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  • 1.
    Borres, Adam
    Swedish National Defence College. University of Defense, Tjeckien.
    Logistics in enemy territory2014Independent thesis Advanced level (professional degree), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The background of this study comes from the lack of documentation and knowledge about logistics in units, which has the main focus on combat or reconnaissance. The aims of the thesis is to determine and compare the different methods used to provide logistical support to units operating in enemy territory by Sweden and the Czech Republic in todays convention and asymmetric wars.Method of gathering information is through qualitative interviews using a semi-structured interview technique with both Swedish and Czech officers. The topics of the interviews are defined beforehand on an interview template and are based on the Swedish basic view of logistics. The three logistical branches that are covered are; service, movement and healthcare support. The result shows that Sweden and the Czech Republic have largely the same methods in all three branches. Sweden has one method in both service and healthcare support, which the Czech Republic does not have. For service support the method is a “forward operating place” which is similar to a forward operating base but only smaller and within the enemies territory. With healthcare support Sweden has small competent medicalgroups further out in enemy territory.The conclusion is that although Sweden and the Czech Republic have mostly the same logistical methods in supporting units in enemy territory they sometimes use them differently. The Swedish armed forces have a more evolved system for logistical support in enemy territory, which is a consequence of the cold war and the Swedish decision of not joining NATO, according to the author.

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    Logistics in enemy territory
  • 2.
    Ekström, Thomas
    et al.
    Swedish Defence Research Agency, Kista, Sweden.
    Skoglund, Per
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Ström, Mats
    Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, Stockholm, Sweden.
    An optimised defence supply system: Defining the principles2017In: NOFOMA 2017 - The 29th NOFOMA Conference: ”Taking on grand challenges” / [ed] Hellström, Daniel; Kembro, Joakim; Bodnar, Hajnalka, Lund: Lund University , 2017, p. 761-763Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    The purpose of   this paper is to describe the first step in the process of optimising the   Swedish defence supply system. The first step entails defining principles for   distribution and storage.

    Design/methodology/approach

    The research   builds on literature reviews, archival records, Swedish military documents,   participatory observation at FMV and in the Swedish Armed Forces Head   Quarters, study visits to military units, presentations by Subject Matter   Experts (SMEs), and war gaming.

    Principles from   business logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) were identified and   analysed in order to assess their applicability in the Swedish military   context. Similarly, military logistics principles from other nations (US and   UK), as well as from multinational organisations (UN, NATO, and EU), were   identified and analysed. Finally, current and past Swedish logistics   principles from guiding documents and military practise were also identified.  

    Findings

    The newly dawned   political attention to operational effect, operational capabilities,   availability and preparedness must lead to a shift of paradigm in defence   logistics. Military logistics must move from the prevailing focus on   effectiveness and efficiency in production logistics to an effect based   operational logistics, supported by an effective and efficient production   logistics. This means that new military logistics principles must be applied.   The conducted research has suggested a set of new principles for distribution   and storage.

    The working group has identified and analysed principles in business logistics and SCM, as well as domestic and international principles in military logistics. The working group has found that there is no established set of principles that in and by itself meets the requirements for designing an optimised system for storage and distribution which satisfies the goal and the constraints. The working group has therefore selected principles from different sources and augmented these with a couple of principles constructed by the working group.

    The working group   proposes that the following principles should be established for distribution   and storage in the Swedish defence supply chain:

    •   Primacy   of operational requirements – It is the requirements of the operational   commander that must be satisfied.
    •   Adapted   protection – The requirements for protection must be considered in the   selection of system for distribution and storage.
    •   Categorisation,   segmentation and differentiation – Supplies should be categorised and   segmented, and the treatment of segments should be differentiated.
      •   Strategic   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and sustainability until external   delivery can be guaranteed.
      •   Risk   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and initial sustainability.
      •   Certain   leverage supplies may require storage to a certain degree in order not to   jeopardise initial availability and initial sustainability.
      •   Generally,   it is not necessary to store routine supplies.
      •   Storage   close to military units – Limiting supplies should be stored close to the   military units in order to ensure initial availability and initial   sustainability for activated and mobilised military units.
      •   Storage   close to the area of operations – Reserve supplies should be stored close to   the envisioned areas of operations in order to ensure operational   sustainability.
      •   The   requirement for redistribution and dispersion in higher levels of   preparedness should be minimised.
      •   Efficient   distribution solutions, which do not restrict operational effect, should be   used up until the area of operations.
      •   Military   units close to the area of operations should have organic distribution   capability to be able to handle all requirements for transportation.
      •   Postponement   – Products should be kept generic as long as possible, and value adding,   customising, activities should be postponed as long as possible.
      •   Modularisation   and bundling of goods and services – Components (goods, services, or   combinations of goods and services) should be grouped (bundled) together into   larger modules or systems, which at a later stage can be combined in order to   create customised end products.
      •   Efficient and lean in peace.
      •   Effective, agile and responsive in higher levels of preparedness.
      • ·           Flexibility to adapt the configuration of the supply chain to   different levels of threat, preparedness and conflict.

    Contrary   to most supply chains in business logistics, but akin to the reality of   supply chains in humanitarian logistics, supply chains in defence logistics   must have two distinct different modes: dormant and action. This means moving from applying the principles of efficiency and   lean in peace, to the application of the principles of effectiveness, agility   and responsiveness in higher levels of preparedness. To have the ability to   move between these two modes is an application of the principle of   flexibility.

    The working group   has found that several of the principles applied in business logistics are   better suited to be components in everyday improvement management within   defence logistics, rather than as principles suited for supply chain design   and supply chain configuration. Consequently, the working group proposes that   improvement management within defence logistics command and control should   always address the following issues:

    •   Eliminate,   reduce and/or redistribute lead-times – Non value adding activities should be   eliminated. Time should be allocated so that activities are executed in   parallel. It must be ensured that activities are not duplicated between   different organisations.
    •   Eliminate,   reduce and/or adapt to variations and uncertainties – Variations and   uncertainties must be identified and analysed, in order to enable elimination   or reduction, alternatively allow for required adaptations.
    •   Simplify   and compress structures and processes – The number of decision elements or   nodes in logistics systems, e.g. the number of different variations of   products, customers, suppliers, storage nodes, number of steps in   distribution channels, levels in product structures, etc. should be reduced.   Components, processes, and interfaces should be standardised.
    •   Simplify   administration and minimise transaction times – Administration should be   simplified and the extra lead time due to administrative processer should be   minimised.

    Several of the   proposed principles have been validated by SMEs within the Swedish Armed   Forces and FMV through war games which have been conducted at the tactical   and operational levels for this purpose. However, the working group   recommends that further validation activities be conducted, prior to any final   implementation and institutionalisation of the proposed principles.

    Original/value

    The presented work   is relevant for any defence organisation contemplating transformation of its   logistics system in the light of recent developments with implications for   the areas of defence and security policy.

  • 3.
    Listou, Tore
    et al.
    Norweigian Defence University College, Norway.
    Skoglund, Per
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Ekström, Thomas
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Performance Based Logistics: Lessons from the Nordic countries2019In: The 31st Annual NOFOMA Conference: Supply Chain Designs and Sustainable Development of Societies - Extended abstracts, Oslo: BI Norwegian Business School; Norwegian Defence University College , 2019, p. 32-Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose

    PBL is thought of as a novel way of designing defence supply chains, advocating long-term relations in which a 1st tier supplier assumes responsibility for the upstream supply chain, and is awarded or punished based on pre-set performance standards. Activities and resources could be lifted out of the defence hierarchy. PBL should lead to adjusted inter-organisational relations and intra-organisational activity structures. The purpose of this research is to explore a) what barriers and enablers to PBL are perceived as the most important in a Nordic perspective, b) how relations between the Defence and PBL suppliers are handled, and c) whether PBL leads to organisational change within the defence.

    Design/methodology/approach

    Because few PBL contracts exist within the Nordic countries a qualitative approach was chosen, based on document studies and semi-structured interviews. Primary data were collected from four units of analysis, each chosen to shed light to all one or more of the research questions.

    Findings

    Our study supports some of, but not all barriers and enablers found in previous research. Lack of supply chain orientation is the main barrier. Relationships seem to depend on trust developed over time, also prior to the PBL contract. Although PBL alters interorganisational activity structures, this only to a minor degree results in organisational change.

    Research limitations/implications

    Qualitative study of a few Nordic PBL contracts. Findings validated in a Nordic context, not necessarily for other small nations.

    Practical implications

    Our findings have implications when planning and implementing PBL contracts.

    Original/value

    This is the first reported study of PBL contracts in the Nordic countries.

  • 4.
    Liwång, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division.
    Risk analysis for shipping under piracy threat2012Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Many different security measures are suggested for ships under piracy threat by organisations such as the International Maritime Organisation. The effectiveness of the respective measures is discussed thru out the shipping industry, and different ship operators make different choices. It is important for the security of international shipping to further develop the anti-piracy measures.

    Research has been carried out to describe piracy structures and also to analyse the effects on shipping. It has been shown that piracy is not random and that factors such as seize, speed, cargo and ship vulnerability affect the probability of a pirate attack (Meija et. al. 2009). More research is however needed to further describe the causal relationship that governs the probability and the consequences of an attack.

    Results from research in risk-based ship design shows that rational risk-based analysis procedures can be used as a decision support tool to facilitate increased safety. The methods have been shown to be able to quantify safety risks as a result of failure of technical systems in their self, as well as incidents due to a combination of technical failure and human decisions. The merits of probabilistic risk assessment has however so far not been fully researched for security risks. The military practise regarding threat assessment and risk analysis for antagonistic threats (NATO RTO 2008) is nevertheless a indication of that it is likely that probabilistic risk assessment also can be very well suited for security risks such as piracy.

    The study

    The aim of this study is to evaluate how, based on probabilistic risk assessment procedures, the operation under piracy threat off the Horn of Africa can be analysed. This to support ship owners risk management, development of anti piracy measures and rule making. The purpose of introducing probabilistic risk assessment into the analysis of pirate attacks is to meet safety goals more effectively through a well-balanced combination of proactive and reactive measures whilst keeping focus on the intended overall purpose of the particular ship.

    Based on research on piracy structures this study collects and documents pirate capacity, intention and opportunity to perform attacks based on expert judgment. This information is used as an input to an influence diagram approach to model the network of influences on a pirate attack (IMO 2002). Tools from military security-risk analysis (NATO RTO 2008) and military operational research (Jaiswal 1997) are used in the influence analysis to structure the analysis and to capture and describe relevant aspects.

    The output of the influence analysis serves as system description for hazard identification and risk analysis.

    The risk analysis output follows requirements on safety scenarios for risk-based ship design (Vassalos 2009) and the IMO formal safety analysis (IMO 2002). It is therefore possible to use the analysis output in ship owners risk management and maritime safety work.

    The investigation also develops a test scheme for evaluating the output of the risk analysis against data from piracy reports. Based on statistical comparisons between analysis output and the piracy reports the reliability and sensitivity of the analysis is tested.

    The outcomes of the study are:

    • a stringent documentation of the pirates’ capacity, intention and opportunity to perform attacks,
    • a better understanding of the casual relationships that governs the probability and consequences of an attack,
    • a statistically tested risk analysis, and
    • knowledge on the sensitivity of the risk analysis and the possibilities of the model to capture aspects of risks associated with piracy attacks.

    References

    ELLIS, J., FORSMAN, B., and Dausendschoen, K., Dangerous goods transport with open-top container vessels – risk analysis. SAFEDOR Deliverable D4.8.2., 2008.

    IMO, Guidelines for formal safety assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process, International Maritime Organisation, United Nations, 2002.

    Jaiswal, N. K., Military Operations Research, Quantitative Decision Making, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

    Mejia, M. Q.  Jr, Carioub, P., and Wolff, F-C. Is maritime piracy random? Applied Economics Letters, 2009, 16, pp. 891–895.

    NATO RTO, Improving Common Security Risk Analysis, RTO Technical Report TR-IST-049, Research and Technology Organisation of NATO, 2008.

    VASSALOS, D. ed., Risk-Based Ship Design – Methods, Tools and Applications, Springer, 2009.

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    POSTER 42 TRA2012
  • 5.
    Liwång, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division.
    Riskanalys inom fartygsskydd - en analysstrategi för bättre beslutsunderlag2015In: Tidskrift i sjöväsendet, ISSN 0040-6945, no 2, p. 151-168Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Sjöfartsskydd bedrivs idag både av militära styrkor och civila redare. Det är inte ofarligt, men nödvändigt och viktigt. Med fokus på säkerhetshot undersöker denna avhandling hur fartyg ska förbereda sig inför potentiellt farlig verksamhet, det vill säga hur man skapar ett lämpligt riskmedvetande i förhållande till fartygsskydd.

    Inom sjösäkerhet har regler, rekommendationer och metoder systematiskt utvecklats under många år. Inom sjöfartsskydd är däremot frågorna inte lika belysta och angreppssätten och erfarenheterna är ofta dolda bakom hemligstämplar. Det är rimligt att anta att riskanalysmetoder från andra områden kan användas även för sjöfartsskyddsanalyser, men inte utan att metoderna anpassas till områdets specifika behov. Därför leder den begränsade forskningen och dokumentationen inom området till ett kunskapsgap.

    För att reducera de identifierade utmaningarna inom sjöfartsskydd undersöks i avhandling hur en lämplig analysstrategi för fartygsskydd ser ut. För att öka den övergripande säkerheten för de analyserade verksamheterna ska metoden kunna stötta nödvändiga kompromisser mellan sjösäkerhet och fartygsskydd. Syftet är att utveckla en analysstrategi som är systematisk och som ger beslutsfattaren en lämplig bild av de aktuella riskerna. För att undersöka detta område behandlas i avhandlingen både hot mot militära fartyg och hotet mot civila fartyg från sjöröveri. Därför kan resultatet användas för att utveckla både militära doktriner och civila riktlinjer.

    Studien visar att hur fartygets verksamhet beskrivs i analysen är centralt för resultatet och därmed förståelsen av riskerna. Inte bara skyddslösningar i sig, utan även besättningens riskförståelse och hur det implementerade skyddet förstås måste inkluderas i analysen. Hur det implementerade skyddet förstås kommer också i stor utsträckning att påverka effektiviteten hos implementerade åtgärder. I avhandlingen konstateras också att om analysen görs utan att ta hänsyn till de osäkerheter som finns kan det innebära att resultatet är missvisande. Därför är den osäkerhetsanalys som är möjlig med ett kvantitativt angreppssätt nödvändig, speciellt om syftet är att identifiera robusta skyddsåtgärder.

  • 6.
    Liwång, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Military-Technology Division.
    Risk-based ship security analysis2013In: Naval architect, ISSN 0306-0209, no 2, p. 35-37Article, review/survey (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Chalmers University of Technology and the Swedish National Defence College research the conditions for a risk-based ship security analysis approach. Hans Liwång, licentiate in Engineering, at Chalmers explains further.

  • 7.
    Pettersson, Alexander
    Swedish Defence University.
    Additiv tillverkning för högre teknisk tillgänglighet i internationella insatsområden2018Independent thesis Basic level (professional degree), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper the military utility of additive manufacturing of spare parts during international deployment is explored. We also analyze the effect that additive manufacturing has on technical availability.

    International deployment can be tough for logistical reasons and this leads to a difficulty in supplying ground troops with spare parts. If the spare parts cannot be acquired in the deployment area these have to be shipped from central distribution centers or be ordered directly from the industries. Some spare parts are uncommon and not stored in distribution centers but only get manufactured on order. This type of production can lead to delivery times of up to 40-50 weeks. With additive manufacturing this process could be shortened to 4-10 weeks.

    Conclusions that can be drawn is that additive manufacturing has military utility and can give a higher technical availability, given that a few technical difficulties are resolved. At this point there is a shortcoming in the number of qualified materials for printing spare parts for regular vehicles and this makes it difficult for the industry to approve of spare parts constructed with additive manufacturing. The winning in technical availability is directly linked to how difficult the deployment area is to reach for logistical units. Additive manufacturing has a higher positive effect in areas that are hard to reach.

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    fulltext
  • 8.
    Sahlström, Stefan
    Swedish National Defence College.
    Operativ och taktisk logistik- Jämförelse melllan stridskrafterna avseende tillgänglighet, kontinuitet och förmåga till överlevnad2016Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med uppsatsen är att, med hjälp av främst Moshe Kress principer för operativ logistik, analysera likheter och skillnader avseende hur armén, flygvapnet och marinen tillämpar logistik samt identifiera eventuella möjligheter att samordna tillämpningen för optimal effektivitet i en utveckling mot allt fler gemensamma operationer. Tyngdpunkt är på taktisk nivå.

     

    Det råder ingen tvekan om att logistik är viktigt för all militär verksamhet. Försvarsmakten genomgår omstrukturering som innebär utmaningar när samma resurser behövs av flera samtidigt. Gemensamma operationer ställer krav på interoperabilitet vilket är en utmaning för logistiken som av tradition varit stridskraftsspecifik med begränsat erfarenhetsutbyte över gränserna.

     

    Med stöd av Kress teorier om operativ logistik har tre faktorer operationaliserats. Empirin inhämtas ur Försvarsmaktens styrdokument samt genom intervjuer med nyckelpersoner från Högkvarteret. Genom jämförande analys har likheter och skillnader mellan stridskrafternas logistikkoncept, och tillämpning av desamma, genomlysts. Likheterna är tydligast avseende tidens centrala betydelse, behovet av transportresurser och logistikens tidiga integrering i planeringsarbetet. Även behovet av rutiner, hänvisningar och understöd från andra förenar. Skillnaderna avser främst snabbhet, distribution och leverans, centraliserat respektive decentraliserat ledarskap. Förutsättningarna för val och anpassningsmöjligheter av leveransplatser skiljer sig åt.

     

    Uttalade möjligheter till omedelbar samordning har inte identifierats. Däremot finns det stöd för att ökad förståelse för och kunskap om varandras logistikkoncept, och tillämpningen, kan ge bättre möjligheter till samordnat utnyttjande av befintliga resurser. Över tid bör det kunna leda till ökad effektivitet utan att koncepten måste likriktas.

     

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