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  • 1.
    Berbrick, Walter
    et al.
    U.S. Naval War College, (USA).
    Saunes, Lars
    U.S. Naval War College, (USA).
    Cobb, Richard
    Royal Canadian Navy, (CAN).
    Greaves, Wilfred
    University of Victoria, (CAN).
    Friis, Anders
    Royal Danish Navy, (DNK).
    Riber, Johannes
    Royal Danish Defence College, (DNK).
    Kjærgaard, Steen
    Royal Danish Defence College, (DNK).
    Mikkola, Erkki
    Finnish Navy, (FIN).
    Strømmen, Tor Ivar
    Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, (NOR).
    Handeland, Ingrid
    Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, (NOR).
    Forsman, Andreas
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Gosnell, Rachel
    United States Navy, (USA).
    Sittlow, Brian
    Council on Foreign Relations.
    Potter, Earl
    United States Coast Guard Academy, (USA).
    Tallis, Joshua
    Center for Naval Analysis.
    Thompson-Jones, Mary
    U.S. Naval War College, (USA).
    Shvets, Dmitry
    United States Navy, (USA).
    Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks of the Future2020Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This report, Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic Region: Frameworks for the Future, captures consensus of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative 2020 scholars. Building upon the 2018-2019 NASI work on the limitations of the current cooperative security fora in the Arctic region, this cohort explored existing international frameworks and assessed their abilities to ensure freedom and security in the Arctic through political-military means. NASI 2020 also examined existing frameworks to determine whether they enabled increased dialogue and maritime security cooperation in the region. The frameworks were further evaluated for their abilities to prevent and manage conflict and enhance cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests in the region. Scholars were tasked to identify new frameworks that could be useful in establishing – and maintaining – open channels of communication, preventing conflict, and enhancing cooperation on areas of common security and defense interests among nations and navies in the Arctic region. Finally, the group sought to identify practical arrangements for a future meeting or summit that could bring together states to enhance dialogue on security and cooperation in the Arctic region.

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  • 2.
    Finlan, Alastair
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Danielsson, Anna
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Maritime Operations Section. Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Critically engaging the concept of joint operations: Origins, reflexivity and the case of Sweden2021In: Defence Studies, ISSN 1470-2436, E-ISSN 1743-9698, Vol. 21, no 3, p. 356-374Article in journal (Refereed)
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  • 3.
    Klein, Robert M.
    et al.
    (Ret.) Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, (USA ).
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Sumangil, Ed
    Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, (USA ).
    Pettersson, Ulrica
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Operational Functions Section.
    Baltics Left of Bang: the Role of NATO with Partners in Denial-Based Deterrence2019Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military contribution to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic region should begin with an overall strategic concept that seamlessly transitions from deterrence through countering Russia’s gray zone activities and onto conventional war, only if necessary. NATO should augment its ongoing program to enhance the denial-based deterrence for the region with threats of punishment that demonstrate to Russian leaders they cannot achieve their aims at acceptable costs. Rather than forward-position military forces in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), NATO should consider keeping forces further back to take advantage of strategic depth to limit vulnerability to Russian attack and increase operational flexibility. To support the overall denial-based deterrence concept, the Baltics must commit wholeheartedly to the concept of total defense including significant increases to their active and reserves forces.

  • 4.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of War Studies and Military History, Joint Warfare Division.
    A Convincing Finnish Move: Implications for State Identity of Persuading Sweden to Jointly Bid for NATO Membership2022In: Studia Europejskie, ISSN 1428-149X, Vol. 26, no 4, p. 73-110Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article examines the consequences for Sweden’s state identity by the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO. Taking its starting point in Sweden’s shattering loss of its easternmost provinces in the 1809 Treaty of Fredrikshamn, it explores Sweden’s initial formulations of a policy of neutrality and its evolution until the end of the Cold War. The article then directs attention to how Social Democratic leaders managed to institutionalise a Swedish “active foreign policy”, exerting a lasting, formative influence on Sweden’s state identity. It also addresses the rapprochement of Finland and Sweden after the end of the Cold War and the consequences of the bilateral dynamics that characterised their EU-membership applications. The article critically discusses how Sweden reformulated its concept of neutrality into a nebulous concept of nonalignment and adopted a security policy rooted in a cooperative security approach. Based on key findings drawn from this historical account, this article addresses the processes that lead to Finland and Sweden unexpectedly deciding on jointly applying for NATO membership. It concludes with a forward-looking assessment of how a Swedish NATO membership will ultimately stabilise Sweden’s adaptable state identity and its implications for the Nordic countries’ regional military strategy.

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  • 5.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Maritime Operations Section.
    Continuity and Change in post-Cold War Maritime Security: A Study of the Strategies Pursued by the US, Sweden and Finland 1991-20162017Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    What explains continuity and change in post-Cold War maritime security strategies? What lessons can we learn from the employment of such comprehensive grand strategies in maritime regions where traditional and non-traditional threats converge? While many scholars have addressed particular maritime security issues, this author joins the few who engage themselves in the study of the conceptual development of maritime security.

    Through the lens of structural realism, this thesis examines the logic of the maritime security strategies employed in two distinguished regions by the US and EU member states Finland and Sweden. It concludes that while their maritime security concept remains broad, the recent increase in security pressure has renewed the priority assigned to the military sector of security. Navies are thus re-using the measures implemented by a broad set of civil agencies and the shipping industry to improve maritime security, to gain the level of maritime domain awareness required for establishing regional sea control and project power from the sea.

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  • 6.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security strategy2015Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Maritime Operations Section.
    Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security strategyManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and National Economies: Current Changes in Maritime Security2013In: Journal of Defence Studies, ISSN 0976-1004, Vol. 7, no 3, p. 57-80Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article analyses the alteration of the referent object for maritime security from protection of shipping and port facilities to protection of citizens and national economies. It presents a tentative answer on the extent and consequences of this alteration applied by states in a global perspective, and focuses on validating four explanatory factors on why the alteration has occurred. The time period of study is between 1991 and 2013. Its results illustrate a transition in states’ security policies from traditional expressions of maritime security to broader security perspectives, and also indicates radically altered maritime strategic perspectives among states.

  • 9.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Maritime Operations Section.
    In Search of Cross-Domain Deterrence: Implications of Mutual Deterrence Strategies for the Rules-based Security Order in Europe2017Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Maritime Operations Section.
    In Search of Deterrence: Implications of the Strategies pursued by Russia and the West2017Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia and the West have taken measures and counter-measures in multiple domains aimed at mutual deterrence. Russia’s move from a policy of cooperation to confrontation with the West followed processes of eastward expansion by the EU and NATO, and involved renewed geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions in the post-Soviet space. Its economic growth in the 2000s, centralisation of power and launch of ambitious armament programmes premised the policy change, while the stepwise counter-measures implemented by the West risk escalating the conflict. Russia’s vulnerable economy provides an opportunity for the West to achieve a de-escalation outcome by jointly imposing also firm economic sanctions on Russia.

  • 11.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Jointly Navigating the Baltic-Arctic Strategic Space: The Case of Sweden and Finland2020In: 2020 Cutting the Bow Wave: Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence / [ed] Tom Guy, Todd Bonnar, Jose Garza, Norfolk, Virginia: Combined Joint Operations from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence , 2020, p. 23-27Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Small states have always been at risk when great power competition intensifies in a region, those in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the Arctic being no exception. Sweden and Finland are located at a strategic cross-roads between Russia and NATO, which “Northern Flank” once again receives serious attention from defence planners. Russia is pursuing a strategy of military dominance in the BSR and the European Arctic, and its perceived assertiveness is a major concern among its neighbours. China, for its part, pursues a multilateral approach as a “near-Arctic state”, seeking to make the BSR a strategic springboard to the Arctic by invest-ing in joint ventures with small states. The U.S. more competitive stance on China globally, and on China and Russia in the Arctic, has implications for the security dynamics in the BSR. In the resulting Baltic-Arctic Strategic Space, Finland and Sweden opts for navigating jointly.

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  • 12.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of War Studies and Military History, Joint Warfare Division.
    Maktspelet om Arktis ökar spänningarna i Nordkalotten2023Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Rysslands anfallskrig mot Ukraina och de smältande isarna i norra ishavet ökar spänningarna i Arktis. Med ett försvagat Ryssland flyttar Kina fram sina maktpositioner och de nordiska länderna har all anledning att stärka skyddet i de norra delarna av den skandinaviska halvön.

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  • 13.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Maritim säkerhet: En översikt av begrepp, lagstiftning och forskning för Försvarsmaktens behov2010Report (Other academic)
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  • 14.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies.
    Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region2016In: Focus on the Baltic Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015 / [ed] Adrian J. Neumann & Sebastian Bruns, Kiel: Institute for Security Policy Kiel University , 2016, p. 16-28Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent European and U.S. maritime security strategies are characterised by addressing the multidimensional threats to the maritime domain that result from states􀇯 increased dependency on seaborne trade and maritime resource exploitation. Stefan Lundqvist notes, however, that in the Baltic Sea – as in the Asia-Pacific region – there is a continuing need for navies. This is due to certain regional powers pursuing strategies that include the wielding of sea power in ways that violate international law, heightens the risk of accidents and threatens international security.Given the hybrid character of the threats, he recommends that states in the region opt for a co-operative and comprehensive regional approach to maritime security – like that of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region.

  • 15.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of War Studies and Military History, Joint Warfare Division.
    Réapprendre les leçons de la Guerre froide: le « retour dans le futur » de la Suède dans sa politique de sécurité et de défense2023In: NAQD, ISSN 1111-4371, Vol. N° 41-42, no 1, p. 206-229Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [fr]

    Cet article examine comment la Suède est en train de réapprendre trois leçons de la Guerre froide à la lumière des transformations en cours dans ses conditions de sécurité régionales. Il compare et met en contraste les dynamiques et les politiques de sécurité de trois ères distinctes : la Guerre froide, la période d’après-Guerre froide, et la période d’après 2014. Il identifie dans l’évolution de l’environnement sécuritaire de la Suède les changements qui expliquent le calendrier et l’enchainement de ces adaptations. Cet article examine également les fondements de la politique de neutralité ambiguë de la Suède pendant la Guerre et pourquoi elle différait des politiques de la Finlande, du Danemark et de la Norvège. Il conclut que la Suède réapprend trois leçons de la Guerre froide : a) les conflits armés sur son territoire vont dégénérer en une guerre sur toute la péninsule scandinave et la Finlande ; b) elle a besoin d’évaluations réalistes pour planifier sa défense ; et c) le concept de « défense totale » est la clé pour maintenir le niveau de résilience sociale nécessaire afin de décourager des tentatives russes visant à attaquer, contrôler ou exploiter son territoire. Alors que la période d’après-Guerre froide est souvent considérée comme un vide et une anomalie dans l’histoire de la politique de sécurité de la Suède, cet article établit que le processus qui a fait abandonner à la Suède sa politique de neutralité dans les années 1990 sert en fait de pont stratégique pour l’implémentation actuelle d’un élément de transparence dans sa politique de sécurité. Si la sécurité sur le flanc nord de l’OTAN devait se détériorer, la Suède se rapprocherait sans doute davantage de l’OTAN.

  • 16.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    The Benefits of Three-corner-fights in Maritime Security Studies2014Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Uppföljning och utvärdering av operationer2018In: Militära arbetsmetoder: En lärobok i krigsvetenskap / [ed] Peter Thunholm; Jerker Widén; Niklas Wikström, Malmö: Universus Academic Press , 2018, p. 163-192Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Uppföljning och utvärdering av militära operationer utgör ett sammanhängande system som spänner över alla ledningsnivåer. Behovet av detta system har sitt ursprung i de ökade krav på spårbarhet och mätbarhet av resultat och progression vid genomförandet av militära operationer som ställs i Sverige, EU och Nato. Identifieringen av de parametrar som skall mätas med därför avsedda verktyg under den militära operationens genomförande är en process som tar sin början i de högre ledningsnivåerna, det givna uppdraget, samt operationens slutmål. Genomförandet är däremot en process som föds från de förband som är insatta i operationen, vars insamlade information samman­ställs enligt förberedda riktlinjer, aggregeras och tillvaratas på de olika militära ledningsnivåerna. Denna text beskriver inte bara uppbyggnaden av Sveriges och Natos system för uppföljnings- och utvärdering av militära operationer, samt introducerar de analysverktyg som används på olika ledningsnivåer för att mäta framdrivning och framsteg, den diskuterar även de utmaningar som är förknippade med att implementera en effektiv uppföljnings- och utvärderingsprocess.

  • 18.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Why teaching comprehensive operations planning requires transformational learning2015In: Defence Studies, ISSN 1470-2436, E-ISSN 1743-9698, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 175-201Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article argues that the method outlined in NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) manual is entirely based on systems theory and describes how to apply the principles for managing system change through comprehensive operations projects. Such systems thinking is based on conceptually different principles than traditional military planning methods. Students must therefore be provided with new conceptual tools to understand and handle the complex planning process outlined in the COPD manual. Thereto, they require knowledge of its founding scientific theories to meet academic standards. The concluding message is that military teachers and students must widen their individual mental frames of reference through a transformational learning process to obtain the comprehensive understanding required to fully manage the COPD process. Moreover, they need to prepare for facilitating dialogues in the less mature comprehensive operations planning teams of real-life situations.

  • 19.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Joint Operations Section.
    Engelbrekt, Kjell
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Political Science Section, Sektionen för säkerhet.
    Reintroducing the Great Power Gaze: The Case for a Baltic-Arctic Security Complex2019Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Baltic Sea and the Arctic have once again become scenes for geostrategic great power competition, influencing regional economic, military and environmental security. Here, international relationships span a spectrum from friendship to fear. We observe that a host of different units of analysis currently compete for our attention in this part of Europe. But while “Scandinavia”, “the Nordic area”, “the Baltic Sea region”, “the High North” and “the Arctic” help focus strategic analysis on important and sometimes overlapping components of this area, security complex theory prescribes that we must adopt a broader, multi-layered view in order to understand how great and small power interests play out in this part of the world today. Such analysis must consider China’s global role, NATO’s increasingly elaborate military planning and the Russian Federation’s perception of vulnerabilities and opportunities, in an area that stretches from the Suwalki gap in East-Central Europe to the Barents Sea. In addition, security complex analysis benefits from including the perspectives of small states that control key territories – such as resource-rich continental shelves and exclusive economic zones – and from taking relevant international bodies into account as enabling and constraining factors. As part of a larger project, this paper reviews several sets of open source documents indicative of the incentive structure of such key players, published over the past five years. We delve into the political, economic and military dimensions of aims and actions by three categories of actors, namely: i) China, Russia, the United States; ii) Denmark, Norway; Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada; and iii) the EU, NATO and the Arctic Council. We conclude that, while smaller units of analysis still make sense for limited research purposes, the concept of a Baltic-Arctic security complex is necessary for meaningful strategic analysis.

  • 20.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Widen, Jerker
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Cultivating Regional Maritime Security: Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea2015In: Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation / [ed] Ioannis Chapsos & Cassie Kitchen, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2015, p. 63-73Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Maritime security is increasingly important for the coastal states of the Baltic Sea, which collaborate on sea surveillance in pursuit of maritime domain awareness. Finland and Sweden operate a bilateral system and assume lead roles in multilateral projects; Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior has led them to substantially deepen their defense cooperation by creating a standing bilateral Naval Task Group. We examine this cooperation from a security policy perspective. For the project to succeed, it must operate in harmony with other cooperative strategies and it will also require substantial legislative changes. If Finland and Sweden succeed in adopting new policies, common structures, and organizational norms in their navies, a deep integration is conceivable.

  • 21.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Widén, Jerker
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives, prospects and challenges2016In: Defence Studies, ISSN 1470-2436, E-ISSN 1743-9698, Vol. 16, no 4, p. 346-373Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.

  • 22.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Widén, Jerker
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Swedish-Finnish Naval Co-operation in the Baltic Sea: Motives, Prospects and Challenges2015Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Widén, Jerker
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    The New US Maritime Strategy: Implications for the Baltic Sea region2015In: RUSI Journal, ISSN 0307-1847, E-ISSN 1744-0378, Vol. 160, no 6, p. 42-48Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The new US maritime strategy has received praise from many corners of the world. As a manual it is well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a challenging global security environment in the years ahead. The strategy emphasises maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national interests, and where allies require reassurance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen argue that the document fails, to some extent, to address Russia’s increasingly challenging conduct and its implications for Northeast Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

  • 24.
    Nilsson, Diana
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Joint Warfare Division, Foreign Languages Section.
    Lundqvist, Stefan
    Swedish Defence University, Department of War Studies and Military History, Joint Warfare Division.
    Identifying weaknesses of CLIL in the military higher education classroom2022In: The Journal of Teaching English for Specific and Academic Purposes, ISSN 2334-9182, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 217-243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Due to the ever-increasing expansion of English language integration into content courses within higher educational institutions (HEIs), this study seeks to gain insights into how domestic students, as well as content and language lecturers perceive integrating English for Specific Academic Purposes (ESAP) in an academic/vocational military university using Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL). We investigate firstly on how mostly domestic, non-native English speaking students perceive learning academic military content in an English Educational Environment (EEE), and secondly, how content and ESAP lecturers perceive collaborating within CLIL at the Swedish Defense University. Using a mixed-methods approach with data gathered from students and lecturers, the results are useful for HEIs looking to increase their English integration. Our results indicate that NNES students indeed learn content and language knowledge simultaneously using CLIL because communicative ESAP tasks enable them to process, and increase content knowledge. However, as this article will show, students prefer drastically different CLIL methods for reasons that we argue can be traced to varying L2 proficiencies. Meanwhile, lecturers had different expectations of, and perceived, interdisciplinary collaboration differently. This study concludes by suggesting that CLIL step 3 is inherently flawed due to a mismatch of implicit methods and explicit expectations of language proficiency, which consequently complicate lecturer roles and interdisciplinary collaboration.

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