Endre søk
Begrens søket
1 - 42 of 42
RefereraExporteraLink til resultatlisten
Permanent link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Treff pr side
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sortering
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Forfatter A-Ø
  • Forfatter Ø-A
  • Tittel A-Ø
  • Tittel Ø-A
  • Type publikasjon A-Ø
  • Type publikasjon Ø-A
  • Eldste først
  • Nyeste først
  • Skapad (Eldste først)
  • Skapad (Nyeste først)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Eldste først)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyeste først)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidligste først)
  • Disputationsdatum (siste først)
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Forfatter A-Ø
  • Forfatter Ø-A
  • Tittel A-Ø
  • Tittel Ø-A
  • Type publikasjon A-Ø
  • Type publikasjon Ø-A
  • Eldste først
  • Nyeste først
  • Skapad (Eldste først)
  • Skapad (Nyeste først)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Eldste først)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyeste først)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidligste først)
  • Disputationsdatum (siste først)
Merk
Maxantalet träffar du kan exportera från sökgränssnittet är 250. Vid större uttag använd dig av utsökningar.
  • 1.
    Björnehed, Emma
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marinsektionen (Marin).
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Praktisk examination och examination av praktik: möjligheter och begränsningar2018Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Frågan om praktisk examination och hur man kan och bör examinera praktik är någonting som under en längre tid har varit uppe för diskussion på Försvarshögskolan (FHS). Denna artikel syftar till att diskutera möjligheter och begränsningar med praktisk examination. Fokus kommer att vara på utbildningen av officerare inom det ämne författarna verkar – krigsvetenskap. Artikeln tar sig an frågan med utgångspunkt i gällande rättsläge, högskolepedagogisk forskning- och praktik. Det övergripande syftet är att förstå vad man faktiskt får göra, hur det sker rättssäkert och hur det kan göras i praktiken. Artikeln diskuterar även vad som bör examineras praktiskt och hur detta då skall göras.

  • 2.
    Dittmer, Lowell
    et al.
    University of California, Berkeley.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    China’s Maritime Embroilments2015Inngår i: Asian Survey, ISSN 0004-4687, E-ISSN 1533-838X, Vol. 55, nr 3, s. 447-454Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    China's maritime periphery or ‘‘near seas’’—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—are waters through which a great deal of vital commerce flows, as China, Japan, Korea, and numerous Southeast Asian countries are all major trading nations that import the energy and raw materials that sustain their thriving economies. Since 2009 the East and South China Seas have become increasingly fraught with tension. This has generally been attributed to rising Chinese assertiveness, but not because China has started making a lot of assertions it never made before. As the authors assembled here point out in replete detail, China’s explicit claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets in the East China Sea date back at least to 1971, while it can trace its claim in the South China Sea back to the publication of the famous ‘‘nine-dashed line’’ map by the Nationalists in 1947 (at the time it contained eleven segmented lines; the victorious Communists subsequently dropped two). What has changed since 2009 is China’s more rigorous enforcement of existing claims. This too is brought out in the articles collected below: its actors have seized islands well within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of neighboring Southeast Asian nations, detained fishing boats and confiscated their catch, cut the cables of ships engaged in oil exploration, harassed American surveillance vessels, and most recently undertaken ‘‘reclamation’’ of subsurface islets in order to construct airstrips and harbors. 

  • 3.
    Elin, Rappe
    et al.
    The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    ‘One Belt, One Road’ in the Swedish Context2016Inngår i: Europe and China’s New Silk Roads / [ed] Frans-Paul van der Putten, John Seaman, Mikko Huotari, Alice Ekman & Miguel Otero-Iglesias, European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) , 2016, s. 60-62Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Considering the economic importance of China for Sweden, a project such as the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative should be expected to entail a great deal of interest among Swedish policy-makers and the business community alike. However, this has not been the case, as the response so far has been varied and often cautious. The focus among Sweden’s policy-makers and the business community alike has been a wait-and-see approach, so the impact of OBOR in Sweden has been very limited. Sweden’s business community has been somewhat more optimistic, in particular with regard to opportunities in Central Asia, while the policy-makers in general do not see much that is new with the OBOR project. In conclusion, very little has been done; much more could and should have been done. There is a great need for strong leadership and guidance if Sweden is not going to fall way too far behind other nations with respect to OBOR.

  • 4.
    Hagström, Linus
    et al.
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Nordkorea måste hanteras varsamt2010Annet (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 5.
    Hagström, Linus
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), Statsvetenskapliga avdelningen. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark). The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Hanssen, Ulv
    The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Allt bör göras för att bygga relationer med Nordkorea2017Inngår i: Dagens Nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 6.
    Hagström, Linus
    et al.
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Hanssen, Ulv
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Hot och isolering fel strategi i konflikten med Nordkorea2013Annet (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 7.
    Hanssen, Ulv
    et al.
    Japaninstitutet, Handelshögskolan, Stockholm, Sverige; FU Berlin.
    Hagström, Linus
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), Statsvetenskapliga avdelningen.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Tøffere press og sanksjoner mot Nord-Korea er ineffektivt og kanskje også kontraproduktivt2017Inngår i: Verdens gang, ISSN 0806-0894, artikkel-id 9 oktoberArtikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 8.
    Hickman, Karl
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Weissmann, MikaelFörsvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).Nilsson, NiklasFörsvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).Bachman, Sascha-DominikBournemouth University.Gunneriusson, HåkanFörsvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).Thunholm, PerFörsvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), CATS (Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och Terrorismstudier).
    Hybrid Threats and Asymmetric Warfare: What to do?2018Konferanseproceedings (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step towards developing such a comprehensive approach.

    The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and link state of the art of research and practice.

    Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in order to facilitate future cooperation

    These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters, along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and presentations can be found in the appendix.

  • 9.
    Lyckman, Markus
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), Strategiavdelningen.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark).
    Global shadow war: conceptual analysis2015Inngår i: Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, ISSN 1746-7586, E-ISSN 1746-7594, Vol. 8, nr 3, s. 251-262Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The US strategic shift from nation-building to what has been labelled “light footprint” has carried with it a number of changes in the practices used when waging war on terrorism. These activities include covert and clandestine action by special operations and paramilitary forces, and others, operating under a shadowy mandate. It is essential to analyse these changes, due to the nature of the actions taken and the global reach and consequences of US foreign policies. The concept of “global shadow war” has been used by scholars and journalists alike to describe the practices associated with the light footprint framework, although the concept is ambiguous, lacks clear conceptual boundaries and is yet to be defined. This article attempts to resolve the problem of ambiguity through a systematic analysis of how and when the concept is used, in the process establishing its conceptual boundaries and definitional qualities. Using a method for concept analysis developed by Giovanni Sartori, the article provides a conceptual definition which is more clearly delineated, encompasses the characteristics found in the sources studied, and can be used when theorizing about the many practices taking place within the light footprint framework.

  • 10.
    Nordin, Astrid
    et al.
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Will Trump make China great again?: The belt and road initiative and international order2018Inngår i: International Affairs, ISSN 0020-5850, E-ISSN 1468-2346, Vol. 94, nr 2, s. 231-249Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Under President Xi Jinping's leadership, Chinese foreign relations have moved from keeping a low profile, to a more assertive bid for international leadership that is beginning to take form in the ‘belt and road initiative’ (BRI). This initiative focuses on connectivity in policy coordination, facilities, trade, finance and people-to-people relations, in order to connect China to key parts of Asia, the south Pacific, east Africa and Europe. Networked capitalism and the national unit, which are often seen as spatial opposites in the global political economy, are both exercised through the BRI in mutually supporting ways. Networked capitalism is not challenging the national spatial unit, nor vice versa. Rather, they conglomerate to reinforce Chinese government narratives which portray China as the new trailblazer of global capitalism—thus illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in east Asia. Likely winners of this constellation, if it is successful, are megalopolises in Eurasia, and most of all the Chinese Communist Party. Likely losers are countries that are not included in the BRI, most notably the United States. In a context where President Donald Trump is signalling a more protectionist stance and the United States is withdrawing from free trade pacts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump may ironically enable Xi's dream of making China great again.

  • 11.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    A European Strategy towards East Asia: moving from good intentions to action2013Rapport (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Despite the global power shift from West to East and almost everyone in the EU recognising that the importance of Asia is growing, there has been a lacking willingness to devote time, energy and resources to deepening relations with the region. There has been a lack of a unified strategic vision for the region, and due to internal policy divisions and institutional squabbles, the EU has failed to become a strong, cohesive, actor. Thus, the EU needs to prioritise and focus if to be able to successfully pursue a strategy towards East Asia.

    East Asia is the home to the fastest growing economies in the world. It contains both like-minded partners, economic powerhouses, and a number of developing countries with an interest in learning from the EU experiences. The EU has a unique advantage in the region; besides having economic weight it is seen as a nonthreatening partner in the region, giving a comparative advantage over other major powers such as the US and China.  However, the success of the EU’s strategy requires a unified strategy with clear prioritisation of areas where the EU realistically can have an impact. Emphasise should be put on enhancing the bilateral trade and investment conditions, and to pursue principled polices in particular towards Southeast Asian nations that are going through a democratisation process. Being a region with widespread ecological problems, the impact of knowledge and technology transfers would benefit the EU’s global interests in the environment, energy and climate change areas, as a more sustainable East Asia have direct impact on a global scale.

    When designing an EU global strategy towards East Asia it is important to start form where we are, even if that is not where we would like to be. The European Union is not viewed as a serious political or security actor in East Asia among the regional countries. The EU is best understood as an outside-actor, with no hard power in the region. However, this is not necessary a bad thing. Instead, the EU has a unique position, being seen as a nonthreatening partner. If used wisely, the role as a nonthreatening partner can together with the EU’s economic weight secure a leading position together with China and the US not only in the region but in the world.

    There are many areas of shared concern between the EU and the US. However, the EU should be cautious when cooperating with the US ensuring not losing its credibility and becoming irrelevant as an independent actor. Despite sharing principles, there are major differences between the EU’s attempt to combine principled policies with economic and security concerns while the US policy, in contrast, focuses on the security first, almost always winning over democracy.

    The strengthening of bilateral trade and investment flows, including interlinked areas such as improved market access and investment conditions, should be the main focus of the EU’s strategy towards East Asia. The pursuit of FTAs with East Asian counterparts should be continued, with special emphasis on Japan and Indonesia. The EU should avoid making economic concessions in exchange for concessions on principles. The current practice of pursuing policies aimed at maximising European access and competiveness rather that pursuing multilateralism for its own sake should be continued.

    The EU should be selective in pursuing principled policies, creating more impact for the policies pursued and not to undermining either its role in region or the bilateral trade and investment relations. The EU should focus on cooperation with likeminded partners (Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries). Such a focus will have best possible spill-over effects in the region, and globally as East Asian partners will also benefit the EU’s work on the global level.

    To develop EU-China relations are essential, with China already being the world’s 2nd largest economy and the EU being Chinas largest trading partner. Being a country with widespread ecological problems, the impact of knowledge and technology transfers would benefit the EU’s global interests in the environment, energy and climate change areas, as a more sustainable China have direct impact on a global scale. The China strategy should stand on three legs; economic cooperation – with a focus of protecting European interests such as investments and intellectual property rights as well cooperation around green technology – people-to-people exchanges, and the strengthening of the strategic partnership. For the latter to succeed there is a need to overcoming diverging value expectation, trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make Beijing and the EU’s policies complimentary. All the above needs to be accomplished while the EU continues to stay vocal concerning the human rights situation in China.

    It is important to recognise that East Asia is not only China. The EU should prioritise relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). After a long period of scepticism, ASEAN has opened up to learn from the EU experience making it a potentially major success in the EU’s global strategy. Particular emphasis should be put on Indonesia, one of the region’s most democratic countries and home to the largest Muslim population in the world. Relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan should be enhanced – there are partners that are not only major economic powers, but also ones with whom the EU are sharing similar values and similar challenges.

    It is in the EU’s interest to contribute to the safeguarding of regional peace and security. The EU should work together with regional partners, in particular ASEAN, and the US on issues concerning regional peace and security on all levels, including, but not limited to, forum such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit.

  • 12.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
    Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer “Striving For Achievement”2015Inngår i: Journal of China and International Relations, ISSN 1005-8885, E-ISSN 2245-8921, Vol. 3, nr 1, s. 151-166Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    During the last four decades, China has moved from being an isolated country separated from the international community to having become one of the world’s major powers. It is vital to understand what is guiding Chinese foreign policy, why this is so, and not least what kind of power China is and will be in the future. This article analyses the vital elements and thinking that guides Chinese foreign policy, its priorities and decision making process. It is found that China's foreign policy is embedded in domestic issues. The foremost foreign policy objective is domestic political stability, which in turn is a necessity for the survival of one-party rule. Both are dependent on a combination of two key factors: continuing domestic economic growth and nationalism. The foreign policy is also closely linked to the Chinese self-perception, both its self-superiority/self-inferiority dualism and its multitude of confusing (overlapping) identities about what China is and should be. A key turning year is 2008 when the "global" financial crisis severely affected the United States and Europe at a time of Chinese economic success, which gave China confidence to pursue a more active and aggressive/assertive stance on the international stage. It is concluded that China under Xi Jinping will not be a status que power accepting the world as it is, but nor are we to expect China to become a revisionist power aiming to remodel the global order. China is what can best be described as a responsible reformer "striving for achievements".

  • 13.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Chinese Soft Power and ASEAN’s Constructive Engagement: Sino-ASEAN relations and the South China Sea2014Inngår i: Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, nr 4Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 14.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Chinese Soft Power and ASEAN’s Constructive Engagement: Sino-ASEAN relations and the South China Sea2014Inngår i: Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol. 15Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 15.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    En plats för nästa krig?: Spänningarna ökar i Sydkinesiska sjön2013Inngår i: Internationella Studier, ISSN 0020-952X, nr 1, s. 38-39Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 16.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Hybrid warfare and hybrid threats today and tomorrow: towards an analytical framework2019Inngår i: Journal on Baltic Security, ISSN 2382-9222, Vol. 5, nr 1, s. 17-26, artikkel-id https://doi.org/10.2478/jobs-2019-0002Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This article first traces the origin of hybrid warfare and the label game surrounding the concept, asking whether it is merely old wine in a new bottle, and if so, whether it is still a useful concept. It is found that while being old wine in new bottles, it is still a good wine well worth drinking. While there is not much new in the concept itself, it is a useful tool to think about past wars, today’s wars and the wars of the future. Thereafter, this paper analyses how hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are to be understood in the context of peace, conflict and war. It is shown how hybrid warfare and threats fit into our traditional understanding of conflict dynamics.

  • 17.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Utrikespolitiska institutet.
    Kan Nordkorea avväpnas?2011Inngår i: Internationella Studier, ISSN 0020-952X, nr 2, s. 18-19Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 18.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Keeping alive: Understanding North Korea’s supply lines and the potential role of sanctions2014Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Against all the odds, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) has survived two decades of acute crisis since the end of the Cold War. It has neither collapsed nor reformed itself, despite the dire state of its economy and the existence of extensive international sanctions. This has been possible as it has skillfully adapted to circumstances and found new ways to maintain supply lines and revenue streams, developing and using a range of suppliers and altering their relative importance over time, as well as the way in which they operate, in order to circumvent sanctions. Furthermore, they have also been able to develop new ones. There has also been a shift away from direct state control over illicit and semi-official activities, towards putting more trust in market mechanisms and obtaining the state’s and the regime’s share through different forms of “loyalty schemes”, bribery and public-private constructions. This shift has made it more difficult to target the different sources of revenue.

    It is possible to identify ten supply lines and revenue streams: (a) The shadow economy and semi-official trade; (b) the “court economy”; (c) international trade; (d) the Kaesong Industrial Zone; (e) the export of labour and remittances; (f) mobile phones; (g) tourism ; (h) the arms trade; (i) illicit activities; and (j) foreign assistance. The shadow economy and semi-official trade have been crucial to keeping the state functioning, and the regime as well as the wider population alive. The success of the court economy has been crucial for the survival of the regime. The revenues gained from the export of labour and the national mobile phone network are also surprisingly large. The arms trade continues to bring in revenue, as do tourism and remittances, but none of these are as important as they once were. Illicit activities continue to be a major source of revenue. However, as the government becomes more skilled at hiding its involvement, it is increasingly difficult to estimate the amounts involved or obtained by the regime. International trade, most notably with China and South Korea, is also a major source of income. Foreign assistance also contributes, but is very limited in comparison.

    There is currently a wide range of sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions have been a complete failure in fulfilling their aim of halting North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme. They have, however, had a substantial impact on the country. Under their pressure, North Korea has been forced to adapt to a new reality, not least by hiding its involvement in illicit activities and finding new revenue streams. It has been highly successful at both.

    In trying to refine and design new sanctions, it should be clear that there is no silver bullet. First and foremost, it is important to do the utmost to implement the sanctions currently in place, including monitoring and fine-tuning their implementation. All possible efforts should be made to get those states which do not currently comply to do so. Sanctions will not work as long as China and to some extent South Korea continue to engage with North Korea.

    Sanctions should target the following areas:

    1. The court economy should be a prime target for international sanctions. Financial sanctions are likely to be the most effective.

    2. The export of labour should be targeted by sanctions. It is a major revenue stream and, moreover, an area in which dependence on Chinese compliance is less important.

    3. Existing sanctions on International trade should be fine-tuned and developed. It is extremely doubtful that they will make a major difference, however, as North Korea’s number one trading partner, China, is unlikely to comply. Nonetheless, such sanctions send a signal and are disruptive in Pyongyang.

    4. Efforts to implement sanctions that target the arms trade should continue, not least the work to detect, monitor and intercept suspicious cargoes and financial transactions in and out of North Korea.

    5. Sanctions targeting illicit activities should be fine-tuned and developed in order to increase their effectiveness. Efforts should be made to convince China to increase its pressure, in particular because apart from China, there are few channels left for North Korean illicit activities.

    6. The Kaesong Industrial Zone is in theory a good and easy target for sanctions, and its closure would be a major blow to the regime. However, in practice this is beyond the control of the international community, and it is unlikely that South Korea would be willing to close Kaesong.

    The following areas should not be targeted by sanctions:

    1. The shadow economy and semi-official trade are not good targets for sanctions. They are difficult to target, and doing so would be likely to have a disproportionate impact on ordinary North Koreans.

    2. Remittances are under control and there is no need for, nor would there be any likely impact from, more sanctions.

    3. The mobile phone network offers limited opportunities for successful sanctions. In addition, the proliferation of mobile phones should not be a target for sanctions because increased communication in a closed authoritarian state such as North Korea is a positive development.

    4. Foreign assistance is not an area that should be targeted by international sanctions.

    5. Outgoing Tourism is not possible to develop effective sanctions against. Nor would it be a good thing if wanting North Korea to open up.

  • 19.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Kinas mjuka makt: Finns den? Vad betyder den?”2012Inngår i: Kinarapport, ISSN 0345-5807, nr 4, s. 28-31Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 20.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    University of Gothenburg.
    Peacebuilding in East Asia: The Role of Track II Diplomacy, Informal Networks, and Economic, Social and Cultural Regionalisation2008Inngår i: Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia: Third-Party Mediation and Intervention between China and Taiwan / [ed] Jacob Bercovitch, Kwei-Bo Huang, Chung-Chian Teng, London: Routledge, 2008, s. 67-82Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 21.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding2012Bok (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The East Asian peace is a mystery of the modern age. To many theorists and analysts alike, the post-Cold War calm has been seen as a temporary anomaly, potential military conflicts dominating predictions for the future. Despite this, two decades have passed in which a relative peace has been sustained and it is time to question existing forecasts. Comparing the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the Korean Nuclear conflict, the author explores the informal processes that can help explain the persistence of peace, leading to hope for a future era of stability.

  • 22.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    University of Gothenburg.
    The Missing Link: bridging between social movement theory and conflict resolution2008Rapport (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores what benefits the theoretical development, operationalisation andimplementation of conflict resolution can get from bridging with social movement theory.Four different social movement theories are included: the political process, resourcemobilisation, collective behaviour- and the new social movement approach. For conflictresolution Peter Wallensteen’s theoretical approach is used. The analysis is limited to thepost-Cold War period and intrastate conflicts (civil wars and state formation conflicts). Thiscovers 95% of all post-Cold War conflicts. Four questions are asked and answered: 1. Whatdoes the link between social movement theory and conflict resolution look like?; 2. How cansocial movement theory benefit the development of conflict resolution theory?; 3. How cansocial movement theory benefit the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory?; 4. Howcan social movement theory and social movements be beneficial for the implementation ofconflict resolution theory (i.e. conflict resolution)? The theoretical findings are tested on onecase study (East Timor). The theoretical analysis shows that there exist a link between socialmovement theory and conflict resolution on all levels. The case study confirms the theoreticalfindings.

  • 23.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    The (new) North Korean Crisis: what can be expected and what should be done as a response to the sinking of the Cheonan corvette2010Annet (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 24.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building2010Inngår i: Asian Perspective, ISSN 0258-9184, E-ISSN 2288-2871, Vol. 34, nr 3, s. 35-69Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This article argues that the South China Sea (SCS) conflicthas been a successful case of conflict prevention since the early1990s, and in fact, that a transformation has occurred, from afragile peace to a more stable peace. The article asks why therehas been, and continues to be, relative peace in the SCS,despite the fact that many factors—as well as predictions byneo-realists and most U.S. policy analysts—point in the directionof military conflict. The findings show that the relativepeace is the result of two interlinked categories of processes:elite interactions and regionalization. The former takes theform of Track 2 diplomacy and personal networks, while thelatter is the outcome of the combined forces of Sino-ASEANrapprochement and economic integration and interdependence.Here, China’s acceptance of multilateralism and theASEAN+3 process have been of foremost importance.

  • 25.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    The South China Sea: Still No War on the Horizon2015Inngår i: Asian Survey, ISSN 0004-4687, E-ISSN 1533-838X, Vol. 55, nr 3, s. 596-617Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Using a conflict transformation framework, this article demonstrates that positive transformations have taken place in the South China Sea between 1991 and 2007. Even though these transformations have been weakened in recent years, particularly regarding the actor aspect, it is concluded that a major armed conflict is still highly unlikely.

  • 26.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Understanding Power (Shift) in East Asia: the Sino-US Narrative Battle about Leadership in the South China Sea2019Inngår i: Asian Perspectives, ISSN 0066-8435, E-ISSN 1535-8283, Vol. 43, nr 2, s. 223-248, artikkel-id https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0009Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I study the competing US and Chinese narratives about the South China Sea. Arguing that the practice of calculating power shifts in terms of the changing distribution of material capabilities is inadequate, I complement existing literature by taking ideational and normative dimensions of power into account. I ask what the alternative Chinese narrative of power and leadership in the South China Sea looks like and how it is perceived by others in comparison with the dominant US narrative. While a "hard" power transition is ongoing, China's preferred narrative has yet to become widely accepted and the US narrative will remain dominant for now. Nevertheless, China has been making progress in shifting the narrative of what the future could look like with China's vision for a post-US regional and global order now seen as a possible alternative.

  • 27.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    University of Gothenburg.
    Understanding the East Asian Peace: Informal and formal conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea 1990-20082009Doktoravhandling, monografi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The overall purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical study of the post-Cold War EastAsian security setting, with the aim of understanding why there is an East Asian peace. The EastAsian peace exists in a region with a history of militarised conflicts, home to many of the world'slongest ongoing militarised problems and a number of unresolved critical flashpoints. Thus, thepost-Cold War East Asian inter-state peace is a paradox. Despite being a region predicted to be ripefor conflict, there have not only been less wars than expected, but the region also shows severalsigns of a development towards a more durable peace. The dominant research paradigm –neorealism – has painted a gloomy picture of post-Cold War East Asia, with perpetual conflictsdominating the predictions. Other mainstream international relations theories, too, fail to accountfully for the relative peace. One of the greatest problems for mainstream theories, is accounting forpeace given East Asia's lack of security organisations or other formalised conflict managementmechanisms. Given this paradox/problem, this dissertation sets out to ask "Why is there a relativepeace in the East Asian security setting despite an absence of security organisations or otherformalised mechanisms to prevent existing conflicts from escalating into violence?"

    In order to answer this question, the case of East Asian peace is approached by comparingthree embedded case studies within the region: the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and theKorean nuclear conflict. It explores the full range of informal and formal processes plus the ConflictPrevention and Peacebuilding Mechanisms (CPPBMs) that have been important for the creation ofa continuing relative peace in East Asia between 1990 and 2008. The study furthermore focuses onChina's role in the three cases, on an empirical basis consisting of interviews conducted with keypersons during more than 1.5 years fieldwork in China.

    The three cases show that informal processes exist, and that they have furthermore beenimportant for peace, both by preventing conflicts from escalating into war, and by buildingconditions for a stable longer-term peace. Their impact on the persistence of peace has been tracedto a range of different CPPBMs. Returning to the level of the East Asian case, a common feature ofmany of the identified processes is that they can be understood as aspects or manifestations of theEast Asian regionalisation process. Specifically, elite interactions (personal networks, track twodiplomacy), back-channel negotiations, economic interdependence and integration, and functionalcooperation have together with (China's acceptance of) multilateralism and institutionalisation (ofpeaceful relations) been of high importance for the relative peace. Whereas formalised conflictmanagement mechanisms and the U.S. presence have also contributed to peace, this dissertationshows their contribution to be much more limited.

  • 28.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Understanding the East Asian peace: some findings on the role of informal processes2009Inngår i: Asia Insights, ISSN 0904-4337, nr 2, s. 14-16Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 29.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
    Why is there a relative peace in the South China Sea?2014Inngår i: Entering Uncharterd Waters?: ASEAN and The South China Sea Dispute / [ed] Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies , 2014, s. 36-64Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 30.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    University of Gothenburg, Peking University, Renmin University.
    将地区化与冲突防治联系起来 [Linking Regionalisation and Conflict Provention: the case of China in East Asia]2008Inngår i: 国际责任与大国战略 [International Responsibility and Strategy of Great Powers] / [ed] Zhongqi Pan, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House , 2008, s. 127-146Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 31.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Ahlström, Peter
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Endast genom anfall kan ett avgörande nås: Varför dominerar offensiven militärt taktiskt tänkande?2017Inngår i: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, nr 2, s. 6-18Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This article analyses why the offensive dominates tactical thinking among Swedish officers. Having found that the large majority of Swedish officers think that the offensive dominates tactical thinking in the armed forces (6:1, 16:1 in the case of the army) ten possible reasons are identified and analysed. It found that the key factors for the dominance are military culture and education which together produce and reproduce the offensive bias. These are the factors with the most direct and deepest impact on the officer identity and understanding, form the foundation for tactical thinking, and work as a prism for other important factors.

  • 32.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Ahlström, Peter
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the most offensive of them all?: Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking2019Inngår i: Defence Studies, ISSN 1470-2436, E-ISSN 1743-9698, s. 1-19Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.

  • 33.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Ahlström, Peter
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Offensivens roll i taktiskt tänkande: Slaget vid Caporetto 19172018Inngår i: Tankar om defensiven / [ed] Tommy Jeppsson, Stockholm: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademien och Försvarshögskolan , 2018, s. 14-24Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    I detta kapitel studerar vi offensivens roll i det taktiska tänkandet vid tolfte slaget om Isonzo, mer känt som slaget vid Caporetto, i oktober 1917. Underlag har utgjorts av litteraturen kring slaget samt av erfarenheter från en fältövning på plats i Slovenien. Författarna, tillsammans med lärarna på sektionen för markoperationer och chefen för militärhistoriska avdelningen vid Försvarshögskolan, analyserade på plats slaget och följde i fotspåren på dåvarande löjtnanten Erwin Rommel för att förstå de taktiska förutsättningarna, vägvalen, besluten och dess effekter.

    I detta kapitel utgår vi från resultaten av vår egen forskning kring militärt taktiskt tänkande bland svenska officerare, från existerande forskning kring taktiskt tänkande samt från svensk doktrin och reglementen med betoning på Arméreglemente taktik (ART).

    När man studerar slaget vid Caporetto finner man att det är uppenbart att offensiven och offensivt tänkande har varit förhärskande. Detta gäller såväl Caporetto som de föregående elva slagen om Isonzo liksom den efterföljande jakten efter de italienska trupperna mot Tagliamento. Men varför var offensiven förhärskande? De militära målen och operationsmiljön ger förstås en grundförklaring – då italienarna ville nå Trieste behövde de gå på offensiven, och när Österrike-Ungerns försvar närmade sig kollaps och det operativa rummet saknades var motoffensiv att föredra (i alla fall om tyskt stöd kunde uppbådas). Samtidigt står det klart att offensiven var dominerande i det militära taktiska tänkandet hos såväl italienare som tyskar – de två huvudaktörerna i det studerade fallet.

  • 34.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Björnehed, Emma
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marinsektionen (Marin).
    Praktisk examination och examination av praktik: Möjligheter och begränsningar2019Inngår i: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, nr 2, s. 91-103Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The ability to lead armed combat is central to an officer. It is clear that the military professionis about more than possessing theoretical knowledge. Thus, in order to achieve an educationalprogram that includes the skills and abilities of the military profession there is a need to lookbeyond traditional written examination and apply practical examination in various forms.In this article we argue that while all practice can and should be examined through practicalexamination, not everything that is practically examined has to be practice. More specifically,this article will focus on the possibilities and limitations with practical examination. Focuswill be on the education of officers within the context of war studies. The article approachesthe issue on the basis of the legal framework for higher education in Sweden, research onteaching and learning in higher education and practice at the Swedish Defence University. Theoverall purpose is to understand practical examination with regard to what is allowed, howit is done with judicial security, and how it can be done in practice. The article also discusseswhat should be practically examined and how this should be done.

  • 35.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
    Carlsson, Märta
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Sweden.
    Oxenstierna, Susanne
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Sweden.
    China and Russia - A Study on Cooperation, Competition and Distrust2015Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    China and Russia share a geopolitical world view and a preference for a multipolar world. How their relationship evolves and how they understand their respective positions in the international system are vital for the development of global affairs. The purpose of this report is to analyse the relationship between China and Russia from a political as well as an economic perspective. In this context it compares how the two countries perceive themselves and their role in the world. The report provides an overview of the national foreign policy elements and the economic ties between the two countries. China and Russia cooperate and compete in many areas and their interests and ambitions are exemplified by their policies in Central Asia and Asia-Pacific. Throughout the report the role of the United States as a competitor and a partner to both countries is discussed.

     

    The partnership with China offers Russia an opportunity to conduct a multivector foreign policy and thereby to counterbalance the hegemony of the West. For China it supports the efforts to offset the US influence in the Asia-Pacific. Economic interdependence between the countries is limited, but arms trade and technology transfer are vital elements and energy cooperation is developing. China’s gradual economic reforms have created an economic superpower that will soon be overtaking the United States as the largest economy in the world, while Russia’s economy is stagnating. A weakness in the relationship is the fact that relations with the United States are the most important for both China’s and Russia’s foreign policy. The United States is China’s only real strategic partner, which adds to the weakness of the partnership with Russia. The Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 is found to be a defining moment for the Sino-Russian relationship.

  • 36.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Daniel, Rydberg
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Att leda markoperationer2019Inngår i: Att leda markoperationer: En essäsamling / [ed] Mikael Weissmann & Daniel Rydberg, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2019, 1, s. 7-14Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Introduktion till essäsamlingen "Att leda markoperationer".

  • 37.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Dittmer, LowellUniversity of California, Berkeley.
    Special Issue on "China’s Maritime Embroilments"2015Collection/Antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The full table of content is as follows:

    • China’s Maritime Embroilments LOWELL DITTMER AND MIKAEL WEISSMANN
    • The South China Sea: Law Trumps PowerSTEIN TØNNESSON
    • Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without BreakingCHONG-PIN LIN
    • Chinese Discourse on the ‘‘Nine-Dashed Line’’: Rights, Interests, and NationalismZHENG WANG
    • Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China SeaPAUL MIDFORD
    • How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea DisputePAUL O’SHEA
    • The US Rebalance and Southeast Asia: A Work in ProgressSHELDON W. SIMON’
    • The South China Sea: Still No War on the Horizon MIKAEL WEISSMANN
    • The South China Sea: Achievements and Challenges to Dispute ManagementRAMSES AMER
  • 38.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
    Gerd, Hagmeyer-Gaverus
    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
    Early warning indicators for preventive policy: a new approach in Early Warning research2003Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This working paper presents the preliminary findings from the pilot-project‘Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy’ at the Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute which was launched in late 2002. The pilot phase of the projectwill run for twelve month and is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

    The project combines a monthly survey that retrieves events data from expertswith country framework data and Internet technology, thus breaking new ground inthe field of conflict early warning research. Processing both survey and statisticaldata using a well-designed statistical conflict forecasting model allows for thecreation of indexes that reflect negative national and regional developments in thesocial, political and economic sectors. The results are made available on the Internetin the form of country-specific and regional reports, with the possibility for users tocustomise the system for their own needs.

  • 39.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Krigsvetenskapliga avdelningen (KVA), Sektionen för markoperationer (KV Mark). Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden..
    Hagström, Linus
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), Statsvetenskapliga avdelningen. Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden..
    Sanctions Reconsidered: the Path Forward with North Korea2016Inngår i: The Washington quarterly, ISSN 0163-660X, E-ISSN 1530-9177, Vol. 39, nr 3, s. 61-76Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    There have been regular predictions of North Korea’s imminent collapse. Yet, by adapting to changing circumstances, and finding new supply lines and revenue streams, the state has managed to bypass an increasingly strict sanctions regime aimed at rolling back its nuclear program. This article details the economic flows that continue to keep North Korea alive, against all odds, but argued that these areas are difficult to target as even “smart sanctions” are highly likely to have a range of adverse effects on the wider population. That said, this article recommends continued monitoring of the arms trade, and measures to squeeze the court economy and to target remittances from exported laborers. Yet such efforts have to be combined with a smarter diplomacy built on engagement.

  • 40.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Li, Mingjiang
    S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
    Introduction to the Special Issue: power, Narratives, and the Role of Third Parties: Understanding Power (Shift) in East Asia2019Inngår i: Asian Perspective, ISSN 0258-9184, E-ISSN 2288-2871, Vol. 43, nr 2, s. 215-221Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    "POWER" REMAINS A CENTRAL, IF NOT INDISPENSABLE, CONCEPT IN THE SOCIAL sciences and humanities. In no discipline is this clearer than international relations (IR), where the distribution of power is believed to explain many outcomes in international politics, particularly the propensity for war and peace (Mearsheimer 2010; Friedberg 2011). The importance of the concept notwithstanding, academic and policy debates about international power have long occurred within overly restrictive conceptual boundaries, focusing on the distribution of power defined as tangible assets to explain international politics at the expense of other ways in which power is exercised. Even though this materialist theory of power has failed to help us understand some of the most conspicuous international developments of recent decades, it continues to permeate the literature about international politics.

    There are few places in the world where power is as crucial to shaping international dynamics as in East Asia. The critical question of whether a power shift is ongoing in the region, from Japan and the United States to China, is a central preoccupation of contemporary IR. Given the actors that are involved, the region is arguably the epicenter of a possible global power shift from the West to the East, and from the North to the South. In the East Asian region, a power shift has been seen as impending for more than two decades (Betts 1993; Friedberg 1993; Roy 1994). Today, the concept of a regional power shift is widely accepted both among scholars and observers outside of academia (Shambaugh 2005; Mearsheimer 2010; Layne 2018). A consensus has emerged that there has been a redistribution of capabilities among the major players in the region, although there are different opinions about the extent and outcome of such power shift (Li and Kemburi 2014; see also the Asian Perspective special issue "The East Asia Power Shift: A Critical Appraisal," vol. 38, no. 3, 2014; of particular interest is the introduction by Linus Hagström and Bjorn Jerden).

    This special issue goes beyond materialistic power theory to examine the role and impact of narratives themselves in the (apparent) power shift in East Asia. It investigates the extent to which the narratives produced and spread by key actors succeed in producing effects on third [End Page 215] parties, exploring if and how they succeed in shaping their preferences, interests, and identities regarding contested issues in East Asia. Its focus is on the narratives about China, Japan, and the United States. The underlying idea is that it is the narrative(s) that ultimately define(s) the dynamics of the East Asian security setting and IR more broadly, creating a framework for what actions are possible, when, and for whom. In short, it is ultimately the victorious/dominant narratives that themselves define what is seen as legitimate and illegitimate, what is normal and abnormal, and ultimately what is within the realm of possibility and what is not.

    Special emphasis is put on third parties, as it is they who are the audiences and ultimately the judges of what narrative to accept or is most attractive. For example, the fact that narratives about a more "assertive" and "threatening" China have received increased attention and acceptance is limiting China while at the same time opening new space for Japan and US foreign policy, as they are perceived as important to manage China's purported rise.

    This special issue starts with an article by Mikael Weissmann titled "Understanding Power (Shift) in East Asia: The Sino-US Narrative Battle about Leadership in the South China Sea." Weissmann analyzes competing US and Chinese narratives about the South China Sea. He argues that the practice of calculating power shifts in terms of changing distribution of material capabilities is inadequate. The article aims to complement existing literature by taking ideational and normative dimensions of power into account. The article asks what the Chinese narrative of power and leadership in the South China Sea looks like and how it is perceived by others in comparison with the dominant US narrative. Weissmann concludes that while a "hard" power transition is ongoing, China's preferred narrative has yet to become widely accepted and...

  • 41.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark). The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Rappe, Elin
    The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
    Sweden’s approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Still a glass half-empty2017Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2013 China’s President Xi Jinping launched the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves China undertaking to make infrastructure investments worth billions of US dollars in the countries along the old Silk Road connecting China with Europe. While commonly seen as an infrastructure initiative aimed at strengthening the Chinese economy, it is also a political project with far-reaching strategic aims.

    This UI Brief outlines how China has approached the BRI with Sweden, how Sweden has responded and the perceptions of major Swedish stakeholders. It finds that Swedish officials are often highly cautious, maintaining a wait-and see policy. While also cautious, members of the business community are cautiously optimistic and have been more actively following BRI-related developments, seeking out avenues for potential business. The actual impact of BRI in Sweden, however, is so far very limited.

    The Brief concludes that Sweden’s approach to BRI has been too reactive and too passive. It argues that both the government and the business community need to engage more actively with the BRI in order to maximize its possible benefits. To this end, a national strategy is needed that includes the government and the business sector. Better coordination is also needed between government agencies and to link existing intra-governmental cooperation with the business community. Their importance cannot be overemphasized as the BRI is a political project, not an idealistic free-market endeavour.

  • 42.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Rydberg, DanielFörsvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Taktikavdelningen (TA), Marksektionen (Mark).
    Att leda markoperationer: En essäsamling2019Collection/Antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
1 - 42 of 42
RefereraExporteraLink til resultatlisten
Permanent link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf