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  • 1.
    Ahlerup, Linda
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Webbpoliser, gaming och kontranarrativ: Digitalt förebyggande arbete mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism2022Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I takt med att internet, iPhones och smartphones har kommit att bli en integrerad del av många människors vardag har även betydelsen av den digitala arenan ökat bland de våldsbejakande extremistiska miljöerna. I Sverige har det under de senaste åren genomförts ett flertal viktiga studier i relation till extremism och den digitala arenan. Det saknas emellertid studier som mer specifikt fokuserar på hur den digitala arenan kan integreras i samt stärka det förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism – vilket utgör denna studies fokusområde. Genom att beskriva och diskutera femton exempel på metoder som används inom en svensk samt en europeisk kontext belyser studien hur digitala verktyg potentiellt kan appliceras och integreras i det lokala och nationella förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Utöver detta beskrivs och analyseras potentiella fördelar samt utmaningar med användningen av den digitala arenan i förhållande till just förebyggande arbete, vilket även innefattar en diskussion kring olika metoder och verktygs effektivitet.

    Studien påvisar bland annat att det finns oändliga möjligheter att använda sig av den digitala arenan i förhållande till förebyggande arbete, samt att integreringen av den digitala arenan är ytterst centralt för att på ett effektivt sätt kunna förebygga och motverka just extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Detta då en stor del av extremistiska aktörers aktiviteter i dagsläget sker just online, samt då det är tydligt att online- och offlinedimensionen inte kan separeras funktionellt. Det konstateras dock att flera av de befintliga initiativ som studeras främst tenderar att existera som isolerade företeelser, snarare än att exempelvis utgöra en del av en omfattande nationell handlingsplan samt strategi i relation till det förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Trots att det alltså existerar ett flertal intressanta projekt och initiativ med potential att eventuellt kunna integreras och användas i större utsträckning är det i dagsläget både spretigt och fragmenterat – både nationellt och internationellt.

    Det konstateras även att det finns goda men isolerade exempel i Sverige på hur den digitala arenan kan integreras i det förebyggande arbetet, men att det samtidigt föreligger en generell avsaknad av projekt som på ett strategiskt och holistiskt sätt använder sig av just den digitala sfären. Vidare befinner sig existerande projekt fortfarande i ett tidigt skede. Svenska myndigheter bör således generellt fundera på hur man kan integrera den digitala arenan samt etablera en mer dynamisk onlinenärvaro i sitt dagliga arbete. I dagsläget är det exempelvis väldigt få myndigheter som erbjuder möjligheten till en digital dynamisk interaktion mellan myndigheter och medborgare. I framtiden kommer det dock att vara oundvikligt med en fördjupad digitaliseringsprocess.

    Studien påvisar även att ett flertal av de projekt som beskrivs har uppvisat olika former av framgångar – och att flera av dessa initiativ därmed skapar potentiell inspiration för lanseringen av liknande initiativ i Sverige. Det konstateras dock att det inte går att isolera ett eller ett fåtal verktyg som kan bedömas utgöra de mest optimala för att arbeta förebyggande online. Istället kan olika former av verktyg bidra med olika aspekter. Därför krävs det också en palett av olika initiativ – med olika funktioner och fokusområden. I vissa fall bör även dessa initiativ integreras i en omfattande handlingsplan och strategi.

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  • 2.
    Brenner, Björn
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Division of Strategy.
    Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance2017Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Hamas is designated a terrorist organization by Israel, the EU, the USA and the UN. It has made itself notorious for its violent radicalism and uncompromising rejection of the Jewish state. So after its victory in the 2006 elections the world was watching. How would Hamas govern? Could an Islamist group without any experience of power - and with an unwavering ideology - manage to deal with day-to-day realities on the ground? Bjorn Brenner investigates what happened after the elections and puts the spotlight on the people over whom Hamas rules, rather than on its ideas. Lodging with Palestinian families and experiencing their daily encounters with Hamas, he offers an intimate perspective of the group as seen through local eyes. The book is based on hard-to-secure interviews with a wide range of key political and security figures in the Hamas administration, as well as with military commanders and members of the feared Qassam Brigades. Brenner has also sought out those that Hamas identifies as local trouble makers: the extreme Salafi-Jihadis and members of the now more quiescent mainstream Fatah party led by Mahmoud Abbas. The book provides a new interpretation of one of the most powerful forces in the Israel-Palestine arena, arguing that the Gazan Islamists carry a potential to be much more flexible and pragmatic than anticipated - if they would think they stand to gain from it. Gaza under Hamas investigates the key challenges to Hamas's authority and reveals why and in what ways ideology comes second to power consolidation.

  • 3.
    Cilluffo, Frank J
    et al.
    George Washington University.
    Cozzens, Jeffrey B
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories and Conflict Zones2010Report (Other academic)
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  • 4. Cozzens, Jeff
    et al.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Does al Qaeda continue to pose a serious international threat?: YES: The Enduring al-Qa’ida Threat: A Network Perspective2012In: Contemporary Debates on Terrorism / [ed] Richard Jackson and Justin Sinclair, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 90-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Fielitz, Maik
    et al.
    Hamburgs Universitet, (DEU).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Lodenius, Anna-Lena
    Lööw, Heléne
    Mellander, Erik
    Mulhall, Joe
    Hope not Hate, Storbritannien, (GBR).
    Normark, Magnus
    Totalförsvarets forskningsinsitut (FOI), (SWE).
    Sivenbring, Jennie
    Göteborgs Universitet (SWE).
    Ahlin, Filip (Editor)
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Från Nordiska motståndsrörelsen till alternativhögern: En studie om den svenska radikalnationalistiska miljön2020Report (Other academic)
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  • 6.
    Gustafsson, Linus
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    From the Welfare State to the Caliphate: How a Swedish suburb became a breeding ground for foreign fighters streaming into Syria and Iraq.2015In: Foreign policy, ISSN 0015-7228, E-ISSN 1945-2276Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 7.
    Gustafsson, Linus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: An Analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data2017Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The conflict in Syria and Iraq has resulted in an increase in the number of violent Islamist extremists in Sweden, and a significant increase of people from Sweden travelling to join terrorist groups abroad. Since 2012 it is estimated that about 300 people from Sweden have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and, to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Even though the foreign fighter issue has been on the political agenda for several years and received considerable media attention, very little is known about the Swedish contingent.

    The purpose of this study is to examine a set of variables of the foreign fighters that have travelled from Sweden to join jihadi terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq in the period of June 2012 to September 2016. Much of the statistical data analysed have been declassified and provided by the Swedish Security Service. The variables examined are: time of travel; age; gender; geographical concentration in Sweden; citizenship and country of origin; average time spent in the conflict area; numbers of individuals killed; number of returnees; number of fighters remaining in the conflict area; social media activities; and the financing of foreign fighters. The analysis includes 267 people that are or have been residents of Sweden.

    36 people (first-time travellers) travelled to Syria or Iraq in 2012, 98 in 2013, 78 in 2014, 36 in 2015, and 5 in 2016. In addition, some of the foreign fighters have travelled back and forth between the conflict area and Sweden. About 80 percent are associated with IS, and more than 30 percent are associated with Jabhat al-Nusra. 76 percent of the foreign fighters are men and 24 percent are women. The amount of women has significantly changed during the period, from “a few” in 2012 to 18 percent in 2013, and constituting about 40 percent of the foreign fighters in the conflict area in 2014 and 2015.

    The average age of the foreign fighters is 26, and there are no significant differences between the average age of men and women. Still, there is a great variation indicating there are very young travellers but also older ones, as the age ranges in a span of 50 years. 18 percent of the travellers (45 people) are 19 or younger, while about 60 percent (154 people) are between the ages of 20 to 29. Very few people above the age of forty seem to travel. The average age does not change over the period.

    A majority of the foreign fighters, an estimated 80 percent, come from four of Sweden’s 21 counties – Västra Götaland, Stockholm, Skåne and Örebro. About one third of the foreign fighters are, or have been, registered in Västra Götaland County, one quarter in Stockholm County, and a tenth in Örebro County and a tenth in Skåne County. More than seventy percent have been residents of an exposed area (socially deprived areas hit by high criminality and low socioeconomic status). There is information that there have been recruiters in some of the areas, but social media may also have played a role in the mobilisation of foreign fighters.

    75 percent of the foreign fighters are Swedish citizens, and 34 percent are born in Sweden. There are geographical concentrations to North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, as was seen in the 1990’s and 2000’s. There are also concentrations to the Former Yugoslavia and Russia. 38 countries are represented when analysing country of birth, and most of the foreign fighters have at least one parent with country of birth outside of Sweden.

    The average time spent in the conflict area is 16 months, but there is great variation where some foreign fighters have been there for only a month and others for several years. The average time spent for men is 16 months, while the average for women is 21 months.

    At least 49 people from Sweden have died in Syria or Iraq. All of them are men. The data shows that there are no indications that a larger group of the Swedish foreign fighters has been killed in one single battle. Not more than three people have died during a single month. About half of those who have died are from the Västra Götaland region.

    As of September 2016, 106 foreign fighters (40 percent) had returned to Sweden, while 112 (42 percent) were still in Syria or Iraq. It is estimated that 49 of the 267 (18 percent) have died in the conflict.

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  • 8.
    Gustafsson, Linus
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Vilken roll har polisen för att förebygga och förhindra våldsbejakande extremism?2014Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Hansén, Dan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Ranstorp, MagnusSwedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Cooperating Against Terrorism: EU-US Relations Post September 112007Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
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  • 10. Lygre, R B
    et al.
    Eid, J
    Larsson, Gerry
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Leadership and Management (ILM).
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS).
    Terrorism as a process: A critical review of Moghaddam's "Staircase to terrorism" model2011In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 52, no 6, p. 609-616Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study reviews empirical evidence for Moghaddam’s model “Staircase to Terrorism,” which portrays terrorism as a process of six consecutive steps culminating in terrorism. An extensive literature search, where 2,564 publications on terrorism were screened, resulted in 38 articles which were subject to further analysis. The results showed that while most of the theories and processes linked to Moghaddam’s model are supported by empirical evidence, the proposed transitions between the different steps are not. These results may question the validity of a linear stepwise model and may suggest that a combination of mechanisms/factors could combine in different ways to produce terrorism.

  • 11.
    Nicander, Lars
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ranstorp, MagnusUniversity of St Andrews.
    Terrorism in the Information Age: New Frontiers?2004Conference proceedings (editor) (Other academic)
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  • 12.
    Normark, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Financial activities linked  to persons from Sweden  and Denmark who joined  terrorist groups in Syria  and Iraq during the period  2013 ‐ 2016: Report commissioned by Finansinspektionen2017Report (Other academic)
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  • 13.
    Normark, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Finansiella aktiviteter kopplade till personer från Sverige och Danmark som anslutit sig till terrorgrupper i Syrien och Irak mellan 2013 - 2016: Rapport på uppdrag av Finansinspektionen2017Report (Other academic)
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  • 14.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Al-Qa'ida - An Expanded Global Network of Terror2005In: RUSI Journal, ISSN 0307-1847, E-ISSN 1744-0378, Vol. 150, no 3, p. 40-43Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Al-Qaida in Cyberspace: Future Challenges of Terrorism in an Information Age2004In: Terrorism in the information age: new frontiers? / [ed] Lars Nicander & Magnus Ranstorp, Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2004, p. 58-72Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security.
    Extremist Offender Management i Danmark2020In: Extremist Offender Management i Europa: Landsrapporter, London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) , 2020, p. 15-20Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security.
    Extremist Offender Management in Sweden2020In: Extremist Offender Management in Europe: Country Reports, London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) , 2020, p. 87-96Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hamas2005In: Motives, Means and Mayhem: Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Unconventional Weapons / [ed] John Parachini, Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 2005Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hezbollah Training Camps in Lebanon2006In: The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes. Vol. 2, Training / [ed] James J.F. Forest, Praeger, 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Hezbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision- Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions1994In: Terrorism and Political Violence, ISSN 0954-6553, E-ISSN 1556-1836, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 303-339Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Any analysis of the behaviour of the pro‐Iranian Hizbollah organisation in Lebanon requires both an understanding of the movement itself, in terms of its decision‐making apparatus and internal clerical factionalism, and the mechanisms of its institutionalised relationship with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria through military and civilian channels at work within Lebanon. This article argues that Hizbollah's behaviour is principally governed by the depth and allegiance of closely forged relationships between individual Hizbollah leaders and Iranian clergy as well as the adaptability of a particular Hizbollah leader to suit the movement's activity to specific requirements within Lebanon and in the region. As such, clerical factionalism within Hizbollah can be monitored by the ascendancy or demotion of clergymen over the leadership and is also a guide to the direction of the movement in Lebanon as well as to the affiliation and loyalty of Hizbollah's leadership with clerical factions and institutions in Iran.

  • 21.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Hezbollah's Future?: Part 11995In: Jane's Intelligence Review, ISSN 1350-6226, Vol. 7, no 1, p. 34-36Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 22.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Hezbollah's Future?: Part 21995In: Jane's Intelligence Review, ISSN 1350-6226, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 81-83Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 23. Ranstorp, Magnus
    Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis1997Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Lebanese Hizb'Alla organisation and its involvement in the abduction of Western citizens is a complex subject veiled in secrecy which plagued the conduct of foreign policy for most Western governments for over a decade. The West's chequered response to the hostage-crisis underlines the dilemma of the fulfilment of these state's duty to protect their citizens taken hostage abroad without major sacrifices in the conduct of foreign policy. This study demonstrates that the abduction of Western citzens by the Hizb'Allah was motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests and that mechanisms for the resolution of the hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'Allah, Iran, and Syria, influenced by internal Lebanese, regional and international events.

  • 24.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    International Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat: Where are We Post-9/112005In: Terrorism in the UK - Broadening the Government's Counter-Terrorist Response - CONTEST / [ed] Wyn Bowen; Andrew Stewart, Shrivenham: UK Defence Academy , 2005Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Interpreting the broader context and meaning of Bin‐Laden's Fatwa1998In: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, ISSN 1057-610X, E-ISSN 1521-0731, Vol. 21, no 4, p. 321-330Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article analyzes the “inner logic” of the fatwa issued by Usamah Bin‐Laden and a coalition of four other Islamic movements on 22 February 1998. Having first discussed the significance of the “Bin‐Laden phenomenon “ on terrorism in general, an analysis is made of the underlying reasons and broader context of Bin‐Laden's worldview and the fatwa’s appeal to his followers for violent action. It is argued that thisfatwa, when combined with the content of Bin‐Laden's “Declaration of War” in 1996, is neither revolutionary nor unique to broader Muslim concerns but rather is part and parcel of a broader contest over sacred authority in Saudi Arabia and over continued U.S. military presence on the Arabian peninsula. These issues are explored, coupled with the way in which the fatwa illuminates crucial factors behind the behavior of Bin‐Laden and other Islamic revolutionaries.

  • 26.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    'Lone Wolf Terrorism': The Case of Anders Breivik2013In: Sicherheit und Frieden, ISSN 0175-274X, Vol. 31, no 2, p. 87-92Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction2006Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 28.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Mapping Terrorism Studies After 9/11: an Academic Field of Old Problems and New Prospects2009In: Critical Terrorism Studies: a New Research Agenda / [ed] Jackson, Richard & Smyth, Marie & Gunning, Jeroe, London: Routledge , 2009, p. 13-33Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Preventing Violent Radicalization: The Case of Indonesia2009Report (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Research challenges involved in field study on terrorism in the Middle East2013In: Conducting Terrorism Field Research: A Guide / [ed] Adam Dolnik, Routledge, 2013, p. 46-61Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Saudi Arabia and the Global Fight Against Al Qaida2004In: RUSI Journal, ISSN 0307-1847, E-ISSN 1744-0378, Vol. 149, no 1, p. 32-35Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 32.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Terrorism in 2011: bin Laden, the Arab Spring and... Breivik2013In: The emerging Global Security Environment / [ed] Bo Huldt, Pekka Sivonen, Tomas Ries, Camilla Huldt, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2013, p. 271-300Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    Terrorism in the Name of Religion1996In: Journal of International Affairs, ISSN 0022-197X, Vol. 50, no 1, p. 41-62Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 34.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Terrorist Awakening in Sweden?2011In: CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, no 1, p. 1-5Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Strategic Art of Deception2006In: Challenges to Peace-building: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution / [ed] Edward Newman & Oliver P Richmond, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    University of St Andrews.
    The strategy and tactics of Hizballah's current ‘Lebanonization process’1998In: Mediterranean Politics, ISSN 1362-9395, E-ISSN 1743-9418, Vol. 3, no 1, p. 103-134Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    This article contains a careful description and analysis of the transformation of Hizballah from a small rag‐tag militia, skillfully combining terrorist and guerrilla warfare techniques with effective social action on the local level during the chaos of Lebanon's civil war, to a formidable, legitimate political, military and social force on the Lebanese scene in the 1990's, in what has been described as its ‘Lebanonization’ process. This so‐called ‘Lebanonization’ process of Hizballah has become a trademark of the movement. It is visible in the close interrelationship between its political, social, and military activity which has extended its opportunities. It shows an ability to exercise pragmatic judgement within the conditions and limitations imposed on it by Syria's agenda and within the confessional nature of Lebanon's political make‐up. It also demonstrates the limits of Hizballah's manoeuvring within the framework of the wider Iranian‐Syrian relationship and the limits to its ability in presenting itself as an alternative oppositional force amidst sectarian politics and Syrian hegemony. Hizballah strongly emphasizes that it is entirely Lebanese in character rather than a foreign entity directed by Iran in order to reinforce its internal legitimacy within Lebanon.

  • 37.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    The Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in an Age of Globalisation2007In: International Relations and Security in the Digital Age / [ed] Johan Eriksson, Giampiero Giacomello, London: Routledge, 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe2010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Utveckling och säkerhet: Metoder för att motverka radikalisering och terrorism i Indonesien2009Report (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Väkivaltainen Islamistinen Terrorismi Ruotsissa2011In: Suomi, terrorismi, Supo: koira, joka ei haukkunut: miksi ja miten Suomi on välttynyt terroristisen toiminnan leviämiseltä? / [ed] Anssi Kullberg, Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö , 2011, p. 362-380Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 41.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Ahlerup, Linda
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    LVU-kampanjen: Desinformation, konspirationsteorier, och kopplingarna mellan det inhemska och det internationella i relation till informationspåverkan från icke-statliga aktörer2023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Förekomsten av misstro gentemot svenska myndigheter, rättsväsendet, och olika former av kommunal verksamhet – som exempelvis socialtjänsten – är inte något nytt fenomen i en svensk kontext, och har särskilt uppmärksammats i relation till utsatta områden. Frågan om socialtjänstens roll har också exploaterats inom radikalislamistiska miljöer – både nationellt och internationellt. I början av år 2022 uppmärksammades en otillbörlig informations-påverkanskampanj i relation till just den svenska socialtjänsten samt Lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga (LVU), som bland annat gjorde gällande att den svenska socialtjänsten kidnappar barn och särskilt riktar in sig på barn med utländskt påbrå och muslimsk trosuppfattning. Flera olika aktörer i Sverige förenades inledningsvis på sociala medier samt genom fysiska demonstrationer, varpå frågan även fick en omfattande internationell dimension. Detta skulle sedermera komma att utvecklas till det som benämnts som den största påverkanskampanj som Sverige någonsin har träffats av. I kölvattnet av kampanjen har det både förekommit hat och hot mot svenska offentliga institutioner och enskilda socialsekreterare, samt uppmaningar till våld och terrorattentat. Vidare har det även påvisats hur aktörer med kopplingar till radikalislamistiska miljöer – inklusive våldsbejakande sådana – har främjat samt bidragit till att sprida sådana narrativ.

    Följande studie presenterar en kronologisk redogörelse för den så kallade LVU-kampanjens uppkomst och utveckling, både i Sverige och internationellt, samt kopplingarna mellan dessa dimensioner. Studiens empiriska material består främst av innehåll från öppna sociala medier, med ett särskilt fokus på Twitter, Facebook och YouTube, och baseras bland annat på en daglig genomgång av ett antal framträdande utländska arabisk- och turkiskspråkiga konton – både inför kampanjens uppkomst år 2021 samt under dess massiva utveckling under 2022. Utöver den kronologiska redogörelsen genomförs även en narrativanalys av centrala teman och narrativ som förekommit. Slutligen presenteras även en kvantitativ redogörelse för kampanjens och frågans spridning på sociala medier, baserat på aggregerade data från Svenska Institutet (SI). Studien tar därmed ett helhetsgrepp om olika parallella dimensioner av den så kallade LVU-kampanjen, med ett särskilt fokus på kopplingarna mellan det inhemska och det internationella i relation till informationspåverkan från icke-statliga aktörer.

    Studien visar att den otillbörliga informationspåverkanskampanjen inte kan betraktas som ett utpräglat utländskt fenomen, utan att den svenska och den internationella dimensionen inte går att separera. Grunden för LVU-frågans spridning lades i Sverige redan sommaren 2021 i samband med etableringen av den svenska proteströrelsen. Att frågan sedermera fick en så pass omfattande internationell spridning går i sin tur att härleda till ett flertal olika faktorer. En central aspekt är dels den konstanta interaktion som etablerades mellan svenska aktörer samt den mest tongivande aktören i en internationell kontext. Detta i form av Moustafa El-Sharqawy – mer känd under sitt användarnamn Shuoun Islamiya. Denna interaktion inleddes redan under slutet av år 2021, och innan dess att kampanjen och frågan blev viral. El-Sharqawy har därefter kontinuerligt belyst frågan samt ett stort antal konkreta svenska fall, vilka också har använts av tongivande utländska aktörer och mediekanaler.

    Att ett flertal utländska individer och organisationer med miljontals följare på sociala medier valt att lyfta och engagera sig i frågan har också utgjort en viktig faktor för kampanjens och frågansspridning och varaktighet. Bland dessa aktörer återfinns bland annat ett flertal religiösa predikanter och paraplyorganisationer, vilket också har gett kampanjen och frågan en avsevärd tyngd och legitimitet. Dessa aktörer har också gemensamt – bland annat genom ett internationellt upprop – formulerat förslag och krav på konkreta åtgärder. Vidare har omfattande och kontinuerlig utländsk medierapportering också gett frågan ytterligare legitimitet samt spridning.

    En viktig aspekt att ha i åtanke i relation till LVU-frågans uppkomst och utveckling är också att det har funnits väldigt få motkrafter i förhållande till den desinformation och de narrativ som har främjats och spridits internationellt. Fastän vissa aktörer försökt bemöta den desinformation och de felaktiga påståenden som cirkulerat online så har den enorma mängden av innehåll och desinformation trängt bort flera goda försök att utgöra en positiv motkraft samt att förmedla korrekt information. Flera av de aktörer som ifrågasatt desinformationen har dessutom utsatts för omfattande hat och hot, vilket exempelvis innefattat företrädare för svenska muslimska föreningar och församlingar. I sammanhanget är det viktigt att understryka att svenska muslimska företrädare inte har deltagit i kampanjen, utan istället har tagit avstånd från samt fördömt hat- och desinformationskampanjen.

    LVU-frågan och dess dragningskraft har dock inte uppstått i ett vakuum, utan bör snarare ses och förstås i relation till några av de sårbarheter och konfliktytor som finns i det svenska samhället. Detta omfattar dels förekomsten av misstro och bristande tillit gentemot svenska offentliga institutioner och myndighetsutövning, samt dels de inbyggda värderingskrockar som existerar mellan exempelvis kulturella och religiösa förväntningar respektive rättsliga principer i ett demokratiskt samhälle avseende individuella fri- och rättigheter – och särskilt i relation till barns rättigheter. Dessa sårbarheter och konfliktytor har strategiskt exploaterats av ett flertal nationella och internationella aktörer i syfte att främja ett övergripande strategiskt narrativ, samt för att sätta tryck på svensk offentlig förvaltning.

    Den så kallade LVU-kampanjen i kombination med koranbränningarna under 2022 och 2023 har skapat ett ny och skarp hotbild i och mot Sverige. Kampanjen och frågan har gått i vågor och har kontinuerligt återupplivats, där den ryska invasionen av Ukraina exempelvis skapade ett betydande avbrott. Det är dock tydligt att frågan aldrig har försvunnit helt, och vi kan därför inte heller förvänta oss att den kommer att försvinna framöver. Istället kommer den troligtvis att fortsätta i olika skepnader samt i varierande intensitet.

    För att motstå denna typ av fenomen krävs inte enbart förebyggande åtgärder mot desinformation specifikt, och det räcker inte heller med att enbart förmedla korrekt information. Istället krävs också omfattande förtroendeskapande insatser, vilket bör ske i direkt fysisk kontakt mellan invånare och statliga respektive kommunala instanser. Detta innefattar också ett behov av ökad kunskap och kompetens bland tjänstemän avseende aspekter som kulturella och religiösa normer och värderingar. Detta i syfte att skapa en ökad förståelse för de invånare man möter i sitt vardagliga arbete. Det är därmed viktigt att adressera de underliggande sårbarheter och konfliktytor som existerar i det svenska samhället, och som utgör en grund för att denna typ av kampanjer tillåts att få fäste. Att enbart arbeta mot desinformation men inte ägna resurser åt det långsiktiga förebyggande och förtroendeskapande arbetet skulle annars utgöra ett illustrativt exempel på där man enbart fokuserar på symptomen, snarare än de underliggande orsakerna till samtidens existerande hot och utmaningar. Här krävs koordinerade insatser från svenska myndigheter och kommuner på en helt annan nivå än vad som sker idag.

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  • 42.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Ahlerup, LindaSwedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.Ahlin, FilipSwedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    Salafi-Jihadism and Digital Media: The Nordic and International Context2022Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book explores the online strategies and presence of Salafi-Jihadi actors in the Nordic as well as the international context.

    Global Salafi-jihadism has been at the epicentre of international focus during the past decade. This book explores how the Swedish and other Nordic Salafi-jihadist sympathisers have used social digital media to radicalise, recruit, and propagate followers in relation to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and online communities. The chapters in this volume unpack different perspectives of Salafi-jihadi communications strategies, as well as how the international Salafi-jihadi community has constantly reconfigured and adapted to changing security conditions. The case studies of the Nordics constitute a microcosm of wider Salafi-jihadi narratives in relation to the rise and fall of the Islamic State’s so-called ‘digital caliphate’.

    This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, counter-extremism and counter-terrorism, social media and security studies.

  • 43.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlerup, Linda
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Gränslös extremism: En studie om transnationella kopplingar till svenska radikala miljöer2021Report (Other academic)
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    fulltext
  • 44.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism: Influence and Challenges for Swedish Society2019Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines the influence from salafi and salafi-jihadist milieus inSweden and the interactions between these different forms. This executivesummary focuses on the evolution of salafi-jihadis milieus in Sweden andsurrounding salafi elements; messages from these milieus; their methods forinfluence and the impact on local communities in Sweden.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 45.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Mellan salafism och salafistisk jihadism: Påverkan mot och utmaningar för det svenska samhället2018Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna studie undersöker påverkan från salafistiska och salafist-jihaditiska miljöer i Sverige samt relationendem emellan. Fokus läggs på framväxten av salafist-jihadistiska miljöer i Sverige samt omgärdande salafistiskaelement; vilka budskap miljöerna förmedlar, metoder för påverkan samt vilken upplevd påverkan miljöerna hari svenska lokalsamhällen.

    Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) har beställt och finansierat genomförandet av dennaforskningsrapport (alt. studierapport). Författarna är ensamma ansvariga för rapportens innehåll.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 46.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Brun, Hans
    Terrorism Learning and Innovation: Lessons from PIRA in Northern Ireland: A closed workshop summary2013Report (Other academic)
    Download (jpg)
    presentationsbild
  • 47.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Dos Santos, Josefine
    Hot mot demokrati och värdegrund - en lägesbild från Malmö2009Report (Other academic)
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    fulltext
  • 48.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    University of St Andrews.
    Gunaratna, Rohan
    Taking on the kidnappers2001In: Jane's Intelligence Review, ISSN 1350-6226, Vol. 13, no 5, p. 10-11Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 49.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Gustafsson, Linus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism på lokal nivå: Exempel och lärdomar från Sverige och Europa2015Report (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 50.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Herd, Graeme
    George C. Marshall Center.
    Approaches to Countering Terrorism and CIST2007In: The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies For Counter-Terrorism / [ed] Anne Aldis,Graeme Herd, London: Routledge, 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
12 1 - 50 of 61
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