Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

Denna bok är tillägnad ett begrepp som alla officerare som genomgått utbildning i Sverige känner väl, men trots allt kanske inte alltid fått riktigt grepp om. Uppdragstaktik omnämns i en rad olika sammanhang inom den svenska Försvarsmakten och förväntas vara vägledande för hur militära insatser leds, och samtidigt har sammanhangen inom vilka det begagnas i viktiga avseenden omvandlats genom organisatoriska och teknologiska förändringar. Vad innebär uppdragstaktik idag, givet historiska erfarenheter men också dessa betydelsefulla förändringar samt i relation till relevanta försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar?

Nowadays, it is already a truism to state that digital media are effective tools used by citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) and social movementsto protest, to demand, to push and (sometimes) achieve social and political change. No question, they are. This has been observed and registered time and again in a luminous series of academic contributions (some notable examples include Castells 2012; Cottle 2011; De Luca. Lawson and Sun 2012; Howard and Muzammil 2011; Tremayne 2014; Tufekci 2017). Exactly how these media have been taken up by civic actors in specific contexts has been studied and discussed in fascinating detail (Cammaerts, 2018; Gerbaudo 2012; Treré 2019). This book goes one step further to ask a broader question: Has the use of digital media by civic actors improved (or depleted) the quality of democratic life understood as broad and effective citizen participation in public affairs and decision-making? 

This article outlines a general history of the intellectual origins and development of geopolitical thought. It provides categories for assessing contemporary expressions of this phenomenon, and then discusses the applicability of these tools to the Baltic Sea region. The article focuses on eliciting and juxtaposing contrasts between the three classical bodies of literature that evolved largely in parallel, and ends up briefly commenting on a fourth, partly “critical” approach. The main takeaway is that considering all four geopolitical approaches before applying any of them to the Baltic Sea realm encourages analysts to embrace a more holistic and dynamic viewpoint than each of the alternatives individually can offer. Such a conceptualization promises to forge analytical linkages between a series of relevant, geographically contingent circumstances including resources, arenas and communities that represent prerequisites and opportunities incrisis, conflict, or war.

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.

Det är allmänt bekant att den amerikansk-ryska dialogen «återställdes» 2009 under presidenterna Obama och Medvedev men tveksamt huruvida denna symbolpolitiska utfästelse även skapade förutsättningar för bättre, eller närmare, mellanstatliga relationer. I det följande företas en analys av återverkningar av de signaler om förnyat samarbete som sänts av respektive politisk ledning inom multilaterala fora där både USA och Ryssland deltar, med särskild tonvikt på Organisationen för Säkerhet och Samarbete i Europa (OSSE) och FN:s Säkerhetsråd. Det övergripande intrycket är att amerikansk-rysk diplomatisk samverkan 2009–2011 förblev fortsatt begränsad, i några spörsmål mer fokuserad, men att man från båda sidor medvetet undvek att «störa» varandras prioriterade intressen. En specifik iakttagelse från OSSE-samarbetet är att Rysslands diplomatiska initiativ var bättre underbyggda än tidigare, och kan förväntas få starkare genomslag i framtiden, åtminstone på det europiska fastlandet. Till skillnad från USA, som handlar via Säkerhetsrådet när man tror sig kunna skapa en koalition för ett visst ändamål, var rysk FN-diplomati 2009–2011 alltjämt defensiv.

The 2016 American presidential election has been described as ‘a race like no other’, with reference to the tone and nature of the campaign and the stark contrast between the policy platforms of the two main contenders, as well as the unusually high stakes involved for America, the transatlantic link, and beyond. The analysis contained in this memorandum discusses the foreign, security and defense policy platforms of Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump, the leadership styles of the two main candidates, and their respective approaches to transnational alliances and partnerships. In each of three areas of comparison Clinton emerges as the markedly more predictable, more competent and better prepared contender, also reassuringly focused on strengthening ties to close allies and partners in the coming years. From the vantage point of the global order, international trade, security and stability in Europe and the Baltic Sea region, Sweden is therefore significantly more likely to benefit from a Clinton presidency than from an administration led by Trump, and might even be in a position to forge closer ties to the United States in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy following a victory for the Democratic Party candidate on 8 November.

EU enlargement and the incorporation of the acquis communautaire are widely seen as successful and emboldening the integrity of political, administrative and legal institutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The analysis reported here describes the specific problems associated with affirming institutional integrity in the fieldof public procurement, which constitutes a 'tough test'. Public procurement is namely an area where the acquis swiftly gained pre-eminence in accession states, but whose complex regulations depend on a well-functioning judiciary, effective administrative supervision and limited corruption. The experience in Poland and Bulgaria, countries that represent different stages of institution building in this area, is compared. The results suggest that an EU-compatible public procurement regime is being consolidated throughout the CEE region. At the same time, that regime may only work well when boundaries between institutional subjects, as well as between the spheres of law, politics and economics, are upheld in post-communist countries. 

This book explores the multilayer nexus among inter-related international and regional security parameters that critically define the EU's rapidly changing security environment. In terms of intensity, complexity and urgency these changes constitute challenges that threaten the very core of European security - both internal and external. In a fluid and transitional international environment of diversified needs and polymorphic threats the space dimension acquires a novel unified meaning. The book closely examines the EU's current strategic, organisational and defence capabilities regarding global, regional and domestic challenges such as terrorism, systemic instability, global order and a number of crucial hindrances to transatlantic cooperation. The chapters offer not only valuable theoretical insights, but also unique perspectives on operational and organisational elements of EU applied policies based on the testimonies of field experts. The combination of theory-based approaches and the demonstration of the EU's operational capabilities and weaknesses as externalized through its global strategy choices provide an overall evaluation of adopted policies and their effects. This is crucial in a global transition period that will define the EU's role and its potential to produce desired outcomes through synergies with its strategic allies.

The proliferation of "minilateral" summits is reshaping how international security problems are addressed, yet these summits remain a poorly understood phenomenon. In this groundbreaking work, Kjell Engelbrekt contrasts the most important minilateral summits -- the G7 (formerly G8) and G20 -- with the older and more formal UN Security Council to assess where the diplomacy of international security is taking place and whether these institutions complement or compete with each other. Engelbrekt's research in primary-source documents of the G7, G8, G20, and UN Security Council provides unique insight into how these institutions deliberate on three policy areas: conflict management, counterterrorism cooperation, and climate change mitigation. Relatively informal and flexible, GX diplomacy invites more countries to take a seat at the table and allows nontraditional security threats to be placed on the agenda. Engelbrekt concludes, however, that there is a continuing need for institutions like the UN to address traditional security problems. High-Table Diplomacy will provoke discussion and further research on the role of minilateral summits among scholars of international relations, security studies, and international organizations.

The first part of this report provides an overview of the history of nuclear weapons doctrine, as it evolved in parallel to the practice of warfare and war planning in the mid-1940s and subsequently as an integral element of the cold war. A distinction is made between the early development of nuclear weapons doctrine, when United States held a dominant position in the field, and the near-parity situation that ensued in the late 1960s and onwards. The second part of the report consists of an analysis of American, British, French and Russian nuclear weapons doctrine between 1991 and 2018, illustrating how a period of low tension was gradually replaced with a reinvigoration of mutual suspicion after the year 2000. A third part briefly examines recent contributions to the American scholarly debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for strategic thought in a world moving toward polycentrism, as it revisits earlier theoretical insights and challenges conventional wisdoms. The fourth and final part elicits lessons for Sweden in particular.

Overall, the report demonstrates that nuclear weapons consistently have represented an integral element of managing security risks in the Western hemisphere but that domestic political and defense industry considerations play in as well. It also suggests that doctrinal adjustments mirror the major concerns of policymakers in this regard and that nuclear powers are well aware of special obligations and privileges ascribed to them by countries that lack this category of weapons. A world in which the United States wields the greatest share of this power (unipolarity) will nonetheless be quite different from one in which two countries possess roughly the same capacity (bipolarity), and yet fundamentally different from one in which three or more countries compete to gain, or sustain, an edge toward others (multipolarity).

To the extent that the world is moving toward greater security competition including the dimension of nuclear power, it will inevitably be more difficult for individual states to remain on the sidelines, unless they are ready to compromise their political autonomy. In terms of options for aligning Sweden with a broader security arrangement in the near future, there are only three feasible alternatives that may offset the risk of nuclear coercion: responding within the framework of the EU, forge closer ties to NATO, or build a bilateral relationship to the United States. Each such option comes with its own set of assets and liabilities, as does remaining a passive bystander.

Multilateral negotiations to reach a universal, binding international agreement on measures that curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have repeatedly failed since a scientific consensus on global warming formed in the late 1970s. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was famously never ratified by the United States, the biggest emitter, and the 2009 Copenhagen conference only produced a narrow deal between the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Numerous attempts to involve international financial institutions or the G7/G8 have also been unsuccessful. Given the present crisis of multilateralism it can be argued that the time is ripe to engage fully in minilateral climate diplomacy, conferring ownership of the process to the main stakeholders. An informally orchestrated, minilateral diplomacy based on rationalist insights from conventional game and negotiation theory would then sway polluters to press ahead with measures that mitigate and adapt to the anticipated repercussions of climate change. Only after a political deal has been struck between major stakeholders may opportunities arise for ex post authorization and agenda control mechanisms involving the wider international community.

In 2008–2011, the Group of 20 swiftly eclipsed the Group of 7, created in themid-1970s as an informal mechanism for stabilizing markets and facilitating transnational currency exchange and investment. Several observers have expressed the view that the former, broader group is also destined to appropriate the role of the Group of 8, the G7’s pioneering successor in the realm of nontraditional security. This article examines the G7/8 legacy of forgingquasi-permanent institutional arrangements and frameworks in this policy area and goes on to gauge nontraditional security initiatives subsequently launched by the G-20. Having juxtaposed the past record of these bodies and analyzed the interests and power dynamics that influence member stateaction in the short and long term, the article outlines three basic options for how the relationship between the G-20 and the G7/8 may evolve.

Detta kapitel diskuterar nationalismens historiska bakgrund både i förhållande till staternas framväxt och till begreppet etnicitet. Medan nationsbegreppet bör betraktas som nära knutet till den moderna statens och industrisamhällets epok, är etnonationalism en lämplig beteckning på grupptillhörighet med politiska anspråk i vidare bemärkelse. Den internationella politikens utformning och karaktär är djupt präglad av nationalism och den inneboende spänningen i nationalstatsbegreppet påverkar än idag kris- och konflikthantering, diplomatisk praktik och internationella organisationers verksamhet.

The United Nations Security Council is the primary international body in charge of upholding international peace andsecurity. Permanent and nonpermanent member states share in the responsibility to avert great power conflicts andthwart asymmetric disputes, regional instability and civil war, but the former task has priority and the prerogatives andtherefore the obligations of the five permanent member states widely exceed those of countries that hold two-yearelected seats. The bifurcation of roles nevertheless produces ‘responsibility shirking’, which weakens Council perfor-mance on the latter type of tasks. This article suggests that responsibility shirking is underreported in the literatureeven though it is well known to diplomatic practitioners. It considers three types of remedies to the situation, arguingthat amendments to the UN Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure are unlikely, but that piecemeal and prag-matic reform could precipitate a change of mindset. In particular, allowing nonpermanent member states to co-chairthe drafting of resolutions is likely to engage all member states in the core business of the Council.

This article examines Sweden’s successful 2016 bid to serve at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and shows that the subsequent 2017–18 tenure relied on a formula with three key elements. One was to mobilize the competitive advantages of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and a second to systematically highlight Africa-related priorities. A third element was to boost the standing of the E10 category of members in day-to-day diplomatic practice. After securing a plurality of votes in the General Assembly, Swedish diplomats went to work with a unique constellation of concurrently serving likeminded countries, generally receptive to Stockholm’s priorities. The formula appears to have contributed to a solid performance in 2017–2018. That said, the UNSC is not conducive to individual E10 members having a lasting impact on its institutional memory.

The Lisbon Treaty enacted in 2009 allows the European Union (EU) to adopt a foreign, security, and defense policy with a higher profile. In particular, the High Representative and the European External Action Service are now in a position to conduct a continuous conversation with China, India, Japan, and ASEAN beyond trade-oriented dialogues. But a genuine strategic approach toward Asia requires military expertise so as to adequately assess how to best contribute to stability in this part of the world. Military diplomacy involving individual member states already takes place, yet virtually no information is shared at the EU level. The adoption of a full-fledged strategic approach toward Asia would not only be politically astute and make excellent economic sense; it can also consolidate EU institutions in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy.

The broader purpose of this project is to approach the problematic of the growing importance of Asia in international relations at large, and to do so through a European Union perspective in which Sweden constitutes one component. A more immediate goal of the analysis is to elicit overarching priorities in Swedish and EU policymaking toward Asia and the region’s three preeminent powers in particular. Three policy objectives are explored as elements of an overall strategic approach toward Asia, and the analysis reaches four conclusions. First of all, the adoption of a strategic approach toward Asia may enhance stability in that part of the world. Second, the adoption of a strategic approach toward Asia will help consolidate EU institutions operating in the realms of foreign, security and defense policy. Third, the establishment of a strategic approach toward Asia would be politically astute. Fourth, the creation of a strategic approach toward Asia makes excellent economic sense. Finally, it is noted, Sweden is well positioned to make substantive contributions to all three policy objectives.

This article provides an overview and concise analysis of the often underappreciated bilateral security and defense agreements that the United States entertains with a significant number of countries around the world. It sets out by emphasizing the role of the United States in sustaining the world order at a systemic level and notes that Washington’s bilateral relations, albeit forming a significant part of the overall security and defense arrangements, receive much less attention than multilateral alliances and systemically conditioned alignments.  After briefly reviewing recent literature on this subject, the article examines the process by which the United States enters into agreements of varying legal and political status, and then discusses the ramifications and limitations of the respective types of arrangements.  In turn, the article examines formal bilateral treaties (mainly with East Asian states), politically motivated security and defense agreements (mainly in the wider Middle East), and, lastly, executive agreements initiated by the presidential administration, the Defense Department or the State Department. The article ends by suggesting that the administration of Donald J. Trump—given campaign statements and the first six months in office—is less likely than many of its predecessors to enter into new agreements and formalize existing alignments, and that the viability of existing ones may become increasingly dependent on America’s counterparts demonstrably living up to their end of the bargain. 

The intellectual relationship between Carl Schmitt and Max Weber has been a point of controversy for at least half a century. At the 1964 convention of the German Sociological Association, in honor of Weber's centenary, Schmitt was famously referred to as Weber's “legitimate student.” This article uses the chapter Schmitt specifically wrote for an edited volume in Weber's memory, published in 1923, as the starting point for juxtaposing the two scholars, and then expands the analysis to encompass a range of sources and commentaries. The comparison focuses on the approach of each of the two scholars to methodology and didactics, theory and conceptual use, as well as to the society/social science nexus. The article concludes by arguing that Schmitt performed a double rhetorical move: while styling himself as Weber's student, he then drew on that authority to assault Weber's liberalism and concept of scientific integrity.

Vad betyder det svenska medlemskapet i den Europeiska Unionen för svensk säkerhets- och försvarspolitik? I vad består och vem bedriver svensk säkerhetspolitik idag? Vilka former tar sig svensk säkerhetspolitik? Vilka beröringspunkter finns med andra politikområden? Vad betyder det nordiska samarbetet? Frågorna ställs i den reviderade andra upplagan av "Svensk säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen" och analyseras utifrån en rad olika perspektiv; från teoretiska till praktiska, från militära till civila och från beslut till implementering.

Thirty years after Bulgaria’s democratic breakthrough, this book provides a “balance sheet” of the country’s democratic institutions through a number of interdisciplinary contributions. The volume is organized around three themes—democratic institutions, civil society, and European Union (EU) processes—and examines such topics such as voting, political parties, populism, media, civil society organizations, identity, and the rule of law. While the contributors argue that Bulgaria’s democracy is successful in terms of the procedural norms of democracy, civic participation, and compliance with EU rules, they also identify serious problem areas. Bulgaria’s democratic institutions struggle with obstacles such as populist Euroscepticism, political elitism, corruption, and a lack of political accountability, though this volume fully acknowledges the historical development of Bulgarian democracy, including its achievements and continuing setbacks.

This book explores ‘lessons learned’ from the military intervention in Libya by examining key aspects of the 2011 NATO campaign. NATO’s intervention in Libya had unique features, rendering it unlikely to serve as a model for action in other situations. There was an explicit UN Security Council mandate to use military force, a strong European commitment to protect Libyan civilians, Arab League political endorsement and American engagement in the critical, initial phase of the air campaign. Although the seven-month intervention stretched NATO’s ammunition stockpiles and political will almost to their respective breaking points, the definitive overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is universally regarded as a major accomplishment. With contributions from a range of key thinkers and analysts in the field, the book first explains the law and politics of the intervention, starting out with deliberations in NATO and at the UN Security Council, both noticeably influenced by the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It then goes on to examine a wide set of military and auxiliary measures that governments and defence forces undertook in order to increasingly tilt the balance against the Gaddafi regime and to bring about an end to the conflict, as well as to the intervention proper, while striving to keep the number of NATO and civilian casualties to a minimum. This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, history and war studies, and IR in general.

In this volume three parameters that seem geared to directly influence the Russian-European relationship are of particular interest. The first concerns the norms, values and institutions that Russia presently embodies both internally and externally, and which from time to time clash with those of the EU. Most recently there has been significant contention regarding the democratic process and respect for human rights in the countries situated west and south of Russia, and indeed in Russia itself. A second parameter concerns Russia’s relationship to the EU and to European great powers such as Germany, France and Great Britain, each with a long historical lineage. But it also pertains to other states of central concern to Russia, Poland, Italy, and Spain. A third parameter concerns the relations between Russia and the states geographically located between the EU area and Russia but also the former Warzaw pact and Comecon countries most recently joining the EU. Any divergencies among states within the EU is bound to be exploited by Russia, especially when basic interests are involved, and there have been a little bit too much of such divergencies for a common EU strategy towards Russia to develop easily. In addition, the states of the ‘New Europe’ rather reinforce conflicts and deepen the existing rifts regarding democratization, human rights issues and energy dependence.