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  • 1.
    Arve, Sten
    Swedish Defence University, Department of War Studies and Military History, Air Operations Division.
    Air Power Considerations for a Small State2023In: Journal of Air Power and Space Studies, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 136-167Article in journal (Refereed)
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  • 2.
    Arve, Sten
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Air Operations Section.
    Learning the lesson of an intelligence failure?2020In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 4, p. 123-125Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna essä tar utgångspunkt inom teoribildningen rörande ”Intelligence Failure” och hävdaratt det går att fastställa om en organisation har ”lärt av sina misstag” utifrån tre undersökandeperspektiv. Först kan man undersöka organisationens erfarenhetshantering, vilket gerunderlag av formell karaktär. Här lyfts exempel från Försvarsmaktens erfarenhetshanteringfram. Därefter kan man undersöka organisationens reformering utifrån olika utkast om”Intelligence Failure” exemplifierade av Zegart, Betts och Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski. Slutligenkan man undersöka organisationens prestationer över tiden och därigenom få underlag omeffekten av lärandet. Det finns dock flera historiografiska utmaningar med att dra slutsatserutifrån fallstudier och varje perspektiv ovan bidrar helt eller delvis med underlag, beroendepå det särskilda fallet. I kombination formar de emellertid ett stabilt ramverk för undersökningarsom kan påvisa om en organisation ”lärt av sina misstag”.

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    Intelligence Failure and Lessons Learned Methodology
  • 3. Arve, Sten
    Prediction of regime change is a constant challenge to intelligence organizations. What intelligence lessons can be learned from the fall of the Shah in 1978?: Why did the US intelligence community fail to predict the fall of the Shah? What failure theory explains it best? What lessons may be drawn from it? Why was Israeli intelligence more successful in this case? What may we learn combined from the US failure and the Israeli success? How does the case match theory on Regime Change and what may we learn?2019Other (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation deals with the “Fall of the Shah” in 1978 from the perspective of intelligence concerning Regime Change. It compares the US and Israeli intelligence effort using intelligence failure theories in combination with intelligence success. The dissertation builds on released documents from the US National Security Archives as well as a variety of secondary sources. It argues that the US failure was caused by mistakes on multiple levels, the lion’s share within policy making and analysis, but also that comprehensive understanding of the case requires an intermixture of theories. Further, several relevant lessons learned can be drawn and the intertwinement of intelligence and Covert Action is highlighted.

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    Fall of the Shah
  • 4.
    Arve, Sten
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Air Operations Section.
    The UK assessment failure on Iraqi: Why did it happen and what may we learn from it?2019In: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ISSN 0023-5369, no 4, p. 103-112Article in journal (Other academic)
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    fulltext
1 - 4 of 4
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