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The issue of port security raised concerns at the highest levels after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States. Security threats against ports and vessels acquired a new perspective and in 2002 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, introducing Chapter XI-2 - Special measures to enhance maritime security. This set of regulations enshrines the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code), which entered into force on 1 July 2004.

This Code establishes a set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. It encompasses two parts. Part A establishes the mandatory provisions, the non-mandatory (“recommended”) and part B provides guidelines about how to comply with the obligatory requirements of part A. Together with a critical analysis of the national legislation about the enactment of the ISPS Code into national law, this dissertation examines the level of implementation and compliance of this instrument in Mexico with special focus on port security. This dissertation also provides a transparent incident-reporting instrument developed and tested through this research effort in Mexico for reporting of port and maritime security incidents.

This tool joins three primary port/maritime security functions:

 a) Reporting of port and maritime security incidents;

 b) Classification and investigation of serious security incidents that require reassessments of the Port Security Assessments, (PSA), Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSA), and amendments to Port Security Plans (PSP) and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) and finally;

 c) Collection of evidence material related to the security incident.

This instrument, combined with statistics, provides nations with crucial information, about threats, needs and challenges for allocation of economic, material and human resources. It also provides essential information material to set up strategies for the development of a National Maritime Security Policy. Its flexibility and adaptability makes possible its implementation at any State of the world.

The results of this analysis reflect the conflictive cooperation between the Secretaría de Marina (SEMAR) and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, (SCT). This, together with the ambiguities and contradictions of the National Maritime Regime, even though the extensive reforms of 2016 limits the exercise of authority of SEMAR and the operation of the CUMAR(s), the organ responsible for implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, at all ports across the country. This doctoral dissertation comprises six introductory chapters, which are referred to as the kappa and five annexed papers. It aims to contribute to the maritime realm within the area of maritime security, with special focus on port security through the following general objectives:

 • Elaborate a critical analysis of the current port security situation of Mexico, with special focus on implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code, including the state of the art and harmonization of international legislation with national law;

 • Identify the most relevant security threats to port facilities in Mexico, including oil terminals and offshore installations;

 • Develop an analytical instrument for security incidents-reporting & incident investigation, to strengthen the continual evolution of PSA/PFSA and PSP/PFSP and useful for setting up the strategies of a national maritime security policy with possibility for implementation worldwide.

The approach adopted in this study is mainly based on qualitative methods, combined with action research and a limited use of statistics. The research objectives call for classical documental analyses examining the elements of relevant international legislation against its implementation into national legislation in the referred nation-state. The methods were selected on their usefulness and efficacy for analysis of law and policy. Action Research was used for implementation test and improvement of the reporting incident instrument, which can also be used for setting up the strategies for the development of a National Maritime Security Policy. Action Research is recommended when it is intended to improve understanding, develop his/others learning and influence other’s learning, taking action for social improvement.

The findings related to serious deficiencies in the implementation and compliance of the ISPS Code in Mexico, concerning reporting of security incidents and its re- evaluation with the PFSA and respective amendments to PFSP, the poor exercise of authority from the representatives of SEMAR at the CUMARs in respect of fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities concerning port and maritime security; and the identification of necessary legal amendments to national law, as well as the remarkable improvement in reporting security incidents after the implementation of the “transparent security-incident-reporting tool”, that enables port/maritime security incident investigation and can serve to identify the problem areas; contributing to set up the strategies for the development of a national maritime security policy, together with the instrument itself, are some of the most relevant contributions of this dissertation.

The current analysis examines three different solutions that Mexico implemented within its ports and offshore installations in order to improve the country’s maritime security framework, as well as ensuring compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): privatisation, militarisation and, finally, their combination. The findings of an on-going research effort include inconsistencies within the data of the necessary security incident records, or even their total absence. Inadequate competence and training among the Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) also stands out. Another important issue was the use of different procedures among the ports under investigation for dealing with exactly the same security incidents. The clear conclusion is that after twelve years of the ISPS Code implementation, Mexico, which is leading the Interamerican Port’s Commission of the Organisation of American States (OAS), does not comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code at an acceptable level; the lack of a national maritime security policy has resulted in a poor (maritime) security culture, despite the severe (security) challenges that this nation is facing. It is also true that the country under discussion is currently reorganising its maritime security apparatus, with some positive results; tools and recommendations for enhancing the Mexican maritime security operating framework are therefore provided, along with areas of potential future research.

The analysis in hand conducts an assessment of the need of implementingthe International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) instruments- as established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) - and particularlythe Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and Port Facility SecurityPlan (PFSP) at Customs Maritime Units. This research effort examines the securityat Mexican Customs Maritime Units’ installations at different ports fromthe ISPS Code perspective. To study these phenomena, Harbour Masters, theCommanders of the Navy, Directors of Customs Units, Port Facility SecurityOfficers and Port Directors from eighth of the most important Mexican portswere interviewed on the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities forimproving maritime and port security. Additionally, the customs maritime units’installations were visited for direct observation. The results demonstrate the negativeeffect of customs agents’ rotation between airport customs units, bordercustoms units and Customs Maritime Units, as well as the need for the developmentand implementation of PFSAs and PFSPs not only at ports and port terminals,as required by the ISPS Code, but also at the Customs Maritime Unitsinstallations, which are within the port installations. The findings show that inMexico, more than 40% of port and maritime security incidents occurred at theCustoms installations during the year of 2017. The lack of security assessmentsand security plans that relate to Customs Maritime Units put in risk to the wholeport facility and its terminals. Therefore it is recommended the establishment ofa national department within the Customs Authority to lead the development ofsecurity assessments and security plans but in accordance with the specificationsof the ISPS Code, aiming for a harmonization between “Customs SecurityPlans” and PFSP. This will ensure that security procedures established at CustomsMaritime Units are synchronized with those from the port facility in caseof serious security incidents. Finally, the urgent need for providing maritime and port security training related to ISPS Code requirements and procedures to customs’police personnel serving in Customs Maritime Units was identified. Theoreticaland practical implications are discussed for researchers and practitionersin the areas of maritime security and future research directions are provided.

This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), for the case of Mexico. This investigation was initially oriented solely towards Mexico, but due to the absence of research within this subject for the referred country the review had to be done through subcategories with the conditional connection of Mexico and relevant issues were selected. The primary data confirmed the absence of research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed for a wider geographical coverage and an expanded on general bases the scope of analysis, since ten (10) different academic databases were exploited. The literature review from an author-centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the basis to further develop (and examine) the concept-centric approach, through eight selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on specific concepts, allowed the identification of cross fertilization of such concepts in the respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) have an integrated perspective, where the categories of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management and the issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. The results demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in these areas from America Central and South America in relation to other parts of the globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code in Mexico. In the scientific contributions on the subject were Mexico is included; it is in reference to isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific research on this area for the specific country might also be related to the lack of a national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have pointed out in other contributions.

This paper aims to improve port security measures in developing countries via integrating the procedures of incident reporting and the associated follow up investigation, hinging on the Mexican experience. The analysis examined port security at Mexican ports, where stakeholders were interviewed on the subject to identify the challenges and opportunities for security incident reporting, updating of security incident records and facilitation of the follow up investigation. Then, a qualitative security model was developed; under this new framework, incident reporting, incident investigation, the re-assessment of security threats through the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and the necessary modifications to the Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) were all integrated. These subjects were all incorporated into a “transparent port security incident reporting tool”. This tool was implemented at all ports in Mexico, where the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) applies, by the National Maritime Authority. This demonstrated in a real case through “action research”, the improvement of port security framework in the country. Measurements were executed every quarter throughout the year 2017 and the incident-reporting instrument was adjusted accordingly. The results demonstrated a significant improvement in reporting security incidents, with the increase from absolutely nothing (zero) to 57 providing a strong indicator of success. In addition, 56% of those reported maritime incidents were also associated with recommendations to be integrated into the PFSA and respective PFSP. Collecting accurate and immediate information/evidence material while reporting security incidents is crucial for effective incident investigation and continuous improvement of the PFSP.

After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction-round offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the continental shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of policies prioritizing maritime security and protection of critical offshore infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port's security program and establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilities, it has not been fully implemented in several important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.

An extended number of people still risk their life today, while illegally crossing the Mediterranean and/or the Aegean Sea as part of an effort to reach a European country. Border management constitutes a crucial tool for effectively dealing with illegal and irregular migration via sea. However, migration and border management literature is lacking studies that address the genuine drivers of migrant crisisfrom a (geo)strategic viewpoint, or rely on the theoretical underpinning of border management from that same angle. This article aims to examine the root causes of a specific national security challenge currently faced by Greece and the EU in large part, namely mixed migratory flows in the Aegean Sea. It explores the theoretical(geo)strategic underpinning of border management at the external EU borders inthe Aegean Sea; merely desk research was used for the collection/analysis of the data. Relevant results suggest that (geo)strategic considerations provide improved understanding not only of the root causes of seaborne migration that are identified as heightened status of insecurity and extreme poverty in the States of origin, but also of strategy formulation in the field of border management at European and national level (Greek sea borders). Results are discussed in terms of existent (geo)strategic theories and models, with a special focus on the ‘strategic thinking in 3D’ framework, the ‘Heartland’ and ‘Rimland’ theses, as well as topographical features and demographics.The aim is to shed light on strategic thinking and planning in the wider domain of security and provide recommendations to improve the current situation.

This paper analyses the implications of non-compliance with the requirementsestablished in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)Code, particularly ship security assessments (SSA) and ship security plans (SSP),on the loss of marine insurance coverage. The study is conducted within theframework of maritime security, focusing on perils insured and losses covered,based on the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013, version 2019, and its connectionwith the requirements of the ISPS Code. This mandatory code was incorporatedinto the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),1974 as amended, through chapter XI-2 on “Special Measures to EnhanceMaritime Security”, which comprises a package of maritime security amendmentsthat entered into force on July 1, 2004.The authors conclude that the lack of a properly certified ship securityofficer (SSO), the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) and an approvedand fully implemented SSP on board the vessel, as well as substantial breachesin the implementation and compliance of the respective security plan and itscompulsory procedures, can lead to the loss of marine insurance coverage. Particularexamples include cases where the losses were caused by negligence incomplying with the ISPS Code related to security perils such as piracy, hijacking,transport of drugs and other illegal items, among others; the authors also observea causal connection between the loss and the infringement to the procedures ofthe plan. Aside from future research directions, this paper also discusses theoreticaland practical implications for researchers and practitioners in the areas ofmaritime security and marine insurance. Finally, the authors highly recommenda new revision to the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan to include clear and specific provisions about the obligation of ship-owners concerning implementation andcompliance of the ISPS Code requirements, with regards to the SSA and the SSPwith its mandatory procedures.

This chapter examines oil theft, and other types of transnational organized crime at sea (such as the illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances standing out), within the framework of maritime security and, particularly, the effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). The chapter focuses on Mexico; however, these findings can also apply to other countries facing similar security threats. It also highlights possible solutions associated with the effective implementation of the ISPS Code and other appropriate maritime security measures. An important conclusion is that oil theft and illegal bunkering activities, as well as piratical attacks against offshore platforms, are clearly on the rise in Mexico. It also indicates that there is a new trend in the transportation of drugs and weapons, which involved affixing them in packages to the bulbous bows of vessels, a practice which requires international acknowledgment and appropriate handling measures to effectively tackle this specific unlawful practice. It also includes recommendations concerning the use of remote-controlled underwater vehicles (commonly known as drones) by port authorities for hull inspections. Vast quantities of oil are lost daily in Mexico through theft. Large ocean-going tankers take the majority of the stolen crude oil to selected refineries outside the country. This requires significant efforts and coordination that can only be carried out by well organized criminal rings.

This paper examines piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Mexico, under the framework of maritime security. The results indicate that piratic attacks are most likely underreported by the Government of Mexico. The research findings documented fourteen attacks on supply vessels and offshore platforms for the first half of 2020; only three relevant attacks were officially reported in the same period by the vessel´s (foreign) flag jurisdiction. However, the Maritime Authority of Mexico did not change the security level at any of the ports or territorial sea during the incidents. The maritime security level remained the same (level 1) during 2020, despite several alerts launched by the international maritime community. Recommendations by the respondents (shipmasters, SSO, CSO and PFSO) included that a permanent increased security level (level 2) should be implemented in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico until this specific problem is resolved. Participants suggested additional special measures to tackle the problem including the evaluation to class the area as a High Risk Area (HRA) and the establishment of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), for international cooperation and capacity building with the US Coastguard authorities to promote necessary collaboration towards effectively dealing with these security threats.

Within the globalization era, the conduct, resolution, and impact of international conflicts are frequently not limited solely to the belligerent states involved. Conflict influences distant countries and often illustrates the vulnerability of sea access to the security of coastal and landlocked nations, by factoring in that: import/export commodities are impacted; access to vital energy resources is undermined; and/or international resource distribution is threatened. Therefore, the maritime domain (and its military, legal, and commercial components) represents a Russia/Ukraine conflict cornerstone and the epicenter of this analysis. This conflict highlights maritime trade importance and re-establishes the strategic significance of protecting multi-polarity, the “rule of law”, and freedom of the seas within the Black Sea region (BSR), which today represents a very large concentration of power (involving actors like Russia, USA, NATO, EU) and has been the site of ten post-Cold War conflicts. Resultantly, maritime domain objectives and tactical events (on, above, and below the seas) require detailed analysis as hostilities continue, the norms and principles of international law are threatened and/or undermined, and prospective combat end-state(s) are considered. Such will define Russia’s and Ukraine’s future(s), as well as economic-diplomatic stability and the future of rules based international order across the BSR, which is a vital maritime transport corridor.

Amidst increasing maritime emphasis, this conflict also illustrates transformational warfighting facets. In addition to troops, ships, and aircraft, modern battlefields now include issues like: Information Warfare outlets; “lawfare”; cyber threats; and adversaries with unprecedented Artificial Intelligence capabilities. The international community must acknowledge these skills yield warfighting capability to nations lacking capacity. As naval warfare equipment and tactics change, protecting sea lanes, preventing maritime hegemony, and upholding the “rule of law”,  -and are enhanced by globalization.

This article analyses the application of the legal provisions established in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to streamline and reorganize cooperation between Government agencies with maritime security tasks and responsibilities. 

It highlights the difficulties raised by the existence of a multiplicity of actors involved in maritime security and identifies barriers in attempts from the Designated Authority and Administrations to assign duties among all stakeholders to cope with maritime security threats and ensure compliance with maritime security guidelines. 

Three obstacles for an effective and efficient allocation of duties will be discussed within the framework of maritime security, focusing on the requirements of the mentioned Code, which was incorporated into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended, through chapter XI-2 on “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security”, that entered into force on July 1, 2004. These are: a) absence of public official and fully up-dated maritime security incident statistics; b) lack of awareness and knowledge about types of security incidents versus safety accidents, or the so called safety near-misses and; c) poor collaboration among State agencies concerning information sharing about specific security duties, a situation often generating duplication of tasks and preventing relevant work to be considered into maritime security management at different levels. 

The authors conclude that the production and official publication of maritime security incident statistics, as well as the establishment of procedures and processes for effective information sharing, along with clear specification for each agency involvement and necessary distribution to carry on the constant responsibility of managing security risks, are necessary to improve compliance of maritime security guidelines and give a step forward into securing the territorial sea and our oceans. 

Finally, the authors highly recommend that Governments and international institutions, including the European Union (EU) and particularly Eurostat, as the statistical office of the EU, starts the production and official publication of relevant statistics, with a clear distinction between maritime security incidents and maritime accidents.

A proper assessment of maritime security risks at the national level is crucial to a national maritimesecurity plan (NMSP) in order to secure the concerned country’s ports, vessels and territorial sea. Thus, the importance of implementing a national maritime security assessment (NMSA) to counter securitythreats and ensure the continuity of national and international trade. The most important set of inter-national regulations concerning maritime security is the International Ship and Port Facility Security(ISPS) Code, which includes revision, approval and control of compliance of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), which shall be based upon the Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA). This paper proposes a mathematical dynamic model that calculates in real time the residual risk for the whole country and each of its ports by adapting and expanding the formula and procedures established in the Code, which since it has already been implemented around the world, gives the opportunity to take advantageof this quantitative solution to administrate maritime security risks on a nation-wide basis and create an effective national maritime security plan, which would allow the concerned authorities to improve situational awareness and adapt to security changes through a better planning of human, economic and material resources to deter security threats. The model was tested with the use of five encoded categories as countries, each of them with three ports, which encompassed three port facilities. The results indicate that this methodology is easy to implement and widespread use of that model could strength robustness in national security. 

This chapter analyses the evolution of technological tools to improve port and maritime security, in relation to relevant regulations for their effective use and implementation on board ships and port facilities, based on the legal provisions established under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. New technology applications can contribute to reducing security threats at sea. However, international regulations and national laws are not reformed at the same speed as the evolution of technological innovation in ships and other sea-going vessels. The slow reform of regulations and laws is delaying the benefits that novel solutions might bring to the maritime industry and to the whole world in terms of maritime security. In this chapter, the authors introduce a limited number of technology applications instruments, with the use of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) systems, similar to those used for inspection and maintenance, but combined with sensors to strengthen port and maritime security and, at the same time reduce the illegal trafficking of drugs. Desk research and relevant selected literature from this wide research field were used for the collection/analysis of the data and identification of a suitable solution. The authors suggest changes to the ISPS Code to standardize such equipment on board vessels, equating its need and significance to the Automatic Identification System (AIS), or the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), to counter drug traffic by sea threats of the type of packages affixed to the bulbous bow of vessels, which is quite common, especially in the Latin-American region. Finally, outline future trends in drug detection on board vessels due to continuous technical improvement, which is also used by criminal ring organizations, arguing that in the same way as transnational organized crime is adapting and implementing innovative technology, governments and international organizations must also follow this adaptability to deter such security threats and improve the security of ports and oceans.