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China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.

This article critically evaluates the basis, aspirations, and prospects for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. The assumption that common enemies, friends, and interests should have given rise to solid and steadily improving relations between Tokyo and Seoul has been far from realized. Rather, the Japan-ROK relationship continues to be marked by highly volatile behavior – ranging from intense friction to reluctant cooperation – which not only offers a vexing puzzle to the Realist school of international relations but also to the Constructivist one. This article argues that despite the perceived improvement in relations, Japan-South Korea security cooperation is situational and limited; recent developments do not imply a fundamental realignment of the two powers towards one another.

This chapter summarizes cross-Strait relations since the mid-1990s and examines the prospects and challenges for a resolution to cross-Strait tensions from the domestic and political, the economic, and the strategic dimensions. It argues that despite short-term improvements in cross-Strait relations, the countervailing dynamics that have emerged as a consequence of six decades of cross-Strait relations point to endemic antagonism. The economic and socio-political context of cross-Strait relations has undergone significant changes to bring into view the prospect of permanently removing the Taiwan Strait off the list of potential flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific. The probability of China and Taiwan overcoming the contrasting perceptions of their relationship and negotiating a peace agreement that would satisfy Beijing, Taipei and Washington, remains low. Contentious relations between China and Taiwan have remained an uncomfortable legacy of the unfinished Chinese Civil War of the 1940s.

This report assesses trends in Taiwan’s defense policy and force posture. The Republic of China’s (ROC, Taiwan) armed forces’ primary aim is to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) from military aggression against Taiwan’s main island and offshore islands. In the event of such a contingency, the ROC armed forces aim to deny the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to establish mainland China’s rule over Taipei. But Beijing is ratcheting up military pressure on Taiwan to coerce it to accept “peaceful reunification” on Chinese terms. This includes record-setting air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in October 2021 and the regular holding of military drills and amphibious landings on small islands near Taiwan. As well, in response to the 2022 visit of the US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, China held its largest live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait with the firing of ballistic missiles and the deployment of warships and fighter jets. The exercises simulated a blockade of Taiwan and infringed on Taiwan’s territorial waters. Such scenarios have demonstrated the vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defense, including a haphazard force structure, lack of readiness, and dependence on US military and diplomatic support.

The United States has recently stated that it would prevent changes to the cross-strait status quo by bolstering Taiwan’s defense against China. As a result, America’s Indo-Pacific allies and partners are considering how to contribute to Taiwan’s defense and deterrence against China. Also, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded Taiwan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific that the possibility of war in the Taiwan Strait is very real. The willingness with which Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore responded to the Biden administration’s call to sanction Russia and provide assistance to Ukraine suggests that the Indo-Pacific would be looking to Europe for similar support should China provoke conflict. Today, neither Europe nor the Indo-Pacific can continue to hold the notion that “far-away” conflicts will not have political, economic, or strategic repercussions on their own neighborhood.

This report begins by tracing Taiwan’s evolution to a de facto sovereign nation with a unique geopolitical and geostrategic status. It then looks at the country’s military capabilities and modernization plans and examines whether Taipei can meet its objectives to deter and deny China from using force to impose sovereign control over Taiwan. Taiwan is investing in missile defense and asymmetric weapons to signal to China that it would incur high costs if it decided to invade. Should such an invasion occur, Taiwan’s armed forces must meet certain requirements to defend its littoral coast and offshore islands. For China to invade Taiwan, PLA forces would have to dominate the air and sea approaches to Taiwan, land amphibious forces, and deliver sufficient manpower, weapons, logistics, and supplies to achieve control over Taiwan. Such an effort would also mean occupying Taiwan’s offshore islands which could otherwise be used to cut off the PLA from resupply and support from the mainland. Due to their geostrategic position, the islands also serve as an early warning system for Taiwan, the United States, and its allies.

As part of its deterrence effort, Taipei is also attempting to diversify its security partnerships, to increase its standing in the international system, and to raise awareness of the repercussions if China invaded Taiwan. As Taiwan remains reliant on the United States for arms and informal security guarantees under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the 1982 Six Assurances, it is focusing on enhancing its partnerships with the United States’ allies in the region. Primarily, these are Japan and Australia, who have a shared interest in countering China in the East and South China Sea. Taipei may also look to European defense manufacturing nations such as France and Germany to obtain technological and military know-how for its indigenous defense industry.

This report continues with an analysis of the regional and international implications of a possible loss of Taiwan’s independence. The United States and its allies have already begun to adjust doctrine and force posture. Regional stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific are also discussing what they can learn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to strategically support Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China. This has heated up the debate within Taiwan – as well as between Taipei and Washington – of how ROC armed forces can succeed in defending Taiwan, deterring China from a unilateral attack, and denying China control over Taiwan and its offshore islands.

Moreover, bolstering Taiwan’s defense in the short to medium term would make a lasting contribution to deterring China from aggression and adventurism. Therefore, this report concludes with a set of policy recommendations to hold substantive ex - changes between Taiwan, Europe, and the IndoPacific. The recommendations are based on the assumption that war over Taiwan is not a certainty. Key recommendations include establishing an official dialogue between Taiwanese and Europe - an lawmakers to exchange knowledge on countering foreign interference and disinformation. NATO and Taiwan should set up a working group to raise awareness of the implications to both the IndoPacific and Europe of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This could include a wargame about the consequences of a Taiwan Strait conflict on Russia’s calculations in Europe and NATO deployments. Lastly, it would be useful for Taiwan, other Indo-Pacific nations, and European countries to share insights on improving societal resilience and civil defense capabilities. Such joint efforts would signal to China the willingness to punish actions that change the cross-straits status quo. This could contribute to deterring China from conducting a unilateral attack on Taiwan and its territories and might decrease the likelihood of conflict.

This brief discusses the Quad’s agenda and how its design is tailored to the Indo-Pacific. It argues that working with the Quad will entail individual, like-minded European and Indo-Pacific countries coordinating in ad hoc, flexible formats. Such arrangements should focus on niche issues where European countries and the EU have overlapping interests with Quad members, such as Indian Ocean and maritime security or ensuring cheap, high-quality, and reliable technologies to assist developing countries’ transition to renewable energy. It concludes with a set of policy recommendations on how to further this agenda.