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Since the ending of the Cold War, the defence sector, particularly the areas of military logistics and defence acquisition, has been undergoing a comprehensive transformation. There are several factors that explain this transformation: changes in defence and security policies for nations and organisations; reductions in defence expenditure; participation in Peace Support Operations; Lessons Learned from these operations, especially in the area of logistics; revolutionary development in the area of Information and Communication Technology; emergence of novel Commercial Best Practises in the areas of business and business logistics; and changes in the legislation regarding the conduct of public procurement in Europe.

In military logistics, the relatively easily described static supply and support chains of the Cold War Era, designed for military units that stood in preparedness, Just-in-Case, of full-scale military conflicts in Europe, are now being substituted for flexible, dynamic operational supply and support chains, designed for military units that are deployed on Peace Support Operations around the globe. Hence, new types of missions have to be provided for. As a consequence, new military concepts have to be considered; new technology is being implemented; and new Commercial Best Practises are being evaluated, adapted and adopted; in order to enhance performance and ensure Value-for-Money.

In defence acquisition, the single Business Model of the Cold War Era, i.e. procurement of equipment, is being replaced by a spectrum of emerging Business Models, ranging from the traditional procurement of equipment, via acquisition of equipment and support, to acquisition of availability and capability, i.e. acquisition of performance. Consequently, new Commercial Best Practises are being evaluated, adapted and adopted; Commercial and Military-Off-The-Shelf products and services are being utilised; and Public Private Participation, Cooperation, and Partnerships are being investigated and initiated; in order to enhance performance and ensure Value-for-Money, while simultaneously mitigating operational risk in the supply and support chains.

This licentiate thesis reports on a research project that was commissioned by FMV, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, and conducted in order to

"study, analyse, and evaluate Business Models regarding how they can handle the new supply concept that a new logistical interface brings about, with a particular emphasis on the risk taking that is part of the business concept". This research purpose was used to formulate three Research Questions:

• Research Question 1: How can a generic Business Model for a non-profit, governmental, Defence Procurement Agency be described?

• Research Question 2: Which strengths and weaknesses do different Business Models have in the context of defence acquisition?

• Research Question 3: Which risks are associated with different Business Models in the context of defence acquisition?

Using constructs from: Business Model theory, Public Private Participation theory, defence acquisition theory and practise, and military logistics theory and practise; a generic Public Private Business Model for defence acquisition was developed. The generic model consists of numerous variables, which enables an array of possible configurations. The model was used in a multiple case study to describe and analyse four defence acquisition projects in the UK. The multiple case study demonstrated that the generic Public Private Business Model is useful in order to describe defence acquisition projects. The model has also demonstrated that it is useful in order to analyse acquisition projects, including performance and risk.

The Public Private Business Model has demonstrated its usefulness by discovering internal and external misalignments. The internal misalignments are Business Model configurations where the different building blocks are working against each other. The research has revealed examples where the mitigation of operational risk in the supply and support chains creates new risks in other building blocks. An external misalignment occurs when a Business Model configuration works against the deal for which it was designed, or the strategy that it is intended to realise. The research has revealed examples where there is a risk that the Business Model configuration is detrimental to the overarching strategy, e.g. transferring risk to the private sector or incentivising industry to enhance performance. Hence, the Public Private Business Model ought to be useful to identify and eradicate negative patterns and to identify and reinforce positive patterns.

The research has revealed three potential generic problems for Performance Based Contracts: a "definition problem" (i.e. what to measure); a "measurement problem" (i.e. when, where and how to measure); and a "comparison problem" (i.e. with what to compare). The research results demonstrate that it must be made explicit which dimensions of performance; e.g. speed, quality, cost, flexibility and dependability; that should be measured, and why others should be omitted. The research suggests that performance must be explicitly specified for any Performance Based Contract in order to avoid any unnecessary problems with interpretations. Furthermore, the research indicates that performance metrics must be explicitly described. In addition, the results emphasise the importance of having an established baseline, against which to compare the measurements of Key Performance Indicators.

An important priority in the current Swedish Defence Bill is to increase the operational warfighting capability of the Swedish Armed Forces, which has implications for the defence supply chain. A recent study suggested that the Swedish Armed Forces should use segmentation of supplies and differentiation of supply chains to enable an affordable supply chain design (SCD). This raises questions regarding which segmentation model and which supply chain strategies (SCSs) the Swedish Armed Forces should use.

The purpose of this research is to design and develop a purchasing portfolio model (PPM) for defence procurement, which will be of practical use for defence authorities. The author defines a PPM as consisting of a segmentation model, tactical levers, differentiation strategies and guidance for management decisions. The research builds on a Delphi study with twenty experts from Swedish defence authorities. It addresses the operational requirements on readiness and sustainability that must be satisfied, as well as research gaps and open issues in the literature regarding PPM design and application.

The findings include several novelties. The author proposes a dynamic PPM, including an innovative two-stage segmentation model, with a precursor and a two-dimensional model. The latter merges sixteen elements into one square and three other segments. Another originality is that the PPM is both prescriptive and serves as a catalyst for in-depth discussions. The author also develops guidance for management decisions, including twelve tactical levers, and eight SCSs to differentiate treatment of the supply segments.

The research contributes to theory by combining constructs from the purchasing and supply management (PSM) literature and supply chain management (SCM) literature, and applying them in the context of military logistics, including defence procurement. It contributes to practice by developing a PPM that is relevant to practitioners in defence procurement and satisfies the operational requirements of the Swedish Armed Forces. It also contributes to methodology by investigating how researchers can use two panels in Delphi studies to enhance research validity.

Purpose

The dual purpose of this paper is to analyse the implications on research rigour of using two panels in a Delphi study, and to take a first step towards investigating how researchers in logistics and SCM establish rigour in Delphi studies.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on a literature review on research rigour in Delphi studies, this paper analyses how a modified design, with two panels, effected research rigour in a Delphi study that produced unexpected results. The paper also conducts a pilot literature review on Delphi-studies in logistics and SCM research, and investigates how these authors establish research rigour.

Findings

This paper finds that with two panels, researchers may enhance rigour in a Delphi study, but also that such a design may lead to results that would be less likely with a conventional design, especially if combined with concluding workshops. The pilot literature review indicates that Delphi-studies in logistics and SCM research establish rigour through the provision of an audit trail, rather than by explicitly discussing the quality criteria of correspondence and/or trustworthiness.

Research limitations/implications (if applicable)

The research indicates limitations with a conventional Delphi design, with one expert panel, and opportunities with a modified design, with two panels. Further research is required to explore these indicative findings.

Original/value

The paper demonstrates how a modified design of the Delphi technique, in combination with concluding workshops, can produce results and insights that would be more difficult to achieve with only one expert panel.

Layered resilience has received increased attention in recent years. This paper addresses an important subset of layered resilience, which is resilience in defence supply chains. The paper reports on findings from two studies, conducted in the Swedish defence sector. The purpose of the two studies is to identify feasible solutions for how the Swedish defence sector can redesign its supply network to meet the new challenges of a re-established Swedish Total Defence. The first study used a modified Delphi technique and concluded that two Delphi panels constitute a useful modification to the Delphi technique. Two panels increase the validity of the results and can potentially lead to interesting outcomes that a traditional design is less likely to produce, particularly if combined with presenting the panels with statements from different perspectives and using workshops to discuss the findings. The second study used a survey to investigate which tactics for resilience in defence supply chains defence authorities and defence industry prefer in peace, crises, and war. Though inconclusive, the findings indicate that authorities and companies agree that multiple sourcing and pre-storage of supplies are important tactics to achieve resilience in defence supply chains. This is in line with previous research in commercial supply chains, which identifies increased safety stock and multi-sourcing as two of the most commonly used tactics to address disruptions.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to develop guidance, including tactical levers, for the application of a dynamic purchasing portfolio model (PPM) for defence procurement.

Design/methodology/approach: The study uses a workshop and a literature review to identify suitable tactical levers for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement. Based on application rules proposed in previous research (Ekström et al., 2021), the study then formulates guidance for application and validates the methodology in two desktop exercises.

Findings: The study identifies tactical levers and proposes guidance for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement.

Research limitations/implications: The proposed guidance includes tactical levers, which will enable defence authorities to dynamically reposition in the segmentation model proposed by Ekström et al. (2021) and find an enhanced position to optimise. The presented results build on a study in the Swedish defence context. To determine generalisability, additional studies are required.

Originality/value: The paper develops guidance, including tactical levers, for the application of a dynamic PPM for defence procurement, which is original in several aspects. The guidance addresses public procurement, which is a novelty. In contrast to most extant PPMs, the model is dynamic, which enables practitioners to reposition in the model. 

Purpose – Defence supply chains (SCs) aim at operational outcomes, and armed forces depend on them to provide availability and preparedness in peace and sustainability in war. Previous research has focussed on strategies for SCs aiming at financial outcomes. This raises the question of how suitable commercial supply chain strategies (SCSs) are for supply chain design (SCD) in defence. The purpose of this paper is to explain the constructs of SCSs that satisfy military operational requirements and to propose SCSs that are appropriate in defence. 

Design/methodology/approach – This paper reports on a Delphi study with 20 experts from Swedish defence authorities. Through three Delphi rounds, two workshops and a validation round, these experts contributed to the reported findings. 

Findings – The findings demonstrate that commercial SC constructs are acceptable and applicable in defence but not sufficient. An additional strategy is required to satisfy requirements on availability, preparedness and sustainability. The paper shows that different requirements in peace and war make it challenging to design suitable defence SCs and proposes eight SCSs that satisfy these requirements. 

Research limitations/implications – The results emanate from the Swedish defence context and further research is required for generalisation.

Originality/value – This paper extends theory by investigating SCs aiming at operational outcomes. For managers in companies and defence authorities, it explicates how the unique issues in defence must influence SCD to satisfy operational requirements.

This study explains the constructs of a purchasing portfolio model (PPM) that defence authorities can use in practice in defence procurement and designs a segmentation model. We identify open PPM design and application questions in the literature and conduct a Delphi study with twenty experts from Swedish defence authorities to design a segmentation model that is fit-for-purpose. The paper addresses the open design and application questions discussed in the literature and satisfies the operational requirements of the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF). The proposed segmentation model builds on three dimensions: the operational requirements of the SwAF, the market's ability to deliver supplies on time, and limitations in the SwAF operational capability if the market does not deliver supplies on time. To reduce complexity, we propose a two-stage model in which we use one dimension as a precursor to a two-dimensional model. In the latter, we merge sixteen elements into one square along with three other segments which users should treat differently. The paper contributes to extant academic knowledge on PPMs by eliciting practitioners' views on open design and application questions. We develop the proposed segmentation model in cooperation with practitioners and believe that it will be of value in defence procurement practice.

The article outlines the first steps towards creating the foundations for further research into the logistical aspects of warfare in the context of societal resilience. The possibility of achieving seven basic indicators of national stability, the organization and network of using the strategy of rapid response to threats to achieve efficiency, reliability and stability of the state are considered.

Purpose

The purpose of   this paper is to describe the first step in the process of optimising the   Swedish defence supply system. The first step entails defining principles for   distribution and storage.

Design/methodology/approach

The research   builds on literature reviews, archival records, Swedish military documents,   participatory observation at FMV and in the Swedish Armed Forces Head   Quarters, study visits to military units, presentations by Subject Matter   Experts (SMEs), and war gaming.

Principles from   business logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) were identified and   analysed in order to assess their applicability in the Swedish military   context. Similarly, military logistics principles from other nations (US and   UK), as well as from multinational organisations (UN, NATO, and EU), were   identified and analysed. Finally, current and past Swedish logistics   principles from guiding documents and military practise were also identified.  

Findings

The newly dawned   political attention to operational effect, operational capabilities,   availability and preparedness must lead to a shift of paradigm in defence   logistics. Military logistics must move from the prevailing focus on   effectiveness and efficiency in production logistics to an effect based   operational logistics, supported by an effective and efficient production   logistics. This means that new military logistics principles must be applied.   The conducted research has suggested a set of new principles for distribution   and storage.

The working group has identified and analysed principles in business logistics and SCM, as well as domestic and international principles in military logistics. The working group has found that there is no established set of principles that in and by itself meets the requirements for designing an optimised system for storage and distribution which satisfies the goal and the constraints. The working group has therefore selected principles from different sources and augmented these with a couple of principles constructed by the working group.

The working group   proposes that the following principles should be established for distribution   and storage in the Swedish defence supply chain:

•   Primacy   of operational requirements – It is the requirements of the operational   commander that must be satisfied.
•   Adapted   protection – The requirements for protection must be considered in the   selection of system for distribution and storage.
•   Categorisation,   segmentation and differentiation – Supplies should be categorised and   segmented, and the treatment of segments should be differentiated.
  •   Strategic   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and sustainability until external   delivery can be guaranteed.
  •   Risk   supplies should always be stored in sufficient quantities and volumes in   order to ensure initial availability and initial sustainability.
  •   Certain   leverage supplies may require storage to a certain degree in order not to   jeopardise initial availability and initial sustainability.
  •   Generally,   it is not necessary to store routine supplies.
  •   Storage   close to military units – Limiting supplies should be stored close to the   military units in order to ensure initial availability and initial   sustainability for activated and mobilised military units.
  •   Storage   close to the area of operations – Reserve supplies should be stored close to   the envisioned areas of operations in order to ensure operational   sustainability.
  •   The   requirement for redistribution and dispersion in higher levels of   preparedness should be minimised.
  •   Efficient   distribution solutions, which do not restrict operational effect, should be   used up until the area of operations.
  •   Military   units close to the area of operations should have organic distribution   capability to be able to handle all requirements for transportation.
  •   Postponement   – Products should be kept generic as long as possible, and value adding,   customising, activities should be postponed as long as possible.
  •   Modularisation   and bundling of goods and services – Components (goods, services, or   combinations of goods and services) should be grouped (bundled) together into   larger modules or systems, which at a later stage can be combined in order to   create customised end products.
  •   Efficient and lean in peace.
  •   Effective, agile and responsive in higher levels of preparedness.
  • ·           Flexibility to adapt the configuration of the supply chain to   different levels of threat, preparedness and conflict.

Contrary   to most supply chains in business logistics, but akin to the reality of   supply chains in humanitarian logistics, supply chains in defence logistics   must have two distinct different modes: dormant and action. This means moving from applying the principles of efficiency and   lean in peace, to the application of the principles of effectiveness, agility   and responsiveness in higher levels of preparedness. To have the ability to   move between these two modes is an application of the principle of   flexibility.

The working group   has found that several of the principles applied in business logistics are   better suited to be components in everyday improvement management within   defence logistics, rather than as principles suited for supply chain design   and supply chain configuration. Consequently, the working group proposes that   improvement management within defence logistics command and control should   always address the following issues:

•   Eliminate,   reduce and/or redistribute lead-times – Non value adding activities should be   eliminated. Time should be allocated so that activities are executed in   parallel. It must be ensured that activities are not duplicated between   different organisations.
•   Eliminate,   reduce and/or adapt to variations and uncertainties – Variations and   uncertainties must be identified and analysed, in order to enable elimination   or reduction, alternatively allow for required adaptations.
•   Simplify   and compress structures and processes – The number of decision elements or   nodes in logistics systems, e.g. the number of different variations of   products, customers, suppliers, storage nodes, number of steps in   distribution channels, levels in product structures, etc. should be reduced.   Components, processes, and interfaces should be standardised.
•   Simplify   administration and minimise transaction times – Administration should be   simplified and the extra lead time due to administrative processer should be   minimised.

Several of the   proposed principles have been validated by SMEs within the Swedish Armed   Forces and FMV through war games which have been conducted at the tactical   and operational levels for this purpose. However, the working group   recommends that further validation activities be conducted, prior to any final   implementation and institutionalisation of the proposed principles.

Original/value

The presented work   is relevant for any defence organisation contemplating transformation of its   logistics system in the light of recent developments with implications for   the areas of defence and security policy.

Performance Based Logistics (PBL) as a support strategy for defence systems has been coined as a paradigmatic change within defence acquisition and maintenance. Originating from the defence industry, the concept has been adopted in many defence organisations. Although studies of its applicability has identified both enablers and barriers for implementation, these studies predominantly are performed in a few large nations. How the concept corresponds with a small state perspective needs to be addressed. Further on, perceived outputs of PBL practices would differ between the acquisition organisation, the supplier of PBL services, and the users of the services. Understanding these differences in perceptions would give valuable knowledge about how to design PBL contracts. Thirdly; assuming that PBL contracts indeed result in improved effectiveness, adapting the involved organisations to a new way of managing logistics should be accompanied by related organisational change processes. The purpose with this study is to contextualise the concept and define barriers and enablers for PBL in a small state perspective (represented by Norway and Sweden), identify different stakeholders’ expectations for output, and explore whether implementing such a concept is perceived as a significantly new way of organising defence supply chains with an accompanying organisational change strategy. 

Purpose

PBL is thought of as a novel way of designing defence supply chains, advocating long-term relations in which a 1st tier supplier assumes responsibility for the upstream supply chain, and is awarded or punished based on pre-set performance standards. Activities and resources could be lifted out of the defence hierarchy. PBL should lead to adjusted inter-organisational relations and intra-organisational activity structures. The purpose of this research is to explore a) what barriers and enablers to PBL are perceived as the most important in a Nordic perspective, b) how relations between the Defence and PBL suppliers are handled, and c) whether PBL leads to organisational change within the defence.

Design/methodology/approach

Because few PBL contracts exist within the Nordic countries a qualitative approach was chosen, based on document studies and semi-structured interviews. Primary data were collected from four units of analysis, each chosen to shed light to all one or more of the research questions.

Findings

Our study supports some of, but not all barriers and enablers found in previous research. Lack of supply chain orientation is the main barrier. Relationships seem to depend on trust developed over time, also prior to the PBL contract. Although PBL alters interorganisational activity structures, this only to a minor degree results in organisational change.

Research limitations/implications

Qualitative study of a few Nordic PBL contracts. Findings validated in a Nordic context, not necessarily for other small nations.

Practical implications

Our findings have implications when planning and implementing PBL contracts.

Original/value

This is the first reported study of PBL contracts in the Nordic countries.

The authors' goal was to understand how defense supply chains can better withstand unanticipated and highly impactful disruptions whose probability and impact cannot be readily calculated or quantified. Specifically, the project team set out to identify the current state of the research on supply chain risk management (SCRM), supply chain disruption management (SCDM), and supply chain resilience, both within the defense sector and across the broader commercial landscape. The project team explored the unique characteristics of defense sector supply chains and the ways in which practices from other sectors might or might not be applicable. The team also sought to identify knowledge gaps or broader questions that might not appear in the literature. This study was co-led by RAND and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut).

The authors found that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense, as well as to identify how supply chain specialists and defense and security policymakers might implement these strategies across both the private sector and government. The authors therefore created a research agenda to help fill existing gaps in understanding how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption.

Key Findings

The authors determined that more research is required to identify good strategies for SCDM for defense. The main gaps in understanding also represent some of the key enablers for effective defense SCDM.The authors propose a research agenda with the following five areas to help fill gaps in understanding of how defense supply chains can better resist and recover from disruption: (1) Improve understanding of supply chain disruption, including the composition of defense supply chains and its associated stakeholders and actors. (2) Determine which commercial sector approaches to SCDM can be adapted for or adopted by defense. (3) Recognize and tackle challenges for SCDM stemming from the multisectoral nature of defense supply chains. (4) Clarify and distinguish between SCRM and SCDM to understand the benefits and challenges of each. (5) Define what resources are needed to enable implementation of defense SCDM.

The lacking Russian progress in war in Ukraine is often attributed to failing logistics, yet the logistics and its eventually failure is not explained. The purpose with this paper is to present some logistics principles that can be used to describe the Russian way of logistics planning, and to infer whether failing logistics slowed down the military operations or if failing operational conduct led to revised operational plans that could not be sustained logistically. The initial Russian Course of Action (COA) to take Kyiv was probably well supported logistically. When the COA failed, contingency plans most likely did not take into consideration the logistical challenges of supporting another type of operation, partly because of the logistics vacuum resulting from the preceding exercises. In the southeast the logistical concept seems to build on the echelon principle, which fits poorly with the lack of operational success. Adding to this is successful Ukrainian tactics of targeting Russian logistics resources which significantly reduces the Russian fighting power. This assessment is based on openly accessible information about the Russian campaign. Reporting from an ongoing war poses challenges of verifying data. Both warring parties and other stakeholders pursue their own interest through strategic communication. Yet, by combining different sources we believe that our findings are quite robust. For future research, archival studies both in Ukraine and Russia, combined with interviews with logistics personnel at both sides would add new dimensions to the research. We realise though that such data sources will not be accessible for quite some time.