysis, respectively labelled as a vulnerable, a trusting and a sceptical group. Vaccination rates and precautionary behaviours were demonstrated to differ between these groups. Conclusions: Perceptions relating to the 2009 pandemic are likely to influence uptake of vaccination in the future. Authorities need to be aware of different patterns of beliefs and attitudes among the public, and that these may vary in different phases. Communication of risk needs to be dynamic and prepared to engage with the public before, during and even for some time after the acute risk period.