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Frågan om praktisk examination och hur man kan och bör examinera praktik är någonting som under en längre tid har varit uppe för diskussion på Försvarshögskolan (FHS). Denna artikel syftar till att diskutera möjligheter och begränsningar med praktisk examination. Fokus kommer att vara på utbildningen av officerare inom det ämne författarna verkar – krigsvetenskap. Artikeln tar sig an frågan med utgångspunkt i gällande rättsläge, högskolepedagogisk forskning- och praktik. Det övergripande syftet är att förstå vad man faktiskt får göra, hur det sker rättssäkert och hur det kan göras i praktiken. Artikeln diskuterar även vad som bör examineras praktiskt och hur detta då skall göras.

China's maritime periphery or ‘‘near seas’’—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—are waters through which a great deal of vital commerce flows, as China, Japan, Korea, and numerous Southeast Asian countries are all major trading nations that import the energy and raw materials that sustain their thriving economies. Since 2009 the East and South China Seas have become increasingly fraught with tension. This has generally been attributed to rising Chinese assertiveness, but not because China has started making a lot of assertions it never made before. As the authors assembled here point out in replete detail, China’s explicit claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets in the East China Sea date back at least to 1971, while it can trace its claim in the South China Sea back to the publication of the famous ‘‘nine-dashed line’’ map by the Nationalists in 1947 (at the time it contained eleven segmented lines; the victorious Communists subsequently dropped two). What has changed since 2009 is China’s more rigorous enforcement of existing claims. This too is brought out in the articles collected below: its actors have seized islands well within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of neighboring Southeast Asian nations, detained fishing boats and confiscated their catch, cut the cables of ships engaged in oil exploration, harassed American surveillance vessels, and most recently undertaken ‘‘reclamation’’ of subsurface islets in order to construct airstrips and harbors. 

This article will investigate the implementation of strategic communication at the lower segment of the military hierarchy in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. It focuses primarily on the experiences of communicating strategically at the tactical level in manoeuvre forces, using Sweden in Afghanistan as a case study. Findings reveal that the tactical level often distances itself from the communicator tasks, arguing that this belongs to other units or personnel. However, the tactical level also pinpoints the vital role they play in shaping attitudes and beliefs in the area of operations. The results thus indicate a type of cognitive split in the perception of the communicator role among the manoeuvre forces. Furthermore, the study reveals several obstacles in effectively executing strategic communication in the military domain. The most prominent areas are contradictions in messages due to force-protection measures and lack of synchronization.

The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step towards developing such a comprehensive approach.

The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and link state of the art of research and practice.

Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in order to facilitate future cooperation

These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters, along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and presentations can be found in the appendix.

Mot bakgrund av en breddad och allt mer komplex hotbild mot Sverige och en ambition att stärka den svenska totalförsvarsförmågan har regeringen och Regeringskansliet på senare år skjutit till nya medel och försvarsanslag till det militära och civila försvaret, inklusive den militära Säkerhetstjänsten. De har även tagit fram ett antal nya lagar och regler som på olika sätt syftar till att vägleda säkerhetstjänstens verksamhet och stärka landets motståndskraft mot olika säkerhetshot inom ramen för totalförsvaret.

Denna antologi har till uppgift att utifrån olika perspektiv analysera hur moderna hotbilder, ny teknik, lagstiftning, natomedlemskap och krav på samverkan med andra myndigheter och företag kommer påverka den militära säkerhetstjänstens och säkerhetsunderrättelsetjänstens verksamhet i framtiden. Antologin är skriven av några av Sveriges ledande experter på området i syfte att beskriva de utmaningar som den militära säkerhetstjänsten och säkerhetsunderrättelsetjänsten står inför samtidigt som totalförsvaret och krisberedskapen i Sverige återuppbyggs.

Några av de frågor som ställs i antologin är hur och i vilken utsträckning det försämrade säkerhetsläget i vårt närområde, ny säkerhetsskyddslagstiftning, ambitionen att stärka det svenska totalförsvaret och Sveriges medlemskap i Nato kommer leda till att säkerhetstjänstens arbetsuppgifter förändras i framtiden? Slutsatserna från denna antologi är säkerhetstjänsten och säkerhetsunderrättelsetjänsterna i Sverige står inför ett paradigmskifte där det kommer vara nödvändigt att modernisera organisationen och implementera ny teknik för att anpassa sig till den digitala eran. Även vikten av intensifierad internationell samverkan kommer spela stor roll för säkerhetstjänstens möjligheter att bedriva ett effektivt arbete på nationell nivå i framtiden. Det multilaterala samarbetet är här för att stanna även om det är svårt och bygger på förtroenden mellan stater som inte alltid finns.

The US strategic shift from nation-building to what has been labelled “light footprint” has carried with it a number of changes in the practices used when waging war on terrorism. These activities include covert and clandestine action by special operations and paramilitary forces, and others, operating under a shadowy mandate. It is essential to analyse these changes, due to the nature of the actions taken and the global reach and consequences of US foreign policies. The concept of “global shadow war” has been used by scholars and journalists alike to describe the practices associated with the light footprint framework, although the concept is ambiguous, lacks clear conceptual boundaries and is yet to be defined. This article attempts to resolve the problem of ambiguity through a systematic analysis of how and when the concept is used, in the process establishing its conceptual boundaries and definitional qualities. Using a method for concept analysis developed by Giovanni Sartori, the article provides a conceptual definition which is more clearly delineated, encompasses the characteristics found in the sources studied, and can be used when theorizing about the many practices taking place within the light footprint framework.

International politics have become ever more volatile over the last decade, increasing the risk of large-scale military violence. Yet the precise character of future war will depend on a range of factors that relate to adversaries, allies, technology, geographical scope and multiple domains of warfighting. Few would question that land forces will be important also in the foreseeable future. However, given that the battlefield is in a state of transformation, so is the mission, purpose and utilization of land forces. Indeed, the future conduct of land warfare is subjected to serious and important questions in the face of large and complex challenges and security threats.

Advanced Land Warfare explores the evolving role of land forces, paying particular attention to the changes that have taken place in the art of commanding and executing combat, as well as the role of rapid technological innovation and information dissemination in shaping warfare. The book provides insights into key contemporary developments in land warfare and presents case studies on land tactics and operations in different national contexts, drawing on the best of theory, practice, and professional experience and featuring chapters written by leading international scholars and practitioners. Relating to the realities of the modern battlefield, the book addresses a number of critical questions about land tactics and operations, combining a conceptual basis with empirical examples of tactical thinking and practice and emphasising the importance of understanding the perspectives of various national armies, in order to provide a current understanding of the central issues of land warfare.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, the development of land warfareis briefly outlined, before key current and future challenges in the operational environment are examined. In the following section, the future character ofwar and the transformation of the battlefield is addressed. Thereafter, the structure of the volume and its chapters are outlined.

This open access anthology takes a holistic approach to how Russia carries out hybrid warfare against its neighbouring countries - states at the intersection between the East and West.The book addresses the vulnerabilities of these countries to Russian influence and hybrid warfare tactics, as well as their responses to this security challenge. It includes a close examination of local developments in states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Finland, Armenia, Serbia and many others, analysing specific scenarios and practices, and draws on these observations to develop the current conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare as a phenomenon. Scholarship frequently focuses only on Russia and treats countries subjected to Russian hybrid measures as passive victims, thus providing an overly schematic picture of Russian behaviour. This book instead treats these states as actors in their own right, assessing their potential to address and counter the specific security problems arising from their geographic and political position.

The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

The international security environment has in recent years evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey zone of war and peace. Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, henceforth HT&HW, are today high on security agendas across the globe. However, despite the attention, and a growing body of studies on specific issues, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards identifying, analysing and countering HT&HW. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on HT&HW, by covering the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them together with a number of real-world case studies.

Over time the grey zone between peace and war has grown considerably, underscoring the necessity of understanding hybrid warfare and related threats. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have manifested this paradigm, being a good example of the problem in thinking about war and peace as binary categories. How does a country or group of countries deal with threats and aggression in this grey area, such as ‘little green men’ that appear in uniform but without national denomination and refuse to tell where they come from, election-influenced operations or cyberattacks, to mention but a few possible actions.

By uniting the knowledge of both practitioners and scholars, the volume aims to identify the existing tools for countering HT&HW, as well as experiences from a wide set of empirical contexts. Mirroring this, the project is a cross-sector collaboration between the Department of Military Studies and the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defence University. The former represents an academic environment where research and teaching are intertwined in a range of subjects including War Studies, Military Technology and Military History. The latter is a national centre within the Swedish Defence University tasked with developing and disseminating knowledge about asymmetric threats within the context of societal security and resilience.

This volume focuses on the challenge posed by HT&HW to Western democracies, and their ability to address it. Western democracies are not only the type of states most frequently targeted by hybrid measures, but also the most vulnerable. By virtue of being open, pluralistic and liberal societies with freedom of the press and rule of law, Western democracies display both inherent weaknesses that can be targeted and inherent constraints – in particular through the rule of law and basic freedoms – that limit the scope for defensive actions. These vulnerabilities are increasingly recognized by Western governments, which have developed a range of entities to address them, although coordination in many instances remains weak. The later sections outline the growing significance of HT&HW on the security agendas of Western democracies and the challenges they imply, as well as the entities these states have established in response. Although neither list is complete, they provide an overview of the current situation. The final sections provide an outline of the volume’s structure and a summary of each chapter.

Under President Xi Jinping's leadership, Chinese foreign relations have moved from keeping a low profile, to a more assertive bid for international leadership that is beginning to take form in the ‘belt and road initiative’ (BRI). This initiative focuses on connectivity in policy coordination, facilities, trade, finance and people-to-people relations, in order to connect China to key parts of Asia, the south Pacific, east Africa and Europe. Networked capitalism and the national unit, which are often seen as spatial opposites in the global political economy, are both exercised through the BRI in mutually supporting ways. Networked capitalism is not challenging the national spatial unit, nor vice versa. Rather, they conglomerate to reinforce Chinese government narratives which portray China as the new trailblazer of global capitalism—thus illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in east Asia. Likely winners of this constellation, if it is successful, are megalopolises in Eurasia, and most of all the Chinese Communist Party. Likely losers are countries that are not included in the BRI, most notably the United States. In a context where President Donald Trump is signalling a more protectionist stance and the United States is withdrawing from free trade pacts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump may ironically enable Xi's dream of making China great again.

The need to develop resilience and psychological defence in the face of different forms of hybrid threats and malign foreign influence and interference is greater than ever. In this light, it has become increasingly obvious that a country’s resilience and psychological defence capabilities must cover a broad spectrum of conflicts, including severe crises and war. This paper takes these complex and multifaceted types of threats as a point of departure in its attempt to outline an analytical framework for countering hybrid threats and foreign influence and interference. The ambition is then to operationalise this framework into a practical guide that can be used for identifying and analysing hybrid threats and foreign influence against democracies and their national interests. 

To be able to build resilience and psychological defence, a shared analytical framework is needed, which provides a broader and more inclusive nation-state perspective than existing frameworks. The framework outlined in this paper is intended to be a starting point for analysis, usable for government and non-government actors alike. It aims to serve as a platform for addressing different dimensions of hybrid threats and malign foreign influence and interference. It also provides tools for comparing and analysing the dimensions within and across cases. The formation of responses to foreign interference should be seen as a process consisting of three distinct phases: 1) assessing situational awareness; 2) addressing defence and countermeasures; and 3) evaluating the state’s system for countering foreign interference. 

This framework serves as the basis for the development of a practical analytical guidebook that is built to be modular, where one can pick and choose depending on own needs and questions asked. It is also developed to be suitable for both more structured analysis as well as less structured qualitative analysis. The guidebook is simplified into an analytical template that can be used as a readily available checklist for users.

Considering the economic importance of China for Sweden, a project such as the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative should be expected to entail a great deal of interest among Swedish policy-makers and the business community alike. However, this has not been the case, as the response so far has been varied and often cautious. The focus among Sweden’s policy-makers and the business community alike has been a wait-and-see approach, so the impact of OBOR in Sweden has been very limited. Sweden’s business community has been somewhat more optimistic, in particular with regard to opportunities in Central Asia, while the policy-makers in general do not see much that is new with the OBOR project. In conclusion, very little has been done; much more could and should have been done. There is a great need for strong leadership and guidance if Sweden is not going to fall way too far behind other nations with respect to OBOR.

Despite the global power shift from West to East and almost everyone in the EU recognising that the importance of Asia is growing, there has been a lacking willingness to devote time, energy and resources to deepening relations with the region. There has been a lack of a unified strategic vision for the region, and due to internal policy divisions and institutional squabbles, the EU has failed to become a strong, cohesive, actor. Thus, the EU needs to prioritise and focus if to be able to successfully pursue a strategy towards East Asia.

East Asia is the home to the fastest growing economies in the world. It contains both like-minded partners, economic powerhouses, and a number of developing countries with an interest in learning from the EU experiences. The EU has a unique advantage in the region; besides having economic weight it is seen as a nonthreatening partner in the region, giving a comparative advantage over other major powers such as the US and China.  However, the success of the EU’s strategy requires a unified strategy with clear prioritisation of areas where the EU realistically can have an impact. Emphasise should be put on enhancing the bilateral trade and investment conditions, and to pursue principled polices in particular towards Southeast Asian nations that are going through a democratisation process. Being a region with widespread ecological problems, the impact of knowledge and technology transfers would benefit the EU’s global interests in the environment, energy and climate change areas, as a more sustainable East Asia have direct impact on a global scale.

When designing an EU global strategy towards East Asia it is important to start form where we are, even if that is not where we would like to be. The European Union is not viewed as a serious political or security actor in East Asia among the regional countries. The EU is best understood as an outside-actor, with no hard power in the region. However, this is not necessary a bad thing. Instead, the EU has a unique position, being seen as a nonthreatening partner. If used wisely, the role as a nonthreatening partner can together with the EU’s economic weight secure a leading position together with China and the US not only in the region but in the world.

There are many areas of shared concern between the EU and the US. However, the EU should be cautious when cooperating with the US ensuring not losing its credibility and becoming irrelevant as an independent actor. Despite sharing principles, there are major differences between the EU’s attempt to combine principled policies with economic and security concerns while the US policy, in contrast, focuses on the security first, almost always winning over democracy.

The strengthening of bilateral trade and investment flows, including interlinked areas such as improved market access and investment conditions, should be the main focus of the EU’s strategy towards East Asia. The pursuit of FTAs with East Asian counterparts should be continued, with special emphasis on Japan and Indonesia. The EU should avoid making economic concessions in exchange for concessions on principles. The current practice of pursuing policies aimed at maximising European access and competiveness rather that pursuing multilateralism for its own sake should be continued.

The EU should be selective in pursuing principled policies, creating more impact for the policies pursued and not to undermining either its role in region or the bilateral trade and investment relations. The EU should focus on cooperation with likeminded partners (Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries). Such a focus will have best possible spill-over effects in the region, and globally as East Asian partners will also benefit the EU’s work on the global level.

To develop EU-China relations are essential, with China already being the world’s 2nd largest economy and the EU being Chinas largest trading partner. Being a country with widespread ecological problems, the impact of knowledge and technology transfers would benefit the EU’s global interests in the environment, energy and climate change areas, as a more sustainable China have direct impact on a global scale. The China strategy should stand on three legs; economic cooperation – with a focus of protecting European interests such as investments and intellectual property rights as well cooperation around green technology – people-to-people exchanges, and the strengthening of the strategic partnership. For the latter to succeed there is a need to overcoming diverging value expectation, trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make Beijing and the EU’s policies complimentary. All the above needs to be accomplished while the EU continues to stay vocal concerning the human rights situation in China.

It is important to recognise that East Asia is not only China. The EU should prioritise relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). After a long period of scepticism, ASEAN has opened up to learn from the EU experience making it a potentially major success in the EU’s global strategy. Particular emphasis should be put on Indonesia, one of the region’s most democratic countries and home to the largest Muslim population in the world. Relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan should be enhanced – there are partners that are not only major economic powers, but also ones with whom the EU are sharing similar values and similar challenges.

It is in the EU’s interest to contribute to the safeguarding of regional peace and security. The EU should work together with regional partners, in particular ASEAN, and the US on issues concerning regional peace and security on all levels, including, but not limited to, forum such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit.

This report explores how elite networks among ASEAN countries can contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. Indeed, the building of cross-border elite networks is particularly relevant today given the heightened tension in the region and beyond caused by the ongoing power shift from the West to the East, and from the United States and Japan to China. In fact, with today’s new challenges such as the Sino-US trade war and the ongoing pandemic, it is particularly important to ensure both formal and informal elite interactions among ASEAN members and with the broader Asia-Pacific region, as they can often work as “normal” even during uncertain times.

Mainstream International Relations (IR) theory has problems fully accounting for the regional dynamics of East Asia. This article explores whether the pursuit of soft power—a concept that has been given a prominent position in research on East Asian IR—can provide one piece of the puzzle for understanding East Asia’s regional dynamics. This article proposes an analytical framework for analyzing soft power that problematizes the rigid soft power/hard power binary. The framework proposes a way to understand soft power and the hard-soft spectrum of behavior that allows for the inclusion of economic power while still drawing a line between hard and soft power, where not all economic power is soft, but nor is it all hard. It is argued that to keep the concept of soft power relevant in the East Asian context economic power needs to be included. The line is drawn between economic coercion and economic inducement, arguing that when induced there is still a certain level of freedom as one can choose whether the payments or bribes offered are good enough for it to be worthwhile to change one’s preference and behavior. Coercion, in contrast, utilizes a different dynamic where the point is to force someone to do something they are unwilling to do.

During the last four decades, China has moved from being an isolated country separated from the international community to having become one of the world’s major powers. It is vital to understand what is guiding Chinese foreign policy, why this is so, and not least what kind of power China is and will be in the future. This article analyses the vital elements and thinking that guides Chinese foreign policy, its priorities and decision making process. It is found that China's foreign policy is embedded in domestic issues. The foremost foreign policy objective is domestic political stability, which in turn is a necessity for the survival of one-party rule. Both are dependent on a combination of two key factors: continuing domestic economic growth and nationalism. The foreign policy is also closely linked to the Chinese self-perception, both its self-superiority/self-inferiority dualism and its multitude of confusing (overlapping) identities about what China is and should be. A key turning year is 2008 when the "global" financial crisis severely affected the United States and Europe at a time of Chinese economic success, which gave China confidence to pursue a more active and aggressive/assertive stance on the international stage. It is concluded that China under Xi Jinping will not be a status que power accepting the world as it is, but nor are we to expect China to become a revisionist power aiming to remodel the global order. China is what can best be described as a responsible reformer "striving for achievements".

This chapter argues that it is crucial to understand the role of the military in the grey zone, as unless hybrid threats- and warfare can be successfully handled there, the war is likely to have been lost before a conventional war breaks out. Asking what role the military can and should play in responding to hybrid threats- and warfare today and in the future, the paper presents an analytical framework operationalising hybrid threats and warfare, which is then applied on the official discourse in the Baltic and a case study of Sweden analysing what role the members of the military themselves think it should have. It is concluded that the role of the military needs to be recognised and utilised in the most efficient way possible across the grey zone while at the same time ensuring that democratic principles and the rule of law are upheld. It is encouraging to see that the role of the military in the grey zone is both recognised and in correlation in the official discourse and in the thinking of military officers.

Den internationella säkerhetsmiljön har under de senaste åren utvecklats till envolatil och allt större gråzon mellan krig och fred. Säkerhetsutmaningar ochantagonistiska hot som härrör från olika typer av hybridhot och icke-linjär krigföringbefinner sig idag högt upp på säkerhetsagendan inte bara i Sverige utan över helavärlden. Med tiden har gråzonen mellan fred och krig vuxit avsevärt, vilketunderstryker nödvändigheten av att förstå dynamiken hos gråzonen, aktivahybridhot, samt icke-linjär krigföring.

USA:s och Europas samlade militära resurser är fortfarande kraftigt överlägsnaRysslands, och än så länge även Kinas. Detta har varit en drivkraft för dessa och andraaktörer att utveckla och kombinera andra, mindre resurskrävande sätt att konkurrerapå den globala arenan. Icke-linjär krigföring och hybridhot är vanliga strategier hosmånga aktörer, bland annat Ryssland, Kina, Iran och Nordkorea, samt vissaickestatliga aktörer, främst IS och Hizbollah. 

Rysslands agerande i Ukraina före invasionen 24 februari 2022 har manifesteratdetta paradigm genom att vara ett bra exempel på problemet med att tänka på krigoch fred som binära kategorier. Hur hanterar ett land eller en grupp länder hot ochaggression i det här gråområdet, till exempel "små gröna män" som visas i uniformmen utan nationell beteckning och vägrar att berätta var de kommer ifrån? Ellervalpåverkande operationer eller cyberattacker?Iran är ett tydligt exempel på hur strategier med inslag av hybridhot ochhybridkrigföring blir lösningen när det upplevs som nödvändigt att utmana västsmilitära övertag. Eftersom USA uppfattas som ett hot mot Irans existens har landetutformat en strategi som bygger på gerillakrigföring, mestadels via ombud ochutanför Iran.

Ett annat exempel återfinns i Spanien där en sammanhållen ryskinformationskampanj riktade in sig på att blåsa upp och öka de nationellamotsättningarna kring det katalanska valet. Detta är ett uppenbart och väldokumenterat exempel på hur en aktör använder sig av olika former av hybridhot ochhybridkrigföring för att exploatera ett lands existerande sårbarheter.Detta innebär förstås inte att väst inte kan kombinera olika politiska medel på ettsätt som kan beskrivas som icke-linjär krigföring eller hybridhot. Debatten har sinabrister och oklarheter, men den utmanar västs binära synsätt på krig och fred liksompå konventionell och okonventionell krigföring. Därför har den bidragit till en bättrehelhetsförståelse av hur en motståndare på ett innovativt sätt kan kombinera olikaverktyg för att utnyttja västliga samhällens specifika sårbarheter och kringgå derasbefintliga försvarsstrukturer. Detta har i sin tur ökat västvärldens förmåga att hanteraantagonistiska hot.

På vilket sätt skiljer sig dessa från traditionella hot? Det tjugoförsta århundradetshot skiljer sig från traditionella hot och krigföring mer i intensitet och grad än i sinnatur. Undantaget är det virtuella och digitala området där både många nya verktyghar skapats samt startkostnaden för att använda dem har sjunkit (t.ex. UAV:er ochövervakningskameror). De nya hoten kommer ofta från motståndare ellerantagonister som syftar till att uppnå resultat utan krig, genom att t.ex. störa,undergräva eller skada målets politiska system och sammanhållning genom enkombination av våld, kontroll, subversion, manipulation och spridning av (felaktig)information.2 Dessa hot riktar sig mot motståndarens samhällen, inte påkombattanter.3

Hybridhot och icke-linjär krigföring innebär samtidigt att det finns en rad möjligakontradiktoriska medel, från hot om krig till propaganda och allt däremellan. Deinnehåller därför flera makt- och påverkansinstrument, men med tonvikten lagd på hot, icke-militära såväl som militära, som opererar i gråzonen under tröskeln föröppet krig. Dessa former av hot och krigföring tillåter inte en entydig åtskillnadmellan olika former av aktörer, vare sig de är statliga eller icke-statliga; soldater ellercivila; organiserat våld, terror, kriminalitet eller krig i traditionell mening. Oavsettvilken aktör hotet härrör från har det blivit vanligt att sådana aktörer kombinerar ochskräddarsyr en blandning av konventionella och oregelbundna medel för att uppnåmaximal effekt.

Denna guide presenterar en modell som integrerar lärandemål med praktiska läraktiviteter och praktisk examination i utbildningen av kadetter och officerare inom ramen för högskoleutbildning. Syftet är att visa hur man kan uppnå konstruktiv länkning i praktiken vid examination av praktiska moment i utbildningen av kadetter och officerare, utan att äventyra de krav på rättssäkerhet som högskoleexamination ställer, samtidigt som utbildningsmål, pedagogiska aktiviteter och utvärderingsmetoder sammankopplas. Därigenom kan praktisk examination av praktiska moment skräddarsys för de militära yrkenas dynamiska och praktiska karaktär.

This article first traces the origin of hybrid warfare and the label game surrounding the concept, asking whether it is merely old wine in a new bottle, and if so, whether it is still a useful concept. It is found that while being old wine in new bottles, it is still a good wine well worth drinking. While there is not much new in the concept itself, it is a useful tool to think about past wars, today’s wars and the wars of the future. Thereafter, this paper analyses how hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are to be understood in the context of peace, conflict and war. It is shown how hybrid warfare and threats fit into our traditional understanding of conflict dynamics.

Against all the odds, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) has survived two decades of acute crisis since the end of the Cold War. It has neither collapsed nor reformed itself, despite the dire state of its economy and the existence of extensive international sanctions. This has been possible as it has skillfully adapted to circumstances and found new ways to maintain supply lines and revenue streams, developing and using a range of suppliers and altering their relative importance over time, as well as the way in which they operate, in order to circumvent sanctions. Furthermore, they have also been able to develop new ones. There has also been a shift away from direct state control over illicit and semi-official activities, towards putting more trust in market mechanisms and obtaining the state’s and the regime’s share through different forms of “loyalty schemes”, bribery and public-private constructions. This shift has made it more difficult to target the different sources of revenue.

It is possible to identify ten supply lines and revenue streams: (a) The shadow economy and semi-official trade; (b) the “court economy”; (c) international trade; (d) the Kaesong Industrial Zone; (e) the export of labour and remittances; (f) mobile phones; (g) tourism ; (h) the arms trade; (i) illicit activities; and (j) foreign assistance. The shadow economy and semi-official trade have been crucial to keeping the state functioning, and the regime as well as the wider population alive. The success of the court economy has been crucial for the survival of the regime. The revenues gained from the export of labour and the national mobile phone network are also surprisingly large. The arms trade continues to bring in revenue, as do tourism and remittances, but none of these are as important as they once were. Illicit activities continue to be a major source of revenue. However, as the government becomes more skilled at hiding its involvement, it is increasingly difficult to estimate the amounts involved or obtained by the regime. International trade, most notably with China and South Korea, is also a major source of income. Foreign assistance also contributes, but is very limited in comparison.

There is currently a wide range of sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions have been a complete failure in fulfilling their aim of halting North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme. They have, however, had a substantial impact on the country. Under their pressure, North Korea has been forced to adapt to a new reality, not least by hiding its involvement in illicit activities and finding new revenue streams. It has been highly successful at both.

In trying to refine and design new sanctions, it should be clear that there is no silver bullet. First and foremost, it is important to do the utmost to implement the sanctions currently in place, including monitoring and fine-tuning their implementation. All possible efforts should be made to get those states which do not currently comply to do so. Sanctions will not work as long as China and to some extent South Korea continue to engage with North Korea.

Sanctions should target the following areas:

1. The court economy should be a prime target for international sanctions. Financial sanctions are likely to be the most effective.

2. The export of labour should be targeted by sanctions. It is a major revenue stream and, moreover, an area in which dependence on Chinese compliance is less important.

3. Existing sanctions on International trade should be fine-tuned and developed. It is extremely doubtful that they will make a major difference, however, as North Korea’s number one trading partner, China, is unlikely to comply. Nonetheless, such sanctions send a signal and are disruptive in Pyongyang.

4. Efforts to implement sanctions that target the arms trade should continue, not least the work to detect, monitor and intercept suspicious cargoes and financial transactions in and out of North Korea.

5. Sanctions targeting illicit activities should be fine-tuned and developed in order to increase their effectiveness. Efforts should be made to convince China to increase its pressure, in particular because apart from China, there are few channels left for North Korean illicit activities.

6. The Kaesong Industrial Zone is in theory a good and easy target for sanctions, and its closure would be a major blow to the regime. However, in practice this is beyond the control of the international community, and it is unlikely that South Korea would be willing to close Kaesong.

The following areas should not be targeted by sanctions:

1. The shadow economy and semi-official trade are not good targets for sanctions. They are difficult to target, and doing so would be likely to have a disproportionate impact on ordinary North Koreans.

2. Remittances are under control and there is no need for, nor would there be any likely impact from, more sanctions.

3. The mobile phone network offers limited opportunities for successful sanctions. In addition, the proliferation of mobile phones should not be a target for sanctions because increased communication in a closed authoritarian state such as North Korea is a positive development.

4. Foreign assistance is not an area that should be targeted by international sanctions.

5. Outgoing Tourism is not possible to develop effective sanctions against. Nor would it be a good thing if wanting North Korea to open up.

Practical pedagogical tools are central to officer training and these tools form part of a longstanding tradition, not just within the Swedish Defence University but also within the Swedish Armed Forces more broadly. Further, this sphere has always been prominent within the Swedish Defence University, with its long history of using methods including different forms of case studies, map manoeuvres, war games, staff rides, staff exercises and tactical problem solving. This handbook focuses on one of these pedagogical tools: the staff ride.

The handbook is laid out as follows: firstly, a presentation of the historical background to staff rides, along with a discussion of what a staff ride is and what types exist. Secondly, the focus moves to thoughts on planning and implementing a staff ride, in which we discuss the planning phase, lessons learned regarding the use of reconnaissance prior to implementation, and thoughts concerning the pedagogical aspect to the staff ride. Finally, the handbook closes with a discussion on how to plan and implement staff rides, both from practical and pedagogical perspectives. Here a schematic model is presented on the pedagogical dynamics of a staff ride as regards various target groups, based on their understanding and the varying complexities of staff rides.

The East Asian peace is a mystery of the modern age. To many theorists and analysts alike, the post-Cold War calm has been seen as a temporary anomaly, potential military conflicts dominating predictions for the future. Despite this, two decades have passed in which a relative peace has been sustained and it is time to question existing forecasts. Comparing the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the Korean Nuclear conflict, the author explores the informal processes that can help explain the persistence of peace, leading to hope for a future era of stability.

This paper explores what benefits the theoretical development, operationalisation andimplementation of conflict resolution can get from bridging with social movement theory.Four different social movement theories are included: the political process, resourcemobilisation, collective behaviour- and the new social movement approach. For conflictresolution Peter Wallensteen’s theoretical approach is used. The analysis is limited to thepost-Cold War period and intrastate conflicts (civil wars and state formation conflicts). Thiscovers 95% of all post-Cold War conflicts. Four questions are asked and answered: 1. Whatdoes the link between social movement theory and conflict resolution look like?; 2. How cansocial movement theory benefit the development of conflict resolution theory?; 3. How cansocial movement theory benefit the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory?; 4. Howcan social movement theory and social movements be beneficial for the implementation ofconflict resolution theory (i.e. conflict resolution)? The theoretical findings are tested on onecase study (East Timor). The theoretical analysis shows that there exist a link between socialmovement theory and conflict resolution on all levels. The case study confirms the theoreticalfindings.

This article argues that the South China Sea (SCS) conflicthas been a successful case of conflict prevention since the early1990s, and in fact, that a transformation has occurred, from afragile peace to a more stable peace. The article asks why therehas been, and continues to be, relative peace in the SCS,despite the fact that many factors—as well as predictions byneo-realists and most U.S. policy analysts—point in the directionof military conflict. The findings show that the relativepeace is the result of two interlinked categories of processes:elite interactions and regionalization. The former takes theform of Track 2 diplomacy and personal networks, while thelatter is the outcome of the combined forces of Sino-ASEANrapprochement and economic integration and interdependence.Here, China’s acceptance of multilateralism and theASEAN+3 process have been of foremost importance.

Using a conflict transformation framework, this article demonstrates that positive transformations have taken place in the South China Sea between 1991 and 2007. Even though these transformations have been weakened in recent years, particularly regarding the actor aspect, it is concluded that a major armed conflict is still highly unlikely.

In this article I study the competing US and Chinese narratives about the South China Sea. Arguing that the practice of calculating power shifts in terms of the changing distribution of material capabilities is inadequate, I complement existing literature by taking ideational and normative dimensions of power into account. I ask what the alternative Chinese narrative of power and leadership in the South China Sea looks like and how it is perceived by others in comparison with the dominant US narrative. While a "hard" power transition is ongoing, China's preferred narrative has yet to become widely accepted and the US narrative will remain dominant for now. Nevertheless, China has been making progress in shifting the narrative of what the future could look like with China's vision for a post-US regional and global order now seen as a possible alternative.

The overall purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical study of the post-Cold War EastAsian security setting, with the aim of understanding why there is an East Asian peace. The EastAsian peace exists in a region with a history of militarised conflicts, home to many of the world'slongest ongoing militarised problems and a number of unresolved critical flashpoints. Thus, thepost-Cold War East Asian inter-state peace is a paradox. Despite being a region predicted to be ripefor conflict, there have not only been less wars than expected, but the region also shows severalsigns of a development towards a more durable peace. The dominant research paradigm –neorealism – has painted a gloomy picture of post-Cold War East Asia, with perpetual conflictsdominating the predictions. Other mainstream international relations theories, too, fail to accountfully for the relative peace. One of the greatest problems for mainstream theories, is accounting forpeace given East Asia's lack of security organisations or other formalised conflict managementmechanisms. Given this paradox/problem, this dissertation sets out to ask "Why is there a relativepeace in the East Asian security setting despite an absence of security organisations or otherformalised mechanisms to prevent existing conflicts from escalating into violence?"

In order to answer this question, the case of East Asian peace is approached by comparingthree embedded case studies within the region: the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and theKorean nuclear conflict. It explores the full range of informal and formal processes plus the ConflictPrevention and Peacebuilding Mechanisms (CPPBMs) that have been important for the creation ofa continuing relative peace in East Asia between 1990 and 2008. The study furthermore focuses onChina's role in the three cases, on an empirical basis consisting of interviews conducted with keypersons during more than 1.5 years fieldwork in China.

The three cases show that informal processes exist, and that they have furthermore beenimportant for peace, both by preventing conflicts from escalating into war, and by buildingconditions for a stable longer-term peace. Their impact on the persistence of peace has been tracedto a range of different CPPBMs. Returning to the level of the East Asian case, a common feature ofmany of the identified processes is that they can be understood as aspects or manifestations of theEast Asian regionalisation process. Specifically, elite interactions (personal networks, track twodiplomacy), back-channel negotiations, economic interdependence and integration, and functionalcooperation have together with (China's acceptance of) multilateralism and institutionalisation (ofpeaceful relations) been of high importance for the relative peace. Whereas formalised conflictmanagement mechanisms and the U.S. presence have also contributed to peace, this dissertationshows their contribution to be much more limited.

This chapter addresses the daunting challenge of urban warfare on tomorrow’s battlefield. In the first section, it provides a brief background of the urban warfare phenomenon. It approaches urban warfare by asking why the field has now emerged after a long period of relative neglect. Thereafter, the chapter outlines the different challenges to and expectations for urban operations on the battlefields of today and tomorrow. A number of key challenges are addressed: the impact of rapid urbanization, multi-domain operations, grey zone problems, the impact of technology on urban operations, and the urbanization of insurgency. Observing that urban areas will be an increasingly important arena for future land warfare, the chapter argues that urban operations and warfare should acquire a greater significance in our understanding of the operational environment. With large cities being the centre of gravity for political and economic interaction and although urban warfare is a nightmare that one reasonably hopes to avoid, it is not always possible to choose the battlefield and it is therefore better to prepare thoroughly for this eventuality. Finally, to help with the preparation, the chapter presents eleven lessons about urban warfare.

This article analyses why the offensive dominates tactical thinking among Swedish officers. Having found that the large majority of Swedish officers think that the offensive dominates tactical thinking in the armed forces (6:1, 16:1 in the case of the army) ten possible reasons are identified and analysed. It found that the key factors for the dominance are military culture and education which together produce and reproduce the offensive bias. These are the factors with the most direct and deepest impact on the officer identity and understanding, form the foundation for tactical thinking, and work as a prism for other important factors.

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.

I detta kapitel studerar vi offensivens roll i det taktiska tänkandet vid tolfte slaget om Isonzo, mer känt som slaget vid Caporetto, i oktober 1917. Underlag har utgjorts av litteraturen kring slaget samt av erfarenheter från en fältövning på plats i Slovenien. Författarna, tillsammans med lärarna på sektionen för markoperationer och chefen för militärhistoriska avdelningen vid Försvarshögskolan, analyserade på plats slaget och följde i fotspåren på dåvarande löjtnanten Erwin Rommel för att förstå de taktiska förutsättningarna, vägvalen, besluten och dess effekter.

I detta kapitel utgår vi från resultaten av vår egen forskning kring militärt taktiskt tänkande bland svenska officerare, från existerande forskning kring taktiskt tänkande samt från svensk doktrin och reglementen med betoning på Arméreglemente taktik (ART).

När man studerar slaget vid Caporetto finner man att det är uppenbart att offensiven och offensivt tänkande har varit förhärskande. Detta gäller såväl Caporetto som de föregående elva slagen om Isonzo liksom den efterföljande jakten efter de italienska trupperna mot Tagliamento. Men varför var offensiven förhärskande? De militära målen och operationsmiljön ger förstås en grundförklaring – då italienarna ville nå Trieste behövde de gå på offensiven, och när Österrike-Ungerns försvar närmade sig kollaps och det operativa rummet saknades var motoffensiv att föredra (i alla fall om tyskt stöd kunde uppbådas). Samtidigt står det klart att offensiven var dominerande i det militära taktiska tänkandet hos såväl italienare som tyskar – de två huvudaktörerna i det studerade fallet.

Praktiska pedagogiska redskap är en central del i utbildningen av officerare. Detta är ett område där det finns en lång tradition, både på Försvarshögskolan och inom Försvarsmakten mer generellt. Detta är också ett område där Försvarshögskolan alltid har varit framträdande, där metoder som applikatoriska exempel (applex), krigsspel, fältövningar, stabstjänstövningar och taktiska problem under lång tid har använts. Denna handbok riktar in sig på ett av dessa pedagogiska redskap: fältövningar. 

Handboken är disponerad som följer: först ges en historisk bakgrund till fältövningar och vi diskuterar vad en fältövning är och vilka typer som finns. Därefter flyttar fokus till tankar kring att planera och genomföra en fältövning. Här diskuterar vi planeringsfasen, lärdomar kring nyttan av att rekognosera inför genomförande och tankar kring fältövningens pedagogiska genomförande. Handboken avslutas med en diskussion kring hur man bör tänka när man planerar och genomför en fältövning, både praktiskt och pedagogiskt. Här presenteras även en schematisk modell kring fältövningens pedagogiska dynamik för olika målgrupper baserat på deras förförståelse och olika fältövningars komplexitet.

The use of various practical pedagogical tools is an important part of officer training. This is also an area where there is a long tradition in the training of officer cadets and officers in staff colleges as well as in the Armed Forces more generally. This article focuses on staff rides aimed at teaching tactics and operational arts based on historical examples. This type of staff-rides aims to learn from history with a bearing on the present and the future.

The article is organized as follows: first, the article gives a short overview of the history of staff rides, followed by a discussion on different types of staff rides. Then the focus shifts to ways to planning and carrying out a staff-ride. This includes the planning phase, reconnaissance, and the different pedagogical tools that can be used and their implementation. The article concludes with a discussion of how to think when planning and carrying out a staff rides, both practically and pedagogically. The article here presented a schematic model of the pedagogical dynamics of the staff ride for different target groups based on their pre-understanding and the complexity of different field exercises.