Efforts to raise awareness about foreign disinformation might accidentally increase distrust towards legitimate media. We argue that state discourse on disinformation is comparable to strategic framing in journalists’ coverage of political events, and that it might imbue audiences with cynicism. Furthermore, in contrast to an experimental paradigm that depicts disinformation audiences as passive, we suggest that news consumers actively appropriate and produce content themselves. Conceptualising media content as ‘strategic’ rather than sincere might influence audiences to share and produce media content strategically. This Machiavellian tendency leads to similar effects on bias as motivated reasoning. Most accounts of motivated reasoning assume that limits of psychological processing are the reasons for biased judgements of what is true and fake, however, we argue that biases can also be due to culturally acquired second-order beliefs about knowledge. To explain this, we build on ideas about ‘folk epistemology’ and propose the term ‘strategic epistemology towards media’. Resistance-building efforts against disinformation risk promoting such a strategic epistemology towards media and this can have harmful effects on democratic dialogue. To avoid this, educational interventions should be premised on social epistemology rather than experimental psychology.
This article suggests a diagnostic framework of public communication intended to capture new communication strategies used by Armed Forces across Europe to legitimize new tasks and recruit new personnel. Three distinct communicative models that impact differently on democratic values and public support are suggested: an Old Public Administration (OPA) model influenced by bureaucratic values, a New Public Management (NPM) model fuelled by market values and a deliberative model labelled ‘New Public Service’ (NPS) that is largely influenced by proponents of ‘e-democracy’. A case study of the communication of the Swedish Armed Forces identifies a lingering bureaucratic (OPA) ideal. The market ideal (NPM) however clearly dominates. The article concludes that communication along market purposes, principles and practices risks distancing Armed Forces further from society. Yet, an embryonic deliberative ideal (NPS)—much fuelled by the use of social media such as blogs—was also identified. This growing ideal holds the potential of infusing deliberative vigor into the organization and presumably facilitates the bridging of the gap to society.
Previous research shows that the Swedish Armed Forces’ communication is dominatedby market communication, and that this may impact on how the organizationis anchored in society. By adopting a neo-institutional perspective to the studyof agency communication, this article aims to deepen the analysis of the ArmedForces’ communication. Our analysis, based on interviews and official documents,demonstrates both risks and opportunities with marketization of the Armed Forces’communication. On the one hand, market communication may lead to the neglectof alternative values and images of the Armed Forces. Also, the rushed changes incommunication strategies identified risk providing an image of a complex organizationthat is difficult to comprehend, which may undermine the Armed Forces’legitimacy. On the other hand, the Armed Forces’ enhanced role as an employer andcomprehensive use of social media has led to more transparency and to the fosteringof values corresponding to values in society at large. How the Armed Forces, itsleadership, management, and communicators relate to these opportunities andrisks will be crucial for the organization’s future legitimacy.
Projection of strategic narratives to gain competitive advantages is a central feature in the global competition for status and power. This article presents a comparative narrative analysis of how the Russian state sponsored news platform Sputnik narrates Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden 2014–2019. The objectives are to uncover what negative work strategic narratives can perform and to decipher how adverse narratives are constructed. The findings suggest that Sputnik uses a mix of standard strategies and tailor-made narratives, working to destruct, direct and suppress the Nordics. The analysis exposed distinct differences as Sputnik narrated Sweden and Denmark more negatively than Norway and Finland. The narratives can serve to divide and weaken the Nordics and the EU, and undermine international reputations of each state. The strategy of division through narratives is particularly problematic as polarization challenges Western democracies and the EU. The article furthers narrative research by testing a recently crafted analytical framework and by presenting findings that indicate a need for a broadened research agenda. Whereas previous research has primarily centred on how malign information influence can harm democracy, our results indicate that narratives can cause a broader variety of harms.
This book explores ‘lessons learned’ from the military intervention in Libya by examining key aspects of the 2011 NATO campaign. NATO’s intervention in Libya had unique features, rendering it unlikely to serve as a model for action in other situations. There was an explicit UN Security Council mandate to use military force, a strong European commitment to protect Libyan civilians, Arab League political endorsement and American engagement in the critical, initial phase of the air campaign. Although the seven-month intervention stretched NATO’s ammunition stockpiles and political will almost to their respective breaking points, the definitive overthrow of the Gaddafi regime is universally regarded as a major accomplishment. With contributions from a range of key thinkers and analysts in the field, the book first explains the law and politics of the intervention, starting out with deliberations in NATO and at the UN Security Council, both noticeably influenced by the concept of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It then goes on to examine a wide set of military and auxiliary measures that governments and defence forces undertook in order to increasingly tilt the balance against the Gaddafi regime and to bring about an end to the conflict, as well as to the intervention proper, while striving to keep the number of NATO and civilian casualties to a minimum. This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, history and war studies, and IR in general.
‘Othering’ – the view or treatment of another person or group as intrinsically different from and alien to oneself – is a central concept in the International Relations literature on identity construction. It is often portrayed as a fairly singular and predominantly negative form of self/Other differentiation. During the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden at first glance emerged as exactly such a negative Other. This article problematises such a view of Othering. Departing from a narrative analysis of news reporting on Sweden’s management of COVID-19 in the United States, Germany and the Nordic states, the article proposes an ideal type model with four forms of Othering – emotional, strategic, analytic and nuanced – not recognised in previous research. These types differ in their treatment of the Other as more or less significant and in involving a more or less self-reflexive construction of the self. Although narratives in all these settings drew on previously established narratives on Sweden, they followed different logics. This has implications for our understanding of Sweden as an Other in the time of COVID-19, as well as of self/Other relations in International Relations more broadly.
The advent of social media can be seen both as a risk and an opportunity by armed forces. Previous research has primarily examined whether or not the use of social media endangers or strengthens armed forces’ strategic narrative. We examine armed forces’ perceptions of risks and opportunities on a broad basis, with a particular focus on areas of deployment. The article is based on a survey of perceptions of social media amongst the armed forces of EU member states, thus adding to previous research through its comparative perspective. Whereas previous research has mainly focused on larger powers, such as the US and the UK, this article includes the views of the armed forces of 26 EU states, including several smaller nations. In analyzing the results we asked whether or not risk and opportunity perceptions were related to national ICT maturity and the existence of a social media strategy. The analysis shows that perceptions of opportunities outweigh perceptions of risks, with marketing and two-way communication as the two most prominent opportunities offered by the use of social media. Also, armed forces in countries with a moderate to high ICT maturity emphasize social media as a good way for marketing purposes.
How can European democratic states respond to Russian information warfare? This article aims to enable and spur systematic research of how democracies can respond to the spread of distorted information as part of information warfare. The article proposes four ideal-type models representing different strategies that democratic governments can employ; blocking, confronting, naturalising and ignoring. Each strategy is illustrated by ways of empirical examples of strategies applied by European states in view of what is regarded as an unwelcome Russian strategic narrative that is spread as part of information warfare. We problematise each strategy and explore reasons for why states choose one strategy over another. We then explore how different strategies might contribute to destabilise or stabilise the security environment and how they resonate with democratic values. Finally, we contribute to theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting that the choice of strategy will influence states in their formation of strategic narratives. We thus further theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting the link between strategies and narratives, thus identifying one central dynamic in how narratives are formed.
The new media situation gives fuel to increased competition between narratives. In the sphere of security this poses challenges to government strategic narratives. Scholars, drawing on findings from the Anglo-Saxon sphere, suggest that the new media activism gives rise to counter-hegemonic narratives that thrive on and through social media sites. We argue that the emergence of counter-narratives in the sphere of security depends upon a few key dynamics that might vary with political context such as political culture, the size of the blogosphere, the debate in mainstream media and socialization processes within the military organization. Our case study of Swedish blogging about Sweden’s military contribution to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan suggests that blogs are mainly used to sustain – and not to challenge – the governmental narrative. This invites us to question the significance of new media platforms as counter-hegemonic forces in communities beyond the Anglo-Saxon sphere.
The effects of exposure to Russian propaganda have long been feared; however, academic research examining responses is scarce. This study aims to investigate the responses of Russian speakers in Latvia to a narrative propagated by the Kremlin-sponsored media outlet Sputnik Latvia that narrates Latvian government policy as Russophobic. The potential to entrench existing ethnopolitical divisions has been highlighted as a possible effect of Russian speakers consuming this narration. We adopt a comprehensive, mixed-method research approach, where we first provide an analysis of the content of Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative in its recent output. Then, using this analysis, we examine how Russian-speaking participants respond to this content in a preregistered survey experiment and a focus group. Theoretically, we orient around the rejection-identification model. This predicts individuals to generally experience lower well-being after perceiving group-based discrimination, but that embracing the stigmatized identity can help maintain well-being despite this perceived devaluation. Our results showed that even brief exposure to Sputnik Latvia's Russophobia narrative led to higher levels of perceived discrimination and group identification in Russian speakers. However, we found no significant effects on well-being, which deviates from extant literature on discrimination. We discuss the reasons for this and suggest future directions.
Although concern about the effects of international audiences consuming Russian state-sponsored media has been expressed, little empirical research examines this. The current study asks how audiences in Latvia respond to narratives projected by Sputnik Latvia – a Kremlin-financed news outlet. We begin a tripartite methodological approach with an analysis of the types of narratives the outlet projects. We then test how ethnic Latvian and Russian-speaking participants in Latvia respond to destruction narratives that portray Latvia as “failing,” the most prominent type in our analysis. We use two survey experiments that test an existing hypothetical mediation model predicting an array of affective and trust responses. We find evidence that exposure to destruction narratives triggered largely similar responses in both groups; however, exploratory analyses and post-survey focus groups are used to show that their motivations may be different. We conclude by discussing potential reasons for these differences, and the ramifications of these results.
Russia utilizes state-sponsored news media outlets, such as RT or Sputnik, to project antagonistic strategic narratives into targeted societies and perturb international audiences. While psychological responses to this conduct are frequently assumed, there is a lack of causal evidence demonstrating this. Using a transdisciplinary perspective, we conducted four survey experiments that tested two path models predicting possible cognitive and emotional responses to two narrative strategies that Russian state-sponsored media employ: destruction, which portrays a state as weak and chaotic, and suppression, which portrays a state as indecent and morally deviant. The experiments had between-participant designs, where participants read either an article demonstrating a strategy or a control text, and then indicated their responses to several trust and emotional variables. Participants were either Swedish or Dutch citizens, to build on previous analyses of Russian narration about Sweden and The Netherlands. Path analyses revealed significant differences between the conditions on several response variables. However, we found no evidence that these effects were mediated by generalized realistic or symbolic threat perceptions. We contribute preliminary insights into potential causal links between Russian antagonistic narrative strategies and specific psychological responses. This study, and its overarching research agenda, should have implications for practitioners seeking to counter Russian information influence.
This article explores how armed forces in EU member states work with and view social media in national and international settings, and what the patterns of convergence/divergence are on these issues. To that end, a questionnaire targeted at EU armed forces was constructed. An index of qualitative variation was calculated to explore the relative convergence among respondents (n = 25) on issues of risks and opportunities with using social media nationally and internationally. Consistent with previous research on European armed forces, we found higher levels of divergence than convergence. Contrary to our expectations that similar challenges, joint international standards, and membership in international organizations would foster convergence with regard to social media use in areas of deployment, we found that convergence appeared foremost pertaining to the domestic level. Policy divergence was strongest in areas of deployment.
In this article we explore how Swedish citizens perceive security threats, and how threat perceptions overlap with ideology, trust and demographics. The results show that concerns over security threats are foremost connected to an authoritarian outlook. In addition, four typical groups of security orientations were identifed. On the one end of the spectrum, we found one group with anti-immigrant, anti-feminist and anti-egalitarian opinions and low confdence in media and institutions. At the other end, we identifed a group dominated by women with university degrees, who believe in egalitarian tolerance and display trust in societal institutions. Even though the findings are in line with previous research on the radical right globally, we were intrigued by the existence of a clearly defned group of respondents that oppose feminism to the extent that it is even seen as a security threat. This is particularly striking given that Sweden is thought of as one of the most equal countries in the world, with a government pursuing a feminist foreign policy.
The article asks what the evolution of NATO-Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO’s and Sweden’s recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community; identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.
This review article exposes that the scholarly interest in the notion of ‘responsibility’ in the field of security studies goes far beyond the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the debate on emerging ‘responsible stakeholders’ in Asia. It is argued that the significant scholarly attention to ‘responsibility’ reflects political concerns with transnational threats and humanitarian issues, but it also mirrors a quest for status and power in a post-hegemonic security milieu as well as a need to distribute responsibilities among powers in an effective way. The article reviews approximately 160 peer-reviewed articles to expose strengths and weaknesses in the scholarly production of knowledge on responsibility in the field of security studies. The article suggests a new way to categorize works on responsibility in terms of ‘doing’, ‘being’ or ‘sharing’; focusing on one or several of these three aspects is an effective way to capture key contemporary problems in international security.
The article challenges Ian Manners's 'Normative Power Europe' thesis by arguing that although the European Union (EU) promotes norms in the international arena, it is not different from other powers. Drawing on a large set of empirical data and making use of a new institutionalist framework, it discerns how major European powers - Russia, France, Germany, Britain and the EU - have worked to gain acceptance for their individual favoured normative yardstick in the realm of security. The article concludes that as a consequence of diverging logics of appropriateness in Europe, the EU should rather be regarded as a divided than as a strong normative power. As long as both the EU and its major member states hold strong individual normative ambitions, the Union risks becoming hampered from acting rapidly and concertedly in international crises.
This article argues that traditional Westphalian powers are increasingly pressured to move beyond Westphalia, towards institutionalization of security co-operation and a broader definition of referent-objects of security. Focusing on the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it notes that the Alliance is severely torn between traditional constructions of ‘the self’ and a need for change. Exploring how NATO handles this dilemma, the article examines how the Alliance articulated its constitutive story during the Strategic concept process of 2009-2010. Four roles crystallised from the reading of the narrative: the fire-fighter, the watchdog, the good neighbour and the seminar leader. It is argued that NATO will be able to meet the exigencies of the post-Westphalian world more or less effectively depending on how it develops in each of these roles. The article concludes that NATO largely remains Westphalian in its four roles, but the launching of the seminar leader role indicates that it may be preparing a farewell toWestphalia. NATO is a composite actor and tensions between academic, global reformist and traditionalist regional story-lines will prevail. Nevertheless, the globalised threat environment is likely to eventually force NATO to fully recognise the need for a more post-Westphalian approach to security.
Russian information influence as an enduring threatOn February 27 2022, the EU announced that it would ban the Russian state-sponsoredplatforms RT and Sputnik from the European media space. The controversialreaction demonstrates that European politicians take the destructiveness ofauthoritarian states’ international broadcasting seriously. This article addresses thenature of the threat, conceptualised as ‘malign information influence’ (MII): informationsponsored by authoritarian regimes or other hostile actors and projectedthrough international broadcasting outlets across borders. The article exploresreactions to Russian information influence and outlines key problems that it cancause, above all polarisation and the undermining of trust, media and democracy.It exemplifies Russian information influence towards the Ukraine and a number ofother states and exposes different channels, strategies and techniques. Effects arebriefly discussed. The article’s key argument is that information influence shouldnot be reduced to a problem of sudden ‘campaigns’ or ‘operations’. It is an enduring,long term, threat.
Can Russia, the European Union and the three major EU member states adopt a unified policy line in the global arena? Charlotte Wagnsson investigates the cohesiveness of ‘greater Europe’ through the detailed scrutiny of policy statements by the leadership elites in the UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU in connection with three defining events in international security: the crisis in Kosovo of 1999; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraq crisis of 2003. This extensive empirical enquiry results in a critical constructivist response to neorealist understandings of European security.
The book contrasts the EU’s new way of ‘doing security’ with the established, competitive bilateral interplay in the European security sphere and provides a clue to the kind of security politics that will prevail in Europe. A joint Moscow Brussels approach would improve the chances of both increasing their relative strength vis-à-vis the USA, but serious cleavages threaten to undermine such a ‘greater European’ common view on security. Wagnsson considers the extent to which the major European players pursue similar objectives, and assesses the possible implications for and the chances of greater Europe emerging as a cohesive global actor. This meticulously researched book will interest scholars and students with an interest in international security, the EU’s international role, European international relations and Russian security.
This article examines the reception and dissemination of ‘maligninformation influence’ (MII) in a liberal democracy; informationsponsored by authoritarian regimes or other hostile actors andprojected through international broadcasting outlets acrossborders. The study contributes to the scarce research on thereception of narratives transmitted by the Russian statesupported media platforms RT and Sputnik, exposingcharacteristics, political attitudes, and sharing behaviors of RT/Sputnik consumers. A nationwide, representative survey (n: 3033)from November 2020 revealed a surprisingly high number ofSwedish RT/Sputnik consumers (7%), with an overrepresentationof young, men and supports of non-parliamentarian parties andthe right wing, nationalist Sweden Democratic Party. Theseconsumers are somewhat more willing than non-consumers todisseminate news on social media and in real life despite beingdistrustful of the sources. The findings strengthen previousresearch in demonstrating the attractiveness of identity grievancenarratives among alternative media consumers, yet the resultsshow that RT/Sputnik consumers also aligned with narratives thatcontrasts with national security policy. They state less trust inpoliticians, institutions, the media, news, and journalism, yet arecomparatively prone to share unreliable or untrue news contenton social media and in real life. The analysis thus identified asection of media consumers who can function as vehicles for thedissemination of MII. The article contributes to the underresearched problem of the potential of MII to take root andprovides a basis for future qualitative research that can refine andprovide nuance to the knowledge of reception of MII.
Scholars, states and organisations have warned that authoritarian regimes and other hostile actors are projecting information to inflict harm upon others. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of this threat. This is mirrored in the plethora of labels in use, ranging from “disinformation” to “sharp power” and “information warfare”. In order to investigate this menace further, we turn our focus to ordinary people’s anxieties, since a better understanding of threat perceptions will also provide a better understanding of the problem. We conducted a comprehensive case study comprising focus group discussions (n: 97) and an extensive survey (n: 2046) among Swedish citizens. We asked: To what extent do people worry about information influence and why? What can this tell us about the nature of this problem or threat? The empirical results suggest that respondents were first and foremost worried about societal cohesion and democracy. They also identified a risk that information influence can undermine trust in societal institutions and the EU. Based on our findings, we suggest that “malign information influence” is an appropriate label to be used in future research. Finally, we propose directions for future systematic research on how malign information infuence is received and processed in different national contexts.
New information technologies and media consumption patterns have enabled aggressive practices that are qualitatively different from old-style propaganda. Actors no longer rely on secrecy, but can openly make use of social media and media outlets in foreign languages to destabilize other states and societies from within. Strategic narratives have become a key means in this endeavour. To expose the discursive (harmful) capacity of strategic narratives, the article suggests detailed analysis based on a narrative ontology. The analytical framework is applied in an exploratory case study of the Russian state-sponsored broadcasting company Sputnik’s strategic narrative about Sweden from 2014 to 2018. In addition to unmasking Sputnik’s strategic narrative, the article fills a gap in previous research in particular by exposing three antagonistic narrative strategies labelled ‘suppression’, ‘destruction’ and ‘direction’. These strategies reflect general driving forces in the security sphere and can inspire and structure future research into antagonistic strategic narration.
The reach of illiberal international propaganda outlets rests on citizens in democratic countries as recipients and potential disseminators. However, little research has scrutinised the audiences for such platforms. Why do audiences in democratic states consume content from such outlets, and how far do they actually align with it ideologically? The present research seeks to address this gap. Building on and extending the recent research findings of a large-scale survey, interviews with Swedish media consumers were conducted between 23 March and 13 April 2022, providing a unique close-up on a group of media consumers who stated that they consumed, among other alternative media, the Russian state-sponsored media outlets RT and Sputnik as part of their media diet. The findings, elicited through interviews and the Q-sort method, challenge previous research that presents this audience in a one-dimensional way. First, we investigate their alignment with different political narratives, identifying three different profiles. Although only one profile generally aligned with the RT/Sputnik messaging, almost all the participants appreciate the content and share it on social media. Secondly, we examine their rationale for consumption, revealing a diverse array of motivations, and leading us to theorise four distinct consumption profiles: Distant Observers, Reluctant Consumers, Media Nihilists and Establishment Critics. We interpret these results and discuss their broader implications, before reflecting on the complexities of characterising audiences consuming authoritarian international broadcasting.
Scholars have characterized the EU as a normative power whose greatest asset is to be able to shape conceptions of what is ‘normal’ in international affairs. Scholars have argued that a normative power has to meet certain discursive standards; representing others in a non‐antagonistic, humble way. We question whether the EU can live up to this ideal when defending itself against Russian strategic communication. The empirical enquiry establishes that while the EU High Commissioner communicates in line with the stipulated standards, the newly established East Stratcom Taskforce and its publication ‘Disinformation Digest’ diverges from this ideal. The establishment of the Taskforce has led to the EU losing reflexivity and normative power. The article concludes that while Diez’ and Manners’ standards are utopian in the contemporary communicative climate, they remain useful as guiding rules that can help normative powers ‘watch their language’ and avoid doing unnecessary harm.
The EU views malign information influence (MII) as a threat, and this has been enhanced with the Russian invasion of Ukraine resulting in a ban on several Russian media. This article adds to research on the dilemmas of democracies in combatting MII, by consulting the public on whether the ban was a proportionate and effective measure and if it stained the EU’s moral authority. Combining focus groups with a survey of the Swedish population, we found robust support for the ban – slightly stronger among women and increasing with age – and little backlash towards the EU. Respondents supported active countermeasures yet recognised problems with curtailing the free flow of information. The results indicate a need for refinement of an ideal-type model of countermeasures to MII (Hellman and Wagnsson Citation2017). We suggest a new category – “fortifying” – that highlights shared state/individual responsibility and the strengthening of citizens, authorities and the media. We conclude by suggesting a need for additional research on how to balance values of freedom and security and whether public support of bans relies on the precarious geopolitical situation resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine or if securitisation of information is an enduring trend.
The globalized security situation characterized by transnational threats and international interventionism in ‘‘new wars,’’ connect non traditional local actors and traditional global actors to one another in unprecedented ways. We argue that children in particular need to be highlighted because they are highly pertinent to the globalized security situation, yet they make up one of the few agents that have remained non-politicized in the eyes of the scholarly community. The article suggests a framework of analysis that can generate analyses on security of traditional as well as non-traditional agents. Placing non-traditional groups in the center of attention serves to mirror the complexities of the current security situation better.
International Relations (IR) scholars have theorized the significance of communication and messaging across state borders, using notions such as soft power, sharp power, propaganda and illiberal communication. This study contributes to this body of research by investigating narrative persuasiveness by way of a large-scale experimental exploration of narrative reception. The projection of strategic narratives has become a central feature of modern influencing across borders. Despite the existence of a growing literature on the potentially harmful effects of such narratives, however, their persuasiveness remains under-researched. This article seeks to help fill this gap by asking what might induce people in Sweden to side with strategic narratives projected by Sputnik, the Russian state-funded news media platform. The article puts a central component of Walter Fisher’s classic narrative paradigm to the test: the notions of narrative probability (consistency and coherence) and fidelity (previous life experience). In a rare large-scale survey experiment (N = 2,032), three narratives from Sputnik were presented to respondents to establish the potential perceived narrative probability and fidelity. Contrary to Fisher’s argument and some previous works on strategic narratives, the results show that people can be persuaded by a narrative without having personal experience of the topic, and despite regarding the text as incoherent. This indicates that information influence projected through strategic narratives can be effective regardless of the form of the message and even when introducing unfamiliar ideas. This is an interesting addition to findings in previous studies that source awareness does not negatively affect the effectiveness of strategic narratives. The article ends by highlighting contributions to previous research on persuasion and by suggesting avenues ahead.
Gender differences have been observed regarding many political and social issues, yet welack comprehensive evidence on differences in perceptions on a wide range of securityissues increasingly important to voters: military threats, criminality, and terrorism.Previous research suggests that when women are highly politically mobilized, as they arein Sweden, gender differences in political opinion are large. On the other hand, Swedishpoliticians have worked hard to reduce gender stereotypical thinking. This prompts thequestion: Are there gender differences in attitudes on security issues in Sweden, and if so,in what ways do the attitudes differ? This study is based on comprehensive data from focusgroups and a large-scale survey. The results show that women were more prone to respondwith an “ethic of care,” across security issues. Women were more inclined to understandsecurity problems as structural, explained by macho culture, segregation, and injustice.Women tend to support preventive measures that provide individuals with opportunities tochoose “the right path,” such as education and economic investment in deprived areas.When asked about national security, women believe more in diplomacy and dialogue. Ingeneral, women are less inclined to support various repressive solutions.
This book focuses on problems of, and prospects for, strengthening the global system of security governance in a manner consistent with the aspirations and practices of the EU. The Eu approach to security governance has been successful in its immediate neighbourhood: it has successfully exported its preferred norms and principles to applicant countries, thereby 'pacifying' its immediate neighbourhood and making all of Europe more secure. This edited volume addresses both the practical and political aspects of security governance and the barriers to the globalization of the EU system of security governance, particularly in teh multipolar post-Cold War era. This book will be of great interest to students of security governance, EU politics, European Security and IR in general.