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  • 1.
    Ahlerup, Linda
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Webbpoliser, gaming och kontranarrativ: Digitalt förebyggande arbete mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism2022Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I takt med att internet, iPhones och smartphones har kommit att bli en integrerad del av många människors vardag har även betydelsen av den digitala arenan ökat bland de våldsbejakande extremistiska miljöerna. I Sverige har det under de senaste åren genomförts ett flertal viktiga studier i relation till extremism och den digitala arenan. Det saknas emellertid studier som mer specifikt fokuserar på hur den digitala arenan kan integreras i samt stärka det förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism – vilket utgör denna studies fokusområde. Genom att beskriva och diskutera femton exempel på metoder som används inom en svensk samt en europeisk kontext belyser studien hur digitala verktyg potentiellt kan appliceras och integreras i det lokala och nationella förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Utöver detta beskrivs och analyseras potentiella fördelar samt utmaningar med användningen av den digitala arenan i förhållande till just förebyggande arbete, vilket även innefattar en diskussion kring olika metoder och verktygs effektivitet.

    Studien påvisar bland annat att det finns oändliga möjligheter att använda sig av den digitala arenan i förhållande till förebyggande arbete, samt att integreringen av den digitala arenan är ytterst centralt för att på ett effektivt sätt kunna förebygga och motverka just extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Detta då en stor del av extremistiska aktörers aktiviteter i dagsläget sker just online, samt då det är tydligt att online- och offlinedimensionen inte kan separeras funktionellt. Det konstateras dock att flera av de befintliga initiativ som studeras främst tenderar att existera som isolerade företeelser, snarare än att exempelvis utgöra en del av en omfattande nationell handlingsplan samt strategi i relation till det förebyggande arbetet mot extremism och våldsbejakande extremism. Trots att det alltså existerar ett flertal intressanta projekt och initiativ med potential att eventuellt kunna integreras och användas i större utsträckning är det i dagsläget både spretigt och fragmenterat – både nationellt och internationellt.

    Det konstateras även att det finns goda men isolerade exempel i Sverige på hur den digitala arenan kan integreras i det förebyggande arbetet, men att det samtidigt föreligger en generell avsaknad av projekt som på ett strategiskt och holistiskt sätt använder sig av just den digitala sfären. Vidare befinner sig existerande projekt fortfarande i ett tidigt skede. Svenska myndigheter bör således generellt fundera på hur man kan integrera den digitala arenan samt etablera en mer dynamisk onlinenärvaro i sitt dagliga arbete. I dagsläget är det exempelvis väldigt få myndigheter som erbjuder möjligheten till en digital dynamisk interaktion mellan myndigheter och medborgare. I framtiden kommer det dock att vara oundvikligt med en fördjupad digitaliseringsprocess.

    Studien påvisar även att ett flertal av de projekt som beskrivs har uppvisat olika former av framgångar – och att flera av dessa initiativ därmed skapar potentiell inspiration för lanseringen av liknande initiativ i Sverige. Det konstateras dock att det inte går att isolera ett eller ett fåtal verktyg som kan bedömas utgöra de mest optimala för att arbeta förebyggande online. Istället kan olika former av verktyg bidra med olika aspekter. Därför krävs det också en palett av olika initiativ – med olika funktioner och fokusområden. I vissa fall bör även dessa initiativ integreras i en omfattande handlingsplan och strategi.

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  • 2.
    Brun, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Antagonistiska hot och rättsliga utmaningar2019In: Antagonistiska hot och desspåverkan på lokalsamhället: En antologi / [ed] Henrik Häggström & Hans Brun, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2019, p. 81-90Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Fielitz, Maik
    et al.
    Hamburgs Universitet, (DEU).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Lodenius, Anna-Lena
    Lööw, Heléne
    Mellander, Erik
    Mulhall, Joe
    Hope not Hate, Storbritannien, (GBR).
    Normark, Magnus
    Totalförsvarets forskningsinsitut (FOI), (SWE).
    Sivenbring, Jennie
    Göteborgs Universitet (SWE).
    Ahlin, Filip (Editor)
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Från Nordiska motståndsrörelsen till alternativhögern: En studie om den svenska radikalnationalistiska miljön2020Report (Other academic)
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  • 4.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Science of Command and Control and Military Technology Division, Military Technology Systems Section. Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Sallinen, Margarita
    Swedish Defence University. Statsvetenskap.
    Staters outtalade normer i cyberrymden2021Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Den här rapporten presenterar vilka nationella outtalade normer som kan utläsas hos nio stater som bryter mot internationella överenskommelser i cyberrymden. Det finns olika sorters normer och många definitioner på vad det är, där uttalade normer ofta associeras till skrivna regler, medan outtalade normer associeras till underliggande värderingar som exempelvis styr diplomati. Diplomati är en praktik i hur stater ska interagera med varandra. Den Ryska Federationen använde sig exempelvis av diplomati 1998 under det första utskottet av FN:s generalförsamling då de lyfte frågan om hur informations- och telekommunikationsteknologier kan påverka internationell säkerhet. FN antog då en resolution och 2014/2015 presenterade de elva uttalade normer som ska gälla för ansvarsfullt statligt beteende i cyberrymden. Resultatet i denna rapport visar att alla nio stater har brutit mot FN:s uttalade normer men i olika grad/utsträckning. Resultatet visar därför på att de nationella outtalade normerna som kan utläsas hos de nio staterna under granskning i cyberrymden följer den geopolitiska och geoekonomiska situationen i den internationella miljön.

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  • 5.
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Barnen: de osynliga soldaterna2001Book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Children's Rights in Situations of Armed Conflict: A Path to Change?2006In: Protection of Children During Armed Political Conflict: A Multidiciplinary Perspective / [ed] Charles W Greenbaum; Philip E Veerman; Naomi Bacon-Shnoor, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Dolda hot i cyberrymden: svensk förmågeutveckling över tid2022In: Det svenska tillståndet: En antologi om brottsutvecklingen i Sverige / [ed] Amir Rostami; Jerzy Sarnecki, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2022, p. 384-405Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Förenta Nationerna: en ny aktör i det globala underrättelsesamhället2020In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, ISSN 0039-0747, Vol. 122, no 3, p. 399-416Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Intelligence service as a method to produce analytical reports has always been controversial within the UN as the use of secret information raises ethical dilemmas linked to espionage and impartiality. As a result of this critical approach, UN missions throughout history have lacked their own capacity for intelligence gathering and analysis. Instead, they have had to rely on the intelligence capability of the troop contributing countries. This has created ad hoc solutions and made it difficult for peace missions to manage their own personnel’s security and to create peace and stability in the field of action. However, the UN’s critical approach to conducting its own intelligence service changed fundamentally when the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in July 2017 adopted a new Peace Keeping Intelligence Policy in peacekeeping operations. The decision resulted in sharp protests from both colleagues and member countries. Does this mean that the UN has now become a player in the global intelligence community? This report attempts to describe the UN’s reform efforts and analyses what future challenges and consequences this may have.

  • 9.
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hybrid threats and new challenges for multilateral intelligence cooperation2021In: Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations / [ed] Mikael Weissmann; Niklas Nilsson; Björn Palmertz; Per Thunholm, London: I.B. Tauris, 2021, p. 132-144Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Introduction

    Instability and uncertainty characterize today’s security environment and this produces multidimensional challenges when it comes to mitigating hybrid threats. Hybrid threats can arise as a result of anything from changed conditions in the political landscape or shifts in relative power, to technological developments or something as simple as access to the internet. As a result, today a state actor with few resources can achieve great effects in a third country’s security environment using a toolbox that combines military and non-military means of power projection. A modern hybrid adversary can use an array of methods simultaneously to achieve its strategic goals, from traditional mechanized combat and cyberattacks, to propaganda wars and funnelling money to terrorist groups, to give just a few examples. An actor – state or non-state – can use assaults, subversion, disinformation, cyber intrusions or any other criminal act, to influence, spread fear or create mayhem.[1] Plausible deniability makes it very difficult to determine who the antagonist is in such an environment.[2]

    Today’s hybrid conflicts include a spectrum of complex hybrid threats and warfare and require better intelligence than traditional conflicts. Hybrid conflicts are intelligence intensive because they generate considerably larger amounts of information on asymmetric threats.[3] A hybrid warfare operation is based on the intelligence it collects. The boundary between an ordinary military intelligence service and a civil security intelligence service tends to be blurred in hybrid warfare operations. This is a relationship that places special demands on the intelligence service and its practitioners as well as its customers. The aim of this chapter is to analyse bilateral intelligence challenges and the initiatives that have taken place in recent years, both within Europe and in international military operations, to combat the phenomena mentioned earlier.

    Before moving on to a discussion on current multilateral intelligence cooperation, however, this chapter first provides an interpretation of the hybrid threat concept and discusses the concept of ‘hybrid antagonists’. There then follows a discussion on current multilateral intelligence cooperation to address hybrid threats within the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Finally, the conclusions outline seven challenges facing the international intelligence community in terms of analysis and organization.

    What is ‘multilateral intelligence collaboration’?

    A multilateral agreement is an accord among three or more parties, agencies or national governments.[4]

    There is currently no consensus on the definition of multilateral intelligence. For the purpose of this chapter we will use the definition of Walsh (2010) who suggested that it is ‘the collection, protection, and analysis of both publicly available and secret information, with the goal of reducing decision makers’ uncertainty about a foreign policy problem’.[5]

    So multilateral intelligence collaboration is an accord among three or more agencies or national governments working together to collect, protect and analyse information to reduce decision makers uncertainty about a foreign policy.

  • 10.
    Häggström, Henrik
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Brun, HansSwedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Antagonistiska hot och dess påverkan på lokalsamhället: En antologi2019Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med rapporten är att förklara innebörden av begreppet antagonistiska hot i en lokal kontext, samt beskriva hur begreppet kan tillämpas i olika sammanhang, exempelvis vid Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskaps (MSB) risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser (2019) och i lokala lägesbilder.

    Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredksap har finansierat rapporten inom ramen för Polismyndigheten, Noa/UC-Västs projekt – Ökad lokal krisberedskap till att motverka organiserad brottslighet, social oro, antagonistiska hot och händelser av betydelse för totalförsvaret tillsammans med Malmö Universitet, som syftar till att motverka organiserad brottslighet, social oro, antagonistiska hot och händelser av betydelse för totalförsvaret.

    Kapitel:

    • Inledning - Henrik Häggström och Hans Brun
    • Organiserad brottslighet och våldsbejakandeextremism som antagonistisk hot - Amir Rostami
    • Salafistiska nätverk och antagonistiska hot - Magnus Normark
    • Samtida högerextremism, antagonistiska hotoch dess inverkan på lokalsamhället - Helene Lööw
    • Kollektivistiska strukturer och sedvanerätt: En viktig aspekt av antagonistiska hot - Per Brinkemo
    • Antagonistiska hot och rättsliga utmaningar - Hans Brun
    • Avslutande diskussion - Henrik Häggström och Hans Brun
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  • 11.
    Häggström, Henrik
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Brun, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Avslutande diskussion2019In: Antagonistiska hot och desspåverkan på lokalsamhället: En antologi / [ed] Henrik Häggström & Hans Brun, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2019, 1, p. 91-104Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Häggström, Henrik
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Brun, Hans
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Inledning2019In: Antagonistiska hot och desspåverkan på lokalsamhället: En antalogi / [ed] Henrik Häggström & Hans Brun, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2019, p. 8-31Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Nicander, Lars
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    The Developmental History of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies2021In: Journal of Information Warfare, ISSN 1445-3312, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 57-67Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article describes how to develop, adapt, and manage an independent think tank approaching new cross-sectoral forms of national security threats within a government stove-piped system. The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish Defence University was in a European context a unique hybrid entity that combined academic research with policy-relevant recommendations and trusted second opinions to Cabinet departments and agencies. This article explores how to bend stovepipes within a Swedish context in the areas of Counter-Terrorism, Intelligence Studies, Cyber Security, and Influence Operations.

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  • 14.
    Nilsson, Niklas
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.
    Palmertz, Björn
    Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB), (SWE).
    Thunholm, Per
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Häggström, Henrik
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Security challenges in the grey zone: Hybrid threats and hybrid warfare2021In: Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations / [ed] Mikael Weissmann, Niklas Nilsson, Björn Palmertz, Per Thunholm, London: I.B. Tauris, 2021, p. 1-18Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The international security environment has in recent years evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey zone of war and peace. Security challenges arising from hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, henceforth HT&HW, are today high on security agendas across the globe. However, despite the attention, and a growing body of studies on specific issues, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards identifying, analysing and countering HT&HW. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on HT&HW, by covering the threats themselves as well as the tools and means to counter them together with a number of real-world case studies.

    Over time the grey zone between peace and war has grown considerably, underscoring the necessity of understanding hybrid warfare and related threats. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have manifested this paradigm, being a good example of the problem in thinking about war and peace as binary categories. How does a country or group of countries deal with threats and aggression in this grey area, such as ‘little green men’ that appear in uniform but without national denomination and refuse to tell where they come from, election-influenced operations or cyberattacks, to mention but a few possible actions.

    By uniting the knowledge of both practitioners and scholars, the volume aims to identify the existing tools for countering HT&HW, as well as experiences from a wide set of empirical contexts. Mirroring this, the project is a cross-sector collaboration between the Department of Military Studies and the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defence University. The former represents an academic environment where research and teaching are intertwined in a range of subjects including War Studies, Military Technology and Military History. The latter is a national centre within the Swedish Defence University tasked with developing and disseminating knowledge about asymmetric threats within the context of societal security and resilience.

    This volume focuses on the challenge posed by HT&HW to Western democracies, and their ability to address it. Western democracies are not only the type of states most frequently targeted by hybrid measures, but also the most vulnerable. By virtue of being open, pluralistic and liberal societies with freedom of the press and rule of law, Western democracies display both inherent weaknesses that can be targeted and inherent constraints – in particular through the rule of law and basic freedoms – that limit the scope for defensive actions. These vulnerabilities are increasingly recognized by Western governments, which have developed a range of entities to address them, although coordination in many instances remains weak. The later sections outline the growing significance of HT&HW on the security agendas of Western democracies and the challenges they imply, as well as the entities these states have established in response. Although neither list is complete, they provide an overview of the current situation. The final sections provide an outline of the volume’s structure and a summary of each chapter.

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    Security challenges in the grey zone
  • 15.
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (FOI).
    Salafistiska nätverk och antagonistiska hot2019In: Antagonistiska hot och desspåverkan på lokalsamhället: En antologi / [ed] Henrik Häggström & Hans Brun, Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan (FHS), 2019, 1, p. 46-59Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Ahlerup, Linda
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    LVU-kampanjen: Desinformation, konspirationsteorier, och kopplingarna mellan det inhemska och det internationella i relation till informationspåverkan från icke-statliga aktörer2023Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Förekomsten av misstro gentemot svenska myndigheter, rättsväsendet, och olika former av kommunal verksamhet – som exempelvis socialtjänsten – är inte något nytt fenomen i en svensk kontext, och har särskilt uppmärksammats i relation till utsatta områden. Frågan om socialtjänstens roll har också exploaterats inom radikalislamistiska miljöer – både nationellt och internationellt. I början av år 2022 uppmärksammades en otillbörlig informations-påverkanskampanj i relation till just den svenska socialtjänsten samt Lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga (LVU), som bland annat gjorde gällande att den svenska socialtjänsten kidnappar barn och särskilt riktar in sig på barn med utländskt påbrå och muslimsk trosuppfattning. Flera olika aktörer i Sverige förenades inledningsvis på sociala medier samt genom fysiska demonstrationer, varpå frågan även fick en omfattande internationell dimension. Detta skulle sedermera komma att utvecklas till det som benämnts som den största påverkanskampanj som Sverige någonsin har träffats av. I kölvattnet av kampanjen har det både förekommit hat och hot mot svenska offentliga institutioner och enskilda socialsekreterare, samt uppmaningar till våld och terrorattentat. Vidare har det även påvisats hur aktörer med kopplingar till radikalislamistiska miljöer – inklusive våldsbejakande sådana – har främjat samt bidragit till att sprida sådana narrativ.

    Följande studie presenterar en kronologisk redogörelse för den så kallade LVU-kampanjens uppkomst och utveckling, både i Sverige och internationellt, samt kopplingarna mellan dessa dimensioner. Studiens empiriska material består främst av innehåll från öppna sociala medier, med ett särskilt fokus på Twitter, Facebook och YouTube, och baseras bland annat på en daglig genomgång av ett antal framträdande utländska arabisk- och turkiskspråkiga konton – både inför kampanjens uppkomst år 2021 samt under dess massiva utveckling under 2022. Utöver den kronologiska redogörelsen genomförs även en narrativanalys av centrala teman och narrativ som förekommit. Slutligen presenteras även en kvantitativ redogörelse för kampanjens och frågans spridning på sociala medier, baserat på aggregerade data från Svenska Institutet (SI). Studien tar därmed ett helhetsgrepp om olika parallella dimensioner av den så kallade LVU-kampanjen, med ett särskilt fokus på kopplingarna mellan det inhemska och det internationella i relation till informationspåverkan från icke-statliga aktörer.

    Studien visar att den otillbörliga informationspåverkanskampanjen inte kan betraktas som ett utpräglat utländskt fenomen, utan att den svenska och den internationella dimensionen inte går att separera. Grunden för LVU-frågans spridning lades i Sverige redan sommaren 2021 i samband med etableringen av den svenska proteströrelsen. Att frågan sedermera fick en så pass omfattande internationell spridning går i sin tur att härleda till ett flertal olika faktorer. En central aspekt är dels den konstanta interaktion som etablerades mellan svenska aktörer samt den mest tongivande aktören i en internationell kontext. Detta i form av Moustafa El-Sharqawy – mer känd under sitt användarnamn Shuoun Islamiya. Denna interaktion inleddes redan under slutet av år 2021, och innan dess att kampanjen och frågan blev viral. El-Sharqawy har därefter kontinuerligt belyst frågan samt ett stort antal konkreta svenska fall, vilka också har använts av tongivande utländska aktörer och mediekanaler.

    Att ett flertal utländska individer och organisationer med miljontals följare på sociala medier valt att lyfta och engagera sig i frågan har också utgjort en viktig faktor för kampanjens och frågansspridning och varaktighet. Bland dessa aktörer återfinns bland annat ett flertal religiösa predikanter och paraplyorganisationer, vilket också har gett kampanjen och frågan en avsevärd tyngd och legitimitet. Dessa aktörer har också gemensamt – bland annat genom ett internationellt upprop – formulerat förslag och krav på konkreta åtgärder. Vidare har omfattande och kontinuerlig utländsk medierapportering också gett frågan ytterligare legitimitet samt spridning.

    En viktig aspekt att ha i åtanke i relation till LVU-frågans uppkomst och utveckling är också att det har funnits väldigt få motkrafter i förhållande till den desinformation och de narrativ som har främjats och spridits internationellt. Fastän vissa aktörer försökt bemöta den desinformation och de felaktiga påståenden som cirkulerat online så har den enorma mängden av innehåll och desinformation trängt bort flera goda försök att utgöra en positiv motkraft samt att förmedla korrekt information. Flera av de aktörer som ifrågasatt desinformationen har dessutom utsatts för omfattande hat och hot, vilket exempelvis innefattat företrädare för svenska muslimska föreningar och församlingar. I sammanhanget är det viktigt att understryka att svenska muslimska företrädare inte har deltagit i kampanjen, utan istället har tagit avstånd från samt fördömt hat- och desinformationskampanjen.

    LVU-frågan och dess dragningskraft har dock inte uppstått i ett vakuum, utan bör snarare ses och förstås i relation till några av de sårbarheter och konfliktytor som finns i det svenska samhället. Detta omfattar dels förekomsten av misstro och bristande tillit gentemot svenska offentliga institutioner och myndighetsutövning, samt dels de inbyggda värderingskrockar som existerar mellan exempelvis kulturella och religiösa förväntningar respektive rättsliga principer i ett demokratiskt samhälle avseende individuella fri- och rättigheter – och särskilt i relation till barns rättigheter. Dessa sårbarheter och konfliktytor har strategiskt exploaterats av ett flertal nationella och internationella aktörer i syfte att främja ett övergripande strategiskt narrativ, samt för att sätta tryck på svensk offentlig förvaltning.

    Den så kallade LVU-kampanjen i kombination med koranbränningarna under 2022 och 2023 har skapat ett ny och skarp hotbild i och mot Sverige. Kampanjen och frågan har gått i vågor och har kontinuerligt återupplivats, där den ryska invasionen av Ukraina exempelvis skapade ett betydande avbrott. Det är dock tydligt att frågan aldrig har försvunnit helt, och vi kan därför inte heller förvänta oss att den kommer att försvinna framöver. Istället kommer den troligtvis att fortsätta i olika skepnader samt i varierande intensitet.

    För att motstå denna typ av fenomen krävs inte enbart förebyggande åtgärder mot desinformation specifikt, och det räcker inte heller med att enbart förmedla korrekt information. Istället krävs också omfattande förtroendeskapande insatser, vilket bör ske i direkt fysisk kontakt mellan invånare och statliga respektive kommunala instanser. Detta innefattar också ett behov av ökad kunskap och kompetens bland tjänstemän avseende aspekter som kulturella och religiösa normer och värderingar. Detta i syfte att skapa en ökad förståelse för de invånare man möter i sitt vardagliga arbete. Det är därmed viktigt att adressera de underliggande sårbarheter och konfliktytor som existerar i det svenska samhället, och som utgör en grund för att denna typ av kampanjer tillåts att få fäste. Att enbart arbeta mot desinformation men inte ägna resurser åt det långsiktiga förebyggande och förtroendeskapande arbetet skulle annars utgöra ett illustrativt exempel på där man enbart fokuserar på symptomen, snarare än de underliggande orsakerna till samtidens existerande hot och utmaningar. Här krävs koordinerade insatser från svenska myndigheter och kommuner på en helt annan nivå än vad som sker idag.

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  • 17.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Ahlerup, Linda
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies). Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Analysis Support Division.
    The LVU Campaign: The disinformation campaign against Swedish social services: Disinformation, conspiracy theories and domestic-international links related to malign influence activities by non-state actors2024Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Distrust towards Swedish public authorities, the judiciary, and various forms of municipal activities – including social services – is not a new phenomenon in Sweden and has been particularly noted in relation to so-called socially vulnerable areas. The issue of the role of social services has also been exploited within radical Islamist circles, both nationally and internationally. In early 2022, attention was drawn to a malign information influence campaign in relation to the Swedish social services as well as the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU), which claimed, among other things, that the Swedish social services kidnap children and particularly target children of foreign origin and Muslim faith. Several different actors in Sweden initially united on social media and through in-person demonstrations, and soon thereafter the issue took on an extensive international dimension. This would later evolve into what has been called the largest information influence campaign Sweden has ever faced. In the wake of this campaign, hostility and threats have been directed against Swedish public institutions and individual social welfare officers and calls for violence and terrorist attacks have been made. Furthermore, it has been noted that actors with links to radical Islamist milieus – some violent – also have promoted and spread such narratives.

    The following study presents a chronological account of the origins and development of the so-called LVU campaign, both in Sweden and internationally, as well as the links between these dimensions. The study's empirical material consists mainly of content from freely available social media, with a particular focus on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and is based, among other things, on a daily review of a number of prominent foreign Arabic- and Turkish-language accounts – both prior to the emergence of the campaign, in 2021, as well as during its immense development in 2022. In addition to this chronological account, a narrative analysis of key themes and narratives that have emerged has also been carried out. Finally, a quantitative account of the spread of the campaign and the issue on social media is also presented, based on aggregated data from the Swedish Institute (SI). The study thus takes a holistic approach to the multiple parallel dimensions of the so-called LVU campaign, with a particular focus on domestic–international links related to information influence activities by non-state actors.

    The study shows that this malign information influence campaign cannot be regarded as a distinctly foreign phenomenon, but that the Swedish and international dimensions are intertwined. The basis for the subsequent spread of the LVU issue had already been initiated in Sweden as early as the summer of 2021, with the establishment of the Swedish protest movement. Subsequent widespread international coverage of the issue can be attributed to several factors. One central aspect is the constant social media interaction established between Swedish actors and the most influential actor internationally. That is, Moustafa El-Sharqawy, better known by his username, Shuoun Islamiya. This interaction began as early as late 2021, before the campaign and the issue went viral. Since then, El-Sharqawy has continuously highlighted the LVU-issue along with a large number of specific Swedish cases, which have also been used by influential foreign actors and media outlets.

    The fact that several foreign individuals and organisations, with millions of social media followers, have elected to become engaged in this issue and to place so much emphasis on it has also been an important factor in the scope and staying power of the campaign and the issue. These actorsinclude a number of preachers and religious umbrella organisations, also giving the campaign and the issue considerable weight and legitimacy. These actors have also jointly formulated proposals and made demands for specific measures, including through an international petition. Furthermore, extensive and continuous foreign media coverage has also given the issue further legitimacy and dissemination.

    Another important aspect to bear in mind, with regard to the emergence and development of the LVU issue, is the almost total absence of counter forces opposing the disinformation and narratives being promoted and disseminated internationally. While certain actors have sought to respond to the disinformation and false claims circulating online, the sheer volume of content and disinformation has crowded out several good attempts to constitute a positive counterbalance and to communicate accurate information. Several of the actors pushing back against the disinformation have also been subjected to extensive hostility and threats, including representatives of Swedish Muslim organisations and congregations. In this context, it is important to emphasise that Swedish Muslim representatives have not been participating in the campaign but have instead distanced themselves from it and condemned it.

    However, the LVU issue and its appeal have not emerged in a vacuum but must be seen and understood in relation to certain vulnerabilities and areas of conflict that exist in Swedish society. This includes mistrust and lack of confidence in Swedish public institutions and the exercise of official authority, as well as an inherent clash of values, such as cultural and religious expectations conflicting with legal principles in a democratic society regarding individual rights and freedoms – particularly concerning children's rights. These vulnerabilities and areas of conflict have been strategically exploited by several national and international actors to promote an overall strategic narrative and to put pressure on Swedish public administration.

    The so-called LVU campaign, coupled with the Qur’an burnings of 2022 and 2023, has generated a new and intensified threat both within and against Sweden. This campaign, along with its associated issues, has resurfaced in waves, with events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine causing significant interruptions. However, the issue has clearly never completely disappeared, and we therefore cannot expect it to disappear in the near future. Instead, it is likely to reemerge in different forms and with varying degrees of intensity.

    Withstanding such a phenomenon requires more than preventive measures against disinformation, nor is it sufficient to simply provide accurate information. Rather, extensive confidence-building measures are also required, which should take place in direct person-to-person contact between residents, on the one hand, and national and local government on the other. This also includes a need for greater knowledge and expertise on the part of officials regarding, for example, cultural and religious norms and values. This is required to improve their understanding of residents whom they encounter in their day-to-day social work. As such, it is important to address the underlying vulnerabilities and conflict areas that exist in Swedish society, and which form a basis for enabling such a campaign to take hold. To exclusively seek to counter disinformation, without devoting resources to long-term prevention and confidence-building efforts, would otherwise constitute an illustrative example of focusing solely on the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of the threats and challenges we face today. This will require coordinated action from Swedish public authorities and municipalities at a completely different level than is presently the case.

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  • 18.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlerup, Linda
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Gränslös extremism: En studie om transnationella kopplingar till svenska radikala miljöer2021Report (Other academic)
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  • 19.
    Ranstorp, Magnus
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Ahlin, Filip
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hyllengren, Peder
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Ledarskapscentrum.
    Normark, Magnus
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism: Influence and Challenges for Swedish Society2019Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This study examines the influence from salafi and salafi-jihadist milieus inSweden and the interactions between these different forms. This executivesummary focuses on the evolution of salafi-jihadis milieus in Sweden andsurrounding salafi elements; messages from these milieus; their methods forinfluence and the impact on local communities in Sweden.

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  • 20.
    Treverton, Greg
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    The Intelligence Challenges of Hybrid Threats: Focus on Cyber and Virtual Realm2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    What challenges does “Hybrid Threats” pose for the world of intelligence analysis and tradecraft, and how should intelligence agencies adapt? This study is a part of CATS’ project on intelligence connected to Influence Operations, and is sponsored by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). It addresses the new realm of hybrid threats and challenges, and the roles for the world of intelligence analysis and tradecraft.

    In this this study, Dr Gregory Treverton – former Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council and now Senior Fellow with CATS – analyzes social media and cyber attacks as well as signals and human intelligence in relation to real world events.

    The intelligence challenge starts with recognizing the range of hybrid threats and what is new about them – targets are now societies, not armies; several tools are being used both simultaneously and strategically for maximum effect; and it explores how the cyber dimension, along with the social media (SM) and other virtual arenas offer new, inexpensive avenues of attack. This important analytical contribution begins with the tools, then turns to the challenges of hybrid threats across the elements of intelligence – collection, analysis and relations between intelligence and policy.

    Then, it turns to the special challenges for intelligence agencies – but also the special opportunities – that exist across a range of cyber and virtual domains. In particular it focuses on the implications for the intelligence organizations performing the traditional ‘INT’ functions (HUMINT and SIGINT) and for counterintelligence. It concludes with perspectives on how the special challenges of hybrid threats might conduce to a much wider change in the traditional intelligence paradigm.

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  • 21.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.
    Nilsson, Niklas
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.
    Palmertz, Björn
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Comprehending Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare: The Hybridity Blizzard Model2021In: Збірник тез І Міжнародної наукової конференції «Воєнні конфлікти та техногенні катастрофи: історичні та психологічні наслідки» (до 35 роковин аварії на Чорнобильській АЕС) [Abstracts collection of the I International scientific conference of "Military conflicts and technogenic disasters: historical and psychological consequences" (to the 35 th Anniversary of the Chernobyl Disaster)], Тернопіль: ФОП Паляниця В. А. , 2021, p. 94-97Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    To fully comprehend and counter hybrid threats and hybrid warfare (HT&HW) is acomplex task, but also a very important one. In this paper we will outline a schematic model for how to comprehend hybrid threats and hybrid warfare: the “Hybridity Blizzard Model”. The model comes in three versions, of which the first presents a simplified picture of thedynamics of and between HT&HW, as well as responses and countermeasures. The second version adds a temporal dimension to this relationship, demonstrating how short term actions and responses relate to long-term vulnerabilities and resilience. The third version, in contrast, aims to provide a more accurate picture of the complex real-world situation. The aim of the model is to enable not only a better understanding of the dynamics themselves but also how to identify, comprehend and act against HT&HW.

  • 22.
    Weissmann, Mikael
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.
    Nilsson, NiklasSwedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, Tactical Warfare Division, Land Operations Section.Palmertz, BjörnSwedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).Thunholm, PerSwedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations2021Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Hybrid Warfare refers to a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, so-called ‘irregular warfare’ and cyber-attacks with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy and foreign political intervention. As Hybrid Warfare becomes increasingly commonplace, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on the topic and by covering the threats themselves, as well as the tools and means to counter them, together with a number of real-world case studies.

    The book covers numerous aspects of current Hybrid Warfare discourses including a discussion of the perspectives of key western actors such as NATO, the US and the EU; an analysis of Russia and China’s Hybrid Warfare capabilities; and the growing threat of cyberwarfare. A range of global case studies – featuring specific examples from the Baltics, Taiwan, Ukraine, Iran and Catalonia – are drawn upon to demonstrate the employment of Hybrid Warfare tactics and how they have been countered in practice. Finally, the editors propose a new method through which to understand the dynamics of Hybrid Threats, Warfare and their countermeasures, termed the ‘Hybridity Blizzard Model’. With a focus on practitioner insight and practicable International Relations theory, this volume is an essential guide to identifying, analysing and countering Hybrid Threats and Warfare.

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    Hybrid Warfare PDF
  • 23.
    Ranstorp, Magnus (Author of introduction, etc.)
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Förord till den svenska utgåvan2005In: 11 septemberrapporten: Nationella kommissionens slutrapport om terroristattacken i USA / [ed] Auktoriserad utgåva, Stockholm: Prisma , 2005, p. xi-xxiiChapter in book (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Ranstorp, Magnus (Editor)
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, Staff Division.
    Ahlerup, Linda (Editor)
    Swedish Defence University, Centre for Societal Security, CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies).
    Salafism och salafistisk jihadism 2.0: Påverkan mot och utmaningar för det svenska demokratiska samhället2022Report (Other academic)
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