A wealth of research in comparative politics and international relations examines how the military intervenes in politics via coups. We shift attention to broader forms of military involvement in politics beyond coups and claim that terrorist violence and the threat of terror attacks provide a window of opportunity for military intervention, without taking full control of state institutions. We highlight two mechanisms through which terrorism influences military involvement in politics: (1) government authorities demand military expertise to fight terrorism and strengthen national security and “pull” the armed forces into politics, and (2) state armed actors exploit their informational advantage over civilian authorities to “push” their way into politics and policy-making. A panel data analysis shows that domestic terror attacks and perceived threats from domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase military involvement in politics. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms with the cases of France (1995–1998 and 2015–2016) and Algeria (1989–1992).
A considerable amount of research within security studies has explored the military’s increasingly diverse and multifaceted tasks. However, this debate has been disconnected from the literature on civil-military relations to the effect that we still lack knowledge about how and why these operational tasks have consequences for the relations between the armed forces, civilian authorities, and society at large. In order to provide for a better understanding of these effects, this introduction to the Special Issue debates the concept of operational experiences to capture how the military’s routine activities affect the equilibria, logics, and mechanisms of civil-military relations. The article then provides an overview of the Special Issue’s six contributions, whose diverse and global perspectives shed light on different aspects of the relationship between military missions and the military’s roles in society and politics. Among other factors, they highlight role conceptions - the military’s shared views on the purpose of the institution - as crucial in shaping the dynamic relation between what the military does and what place it occupies within the state and society. The article concludes by describing potentially fruitful areas of future research.
Academic research on civil-military relations often assumes that dangers for democracy and civilian control mainly emanate from the military’s predisposition of ‘pushing’ its way into politics. Yet, civilian control frequently is a precondition for governments’ moves of ‘pulling’ the military into roles that may potentially be problematic. These can include the military’s involvement in political disputes or internal public security missions. Notwithstanding its empirical relevance, little academic work has been devoted to understanding how ‘pulling’ works. In this article, we aim to provide a first, exploratory framework of ‘pulling’ that captures the dynamics of the military’s reactions and indirect consequences for civil-military relations. We identify three analytically distinct phases in which pulling occurs. First, politicians initiate either operational or political pulling moves. Second, we situate the military’s reaction on a spectrum that ranges from refusal to non-conditional compliance. This reaction is driven by the military’s role conceptions about appropriate missions and their relation to politics. In a third phase, the military may slowly start shifting its role conceptions to adapt to its new roles. We illustrate our argument with case studies of two different instances of pulling: operational pulling in the case of France (2015-19) and operational - then-turned-political - pulling in the case of Brazil (2010-20).
Over the past decades, debates revolving around the role and challenges of military families have developed into an important subfield in military sociology. Throughout history, military families have played an important role for military forces, and in the post-World War II era, the role of the family has shifted as a consequence of military professionalization. Research on military families explores the different demands placed upon service members from both the military organization and the family. More recently, such research has studied how the inclusion of women and gender minorities, operational deployments, and broader societal changes transformed the composition, stakes, and challenges of military families and the traditional idea of the military spouse.
Coherence is a core objective in most multinational interventions and seems of particular relevance to UN peacekeeping missions with their increasing complexity and multidimensionality. Yet, coherence has rarely been studied empirically. We borrow the concept of ‘fit’ from organizational theory and use it to develop a conceptual framework to study coherence in peacekeeping operations. Fit is the degree of match between what is required by the mandate, on the one hand, and an institutional set-up and the implemented practices, on the other. We identify three relevant dimensions of fit to study coherence: strategic and organizational, cultural and human and operational fit. Our empirical material focuses on the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and in particular on the interplay between the intelligence components and the rest of the mission. We draw upon a large empirical dataset containing over 120 semi-structured interviews, field observations and participation in pre-deployment exercises and evaluation sessions. Our empirical analysis suggests that low level of fit across several dimensions leads to inertial and widespread frictions in the practice of peacekeeping and could potentially undermine peacekeeping effectiveness. Building on existing scholarship on micro-level approaches to peacekeeping, we hope to further the debate on organizational dynamics within peace operations.
This case is about the comparative case study method and discusses the opportunities and challenges of designing and conducting it in practice. It draws on my research about military organizations in peace operations. In my research, I argue that military organizational cultures influence the way in which soldiers behave while deployed in a peace mission and, ultimately, their ability to keep peace. I complement this argument with an explanation for why those domestic national military cultures look the way they do. To answer my questions, I combine most similar system with most different system designs and compare French and Italian units deployed in the UN mission in Lebanon and the NATO mission in Afghanistan, respectively. I collected my data combining in-depth qualitative interviews, semi-structured questionnaires, focus groups, and observations between 2007 and 2014.
International responses to conflicts and humanitarian emergencies have become more crowded. Not only do traditional actors intervene on a greater scale, such as non-governmental organizations and the military, but new actors such as Private Military Security Companies also play an increasingly important role. These actors often differ in their precise objective and the constituencies they are accountable to. Yet, the practices of these actors in operations are intertwined and many of their tasks overlap. Improved communication and coordination of these actors in complex operations can thus be expected to lead to strong increases in mission effectiveness. This Special Issue provides a conceptual platform to understand and explain under what conditions coordination among these actors occurs. The articles cluster around three themes. A first set focuses on who the actors involved are along a private vs public and military vs civilian divide; a second group of articles assesses experiences of coordination of different actors in the field; finally, a third looks at a plurality of elements that may trigger or hinder coordination.
Although hundreds of thousands of soldiers from different national contingents are deployed every year in multinational peace operations, no previous study has examined differences in peacekeeping practices along national lines. This paper first documents systematically differences in the way national contingents behave during peace operations in their respective area of operation. In a second step, it argues that these differences in behavior are largely consistent with the most important traits of each army's military culture. Based on extensive fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2014 in Lebanon and Afghanistan, the paper shows how, within each mission, Italian soldiers prioritized humanitarian activities, while the French engaged in more patrolling activities, despite being both contingents deployed under similar conditions. These variations in behavior are consistent with the way French and Italian soldiers perceive the mission and context in which they deployed. And both the differences in behavior and perception are in line with the respective armies' military cultures. This paper contributes to the debate on the role of ideational factors in international politics and in particular to the ongoing discussion on strategic and military cultures.
This article seeks to explain the relationship between the European Union (EU) and one of its Middle Eastern neighbors: Lebanon. By conducting an in-depth empirical single case study and engaging in competitive theory testing, this article shows that the EU in Lebanon behaves at the same time as a normative and a realist power. This article challenges both the scholarship on the EU that sees the EU as a normative power as well as scholarship that focuses on structural neorealism to explain the EU's role in its neighborhood. This article adopts an approach that is different from the mainstream approaches in two ways. First, it focuses on the entire set of policies that the EU has implemented or not in Lebanon. Second, it provides an in-depth case study centered on the interaction between the EU and Lebanon, while also looking at the regional dynamics and at the domestic tensions within Lebanon. By doing so, it shows that the EU is a ‘realist-normative’ power in the specific case of Lebanon. Thus, these two frameworks are a false dichotomy and the argument shall be tested on other cases to make it generalizable. This suggests that the constructivist-realist divide coexists in practice
Why does peacekeeping sometimes fail? How can effective peacekeepers increase the likelihood of success of a mission? The two main flaws in the current evaluations of peace operations are that they mainly rely on already concluded missions and that they make use of indicators that do not reveal micro-level dynamics. This article introduces an analytical framework relating the effectiveness of soldiers to their actual impact in their area of operation in a peace operation. The framework is called “unit peace operation effectiveness” (UPOE). Focusing on soldiers in peace operations, this article shows that: different units behave differently; emphasize different aspects of the mandate; and are effective in different ways. Ultimately, this has an actual impact on the end-state of the mission. It relies on and adapts classic security studies works to theoretically enrich the peacekeeping literature. The model is tested in an illustrative case study based on ethnographic work on French and Italian units in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010.
This exploratory article points out how armies differ in the performance of their daily military activities during a peacekeeping mission and analyses the role of contrasting perceptions of the mission operational environment in explaining this variation. As a first step, this article documents systematic variations in the way French, Ghanaian, Italian, and Korean units implement the mandate of the UN mission in Lebanon in their daily military activity. Second, it shows that the four armies also interpret or “construct” the operational environment differently and in a way that is consistent with their different military behavior. Third, preliminary evidence suggests that previous experiences of each army influence the way in which the operational environment is constructed. Data were collected combining participant observation in Southern Lebanon with questionnaires and interviews. This article thus builds on sociological works on different operational styles but takes a methodological approach closer to that in security studies.
The tactical level has become increasingly important in the conduct of contemporary complex military operations. Yet, the potential impact that this tactical level may have on domestic civil–military relations has been neglected. In this article, we focus on mechanisms by which low-level soldiers have acquired an increasing importance in tactical operations and we suggest that this may influence civil–military relations in the future. We argue that two phenomena deserve particular attention. These mechanisms are not new but they have had new effects by making it possible for soldiers to influence politics in sometimes unforeseen ways: the first is the strategic corporal and the second is the expansion of ancillary tasks. Our contribution lies at the interface between military sociology and security studies and seeks to show how the tactical level of warfare has become a fundamental context in which civil–military relations are enacted. Exploring these dynamics is fundamental to understanding under what conditions soldiers may interact with other actors in complex operations.
Qualitative scholars exhibit a wide range of views on and approaches to causality. While some approaches reject causality from the outset, a large strand of qualitative research in political science and international relations does, however, pursue causal explanation. Qualitative scholars nevertheless disagree about what causality means. Our paper reviews what causality means within different strands of qualitative research and how qualitative scholars engage in causal explanations. We focus particular attention on the fertile middle ground between qualitative research that seeks to mimic the statistical model and research that rejects causality entirely. In broad strokes, we understand views of causality as lying on a spectrum and partly overlapping. Along the spectrum, we identify three main clusters: ‘positivist leaning,’ ‘postpositivist leaning,’ and ‘Interpretivist leaning.’ Within each cluster, we identify the main traits and provide illustrative examples. We find merit in each of these three clusters of approaches and in the ongoing dialogue among qualitative scholars of different orientations. Understanding similarities and differences in the way various scholars address causality might encourage some to take steps along the spectrum and expand their repertoires to embrace elements of other approaches. By making these distinctions more explicit, we hope to be able to enhance our understanding of different views of causality and the extent to which they overlap and provide the potential for collaboration.
Peacekeeping helps to prevent conflict and to protect civilians. But how does it work to achieve those aims? Notwithstanding a growing recognition that peacekeeping mandates alone do not directly determine what actually happens in the field, we still know little about how-once deployed-military units translate an ambiguous mandate into action. In this paper, we focus on one dimension of peacekeepers’ behavior that has become increasingly important, namely, how peacekeepers relate to other military units with whom they are supposed to implement their mandate. We systematically document how mandate interpretations emerge and how they influence peacekeepers’ understanding of other troops they work with. Central to this is peacekeepers’ meaning making, a concept we borrow from the sociological literature, which refers to the common and human process through which individuals give meaning to their surrounding context. Drawing on nearly 120 interviews with peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations (UN) mission in Mali (2014-2019), we identify three different ways by which peacekeepers interpret their mandate and interact with other contingents: Voltaire’s garden; building bridges; and othering. Acknowledging peacekeepers’ agency and the social dimension of peacekeeping has important implications for both scholarly and policy debates.
Frames guide the way in which organizations and individuals interpret their surrounding contexts and shape avenues for thought, action, and behavior. This paper tests the individuallevel effects of experiencing ‘frame disputes’: the state of holding individual-level frames that are at odds with dominant organizational frames. We hypothesize that on the individual level a frame dispute will be associated with negative effects on outcomes important for an organization’s functioning. The hypothesis is tested using a survey of a battalion of Italian soldiers. Our results demonstrate that, on average, soldiers who experienced frame disputes in that they perceived their mission differently from the dominant organizational frame displayed significantly lower levels of perceived cohesion, performance, and legitimacy. Frame disputes are likely to be widespread phenomena among organizations and social movements, and understanding their effects has theoretical, empirical, and policy relevance beyond the military case under study.
In complex humanitarian emergencies, why are NGO-military relations cooperative in some cases, yet deeply conflictual in others? Drawing on historical-institutionalist theoretical insights, we argue that NGOs and military organizations are embedded in, and responding to, domestic institutional configurations that define a set of political incentives and constraints, material and normative, which structures and influences the characteristics and outcomes of their relations. Counterarguments suggest that organizational differences and the nature of their missions affect NGO-military relations. Using fresh empirical evidence we assess these arguments by comparing the Italian and the French experiences of NGO-military relations during the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan and the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) between 2007 and 2011. We find that domestic institutional configurations are not left behind when NGOs and military units deploy abroad. Rather, they shape NGOs' and militaries' capacity to work together instead of at cross purposes and ultimately influence the success of international action.
Notwithstanding the prominence of the so-called Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion (SMMGC), important parts of the model are understudied: both conceptually and empirically. In this article we, first, synthesize previous research to conceptualize and measure the overlooked institutional cohesion dimension. Second, we test the validity of the proposed full four-dimensional SMMGC model using a survey of an Italian Alpini battalion, and more rigorous methods than in previous research. Results are supportive of our proposed measurements and the validity of the four-dimensional model. We thus make a methodological and an empirical contribution to further the ongoing debate on military cohesion.