Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between ‘civil association’ and ‘enterprise association’ has inspired international society theorists to conceive of international society as not just a ‘purposive association’ constructed by states to satisfy their interests but also as a ‘practical association’ providing formal and pragmatic rules that are not instrumental to particular goals of state policy. While this article is supportive of the Oakeshottian turn in international society theory, it suggests that somewhat different conclusions can be drawn from it. The article sketches out an alternative conception of international ‘civil association’, one that transcends the boundaries of communities. It is argued that such a notion of civil association is both possible and at the same time anchored in the experiences of the modern state. It is suggested that this notion of international civil association, when sustained by an adequate legal conception, promotes the enforcement of moral and political responsibility across borders. Finally, it is argued that European governments post-Brexit should strive to retain, as much as possible, the element of civil association present in European relations in order to preserve the civil condition, the rule of law, and in order to enhance political responsibility across borders.

The author re-examines the concept of equality in international society, past and present. The conventional view that equality of states necessarily flows from sovereignty, that it is a corollary to sovereignty or simply a synonym, is considered a contingent rather than a necessary contention. The main argument is that equality in global international society should be theorised anew, restoring the normative strength of the principle. It is shown how concepts of equality make intelligible different normative and ethical conceptions of the modern political space in the past. Drawing on the works of such diverse theorists as Hans Kelsen, Peter Singer, John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott, the author suggests how a renewed interest in equality contributes to making international society a more inclusive, egalitarian, and credible moral and political association.

This essay investigates the moral aspects of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention involves the balancing of at least three sometimes contradictory principles - the autnonomy of states, the prohibition of war and the reduction of harm and human suffering - and hence requires not merely a legal and political approach to the matter but renders a moral viewpoint necessary.  It is argued that P.F. Strawson's concept Moral Reactive Attitudes (MRA) contributes to analysing the moral dilemmas and priorities involved. First, MRA underlines the moral aspects of international society that are essential for dealing with the moral conflict inherent in international society. Secondly, MRA helps to balance between competing claims of justification and legitimacy in cases of humanitarian intervention.

This paper presents a Kelsenian perspective on international pluralism showing that international pluralism is not necessarilythe logical consequence of sovereignty but bestowed upon states by international law through the principle of equality. Thepaper argues that this leads to an improved concept of international pluralism as more than a by-product of sovereignty logic.Flowing from Kelsenian legal logic, international pluralism and legal cosmopolitanism share the same origin in theGrundnorm.Hence, this perspective on international relations appeases the perceived conflict between international pluralism andcosmopolitanism. Moreover, the paper suggests that the approach provides a different framework for analyzing internationalnorms and practices, their normative relationship and evolution

The starting point for this analysis is that there is no ’business as usual’ when considering the consequences of the Brexit referendum: there is either the question ’if Brexit?’ or the question ’if-not Brexit?’ because there is no turning around or comfortable retreat to established positions. Starting with an analysis of the British debate this ‘policy-brief paper’ looks at the consequences of the Brexit referendum for transatlantic security relations and in particular the consequences for Sweden. The most important arguments are, in brief: (1) That the value conflict inherent in the British debate, essentially between Eurosceptic nationalism and pro-EU integrationism, is mirrored in several European nations and remains a challenge to the EU; (2) that while Britain remains a European power regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the British geo-political outlook is differs from that of other European nations and will have to be taken into account when considering transatlantic security relations; (3) that NATO is likely to be even more important if Britain leaves the EU but that a strengthening of NATO’s European pillar is likely regardless of the outcome of the referendum, among other things because of US demands on European nations to improve their military capacity; (4) that Sweden in the case of Brexit is likely to lose influence over the development of European security cooperation in general but might nevertheless be able to gain in influence mainly as a result of Sweden’s geo-strategic position.

An account of evil in classical political theory is the concept of evil government. The notion of political decay from good to evil government or to anarchy, the absence of government, among classical political theorists represents both a moral and a political problem. This essay argues that political decay remains a perennial problem because the political condition itself involves the seeds to its own destruction. Moreover, it is claimed that the nostalgic longing to a glorious past for nations or peoples risks turning into what is here labelled ‘political arcadianism’, fostering futile attempts to return to past conditions. The argument is that political arcadianism when focusing on the imagined past rather than the present is a possible cause of political decay.

This article examines the concept of State Civil Disobedience (SCD) in the context of international society. It is argued that SCD is problematic for several reasons. First, that SCD is extremely difficult to practice in an association such as international society, relying, as it does, a great deal on the policies and powers of a few dominating actors; second, that the unequal status of states makes SCD mainly an instrument of the strong, hence undermining not only the idea of civil disobedience as the strategy of the weak but also questioning the role of SCD within an international society based on the formal equality of states. It is concluded that the practice of SCD in international society requires an invigoration of international society as a moral association. A more practical alternative, it is argued, is to conceive of a limited concept of SCD confined largely to non-violent means and preferably practiced in order to resist legal anomalies.

This article is about the politics of ‘the exception’ and the role of ‘exceptionalism’ in contemporary international theory. The concept of ‘the exception’ was coined by Carl Schmitt and has in recent years become an inspiration for international relations theorists and foreign policy analysts, especially when engaging with issues such as great power politics, humanitarian intervention and the war against terrorism. It is concluded that attempts to apply Schmitt’s concept of ‘the exception’ seldom are persuasive and sometimes even contradictory to Schmitt’s theory. When dealt with out of context, ‘the exception’ becomes just an expression about something else. It is shown that there are other ways of handling the kind of political problem observed by Schmitt than what he and his followers are offering.

This chapter argues that realism in International Relations embraces a romantic account of politics in sharp contrast to its scientific pretentions. Central to the romance of realism is the tragic and pessimistic outlook which reveals the connection between Romanticism and realism, shaping a mythical account of power politics. It is argued that the recurring tragic narrative is more than a way to moderate liberal hubris. It makes it possible to convey to the public a political pessimism building on established narratives reserving the finer moral and political understanding of realism for political theorists and diplomats. Looking backwards for patterns of ‘recurrence and repetition’ and the tragic narrative make realism vulnerable to nostalgia, forming ‘retrotopic’ visions of the future or seeking to restore ‘arcadian’ images of past glory.

This paper shows that while there seems to be more or less a general acceptance for plurality as a condition of world politics and at least a vague commitment to a pluralist ideal, the challenge remains to formulate a fruitful account of international pluralism. While dominating approaches to international theory present international pluralism as essentially a by-product and instrumental, this paper suggest an alternative way to conceive of international pluralism when defending the ancient concept variety as a better guide to approach both the understanding of plurality as the human condition and the notion of international pluralism. The paper concludes that it is preferable to accept a variety of pluralist conceptions rather than go on searching for a theoretical conception standing above the controversy; accepting pluralism in a sense involves rejecting just one version of pluralism.

This paper describes and analyses three types of European strategic response since the year 2017 by European governments and the EU in response to US strategic restraint and conditioned by Brexit. The three types of response we label “liberal wintering”, “a stronger Europe” and “a broader coalition”. The paper links strategic response to strategic agency and strategic autonomy leading on to two main conclusions: First, that Brexit has done more to promote than to restrain the development of European common security and defence, both within the EU and when involving nations outside of the EU, such as the UK. Second, that the new broader European security and defence structures open the door to new forms of cooperation, for example between the Nordic countries.