After the EU Membership – New Strategies in Swedish Foreign Politics?After becoming a member of the EU in 1995 Sweden has been governed by theSocial Democrats (1995–2006) and by a Centre-Right coalition (2006–2014) led bythe Moderate Party. Has the EU-membership conserved the tradition of consensusamongst the political parties regarding the foreign policy or has it provided anew platform allowing the parties to express their different ideological preferencesalso in this field of politics? The aim of this article is to shed light on the foreignpolicy of the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party 1995–2014. By analyzing thedebates in the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, it is concluded that the two partieshave similar strategies regarding the means and the ways of the foreign policy butdifferent approach regarding the views on the international settings and the endsof the policy. A potential explanation to the findings is the resurrection of Realismin the Moderate Party’s approach.
Hidden or Forgotten? – Realism in the Swedish Parliamentary DebateThe spoken word of politicians creates expectations for subsequent action. Thelanguage used when formulating security, foreign and defense policies can thusprovide an indication what measures the politicians are prepared to take in orderto promote their national interests. In international relations theory the use offorce is primarily associated with realism. The use of realist concepts in the politicalcommunication could thus serve as an indicator of the politicians’ views on the useof force. In this article the use of realism in the parliamentary debate in Sweden isexplored. The findings indicate differences between the political parties as well asbetween the topics of the debate.
Members of all political parties represented in the Swedish Parliament have during the past decades repeatedly stressed the necessity of directing military activities by using strategies. When focus in now shifting from participating in international military operations far from Sweden to addressing security challenges in Sweden's neighbourhood the needs for a new military strategy is obvious. The aim of this article is to explore whether potential shortcomings in the decisionsmaking process regarding the Swedish security and defence policy can explain why the Government does not seem to guide the Armed Forces with strategies.
How efficient is the academic education of military officers at the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC)? Since War Studies and Military Technology are represented at no other Swedish University, it is challenging when comparing them with other subjects in this regard.Another challenge is how to measure efficiency in academic education. In this article the two subjects are compared with the most similar subject at the SNDC; Political Science. Themethod applied is quite simple. By using similar statistics and approach as the Swedish Higher Education Authority (Universitetskanskerämbetet – UKÄ) uses when comparing theefficiency of different Swedish universities, the subjects are compared in terms of full-time equivalent students per full-time equivalent staff members. The result of the comparison is depressing. If War Studies and Military Technology are to be as efficient as Political Science,the number of full-time equivalent students in the two former subjects has to be increasedfrom about 250 to about 1,450. Another option is to decrease the number of full- time equivalent staff members from about 125 to only 25. Even if the efficiency of the two military subjects does not necessarily have to be exactly on the same level as the efficiency of PoliticalScience, the result of this study indicates that something has to be done in order to increase the standards of War Studies and Military Technology.
Despite their different experiences during the Second World War Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are often looked upon as similar Scandinavian welfare states in many ways. However, their approach to the European Union and Nato in matters of security and defence politics, differs and this indicates that they might not be that similar after all. On the other hand they have all been active contributors to the efforts of conflict management by the international community. Providing military units to peace support operations all over the globe is consequently yet another similarity. In this book the strategic decision making procedures of the four states are explored and compared. The question whether the states are alike or different regarding the use of military force is hence in focus.
This article introduces the ‘coalition of the opting’ as a novel alignment strategy situated between non-alignment and traditional collective security. Drawing on financial derivatives theory, particularly options contracts, the approach offers a flexible alternative to rigid alliance commitments. It provides nations with the ability to secure defense capabilities through time-limited, binding contracts that allow future decisions to be deferred, thus maintaining strategic flexibility. The ‘coalition of the opting’ aims to address the predictability and commitment challenges inherent in existing alignment strategies by creating tailored agreements that ensure partner support when needed, without the full obligations of traditional alliances. While not a substitute for collective defense, this concept seeks to lower the entry threshold for binding commitments, thereby optimizing national defense with partner support. Since the ‘coalition of the opting’ is in its early stages, further theoretical investigation and counterfactual analysis are required to assess its viability.
In this article, we test the theory of “The Coalition of the Opting” by counterfactually including a paragraph in the Yalta Charter, regulating the security cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, welcoming them to develop both call and put options between the member states. The counterfactual Charter is applied to three examples of Russian armed aggression: the war on Georgia in 2008, the war on Ukraine in 2014, and the full-scale invasion on Ukraine in 2022. Although the application of the counterfactually designed options most likely would not have altered the outcome of these aggressions, our findings suggest that the very existence of a coalition of the opting nevertheless could have compelled Russia to think twice before attacking. Arguably, the additional time could have enabled both the coalition and the Western community to undertake counteractions that factually now were absent.
This article seeks to theorize the transformation of the armed forces in Northern Europe by examining its drivers during previous NATO enlargements in the region. The exploration includes the German reunification in 1990, the Polish entry in 1999, and the joining of the three Baltic States, i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, in 2004. Based on these experiences, the article identifies some theoretical considerations for transformation in conjunction with the current accession process of Finland and Sweden. Based on a realist logic, we conclude that the ongoing transformation should be underpinned by a new operational design, hence considering the need for flexibility and for managing potential new expeditionary shocks. To this end, we argue that the focus must initially be internally within the Alliance, i.e., to proceed with novel operational planning for northern Europe before turning the attention to the transformation of the armed forces of the new members.
This article revisits the twenty-three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-missions launched before the economic crisis hit the EU and its Member States to generate conclusions that could assist in the strategy process in Brussels. Six questions anchored in the field of Strategic Studies are operationalized in an analytical framework. Extant EU policies are utilized to identify plausible answers. The analysis suggests that the EU must close the gap between words and deeds to become a more credible actor. It would help the EU to operationalize its ambitions by exploiting its broad portfolio of policy options and to vanguard the post-modern society in crisis management.