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In the last decades, humanitarian mine action (HMA) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes have increasingly been recognized as essential to paving the way for sustainable development thanks to their contributions towards human security, livelihood, and access to services. The integration between the two processes, however, has not yet been fully addressed in the literature or practice. This paper seeks to identify areas where DDR and HMA intersect and, supported by anecdotal evidence, suggest a conceptual framework for future research and implementation. Most importantly, we hope to widen the debate on the potentially synergic relationship between HMA and DDR, flag possible fallacies or oversimplifications, and challenge solely “top-down” approaches.

Following the recent political rapprochement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in March 2018, a joint commission was created to investigate the minefields along the Tajik-Uzbek border and schedule their clearance. The Uzbek government first expressed the intention to remove the landmines along its borders in 2004 and later reported the start of unilateral demining operations in 2005 by the Uzbek military. Less than three years later, Uzbek demining teams had reportedly cleared 95 percent of the minefields along the Tajik border. However, this has not been verified by independent organizations, and civilians still fall victim to landmines in that region.

Este Artigo Estratégico busca analisar a relevância de projetos de impacto rápido (quick impact projects – QIPs) para a estabilização do Haiti, bem como o papel atual (e potencial) desempenhado pelo contingente militar brasileiro no planejamento e na implementação de QIPs em missões de manutenção da paz.

In current multidimensional peacekeeping operations, UN civilian staff perform core substantive tasks, from facilitating peace processes to organising elections and from monitoring human rights abuses to reforming the security sector. Moreover, Special Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements are civilian-only peace operations dedicated to conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding. Still, the training of civilian staff lags behind their military and police counterparts. There are very few available courses and training opportunities, as well as standardized training materials. In this book chapter, we discuss how civilian training can be improved. In particular, we build on Brazil’s recent experiences at Exercise Viking – the largest multidimensional simulated exercise in the world – and suggest that greater integration with existing, often military, training infrastructure may be the way forward.  

The Manipur conflict, which began in mid-2023, highlights deep-seated ethnic tensions between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, escalating into a humanitarian crisis with over 225 deaths and the displacement of 60,000 people. Amid the violence, improvised weapons like "pumpi guns" have gained prominence. Rooted in historical resistance movements, pumpi guns are crafted from locally sourced materials, reflecting resourcefulness and resilience. Their widespread use underscores the challenges of regulating non-industrial weapons in conflict zones. These weapons are pivotal for community defense and symbolic of local craftsmanship and identity, especially in the hill districts. Pumpi guns have evolved in design and utility, serving both defensive and offensive roles, including ambushes and territorial control. Despite their efficacy, they pose risks such as misfires and injuries. The conflict's dynamics are further complicated by cross-border exchanges with Myanmar, including the trafficking of precursor materials and 3D-printed arms. Addressing this issue requires a multifaceted approach, combining stricter arms control, enhanced stockpile security, and regional cooperation. Socio-economic measures, such as vocational training and economic integration, are critical to offering alternatives to illicit weapons production. However, sustainable peacebuilding efforts must address underlying grievances, foster trust between communities and authorities, and integrate rebel groups into state structures to ensure a holistic resolution.

In Brazil, for at least 15 years, civilians have participated in a series of training sessions for UN peacekeeping operations, generally organized by military personnel. Most of the time, this participation has been secondary. In 2022, Brazil once again hosted a remote site of Exercise Viking: this is an international mega-training, assisted by computer, which aims to prepare civilians, police and soldiers to be deployed in missions by international organizations in unstable contexts, including peacekeeping operations. By describing the participation of civilians in this Exercise and comparing it with the previous edition, from 2018, the article aims to demonstrate that, in contrast to the participation of civilians in other trainings in Brazil, Viking 22 broke with the existing paradigm by offering a opportunity to insert civilians in joint training, thus becoming an important precedent for future exercises on peace operations.

Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal in July 2023 and any further reduction of Ukrainian grain exports are likely to have serious implications for both Ukraine’s agricultural sector and economy and for food security far beyond Europe’s borders, driving up food prices and hindering humanitarian agencies’ ability to respond to food crises. However, the war has not only impacted Ukraine’s ability to export food but also its food production. Extensive contamination with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) could keep large areas of agricultural land out of use, potentially for many years, jeopardizing both domestic and international food security. As the Ukrainian government readies a new mine action strategy, it should consider how to address important concerns about the regulation and prioritization of humanitarian mine action.

Post-conflict societies struggle with several interlocking problems that often relate to security and legitimacy. To address these issues, the international community has often turned to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs. In this article, the authors present different aspects of these evolving concepts and what theoretical problems each tool aim to resolve. Furthermore, a symbiosis is found to exist between the ability of PKOs to provide protection in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the long-term benefits that SSR provides through the creation of accountable, efficient and professional security institutions. PKOs contribute to creating necessary preconditions successful SSR implementation, namely a safe environment. However, four additional preconditions must be met: a common vision, external support, local ownership and donor collaboration. Inability to provide these conditions will lead to a sub-optimal implementation and a security sector reform failing to deliver legitimate and professional institutions.

Why are some non-state armed groups more violent than others? Why do some groups resort to inhumane means and methods of war while others restrain from doing so? In trying to answer these questions, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have focused on the drivers of restraint behaviour. However, defining and measuring restraint can be challenging. In this post, Henrique Garbino, Doctoral Candidate at the Swedish Defence University, discusses how we can define and measure restraint focusing on the use of landmines and similar explosive devices by non-state armed groups. This post is based on Henrique’s recent article, “Rebels Against Mines? Legitimacy and Restraint on Landmine Use in the Philippines,” published in Security Studies on 23rd June 2023. 

Joint training is usually cited as a possible solution to the lack of coordination and cooperation between the various actors present in the area of a peace operation. Exercises are an opportunity to promote mutual understanding, trust, cooperation and interoperability among organizations, including civilian, law enforcement and military. Ironically, planning such exercises is itself a coordination and cooperation challenge. This article explores the multidimensional exercise planning process and offers advice on incident design. The recommendations deal with the composition of the planning team, the definition of participants and training objectives, the interaction between participants and between different levels, the multidimensional nature of the exercise and prioritizing the quality, not quantity, of incidents.

Projetos de impacto rápido (QIPs) são, por definição, projetos rápidos, simples e baratos. QIPs têm sido implementados desde 1992 em diversas missões da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), com o objetivo de prestar ajuda humanitária ou de “conquistar os corações e mentes” da população local, principalmente para contribuir para a credibilidade da missão. Este trabalho analisa a implementação de QIPs pelo Componente Militar da Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização do Haiti (MINUSTAH). Este trabalho foi produzido por meio de realização de pesquisa documental e revisão bibliográfica sobre a implementação de QIPs pela ONU em geral e especialmente pela MINUSTAH; juntamente com entrevistas e questionários respondidos por oficiais da seção de Coordenação Civil-Militar das Nações Unidas e membros do escritório de Assuntos Civis que estavam servindo ou serviram no Haiti. Foi observado que, mesmo não sendo possível mensurar quantitativamente as consequências de QIPs, e apesar de algumas reservas, sua eficiência pôde ser verificada especialmente na promoção da credibilidade da missão; no aumento da segurança para operações militares; e finalmente, facilitando a implementação do mandato da missão. Conclui-se que a implementação de QIPs pelo Componente Militar da MINUSTAH, baseando-se no processo de implementação adotado e nas necessidades enfrentadas pela MINUSTAH, é proveitosa e deve ser usada como uma entre as diversas ferramentas do processo de estabilização.

Os projetos de impacto rápido (quick impact projects ou “QIPs”) são, por definição, projetos rápidos, simples e baratos, utilizados, desde 1992, nas diversas missões das Nações Unidas, ora com o objetivo de prover ajuda humanitária ora para “conquistar os corações e mentes” da população e assim contribuir para a credibilidade da missão. Este trabalho teve por objetivo verificar como os QIPs implementados pela Missão das Nações Unidas para a estabilização do Haiti (MINUSTAH) contribuíram para o desenvolvimento socioeconômico daquele país, tendo como base aqueles realizados pela Companhia de Engenharia de Força de Paz. Para tanto, analisou-se a literatura existente sobre a utilização anterior desses projetos em diversas missões da ONU. Com isso, foi possível identificar as principais dificuldades encontradas na implementação dos QIPs, bem como sua eficiência nas situações referidas. Para a análise dos projetos de impacto rápido realizados no Haiti, desenvolveu-se uma pesquisa documental em diversos documentos expedidos pela ONU; além disso, foram realizadas também, entrevistas e questionários com militares e funcionários civis que participavam ou já haviam participado da MINUSTAH. Observou-se que, embora não tenha sido possível medir matematicamente as consequências dos QIP, a eficiência dos projetos no aumento da credibilidade da MINUSTAH, bem como no aumento de segurança para as operações militares, foi confirmada por todos os que participaram desta pesquisa. Concluiu-se que a implementação dos QIPs, baseada no processo adotado e nas necessidades enfrentadas pela MINUSTAH, é algo necessário e os QIPS podem ser utilizados em diversas frentes do processo de estabilização.

What drives restraint in armed conflict? Recent studies have examined different factors contributing to restraint behaviour, mainly focusing on strategic incentives, such as seeking legitimacy from international audiences or securing support from local communities. In this post, Henrique Garbino, Doctoral Candidate at the Swedish Defence University, and Matthew Bolton, Professor at Pace University, explore, instead, how traditional humanitarian norms protecting the innocent, the land, and the body may influence restraint on the use of landmines and similar explosive devices. They conclude that we should not perceive such norms as inadequate alternatives to international humanitarian law; instead, they may serve as a basis for extending global norms beyond the existing laws of war.

Quick impact projects (QIPs) are by definition rapid, simple and cheap projects. QIPs have been implemented since 1992 during several United Nations (UN) missions, either with the objective to provide humanitarian aid or to “win the hearts and minds” of local people, mainly to contribute to the missions credibility. This paper analyzes the implementation of QIPs by the Military Component (MC) of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It was observed that, although not possible to quantitatively measure the consequences of QIPs, and with some reservations, their efficiency could be verified specially in the promotion of the mission credibility; enhancing security for military operations; and finally, facilitating the implementation of the mission mandate. It is concluded that the implementation of QIPs by MINUSTAH’s MC, based on the implementation process adopted and the needs faced by MINUSTAH, is valuable and should be used as one amongst the several tools of the stabilization process.

Rebels have become the most prolific users of landmines but still display significant variation in how they employ and restrict the weapon’s use. This article argues that how rebels exercise restraint on landmine use depends on which audiences they rely on most. In a comparative case study of three Philippine rebel groups—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the New People’s Army—this article highlights three main findings. First, rebels reliant on voluntary compliance from local communities are more likely to limit the effects of landmines on their perceived constituency. Second, when rebels have conciliatory relations with the government, they are more likely to comply with national law, reciprocate government behavior, and limit the effects of landmines on the government’s constituents. Finally, rebels seeking legitimacy from human-rights-conscious foreign sponsors are more likely to comply with international law related to landmine use. 

La literatura académica y la experiencia internacional han identificado la potencial sinergia entre los programas de acción contra minas y de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración. Asimismo, el Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, firmado por el Gobierno Nacional y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), reconoció la acción contra minas como una ruta para la reincorporación de los excombatientes, la reparación de las víctimas y la reconciliación entre las partes de conflicto. Sin embargo, mismo antes de la firma del acuerdo, la institucionalidad colombiana, en cooperación con organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONGs), ya tenía experiencia con la reintegración de excombatientes por medio de la acción integral contra minas antipersonal.

Los excombatientes aportan claras ventajas para las labores de acción contra minas, además del desminado humanitario. Su experiencia como explosivistas, su conocimiento técnico y táctico y la memoria del conflicto armado son fundamentales para la conducción de estudios no técnicos, el despeje de tierras por diversas técnicas de desminado y la desactivación de artefactos explosivos. Los excombatientes también tienen acceso facilitado a las comunidades y están acostumbrados con las labores en los montes y en la selva. Como medida de reincorporación, la acción integral contra minas ofrece oportunidades de reparación, además de un empleo digno, con buen pago y que valoriza las experiencias previas de los excombatientes. Las comunidades afectadas se benefician con las distintas actividades de la acción contra minas, como la liberación de tierras, la educación en el riesgo de minas y la asistencia a víctimas, y con la reincorporación de los excombatientes.

En Colombia, la participación de excombatientes en la acción integral contra minas sucedió de tres maneras diferentes, a saber: el intercambio de información; la participación de excombatientes en el desminado humanitario a través de ONGs; y la creación de Humanicemos Desminado Humanitario, la única organización de acción contra minas totalmente formada por excombatientes. El intercambio de información ocurrió principalmente de manera descentralizada con excombatientes desmovilizados individualmente; no obstante, en 2015, guerrilleros de las FARC-EP apoyaron actividades de despeje de la Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, como una medida de construcción de confianza en el proceso de paz. Hasta la fecha, al menos 19 excombatientes en proceso de reintegración, es decir, desmovilizados antes de la firma del Acuerdo Final, trabajaban en organizaciones de acción contra minas. A pesar del bajo número, esa experiencia ha comprobado la eficiencia del empleo de excombatientes en el desminado humanitario, además de haber promocionado dinámicas de reparación y reconciliación. Por fin, Humanicemos es una iniciativa sin precedentes. Sus planes de desarrollo operacional sugieren que hasta 1.800 excombatientes podrán ser empleados por la organización. Humanicemos enfrenta algunos obstáculos burocráticos que, hasta la fecha, impiden la acreditación de su personal para las labores de estudio no técnico y de despeje. Sin embargo, la organización actualmente emplea 146 excombatientes y planea empezar en los próximos meses actividades de educación en el riesgo de minas, asistencia a víctimas, enlace comunitario, evaluación de impacto, entre otras.

Sin embargo, a pesar de las ventajas ya mencionadas, este estudio identificó los principales retos para la integración de los dos procesos. En primer lugar, se observa que la institucionalidad no ha formalmente reconocido la potencial sinergia de la reintegración y reincorporación a través de la acción contra minas. Con la excepción del Acuerdo Final, las políticas y directrices de implementación del proceso de paz, de los procesos de reintegración y de reincorporación y de acción contra minas son todavía presentados de manera desarticulada. En segundo lugar, hay el riesgo de resistencia por parte de algunas comunidades y de las fuerzas de seguridad en el comienzo de las operaciones de Humanicemos. La estigmatización y desconfianza en relación a los excombatientes pueden perjudicar el desarrollo de Humanicemos. Por fin, los Estados Unidos, el mayor donante para el programa de acción integral contra minas en Colombia, todavía reconocen a las FARC-EP, incluso sus excombatientes en proceso de reincorporación, como una organización terrorista. En consecuencia, la financiación estadounidense no puede ser empleada en soporte de Humanicemos y, hasta la fecha, ha impedido la acreditación de los excombatientes de las FARC-EP para las labores de estudio no técnico y de despeje.

En conclusión, se sugiere las siguientes acciones para la Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización:

1. Promover la integración de la institucionalidad involucrada en los procesos de reintegración y reincorporación y en la acción integral contra minas, en especial entre la Agencia y la Dirección para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal. Eso se puede hacer por medio de un plan de acción conjunto, reconociendo los beneficios potenciales en términos de acción contra minas, reintegración, reincorporación, reparación y reconciliación.

2. Promover la inclusión de excombatientes en proceso de reintegración y de reincorporación por organizaciones civiles de acción contra minas, incluyendo no sólo las operativas como The HALO Trust, APN, DDG, HI, FSD, CCCM, Perigeo, Polus, Atexx y COSINMI, pero también UNMAS, OEA y DAICMA.

3. Promover acciones de construcción de confianza entre la ARN y Humanicemos por medio de organizaciones internacionales y ONGs involucradas con apoyo técnico a Humanicemos.

4. Promover la organización Humanicemos DH en sus canales institucionales como buen ejemplo de reincorporación colectiva y manejar las expectativas de los excombatientes involucrados en el proyecto.

5. Apoyar Humanicemos DH en el diseño de estrategias de construcción de convivencia, paz y reconciliación en las comunidades afectadas.

6. Apoyar Humanicemos DH en el diseño de estrategias de comunicación y cooperación con el sector privado.

7. En coordinación con Descontamina Colombia, apoyar Humanicemos DH en su relacionamiento institucional, en especial con las fuerzas públicas.

8. Por medio de la Descontamina Colombia, incentivar medidas de construcción de confianza entre las fuerzas militares y Humanicemos Desminado Humanitario.

9. Realizar el seguimiento del proceso de reincorporación por medio de la acción contra minas.

10. Aprovechar los avances en el desminado humanitario para la promoción de otras iniciativas del proceso de paz, como la implementación de los Consejos Territoriales de Reintegración, los Programas de Desarrollo Rural con Enfoque Territorial (PDET) y los Programas Integrales de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Rural (PIDAR).

One of the most disruptive forms of drug-related violence is the cartel-state conflicts. In affected places, such as Mexico, Colombia and the city of Rio de Janeiro, the number of cartel-related homicides surpasses battle-related deaths in many civil wars. However, cartel–state conflicts are arguably the rarest form of drug-related violence. Criminals have strong incentives not to confront state officials, given that such clashes can lead to more state repression. To some extent, this pattern has been seen in recent military interventions in law enforcement operations in Brazil. However, during Operation São Francisco, carried out in Rio de Janeiro, the military faced abnormal levels of violence, leading to the first death of a soldier since the implementation of the so-called “pacification” strategy. This paper aims to explain why the criminals chose to resist and deliberately attack the pacification force, based on two cartel-state conflict theories. Whereas the first theory suggests that criminals are more likely to resort to violence against the state in order to protect their turf, given that they operate in profitable and competitive markets; the second posits that cartels engage in confrontations with the state to signal resolve and military capacity for rival gangs. The theories are assessed based on primary and secondary sources, including reports from the military and non-governmental organisations, interviews and a comprehensive literature review. Finally, the different levels of violence displayed by the rivalling criminal groups during Operation São Francisco are explained in light of the proposed theories. The article concludes that the theories are complementary in explaining the resort to violence against the state.

One of the most disruptive forms of drug-related violence is the cartel-state conflicts. In affected places, such as Mexico, Colombia and the city of Rio de Janeiro, the number of cartel-related homicides surpasses battle-related deaths in many civil wars. However, cartel–state conflicts are arguably the rarest form of drug-related violence. Criminals have strong incentives not to confront state officials, given that such clashes can lead to more state repression. To some extent, this pattern has been seen in recent military interventions in law enforcement operations in Brazil. However, during Operation São Francisco, carried out in Rio de Janeiro, the military faced abnormal levels of violence, leading to the first death of a soldier since the implementation of the so-called “pacification” strategy. This paper aims to explain why the criminals chose to resist and deliberately attack the pacification force, based on two cartel-state conflict theories. Whereas the first theory suggests that criminals are more likely to resort to violence against the state in order to protect their turf, given that they operate in profitable and competitive markets; the second posits that cartels engage in confrontations with the state to signal resolve and military capacity to rival gangs. The theories are assessed based on primary and secondary sources, including reports from the military and non-governmental organisations, interviews and a comprehensive literature review. Finally, the different levels of violence displayed by the rivalling criminal groups during Operation São Francisco are explained in light of the proposed theories. The article concludes that the theories are complementary in explaining the resort to violence against the state.

No final do século XIX, grande parte da borracha comercializada no mundo era produzida nos seringais da Bacia Amazônica. A geração de empregos na região atraiu muitos nordestinos que sofriam com a seca e grande parte destes migrantes destinou-se ao território do Acre, que o governo brasileiro até 1903 reconhecia como boliviano. A ocupação do Acre pelos brasileiros, juntamente com ações diplomáticas equivocadas, gerou tensões entre Bolívia e Brasil. Este problema ficou historicamente conhecido como a Questão do Acre. Considerada neste trabalho como o período desde o Tratado de Ayacucho (1867) até o Tratado de Petrópolis (1903), a Questão do Acre oferece exemplos claros da interdependência entre diplomacia e ação militar, bem como da articulação, inicialmente equivocada, dessas duas ferramentas da política externa. Fundamentado na coleta de dados por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica, valendo-se de fontes secundárias e terciárias, e na análise qualitativa dos dados, este trabalho propõe analisar a interdependência entre diplomacia e ação militar durante este período. Após considerar os diversos casos em que essa relação pôde ser evidenciada, conclui-se que a solução da Questão do Acre, materializada pelo Tratado de Petrópolis, pode ser atribuída à consciência dessa interdependência – tanto pelo Barão do Rio Branco, Ministro das Relações Exteriores, como por Plácido de Castro, chefe militar da Terceira Revolução Acreana. Por fim, coloca-se em perspectiva o distanciamento histórico e corrente entre poder político, diplomacia e pensamento militar, prejudicando o exercício de uma política externa coerente e integrada.

The post-Cold War era has ushered in an array of complex challenges, expanding the scope of security agendas for states and multilateral organizations alike. This transformation necessitated regional and international approaches, encompassing multifaceted security threats such as human rights abuses, international terrorism, climate change, migration, pandemics, and cyberattacks. As a result, coordination between civilian and military actors became indispensable. However, this shift brought forth a multitude of civil-military concepts, each tailored to specific entities but resulting in significant confusion due to subtle variations in terminology and interpretation. For instance, the United Nations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization employ various civil-military concepts, often sharing similar terms but conveying distinct meanings. Such conceptual disparities can lead to misunderstandings and hinder effective coordination. This paper introduces an analytical tool that categorizes organization-specific civil-military concepts into archetypes and provides a repository of official concepts and their summaries. The analytical framework is based on four core parameters of each civil-military concept, i.e. the main perspective, the scope, the level of applicability, and whether the concept entails a dedicated function. This resource aims to facilitate a common language for navigating and bridging different civil-military concepts. While essential for national militaries in multinational operations, this guide also benefits civilians engaging with military organizations, providing insights into military approaches to civil-military relations and aiding in identifying interlocutors within military structures. Ultimately, this framework accommodates future developments in civil-military concepts, enabling a contextual understanding within the existing conceptual landscape.