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  • 101.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Marianne et Athéna: La pensée militaire française du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours2011 (ed. 1)Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [fr]

    Comment est-ce que la Marine française a su faire face à l’introduction duvapeur ? Comment est-ce que les français ont aperçu l’introduction del’avion militaire ? Pourquoi l’Armée de terre  a-t-elle adopté une stratégie d’offensive« à l’outrance) avant la Grande Guerre ? Pourquoi est-ce que lesfrançais n’on pas fait face à l’expansion allemande pendant les annéestrente ? Est-ce qu’il est vrai que la pensée stratégique française estaujourd’hui sclérosée? Ces questions, et bien d’autres, se sont élaborées dansce livre qui traite la pensée militaire française du père Hoste et le chevalierFolard fin dix-septième et début dix-huitième siècles jusqu’aux auteurs contemporains.

    La rencontre entre Marianne et Athéna– le symbole de la France et la déesse de la guerre et de la sagesse – est lethème de ce livre. La France dispose d’un patrimoine fier dans ce domaine etelle a donné des impulsions très importantes à la culture stratégique del’Occident.

    Marianne et Athéna montre comment des théories et des doctrinesmilitaires se sont développées en fonction de la situation dans les domaines dela technologie, de la politique et de la culture.

  • 102.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    "Maritime Security - Maritim Säkerhet: Referat av Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens och Kungl. Örlogsmannasällskapets seminarium om maritim säkerhet den 20 september 20112011In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 4, p. 59-62Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 103.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Mellan solidaritet och suveränitet2012In: Vårt Försvar, ISSN 0042-2800, no 4, p. 14-16Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 104.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Mettre un peu d’ordre dans la Maison Européenne2010Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is high time to prepare for the OSCE summit in December 2010 with a view to a possible mandate for negotiations on the security treaty that Russia wants to have. It is important to on the one hand try to accomodate Russia's concerns and, on the other hand, not loose the acquis of the OSCE.

  • 105.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Motorvägar på havet2010In: Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, ISSN 0040-6945, no 1, p. 29-38-Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Projekten sjömotorvägar och Europeiskt sjötransportsystem utan hinder är två mycket ambitiösa program, som säkert skulle vara utomordentligt värdefulla för Europa och dess medborgare. Vägar skulle bli mindre överbelastade, olyckorna skulle minska, ekonomisk effektivitet skulle öka och, inte minst, miljön skulle förbättras.

  • 106.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Några strategiska utmaningar2008In: Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, ISSN 0040-6945, no 1, p. 40-47Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 107.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Orientering om studiegruppen Téthys; planerat föredrag seminarium 2011-09-202011In: Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, ISSN 0040-6945, no 4, p. 318-320Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Téthys; European Center for Strategic and Maritime Studies har som verksamhetsmål att utveckla en global, integrerad och strategisk vision av den maritima arenan genom att stimulera utbyte av tankar och analys avseende dess olika aspekter. Vidare strävar studiegruppen efter att öka förståelsen för havens betydelse för politik och strategi samt mer allmänt att främja maritimt strategiskt tänkande.

  • 108.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Préface2009In: Les Îles Åland en mer Baltique.: Héritage et actualité d'un régime original / [ed] Matthieu Chillaud, Paris: l'Harmattan , 2009, p. 9-13Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 109.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Russia as seen from Sweden2011Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [fr]

    La Russie est, géopolitiquement parlant, le pouvoir dominant de l’Europe du Nord. Son histoire et celle de la Suède sont liées par de nombreuses guerres et autres conflits qui ont marqué la culture stratégique suédoise. Aujourd’hui, la Suède jouit d’un glacis qui la sépare de la Russie, composé des États Baltes, pays membres de l’UE et de l’OTAN. Sa situation stratégique est par conséquent plus confortable que jamais. Mais où va la Russie ? Deviendra-t-elle un partenaire fiable ou fera-t-elle marche arrière dans l’histoire pour tenter de redevenir la grande puissance qu’elle était au temps de Pierre le Grand ou de l’URSS ? Ce sont là des questions d’une importance majeure pour les Suédois. Le présent article ne cherche pas à répondre pas à ces questions. En revanche, il s’efforce de répondre à la question suivante : qu’en pensent les Suédois ? Les Suédois sont plutôt pessimistes quant à l’avenir de la Russie. Ce n’est tellement pas la menace militaire que leur fait peur mais plutôt les faiblesses du pays : le manque de liberté d’expression, la corruption, la criminalité, le non- respect de l’état de droit. Malheuruesement, tous ces facteurs semblent s’aggraver avec le temps. Il existe donc un risque que la Russie se retrouve dans une situation grave, qui la conduirait à tenter une aventure extérieure pour réduire les tensions internes. Le gazoduc North Stream entre la Russie et l’Allemagne pose plusieurs problèmes parce qu’il passera sur le plateau continental suédois. Il est d’un intérêt vital pour la Russie – donc aussi un enjeu militaire. Il pose aussi des dangers pour l’environnement de la Mer Baltique, très fragile. Il conduira également à un ralentissement de la transition nécessaire des Européens vers les énergies renouvelables. Enfin, on peut remarquer le manque de solidarité européenne de la part des Allemands dans cette affaire, qui inquiète non seulement les Suédois mais aussi les autres riverains de la Baltique.  Chez les partis politiques et les stratèges militaires, il existe plusieurs points de vue différents sur la menace que représente potentiellement la Russie. Alors que certains ne croient pas du tout à une telle menace, d’autres considèrent qu’elle n’est pas impensable. En revanche, et la guerre entre la Russie et la Géorgie l’a bien montré, on considère en général qu’il n’est pas impensable que la Russie soit tentée d’agresser l’un des pays Baltes. Dans ce cas, la Suède devra jouer un rôle important en coopérant avec l’OTAN. Cependant, les Suédois souhaiteraient une meilleure coopération entre l’Europe et la Russie. Il est de ce point de vue-là essentiel que la Russie respecte les acquis de l’OSCE et du Conseil de l’Europe.

  • 110.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Strategisk överraskning2009In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 3, p. 60-71Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 111.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Stratégie maritime intégrale: une approche conceptuelle2012In: Revue Défense Nationale, ISSN 1779-3874, Vol. June, no 751, p. 1-7Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ninety per cent of the European Union’s external, and 40 per cent of its internal,trade is carried by sea—a proportion that will increase with the Motorwaysof the Sea project. The author argues for a comprehensive EU approach tomaritime strategy at the highest political level, and highlights the important ofcreating coherent political objectives and strategies to underpin that overallstrategy. He argues further for broader consciousness of the vital importance ofthe sea, not just for Europe, but for mankind.

  • 112.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Svenskt marinstrategiskt tänkande - en återblick med sikte på framtiden2012In: Forum navale, ISSN 0280-6215, Vol. 68, p. 105-149Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the middle of the 19th century, the Royal Swedish Navy was in a very bad shape. However, during the years around the turn of the century, 19th to 20th, the Navy was able to acquire for its time modern ships. At the same time, naval officers laid the foundation for a Swedish naval strategic culture that, basically, was valid until the end of the Cold War. The main aspects of this culture were:

    • Strategic defense against invasion from the sea – with a mix of offensive and defensive tactics that varied over time;

    • Fleet in being using the archipelagos as protection;

    • The main target was to be the enemy’s transport ships, not his main naval force;

    • Strategic cooperation with the army and air force while, especially the army, saw the navy as a subordinate force;

    • A vocation to defend Sea Lines of Communication that was not accepted by the Commander in Chief or by the politicians – except during the two world wars.

    The thinkers of the navy have been influenced from abroad, mainly: Colomb, Corbett, Castex, and to some extent Mahan. Influent naval officers have studied at US Naval War College or its French counterpart.

    Today, this culture is not valid. The navy has to develop a new culture where naval diplomacy, protection of Sea Lines of Communication, power projection, and cooperation with international and national actors are of prime importance. However, the classic strategic language – presence, sea control etc. – are still basically valid and should be used in the development of a new maritime strategy. In this context, the extreme jointness of Swedish Armed Forces is a problem. It is now necessary for the navy to, while still being part of the joint force, to reunite with the maritime world.

  • 113.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Sverige, Europa, världen2010In: Vårt Försvar, ISSN 0042-2800, Vol. 121, no 3, p. 15-17Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 114.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Sveriges strategiska läge i en föränderlig värld2012In: DSM. Debatt, sanningssökande, mediakritik, ISSN 1401-2006, no 2, p. 21-26Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 115.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    The strategic situation of Cyprus2011Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 116.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    The Wonderful Trinity in a Globalized World2010In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 2, p. 127-145Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The article discusses strategic theory with particular emphasis on the lasting importance of the “wonderful trinity” as defined by Clausewitz: blind instinct, creativity, and reason. These are linked to three types of actors: the people, the general, and the government. A third trinity is the three objectives of war: the will of the enemy, his military power, and his country. The article argues that the trinity is rather flexible and can be used also in today’s “asymmetric” conflicts as a tool to increase our understanding. The word “asymmetric”, however, is often misused. To win, it has always been necessary to create asymmetry – or at least “dissymmetry” - to one’s own advantage. In order to win, strategy must define achievable, legal as well as legitimate objectives and associated ways-and-means. History shows that this is very difficult. Furthermore, the result is often not as expected. Friction and surprise make the best plans to fail; modern technology has not changed this fact. As a consequence, there is a need for strategic agility. This implies that a modern strategy needs to be responsive, flexible, and resilient. It must be thought by a “mind” that is adaptive and based on good strategic research. It must be prepared both to take on insurgents according to the formula “war amongst the people” and fight more classic wars – albeit perhaps in new ways.

  • 117.
    Wedin, Lars
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Utvecklingen av sjökrigskonsten 1800-19002009In: Quatre siècles de coopération militaire franco-suédoise = Svenskt-franskt militärt samarbete under fyra sekler: actes des journées d'études franco-suédoises organisées à Stockholm les 25 et 26 octobre 2005 et à Vincennes les 7 et 8 décembre 2006 = svenskt-franskt seminarium organiserad i Stockholm 25 och 26 oktober 2005 och i Vincennes 7 och 8 december 2006 / [ed] Gunnar Åselius och Valérie Caniart, Stockholm/Paris: Försvarshögskolan/Service Historique de la Défense , 2009, p. 87-110Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 118.
    Wedin, Lars
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Zetterberg, KentSwedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies.Åselius, GunnarSwedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Military History Section.
    Militärhistorisk tidskrift 20062006Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 119.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategy Section.
    Book Review Essay: Transformative Learning through Globalization of World Politics: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds) The Globalization of World Politics, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 745 pp. ISBN 13-978-0-19-929777-12009In: Cooperation and Conflict, ISSN 0010-8367, E-ISSN 1460-3691, Vol. 44, no 2, p. 231-240Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 120.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Historien bakom misslyckade strategier för upprorsbekämpning: James S Corum: Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency Zenith Press, 2008.2009In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 6, p. 131-133Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 121.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategy Section.
    Introduction: exploring the utility of armed force in modern conflict2008In: Small Wars & Insurgencies, ISSN 0959-2318, E-ISSN 1743-9558, Vol. 19, no 3, p. 297-302Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 122.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Inviting the Leviathan: External Forces, War and State-Building in Afghanistan2010In: Modern War and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods, and Strategy / [ed] Jan Angstrom & Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Routledge, 2010, p. 208-230Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 123.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategy Section.
    Inviting the Leviathan: external forces, war, and state-building in Afghanistan2008In: Small Wars & Insurgencies, ISSN 0959-2318, E-ISSN 1743-9558, Vol. 19, no 3, p. 374-396Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 124.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    The Problem of Victory of Defeat in Modern War2007In: Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War / [ed] Jan Angstrom & Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Routledge, 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 125.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    The United States Perspective on Victory in a War on Terrorism2007In: Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War / [ed] Jan Angstrom & Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Routledge, 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 126.
    Ångström, Jan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategy Section.
    Är 11 september och kriget mot terrorism bevis för en civilisationernas kamp?2008In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 3, p. 18-39Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 127.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle
    Modern war and the utility of force: challenges, methods and strategy2010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 128.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section.
    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle
    University of Utrecht.
    War, what is it good for?2010In: Modern War and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods, and Strategy / [ed] Jan Ångström & Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Routledge, 2010, Vol. 35, no 5Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 129.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section. Department of War Studies, King's College, London.
    Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan2012In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 35, no 5, p. 663-687Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.

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