Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

Kalla krigets slut har inneburit nya möjligheter för nordiskt försvars- och säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete. Det är dock främst de senaste åren som konkreta initiativ till ett ökat och fördjupat samarbete tagits. Stoltenbergrapporten från våren 2009, där 13 områden för ett fördjupat nordiskt samarbete pekas ut, och bildandet av Nordefco hösten samma år utgör två av de viktigaste exemplen på ett förnyat intresse för nordiskt samarbete i försvars- och säkerhetsfrågor.

Författarna utgår från exempel på konkreta samarbetsprojekt som sträcker sig från Napoleonkrigens slut till 2000-talet. Exemplen söker svar på två huvudfrågor: I vilken utsträckning existerar det en nordisk säkerhetspolitisk modell? Vilka internationella och nationella faktorer har verkat pådrivande respektive återhållande på nordiskt försvars- coh säkerhetssamarbete.

Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor.

This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

This article shows that all four Nordic countries, i.e., Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have adjusted their alignment strategies when responding to the changes in their external environment during the twenty-first century. Furthermore, our findings indicate a great diversity among the four states in their responses. All too often, security policy analyses cluster small states into allies and non-allies, respectively. However, this article suggests that alliance affiliation in isolation is not sufficient for explaining small states’ behavior and adjustments of their strategies. Occasionally, previous experiences of armed conflicts as well as perceptions of strategic exposure provide stronger explanatory power.

Scholars of Strategic Studies have seldom problematized the concept of military strategy beyond identifying the three elements constituting the phenomenon, that is ends, means and ways. Moreover, we see a need for contextualizing the presumably universal conceptualization of military strategy. This article contributes to previous research by operationalize each of the three elements one-step further, thereby introducing an analytical framework for systematic comparisons of states’ different priorities regarding military strategy. Additionally, in order to explain these different priorities, the proposed analytical framework introduces tools related to both relative power and position in the international system, and to regional systems and unit-level characteristics. The usefulness of the analytical framework is illustrated by a summary of some of our findings from a research project on comparative strategy including more than 30 states.

The limits of unity: Consensus or confrontation in shaping Swedish defence policy

How encompassing is the consensus among the political parties represented in the Swedish parliament when it comes to the military threat from Russia, the relations with NATO and the design of the Swedish Armed Forces? This article aims at answering this question by exploring the Swedish defence policy from the Russian war against Georgia in 2008 to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Our results indicate that the consensus among the parties increases with the escalation of the tensions in the international relations. Hence, we disagree with some results of previous research on Swedish security politics. We conclude that the tipping point regarding the Swedish application for NATO-membership was the existential dimension of the current Russian aggression. When the internal efforts to defend Sweden against a potential Russian attack was perceived not being enough, applying for membership was considered a necessity, not an option, among a majority of the parties.

This book analyses how and to what extent ex-communist states have adjusted their defence strategies since joining the EU and NATO, and how differences and similarities between their strategies can be explained.

Between 1999 and 2013, four phases of enlargement took place when the European Union (EU) and NATO allowed 11 new former communist states to enter both organisations. These states share some common attributes and experiences related to strategic culture and common experiences during the Cold War era that can potentially explain similarities in behaviour and preferences among them. However, the strategic adjustments among these states are far from uniform. In an effort to explain these differences, the book introduces three intervening variables: (1) differences in relative power and position in the international system, (2) national geographical characteristics; and (3) historical experiences related to formative periods of state-building processes as well as wars and armed conflicts. Empirically, the book strives to present and analyse the defence strategies of each of the new allies by conducting a structured focused comparison of official strategic documents from the twenty-first century for each of the 11 cases. Theoretically and methodologically, it introduces an analytical framework enabling us to explain both similarities and differences in the formulation of the strategies of the 11 states, and to shed light on their external and internal efforts to promote their strategic interest by operationalising the dependent variable - defence strategy. The analytical framework combines elements of structural realism with classical realism, and constructivist research on unit-level characteristics related to relative power and perceptions of strategic exposure.

This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, European Union policy, NATO and International Relations in general.

This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining great powers during the twenty-first century.

The book’s point of departure is that analyses of countries’ defence strategies should acknowledge that states come in various shapes and sizes and that their strategic choices are affected by their perceptions of their position in the international system and by power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. This creates diversity in strategies that is often overlooked in theoretically oriented analyses. The book examines how five major powers – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia – have adjusted their strategies to improve or maintain their relative position and to manage power asymmetries during the twenty-first century. It also develops and applies an analytical framework for exploring and categorising the strategies pursued by the five major powers which combine elements of structural realism with research on power transition theory and status competition. The concluding chapter addresses questions related to stability and change in the present international system.

This article explores the defense transformation processes during the two initial decades of the twenty-first century among the 11 former communist states that currently are members of both the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The article introduces an analytical framework for systematic comparisons of states’ priorities regarding military strategy. Moreover, the article evaluates the influence of two intervening variables: (i) differences in relative power between middle powers and small states and (ii) differences in geographical exposure. Our findings suggest that differences related to these intervening variables correlate with differences in prioritized strategic ends, means, and ways.

AbstractThe article aims to contribute to previous research in two main ways. First, we intervene in the debate on the stability of the present unipolar system by offering an analytical framework and an empirical approach for exploring and categorizing the actual strategies pursued by the major powers in the contemporary international system. In doing so, we present an analysis of how the strategies of the five system-determining states interact and affect the stability of the system. Second, in order to be able to explain why states pursue different strategies, we complement the analytical framework of structural realism with insights from research on Power Transition Theory (PTT). Hereby, we offer a new comprehensive theoretical approach for analyzing how asymmetric power relations affect strategic choices of major powers.

Do middle powers develop similar defense strategies? Is middle powers a useful category for exploring the diversity of strategies among different categories of states? This article presents a great variation of strategies among the selected cases. Concurrently, similarities between middle powers belonging to similar regional security complexes (RSC) are revealed. The higher degree of great power penetration into a RSC, the lesser options for middle powers to develop individual strategies and vice versa. Furthermore, by comparing our findings with the strategies of more and less resourceful states, common elements among middle powers in terms of ends, means and ways, appear.

Title:

The forgotten legacy of Sweden´s policies of alignment

Abstract:

This article aims to contribute to the present debate on Sweden’s security policy orientation by introducing an analytical framework for explaining and evaluating different choices of grand strategy. The usefulness of the analytical framework is illustrated with reference to Sweden’s previous experiences from perusing policies of military alignment and participation in cooperative security efforts aiming for collective security. A further aim of the article is to remind the readers of these largely forgotten Swedish experiences of policies of alignment. This second aim is related to the mistaken but common view that Sweden during the last 200 years has pursued a consistent policy of non-alignment. In the conclusion of this article six alternative strategies to reduce the present gap between Sweden’s security goals and political and military means are analysed.

De senaste decennierna har inneburit en gradvis omprövning av den alliansfria politik som utmärkte Sverige under kalla kriget. Landets säkerhetspolitiska målsättningar och strategier har förändrats på avgörande punkter. Här beskrivs och analyseras huvuddragen i utvecklingen av den svenska alliansfrihetens innebörd och praktiska tillämpning från Karl XIV Johans tid fram till i dag.

En nationell säkerhetsstrategi handlar ytterst om hur den politiska ledningen inriktar, utvecklar och utnyttjar olika former av maktmedel för att uppnå landets övergripande säkerhetspolitiska mål.

I denna bok presenteras en sammanhållen analys av de olika säkerhetsstrategier som Sverige tillämpat under den 200-åriga fredsperioden sedan Napoleonkrigens slut. Bland dessa säkerhetsstrategier återfinns exempel på såväl olika former av neutralitetspolitik som olika former av allianspolitik samt strategier syftande till kollektiv säkerhet. De svenska vägvalen analyseras och förklaras med hjälp av teorier om säkerhetspolitiska strategier och internationell politik. Boken avslutas med en analys av dagens svenska försvarspolitik.

Boken Svenska säkerhetsstrategier är främst avsedd att användas i utbildning på högskolenivå, men den avser också att lämna ett bidrag till forskning och debatt om svensk säkerhetspolitik.

En nationell säkerhetsstrategi handlar ytterst om hur den politiska ledningen inriktar, utvecklar och utnyttjar olika former av maktmedel för att uppnå landets övergripande säkerhetspolitiska intressen. I boken presenteras en sammanhållen analys av de olika säkerhets­strategier som Sverige tillämpat efter förlusten av Finland 1809. Bland dessa strategier återfinns olika former av neutralitetspolitik, allianser med andra småstater och stormakter samt strategier syftande till kollektiv säkerhet. De svenska vägvalen analyseras och förklaras med hjälp av ett analysramverk som förenar forskning om strategi och internationell politik med ett särskilt fokus på småstaters speciella utmaningar. Boken avslutas med en analys av 2000-talets försvarssamarbeten och säkerhetspolitiska vägval. Denna kompletterade upplaga innehåller en vidareutveckling av bokens teoretiska ramverk och en nyskriven jämförelse mellan svensk försvars- och säkerhetspolitik under 2000-talets första och andra decennium. Övriga delar av boken har uppdaterats med hänsyn till det utvecklade analysramverket och händelser efter första upplagans utgivning. Boken vänder sig främst till universitetsstuderande, men den avser också att lämna ett bidrag till forskning och debatt om svensk säkerhetspolitik.

This article aims to contribute to the present debate on Sweden’s security policy orientation by introducing some general theoretical propositions and concepts related to research on alliance formation and alignment strategies of small states. A further aim of the article is to challenge the mistaken but common view that Sweden ever since  has pursued a consistent policy of non-military alignment.

The usefulness of these propositions and concepts is firstly illustrated with an analysis of Sweden’s previous experiences of military alignment and participation in cooperative security efforts aiming for collective security. Secondly, insights from Sweden’s previous experiences and general research on alliance behaviour of great and small powers are used to discuss potential benefits and costs related to three possible future alignment strategies: (i) a small state military alliance between Finland and Sweden, (ii) a bilateral military alliance between Sweden the US and (iii) a Swedish membership in NATO. Finally, the question of continuity and change in Sweden’s policy of non-alignment is addressed. In answering this question the concepts of critical junctions, path dependency and external shocks are introduced as analytical tools to analyse causes of both continuity and change. I relation to these concepts Sweden’s security strategies have been characterised by far less consistency than theories of critical junctions or external shocks would lead us to expect. It is also argued that the policy of non-alignment since the end of the Cold War has lost most of its practical relevance and that the deteriorating security situation in Europe has created a need for a new coherent Swedish security strategy.