Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

The thesis investigates the political control of the Swedish defence transformation in the second decade after the end of the Cold War. It focuses on high-level political and administrative processes and methods used in governing the Swedish Armed Forces. The existing understanding of political control in civil-military relations theory has two main shortcomings: it confuses the unique role of the military as sui generis with an exceptional(ist) theory for higher government, and its view of higher government is limited/partly misleading. The thesis presents a more elaborate conceptual framework -- strategic governance -- based on contemporary governance theory. The latter features two governance dimensions, organizing and microsteering, which are investigated in three within-case studies of “pivoting projects” for defence transformation: 1) the EU’s Nordic Battle Group 08 under Swedish leadership; 2) the development of a market-based acquisition system; and, lastly, 3) the governance of Sweden’s contribution to Afghanistan. An important finding of the thesis is that higher government in Sweden is not a hierarchical “machine” as depicted in civil-military relations research, but that military and civilian officials alike should be viewed as “servants”, or officarius. In fact, military officers and civilians often work under a "hands-off" mandate without direct supervision. Another finding is the ability of the Swedish Armed Forces to act according to the norms of higher government, rather than in conformity with military professional skills. Since neither reliance on military expertise nor active political involvement is a crucial factor for control, the theoretical implication is that other case studies should employ a governance approach rather than civil-military relations theory. The normative challenges that follow from the research include a) the need to develop a skill set adjusted to higher government in the military officer corps; b) the problem of identifying distinct areas of responsibility/accountability in strategic governance; and, ultimately, c) the necessity of improving coordination between different sectors relevant for national security, as the Swedish model for higher government in some respects is incompatible with strict requirements for generating a “grand strategy”.

This article analyzes U.S. defense planning, and more specifically the public administration of the third offset strategy. The U.S. defense bureaucracy is rooted in a tradition of rational planning, which assumes a process of consistent, value-maximizing choices within specified constrains. The cornerstone in this tradition is the program budgeting system, once created to connect plans with budgets according to preferences. The third offset strategy, aimed at dealing with the challenges of geopolitical competition and budget austerity, is influenced by a different public administration philosophy described as metagovernance. Metagovernance is a challenge to rational planning as it entails an indirect approach of organizing arenas for networks, in which start-up companies and civilian corporations get to interact with government officials in order to identify incrementally suitable acquisition projects. Furthermore, the article contextualizes this tendency in reflexive modernity, in which rationality breaks down due to the pace of societal changes and planning processes constantly become subject to feedback.

Geopolitical analysis and geostrategy are vital parts of the Scandinavian realisttradition. It is not a clearly defined academic school, and its connections tovarious forms of realism is often undefined or implicit, but it tends to be unitedby its policy relevance and empirical emphasis. More specifically, in the ColdWar period geopolitical studies in Scandinavia was characterized by a small-stateperspective, focus on state strategies, and the power of history. State strategieswere explored as various forms of small-state adaptation in classic concepts likethe Nordic balance, the Swedish double policy, and Finlandization. Even if criticshave pointed out explanatory shortcomings, the return of Russia as regional threathas also reinforced the use of geopolitical analysis. Future issues in Scandinaviangeopolitics are both conceptual (what is it?), theoretical (what can it explain?),and empirical (the impact of shifting power structures in international relations)

The article discusses historical enlargements of NATO in order to explore possible explanatory frameworks useful for ongoing research on the enlargement to Sweden and Finland. With the exception for Greece and Turkey 1952, the Cold War “southern and western enlargements” were characterized by a mix of idealist and liberal impulses as well as realist and military considerations. NATO was a military pact with a liberal soul, or a guardian of liberal society with a military toolbox. In the post-Cold War enlargements there were assumptions about no risks for inter-state war, relative European stability and the ability to keep Russian protests under control. In research, NATO’s “eastern enlargements” were controversial because of its contested consequences for European security, but after 24 February 2022 it is clear that the issue of the European security order must also be part of the analysis, not least to understand the drive for membership in Sweden and Finland. The fact that Sweden was a non-member of NATO has been explained both as a consequence of a “Nordic balance”, as well as internationalist norms. The striking impression after the Russian escalation in Ukraine 2022 is that most explanations of NATO’s eastern enlargements are irrelevant to the Swedish and Finnish “northern enlargement”. Further, NATOs northern enlargement has three distinct Swedish and Finnish features: the integrated relationships with NATO prior to membership, the EU memberships and the interconnectedness of the membership applications. Three explanatory frameworks are sketched in the article: a realist perspective of a “reversed Finland factor”, a liberal perspective of an interconnected and iterative application process with pluralist input from elite and general public, and a constructivist perspective of changing Western- or small state identity.

This article has mapped and analyzed internationaldefence cooperation with an emphasis on developments in NATO. In the mapping ofthe processes of defence cooperation initiatives in NATO after the Cold War and9/11, we concluded that there has been a steady stream of capabilitycatalogues, coordination measures and creation of joint ventures. In theanalysis we noted the different types of defence cooperation initiatives(sharing of capabilities, pooling of capabilities, role- and task sharing,co-development, and pooling of acquisitions), the character of the process(sequential and repetitive), and the dynamic and conditions (trade off dynamicsinfluenced by perceived gains, degree of solidarity, strategic similarities,degree of common understanding of political investment, and geographicproximity). The final part of the text elaborated on the potential consequencesof international defence cooperation; in this part we concluded that the threecategories, that might well mirror the future of the transatlantic securityarchitecture, are minimal defence cooperation, flexible defence cooperation orregional defence integration.

This chapter tries to supplement some of the early efforts to interpret the development of NATO’s partnership policy, as well as to widen it somewhat into a military operational perspective. Three official speeches on the executive level in the US are analyzed, including their references to military doctrines, in order to find the strategic rationale that underpins the new globalized partnership agenda. Two operational frameworks can be identified for the US: networking and access. Networking is centered on the decapitation of enemies and is being pursued in an on-going global or transnational shadow war. Access is centered on deterrence in Asia. Both frameworks rest on the concept of partnerships, and this is a contributory factor for their growing importance in the Alliance. This ‘partnerfication’ of NATO will certainly contribute to flexibility, but there is a clear risk that it will not be in the interests of all European states, members or partners alike.

Political scientists are often asked to make public assessments about strategic events.The tendency to rely on historical analogy is problematic as method, while academicmethod proper is to slow, and the problem addressed in this article is how to improveanalytical assessments in strategic affairs. I use and develop an analytical frameworkintroduced during the Cold War by Sovietologist Michael MccGwire in order to systematizeexpert assessments. In the empirical section I illustrate it with an inquiry into theprelude to the escalation in Ukraine 2022. The inquiry shows that the Russian actionsto subordinate Belarus in the Spring of 2021 is key to the understanding of the ensuingmilitary and diplomatic events that often was mistaken as Russian coercive diplomacy.The empirically grounded assessments show that the framework could have improvedprecision in assessments in the run-up to the approaching war.