Through a large part of the 1950s, the United States was very hesitant to share guided-missile technology with its NATO allies. But by the end of the decade, the U.S. attitude had changed and in the early 1960s guided missiles were being transferred to Western Europe in large numbers. This article considers the reasons for the change in the United States' nondisclosure policy, arguing that the transfer of guided-missile technology became a means for the United States to uphold its hegemony in Western Europe. After much prodding by the European NATO countries throughout the 1950s, U.S. policy makers eventually realized that their attitude had to change if the United States was to retain the confidence of its allies. The change was implemented in basic hegemonic terms: in exchange for recognizing U.S. military and economic leadership, the consenting governments had to be offered some kind of material benefits. Military technology was a central ingredient in the bargaining between the United States and the NATO countries during the cold war. Without the transfer of U.S. military technology to Western Europe on a massive scale, the United States could not have claimed to be "the leader of the free world." The article shows that a hegemonic state must be sensitive to the demands of its subordinate nations if it wants to retain its leadership in international affairs, and that hegemony is achieved only at a price.
This article takes a new look at the crucial years in early post-war history, 1948–52, when Swedish-American security relations were established. By 1952 Sweden was firmly within the Western sphere and was considered a trusted ally in the fight against the Soviet Bloc. What had happened since 1948 that made the Swedish government go from almost pariah status to a trusted ally? Prior research has argued that this change was due to a dramatic reversal of US policy towards Sweden, and has even pointed to a very specific date for this policy change—namely February 1950. Washington, it has been said, at that time gave up its objective of getting Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT, which became NATO in 1951).In contrast, the article argues that it was not so much that the Americans changed their minds, as it was Sweden that gradually corrected its policy of neutrality to fit American hegemonic demands, specifically regarding its adherence to the CoCom trade embargo; a process that lasted longer than until February 1950. Moreover, it questions the assumption that getting Sweden to join the NAT was ever a US policy objective. There is simply no evidence to support it. It also makes the case for a reinterpretation of the Swedish-American security relations in the early cold war. The article places these events within the framework of hegemony theory, which in order to improve the understanding of this process.
All through the 1950s and 1960s NATO had secretly utilized a secret flight path, called Amber Nine, over the southwestern part of Sweden. The Swedish government condoned the frequent overflights, despite the fact that Sweden was at the time professing to follow a policy of neutrality in the power struggle between the two superpowers. This article argues that the frequent American use of Amber Nine should be viewed as a materialization of Sweden's consent to US hegemony, and that Amber Nine effectively made Swedish airspace and airports a part of NATO's infrastructure. It also makes the case that the arrangement contributed to the eradication of the credibility of Sweden's policy of neutrality, and that NATO's routine use of a flight path over Sweden, a non-NATO country, warrants a reinterpretation of Sweden's role in the Cold War on NATO's northern flank, as well as challenging the definition of the NATO alliance.
This article deals with the U.S. government’s efforts to curb the Swedish ball bearing producer SKF’s exports to the East early in the Cold War, 1950-1952, and interprets this process within the framework of hegemony theory. The period up to mid-1951 saw increasing U.S. pressure upon Sweden and SKF to consent to U.S. hegemony by abiding by the CoCom embargo. To achieve its objectives U.S. policymakers developed a flexible ‘’carrot and stick’’ approach, and the article adds considerable detail regarding the U.S. government’s handling of SKF. U.S. tolerance and flexibility was dependent upon Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe, which was received through the signing of the Stockholm agreement in mid-June 1951, a hegemonic apparatus through which Sweden’s abidance by the embargo was handled. A small amount of exports was accepted by Washington as long as the main U.S. objective, to deny the Eastern Bloc strategic technology, was adhered to by SKF. The article also reveals the lack of policy coordination in the Swedish government, and the conflicts between the government and SKF regarding the responsibility for adhering to the embargo.
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This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish-American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well.
This article deals with the relations between perhaps Sweden's most influential publicist during the Cold War, the professor of political science and editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter 1946-1959, Herbert Tingsten, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a CIA-sponsored organisation gathering the elite of the world's non-communist leftist intellectuals, Congress for Cultural Freedom and its Swedish sub-branch called 'Svenska kommitten for kulturens frihet' (SKfKF). Tingsten was a professor of political science at University of Stockholm from 1935 to 1946 and then editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter from 1946 to 1959. It argues that parts of Tingsten's work both as an opinion maker and as a scholar was part of a symbiotic relationship with the CCF and the SKfKF. Tingsten was the foremost propagator for the 'end of ideology' thesis in Sweden and the article argues that this campaign was inspired by the CCF's advancement of this idea in the 1950s and 1960s. Tingsten was personally acquainted with several CCF intellectuals and he visited several of the CCF's conferences. The article also makes the case that Tingsten helped the CCF and the SKfKF's causes and furthered their agendas in a number of ways during his time as editor-in-chief of DN. For example, Tingsten allowed the SKfKF to use DN as a platform for presenting its ideas and programmes to a broader public. The article thus shows how the CCF network of intellectuals influenced opinion making in non-aligned Sweden.