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This book addresses the challenges presented to the EU by an increasingly complex security environment. Through the interdisciplinary approach taken, researchers in economics, law and political science identify a range of problems relating to the multiple security threats that the EU faces, and present new means to address them within their respective fields of expertise. The contributions provide accessible and policy-relevant analyses of crucial challenges to the EU’s ability to function as a political union in the years ahead. 

The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step towards developing such a comprehensive approach.

The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and link state of the art of research and practice.

Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in order to facilitate future cooperation

These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters, along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and presentations can be found in the appendix.

In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in Georgia, committing to a foreign policythat would ostensibly make his country a leading example of reform and democratization inthe post-Soviet space, and a net-contributor to Euro-Atlantic security. Throughout its time inpower and until its defeat in Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary elections, the Saakashvili governmentremained steadfast in its commitment to establishing these international roles for Georgia,despite developments in both the country’s international and domestic contexts that couldplausibly have made these roles, and the foreign policy decisions deriving from them, redundant.This dissertation explores the relationship between national role conceptions (NRCs) andforeign policy stability. It demonstrates how Georgia’s NRCs as a Beacon of Liberty and a Net-Security Contributor, evolving specifically in the relationship between the Georgian and U.S.governments during these years, contributed to stability in Georgia’s foreign policy. Yet theseNRCs were also subjected to serious challenges, particularly relating to two crises ensuing overthe November 2007 riots in Tbilisi and the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. Inboth cases, the Georgian government was subjected to conflicting imperatives emanating fromits own role conceptions, the expectations voiced by its U.S. counterparts, and the immediatedemands of crisis decision making.Drawing on recent advances in foreign policy role theory and crisis management theory, twosocial mechanisms are developed, role location and role conflict management. Role location is along-term process of interaction between the actor and significant others, resulting in a gradualharmonization of role expectations and intentions. Role conflict management instead representsthe actor’s handling of potentially disruptive moments, raising questions about the credibilityand legitimacy of existing NRCs in the eyes of others, and confronting the actor with choicesregarding stability and change in existing NRCs.The framework is applied in an analysis of the Georgian government’s foreign policy vis-àvisthe U.S. in the years 2004-2012, with particular attention to the disruptive effects of the crisesin 2007-2008, and the actions taken to address the resulting role conflicts. The analysis drawson unique first-hand material, including interviews with members of the Georgian and U.S.foreign policy elites, confidential diplomatic correspondence and official speeches, to uncoverthe processes by which the mechanisms of role location and role conflict management playedout in Georgia’s foreign policy. The dissertation concludes that the stability in Georgia’s foreignpolicy stemmed from the fact that the two NRCs became deeply socially embedded in Georgia’srelations with the U.S. over time, but also from the Georgian government’s ability to adapt itsNRCs in response to crises, the role expectations of significant others, and contextual change.

Russia’s ‘hybrid’ strategy vis-à-vis neighboring countries highlights the importance of a comprehensive understanding of Russian methods of influence and how these approaches target domestic as well as external vulnerabilities in target states. This article examines the various resources that Russia deploys against Georgia in terms of military, economic, political/subversive and informational resources, displaying how material sources of power are reinforced through an anti-Western narrative, seeking to discredit the country’s integration within NATO and the EU.The article concludes that the current attention to narrative promotion in research on Russian foreign policy risks diverting attention from addressing strategic vulnerabilities, represented in this case by the West’s ambiguous strategy toward Georgia and other states in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood.

This chapter examines the concept of mission command in light of ongoing trends in the evolution of warfare and military operations. The chapter starts with a discussion of mission command respectively in terms of a culture or command philosophy, and as a set of methods and practices of command. It then discusses the role and future utility of mission command in light of developments in three broad areas of importance to the evolution of military command. These are, first, general trends in the current and future operational environment with implications for the command of land operations, with a focus on the US Army’s concept of multi-domain operations. The second area is the ever-increasing demands for information management, and the daunting challenge it poses for any military command system. The third is developments in information technology over the last decades and the more recent shift toward artificial intelligence and automation.

This article examines two fields of geopolitical competition in the Black Sea region, in which an increasing EU involvement is increasingly challenging Russian interests. First, the EU's effort to diversify its energy sources through new transportation routes is meeting competition in the form of Russian-sponsored projects. The EU has realized the partial incompatibility of Russian and EU interests in this regard; however, the lack of cohesion within the EU prevents the formation of common external energy policies. Second, the EU is increasingly recognizing its interest in engaging with conflict resolution in the region. This also runs contrary to Russian strategy, which strives to maintain the status quo in the conflicts rather than working for solutions, in order to maintain Russian leverage over the South Caucasus and Moldova. In this field, the EU has yet to officially recognize its interest conflict with Russia. However, due to the intertwinement of the conflict resolution processes with the EU's deeper policy goals in the Black Sea region, namely the promotion of a stable, secure and democratic European neighborhood, the EU will likely find it increasingly difficult to pursue its key interests in the region, while simultaneously maintaining a passive stance towards Russian policies in the region.

During the years following independence from the USSR in 1991, Georgiadeveloped into a weak state, which saw a high degree of collusion betweenorganized crime and state institutions. Considerable networks were established,consisting of criminal groups and paramilitaries in Georgia and thesecessionist regions, with external links to actors in the North and SouthCaucasus. State actors such as police and customs authorities were to alarge extent involved in smuggling and other illegal activities. These networkswere protected by high officials in the Georgian government and thede facto authorities of the secessionist regions. Hence, a situation evolvedwhere criminal elements were to a large extent integrated with the Georgianpolitical system and where criminal activities brought significant revenuesfor political actors on the Georgian side, while they were a vital part of theeconomies of the secessionist regions.

I vilken grad utgör upplevda hotbilder1 ett hinder för utvecklingenav nationell samhörighet i Georgien? Syftet med denna artikel äratt studera denna fråga med fokus på interaktionen mellan hotfullaföreställningar om «den andre» på den interna och den externapolitiska arenan, som de formuleras av georgiska regeringstjänstemänrespektive invånare i Javakheti-regionen i södra Georgien, enregion som i huvudsak befolkas av etniska armenier och i dagslägetär isolerad från övriga landet.

This article examines the relationship between different conceptualizations of the character of war and the role of land operations and tactics. Cold-War era expectations for a conventional war against a high-technological peer adversary, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), “New Wars” theory, Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Hybrid Warfare all denote different implications for the role and relevance of land forces. While Europe’s increasingly uncertain and unpredictable security environment in recent years has validated the continued relevance of conventional land operations, research in this area should encourage more integrative and cumulative research on future warfare and the potential of land forces.

The development of capabilities for national defence among land forces in the Baltic region underscoresthe need for mission command as a guiding principle of leadership and command. However, the practice of missioncommand in the contemporary military context is far from straightforward. This article presents the results of a surveyconducted with Swedish Army officers, examining their perspectives on positive as well as negative influences ontheir ability to utilize mission in their contemporary working environment. While mission command is envisioned tobecome increasingly important in the future, several obstacles are identified to its utilization and development.

This article examines the function of conflicting threat perceptions as obstacles to thedevelopment of a civic national identity in Georgia. The analysis focuses on threats perceived on theinternal and external political arenas, as defined by Georgian government officials and members ofthe Armenian minority settled in the Javakheti region. It is discerned that the government’s policiesfor national integration are seen as threats in the form of discrimination and assimilation by minorityrepresentatives, while incompatible understandings of Russia’s role in Georgian politics provide forindirect questioning of the minority’s loyalty to the state. It is concluded that conflicting threatperceptions provide a serious impediment to Georgia’s ability to build a civic nation.

As armies across Europe are currently developing capabilities to fight a high-intensity conventional war against a peer adversary, these armies will have to develop units that can fight independently in a complex environment, with limited direction from higher levels of command. Integral to this process is the need for a competent practice of mission command, viewed as a key component of maneuver warfare. The article identifies a set of enablers that need to be present in a military organization in order to practice mission command efficiently, including shared understanding and trust; initiative; a tolerant approach to failure, success, and learning; and the acceptance of mission command as an all-encompassing practice. The article then presents data from interviews with Swedish army officers focusing on the presence and significance of these enablers in their professional context. The article concludes that the increasing complexity of the peacetime tasks performed by military officers give rise to conflicting leadership demands. Consequently, exercising mission command and socializing younger colleagues into the practice is a far from straightforward process, which frequently competes with other demands placed on officers by their colleagues, the organization that they are part of, or the broader societal context.

This article explores the scope conditions of national role conceptions as reference points for foreign policy decision making during crises. It aims to contribute to a refined perspective of the agency of new states undergoing socialization processes in relations with significant others. Drawing on a primary material consisting of interviews with Georgian and US officials, the article analyzes the significance of Georgia’s role conceptions in the country’s relations with the USA in relation to two major crises: the 2007 riots in Tbilisi and the 2008 war with Russia. The article posits that crises provide situational circumstances where the requirements of appropriate behavior associated with role expectations may enter into conflict with the demands of the immediate situation. In order to resolve ensuing role conflicts, actors face the need to both rationalize role expectations, and to compensate for departures from them. In turn, these strategies relate to the possibility for change and stability in role conceptions, and by extension their enactment in foreign policy. The analysis of the Georgian government’s management of the two crises demonstrates actions that implied both rationalization and compensation, aiming to retain the credibility of its existing role conceptions in the eyes of its US counterparts.

Georgian politics since late 2007 has attracted interest mainly because of itshighly polarized political climate. The leadership of Mikheil Saakashvili, widely heraldedas a beacon of democracy in the post-Soviet space following the peaceful Rose Revolutionof 2003, is pitted against an array of determined opposition forces that seek his removal andaccuse his government of authoritarian tendencies. Yet a closer study of Georgian politicssince the August 2008 Russian invasion suggests that the polarization of its politics is notreflected in society, which overwhelmingly supports conciliation and dialogue rather thananother round of revolutionary change. By mid-2009, the overheated Georgian politicalscene showed signs of adapting to this reality.

In this article, we investigate the European Union's (EU) role as a normative foreign policy actor and its troubled relations to Russia and China. We contend that the lack of preparedness of the EU to foresee the increasingly tense relations with these countries can be explained through a role theoretical perspective. We show that the attachment of the EU to its role as a normative international actor reduced its awareness of Russia's and China's growing refusal to accept the EU's ambition to diffuse liberal norms and principles. The EU's inability to read the changing role expectations of China and Russia hampered the shaping of an appropriate foreign policy leading up the diplomatic crises with these two countries in the late 2000s and early 2010s, respectively. Theoretically, the findings contribute with a novel understanding of role conceptions in terms of reducing an actor's preparedness to acknowledge changes to its international role position caused by challenges raised by antagonistic partners.

International politics have become ever more volatile over the last decade, increasing the risk of large-scale military violence. Yet the precise character of future war will depend on a range of factors that relate to adversaries, allies, technology, geographical scope and multiple domains of warfighting. Few would question that land forces will be important also in the foreseeable future. However, given that the battlefield is in a state of transformation, so is the mission, purpose and utilization of land forces. Indeed, the future conduct of land warfare is subjected to serious and important questions in the face of large and complex challenges and security threats.

Advanced Land Warfare explores the evolving role of land forces, paying particular attention to the changes that have taken place in the art of commanding and executing combat, as well as the role of rapid technological innovation and information dissemination in shaping warfare. The book provides insights into key contemporary developments in land warfare and presents case studies on land tactics and operations in different national contexts, drawing on the best of theory, practice, and professional experience and featuring chapters written by leading international scholars and practitioners. Relating to the realities of the modern battlefield, the book addresses a number of critical questions about land tactics and operations, combining a conceptual basis with empirical examples of tactical thinking and practice and emphasising the importance of understanding the perspectives of various national armies, in order to provide a current understanding of the central issues of land warfare.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, the development of land warfareis briefly outlined, before key current and future challenges in the operational environment are examined. In the following section, the future character ofwar and the transformation of the battlefield is addressed. Thereafter, the structure of the volume and its chapters are outlined.

This open access anthology takes a holistic approach to how Russia carries out hybrid warfare against its neighbouring countries - states at the intersection between the East and West.The book addresses the vulnerabilities of these countries to Russian influence and hybrid warfare tactics, as well as their responses to this security challenge. It includes a close examination of local developments in states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Finland, Armenia, Serbia and many others, analysing specific scenarios and practices, and draws on these observations to develop the current conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare as a phenomenon. Scholarship frequently focuses only on Russia and treats countries subjected to Russian hybrid measures as passive victims, thus providing an overly schematic picture of Russian behaviour. This book instead treats these states as actors in their own right, assessing their potential to address and counter the specific security problems arising from their geographic and political position.

The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

The international security environment has in recent years evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey zone of war and peace. Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, henceforth HT&HW, are today high on security agendas across the globe. However, despite the attention, and a growing body of studies on specific issues, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards identifying, analysing and countering HT&HW. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on HT&HW, by covering the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them together with a number of real-world case studies.

Over time the grey zone between peace and war has grown considerably, underscoring the necessity of understanding hybrid warfare and related threats. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have manifested this paradigm, being a good example of the problem in thinking about war and peace as binary categories. How does a country or group of countries deal with threats and aggression in this grey area, such as ‘little green men’ that appear in uniform but without national denomination and refuse to tell where they come from, election-influenced operations or cyberattacks, to mention but a few possible actions.

By uniting the knowledge of both practitioners and scholars, the volume aims to identify the existing tools for countering HT&HW, as well as experiences from a wide set of empirical contexts. Mirroring this, the project is a cross-sector collaboration between the Department of Military Studies and the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defence University. The former represents an academic environment where research and teaching are intertwined in a range of subjects including War Studies, Military Technology and Military History. The latter is a national centre within the Swedish Defence University tasked with developing and disseminating knowledge about asymmetric threats within the context of societal security and resilience.

This volume focuses on the challenge posed by HT&HW to Western democracies, and their ability to address it. Western democracies are not only the type of states most frequently targeted by hybrid measures, but also the most vulnerable. By virtue of being open, pluralistic and liberal societies with freedom of the press and rule of law, Western democracies display both inherent weaknesses that can be targeted and inherent constraints – in particular through the rule of law and basic freedoms – that limit the scope for defensive actions. These vulnerabilities are increasingly recognized by Western governments, which have developed a range of entities to address them, although coordination in many instances remains weak. The later sections outline the growing significance of HT&HW on the security agendas of Western democracies and the challenges they imply, as well as the entities these states have established in response. Although neither list is complete, they provide an overview of the current situation. The final sections provide an outline of the volume’s structure and a summary of each chapter.

The need to develop resilience and psychological defence in the face of different forms of hybrid threats and malign foreign influence and interference is greater than ever. In this light, it has become increasingly obvious that a country’s resilience and psychological defence capabilities must cover a broad spectrum of conflicts, including severe crises and war. This paper takes these complex and multifaceted types of threats as a point of departure in its attempt to outline an analytical framework for countering hybrid threats and foreign influence and interference. The ambition is then to operationalise this framework into a practical guide that can be used for identifying and analysing hybrid threats and foreign influence against democracies and their national interests. 

To be able to build resilience and psychological defence, a shared analytical framework is needed, which provides a broader and more inclusive nation-state perspective than existing frameworks. The framework outlined in this paper is intended to be a starting point for analysis, usable for government and non-government actors alike. It aims to serve as a platform for addressing different dimensions of hybrid threats and malign foreign influence and interference. It also provides tools for comparing and analysing the dimensions within and across cases. The formation of responses to foreign interference should be seen as a process consisting of three distinct phases: 1) assessing situational awareness; 2) addressing defence and countermeasures; and 3) evaluating the state’s system for countering foreign interference. 

This framework serves as the basis for the development of a practical analytical guidebook that is built to be modular, where one can pick and choose depending on own needs and questions asked. It is also developed to be suitable for both more structured analysis as well as less structured qualitative analysis. The guidebook is simplified into an analytical template that can be used as a readily available checklist for users.

International politics have become ever more volatile over the last decade, increasing the risk of large-scale military violence. Yet the precise character of future war will depend on a range of factors that relate to adversaries, allies, technology, geographical scope and multiple domains of warfighting. Few would question that land forces will be important also in the foreseeable future. However, given that the battlefield is in a state of transformation, so is the mission, purpose and utilization of land forces. Indeed, the future conduct of land warfare is subjected to serious and important questions in the face of large and complex challenges and security threats.

Advanced Land Warfare explores the evolving role of land forces, paying particular attention to the changes that have taken place in the art of commanding and executing combat, as well as the role of rapid technological innovation and information dissemination in shaping warfare. The book provides insights into key contemporary developments in land warfare and presents case studies on land tactics and operations in different national contexts, drawing on the best of theory, practice, and professional experience and featuring chapters written by leading international scholars and practitioners. Relating to the realities of the modern battlefield, the book addresses a number of critical questions about land tactics and operations, combining a conceptual basis with empirical examples of tactical thinking and practice and emphasising the importance of understanding the perspectives of various national armies, in order to provide a current understanding of the central issues of land warfare.

An open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence.

This article takes a particular interest in the dynamics between information flows, continuous ongoing assessments, intelligence dissemination, and forward-looking operational advice. The point of departure is the tension between balancing quality (in the sense of in-depth processing of large amounts of information) and speed (meeting requirements of timeliness) in current intelligence assessments. The article takes an explorative approach to practices in current intelligence, utilizing qualitative interview data combined with open source material.

This chapter outlines the findings of the volume. The authors outline a framework for a versatile approach to land warfare. First, they establish a structure of the myriad elements and factors influencing land forces, presenting a continuum of land operations modelling the use of conventional capacity and kinetic effects at different levels of conflict intensity and the role of land forces visualizing the heterogeneity of possible conflict environments where land forces may be deployed. 

Thereafter, the chapter presents two schematic models; the first locates land forces in the broader operating environment by outlining how the strategic environment, conflict intensity, interoperability, and multi-domain operations are constitutive enablers and/or constraints to activities in the land domain. The second outlines how the capabilities of forces in the land domain need to be understood as a function of the interaction between own capabilities, the adversary, the human- and physical terrain, and the information environment. The multidimensional demands placed on land forces in contemporary and future operational environments necessitate a conscious multi-pronged approach to the development of land warfare capabilities, aimed at gaining a versatile edge on tomorrow’s battlefields. In turn, this concerns both the build-up and construction of capabilities, and the means by which they are deployed and utilized in future conflict. The chapter argues that the achievement of versatility should be a crucial aim of contemporary land forces. As outlined in the integrated versatility model, versatility builds on two interrelated and mutually reinforcing qualities in a military organization, adaptability and flexibility. Together, they compose the underlying preconditions for truly versatile land forces.

Hybrid warfare strategies blend conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber-attacks with other influencing methods, such as disinformation, diplomacy and foreign political inteference. There is a need for novel comprehensive approaches to counter them.

Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, HT&HW, are today high on security agenda not only in Sweden but across the globe. Despite the attention and the growing body of studies on the subject, there is a lack of research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed. This article contributes to such an approach by sharing the findings of a project that brings together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on this subject spanning the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them. The article outlines the Western response to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. It is argued that there is no single response to HT&HW, nor to building resilience. HT&HW need to be addressed through a comprehensive, all-inclusive approach. Finally, the article outlines how we address these challenges in practice.

To fully comprehend and counter hybrid threats and hybrid warfare (HT&HW) is acomplex task, but also a very important one. In this paper we will outline a schematic model for how to comprehend hybrid threats and hybrid warfare: the “Hybridity Blizzard Model”. The model comes in three versions, of which the first presents a simplified picture of thedynamics of and between HT&HW, as well as responses and countermeasures. The second version adds a temporal dimension to this relationship, demonstrating how short term actions and responses relate to long-term vulnerabilities and resilience. The third version, in contrast, aims to provide a more accurate picture of the complex real-world situation. The aim of the model is to enable not only a better understanding of the dynamics themselves but also how to identify, comprehend and act against HT&HW.

To fully comprehend and counter hybrid threats and hybrid warfare (HT&HW) is a complex task, but also a very important one. In this chapter we will outline a schematic model for how to comprehend hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, outlining the “Hybridity Blizzard Model”. This model comes in three versions, of which the first presents a simplified picture of the dynamics of and between HT&HW, as well as responses and countermeasures. The second version adds a temporal dimension to this relationship, demonstrating how short term actions and responses relate to long-term vulnerabilities and resilience. The third version, in contrast, aims to provide a more accurate picture of the complex real-world situation. The aim of the model is to enable not only a better understanding of the dynamics themselves but also how to identify, comprehend and act against HT&HW.

Hybrid Warfare refers to a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, so-called ‘irregular warfare’ and cyber-attacks with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy and foreign political intervention. As Hybrid Warfare becomes increasingly commonplace, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on the topic and by covering the threats themselves, as well as the tools and means to counter them, together with a number of real-world case studies.

The book covers numerous aspects of current Hybrid Warfare discourses including a discussion of the perspectives of key western actors such as NATO, the US and the EU; an analysis of Russia and China’s Hybrid Warfare capabilities; and the growing threat of cyberwarfare. A range of global case studies – featuring specific examples from the Baltics, Taiwan, Ukraine, Iran and Catalonia – are drawn upon to demonstrate the employment of Hybrid Warfare tactics and how they have been countered in practice. Finally, the editors propose a new method through which to understand the dynamics of Hybrid Threats, Warfare and their countermeasures, termed the ‘Hybridity Blizzard Model’. With a focus on practitioner insight and practicable International Relations theory, this volume is an essential guide to identifying, analysing and countering Hybrid Threats and Warfare.