For many years, we have noticed that different courses of action (COA) developed by Joint Operational Planning Groups (JOPG) for solving the same mission seldom rarely differ more than marginally. This can lead to plans that are predictable for an opponent. If we want to be able to expose an opponent to surprise and complex problems, predictable plans are not good.Planning doctrine only based on the past experience is most often not the best when preparing for missions in future operations, therefore more creative and divergent thinking is needed.In this paper we discuss conditions for COA development that stimulate creative and divergent thinking. We also discuss how planners continually alternate between divergent and convergent thinking before and during execution of operations.
Future Command and Control (C2) need to be both agile and resilient to cope with unpredictable operational environments and to make use of the technological advances. The Swedish Armed Forces develops a concept for future C2 of military operations. The objective of this paper is to explore the utilization of mission command in a future C2 concept. Sweden has a solid tradition of mission command, promoted by the Swedish culture of participation and empowerment. However, the future operational environment demands a need for organizational agility, thus changing the prerequisites for mission command. The future C2 concept, which is under development, encompasses centralized and decentralized command in fixed and temporary organizations. Centralized approaches may be preferred when it comes to prioritization of technologically advanced exclusive resources. On the other hand, dynamic situations demand rapid decision making and seizing the opportunity given in the moment. The future operational environment includes hybrid warfare and gray zone issues, demanding thorough analysis in order to foresee the political consequences of decisions. Sensor and communication technologies enable enhanced situation awareness; however, the infrastructure is vulnerable. The current paper analyses the application of mission command in the future operational environment, and further mission command in relation to organizational agility. The conclusion is that mission command is still relevant in the complex future operational environment. However, the increasingly complex operational environment demands continuous development of the C2 function.
The conditions for military operations have changed due to, e.g., globalization, climate change, and nations' ambitions and actions. This has resulted in new demands on command and control (C2) capability. Further, the rapid evolution of information technology has provided vigorous opportunities to enhance the C2 capability, e.g., through advanced communication, information management, and decision support. However, the need to rely on modern technology also causes increased vulnerabilities. The sociotechnical nature of C2 systems means that the development of C2 systems is complex and challenging. Developing C2 concepts requires collaboration between people from different knowledge disciplines, traditions, and perspectives. Therefore, there is a need for elaborated concept development approaches and structures that promote collaborative efforts. The objective of this paper is a framework for the development of C2 concepts that enhance the collaboration of people from different traditions. The study was carried out as case study performed in two steps: theoretical development and formative evaluation. The case study targets the development of C2 concepts for future military operations of the Swedish Armed Forces. The framework includes terminology models, a development process, and system representations. The case study shows that in diverse teams, it is essential to agree upon terminology, development process, and systems representations used for the development to avoid misunderstandings and unnecessary rework. The framework explored in this paper is only in its first version. However, the development and the application of the framework was found to facilitate and focus the work of the multi-disciplinary team.
Föreliggande bok har ambitionen att sätta samman tre års forskningsresultat (2016-2018) inom ramen för det av Försvarsmakten (FM) finansierade forskningsprojektet Ledarskap och ledning i en förändrad organisatorisk kontext och omsätta kunskaper till ett pedagogiskt och lättillgängligt material som kan användas i såväl Försvarshögskolans ordinarie kurs- och utbildningsprogram, som enskild läsning eller som utgångspunkt för gruppdiskussioner, seminarier och förberedelser inför något av de teman som tas upp i boken. Bokens innehåll speglar forskningsprojektets sammansättning som består av forskare från Ledarskapsavdelningen i Stockholm, Försvarshögskolans Ledarskapscentrum i Karlstad, och Ledningsvetenskap i Stockholm. Att bokens empiri kommer från militär kontext hindrar inte att bokens innehåll även kan vara av stort intresse för civila läsare, särskilt inom ramen för dem med intresse för civil-militär samverkan i såväl nationella som internationella insatser.
The conditions for military operations have changed due to many things and the cyber-related challenges associated with these conditions require more attention. Many cyber activities are conducted under other circumstances than conventional war that is called the grey zone between peace and war. The objective of this paper is to explore the conditions for mission command when conducting cyber operations. The distinction between war and peace has blurred and adversaries, both state and non-state, threaten the stability in many western countries. Mission command can be seen both as a philosophy and as a method. The fundamental principles for mission command as a philosophy are trust, intent focus, initiative and common ground. This paper discusses if the conditions for Mission Command have changed and are applicable while conducting different types of cyberspace operations and that offensive and defensive cyber operations imply different conditions for Mission Command. The conclusion is that Mission Command as a philosophy is still relevant, but it has to be supported by a comprehensive Command and Control (C2)-Method that is flexible and able to vary between Direct Control and Mission type Control. The C2 Method should be complemented with a dynamic and adaptive control policy for different types of cyber actions. The paper also suggests a holistic model for Dynamic Command that considers both the situations need for action and the Mission Systems C2-needs.