Denna essä tar utgångspunkt inom teoribildningen rörande ”Intelligence Failure” och hävdaratt det går att fastställa om en organisation har ”lärt av sina misstag” utifrån tre undersökandeperspektiv. Först kan man undersöka organisationens erfarenhetshantering, vilket gerunderlag av formell karaktär. Här lyfts exempel från Försvarsmaktens erfarenhetshanteringfram. Därefter kan man undersöka organisationens reformering utifrån olika utkast om”Intelligence Failure” exemplifierade av Zegart, Betts och Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski. Slutligenkan man undersöka organisationens prestationer över tiden och därigenom få underlag omeffekten av lärandet. Det finns dock flera historiografiska utmaningar med att dra slutsatserutifrån fallstudier och varje perspektiv ovan bidrar helt eller delvis med underlag, beroendepå det särskilda fallet. I kombination formar de emellertid ett stabilt ramverk för undersökningarsom kan påvisa om en organisation ”lärt av sina misstag”.
The securitization of health concerns within the European Union has hitherto received scant attention compared to other sectors. Drawing on the conceptual toolbox of actor-network theory, this article examines how a 'health security assemblage' rooted in EU governance has emerged, expanded, and stabilized. At the heart of this assemblage lies a particular knowledge regime, known as epidemic intelligence (EI): a vigilance-oriented approach of early detection and containment drawing on web-scanning tools and other informal sources. Despite its differences compared to entrenched traditions in public health, EI has, in only a decade's time, gained central importance at the EU level. EI is simultaneously constituted by, and performative of, a particular understanding of health security problems. By 'following the actor', this article seeks to account for how EI has made the hunt for potential health threats so central that detection and containment, rather than prevention, have become the preferred policy options. This article draws out some of the implications of this shift.
This article revisits and revives the concept of ‘the Stranger’ in theorising international relations by discussing how this figure appears and what role it plays in the politics of (collective) identity. It shows that this concept is central to poststructuralist logic discussing the political production of discourses of danger and to scholarship on ontological security but remains subdued in their analytical narratives. Making the concept of the Stranger explicit is important, we argue, because it directs attention to ambivalence as a source of anxiety and grasps the unsettling experiences that political strategies of conquest or conversion, including practices of securitisation, respond to. Against this backdrop, the article provides a nuanced reading of the Stanger as a form of otherness that captures ambiguity as a threat to modern conceptions of identity, and outlines three scenarios of how it may be encountered in interstate relations: the phenomenon of ‘rising powers’ from the perspective of the hegemon, the dissolution of enmity (overcoming an antagonistic relationship), and the dissolution of friendship (close allies drifting apart). Aware that recovering the concept is not simply an academic exercise but may feed into how the term is used in political discourse and how practitioners deal with ‘strange encounters’, we conclude by pointing to alternative readings of the Stranger/strangeness and the value of doing so.
China’s direct investment in Sweden surged in 2017 and 2018 due to a number of large acquisitions, mostly in the automotive industry. At the same time, the public debate on Chinese investments has become more critical since 2017, when they were typically seen in a positive light. Throughout 2018 and 2019, a number of actors in government authorities, political parties, the media and civil society have described China’s investments as a potential security threat. Although less prominent in the public debate, business representatives have also become increasingly vocal about potential security risks associated with Chinese investment. The Swedish view of China seems to be aligning with what the EU has called its new “more realistic” approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, a number of policy processes have been launched which are likely to lead to the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to scrutinise Chinese investment and activity in Sweden, especially concerning critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, but also more generally concerning companies whose activities are regarded as sensitive from a security perspective.
There is an extensive and rapidly growing body of literature on armed Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) focused on the US War on Terror. However, smaller Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for military use, or what this paper refers to as tactical UAVs utilised by small states, have received much less scholarly attention ̶ despite their rapid proliferation in the last decade. In order to start rectifying this dual neglect of more limited UAVs employed by small states, the paper makes an empirical contribution to the study of tactical UAVs. Drawing on a substantial number of interviews and studies commissioned by the Swedish Armed Forces, the paper examines the Swedish UAV program, which is in certain ways representative of a smaller state’s efforts to incorporate UAVs into its armed forces. The paper argues that it is crucial to think in terms of systems rather than the UAV as a free-standing resource to be used on its own. If utilized along with other ISR assets, tactical UAVs may have a significant role to play in asymmetric conflicts.
The existing research on Japanese security focuses mainly on the nation state and conceives of male elites as the key bearers of relevant knowledge about the phenomenon. This article problematizes these biases by zeroing in on women’s everyday-oriented perspectives, which fall outside the scope of security politics as traditionally conceived. More specifically, it analyzes the rich material provided by a survey of the members of three major Japanese women’s organizations, using a mixed-method approach premised on statistical methods and qualitative content analysis. The results show that the Japanese women in our sample accommodate and reproduce content from dominant elite views about security and insecurity. However, they also challenge and at times ignore these perspectives by identifying a host of other insecurities as more pressing in their daily lives, notably those related to environmental degradation and Japan’s political development.
Military pilots have long been central to airpower projection in both combat and non-combat operations. While the historical and contemporary roles of military aviators have been examined extensively in previous scholarship, the present study distinguishes itself by evaluating the future prospects of military aviators. By so doing, it argues that technological advances in autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) will most likely lead to the development of pilotless aerial vehicles (PAVs), if current technological and social trends persist. In this new order, the military pilot will become a thing of the past.
It would be hard to overstate the importance of air power in humanitarian intervention (HI) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Yet, the role of air power in HI and R2P has been understudied. This article seeks to remedy the lack of systematic investigation. It does so by developing a framework for assessing the effectiveness of air power during military operations in HI and R2P and applies it to NATO’s air campaigns in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Upon examination NATO is revealed to have fared better in Libya than Kosovo in positively accomplishing its stated humanitarian objectives, minimizing collateral damage and reducing the costs for the interveners, all of which are aspects considered by the model. The relative effectiveness of Operations Unified Protector is generally attributed to geography, diplomacy and technology. It is argued that better ground support, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and burden sharing are needed to enhance the utility of air power in HI and R2P even further.
Content analysis has once again come to the forefront of discussions regarding methods in International Relations (IR). The first wave of content analysis in IR lasted from the 1940s to the 1960s and was marked by a commitment to quantitative and manual analyses. The second wave of content analysis appeared around the third millennium and continues to pervade the discipline also proceeds in a predominantly quantitative manner but emphasizes computer-assisted analysis rather than manual analysis. Critics and advocates of the method alike have, highlighted numerous shortcomings with these approaches. In order to address these limitations, the present investigation argues for a fully integrated content analysis that has the potential to ameliorate the identified weaknesses that have hitherto plagued the method. It accomplishes this task by combining all facets of the method: quantitative, qualitative, manual, and computer-assisted content analyses within a single research project.
Determining whether the opposition is benign or malign is central to the security dilemma. In this context, states have to decide whether the military capabilities of others are for defensive or offensive purposes. Despite the importance of this issue, states’ use of intelligence and diplomacy to gauge others’ capabilities and intentions and its implications for exacerbating, ameliorating and escaping the security dilemma have hardly been addressed. The few who have engaged with the topic have only done so superficially. This article engages with the subject matter at length and argues that both intelligence and diplomacy are double-edged swords in the security dilemma. Intelligence is particularly useful in attaining information regarding the capabilities of others and diplomacy is of great value in acquiring information about their intentions. Yet, they are both prone to error. The best prospects of mitigating and escaping the security dilemma are therefore by utilizing intelligence to gauge others’ capabilities and diplomacy to decipher their intentions, even though these efforts may instead end up aggravating the security dilemma dynamics due to mistakes.
In contrast to the vast majority of Western countries, Sweden left large segments of the society open instead of imposing a lockdown to combat the spread of the coronavirus. As a result, the Swedish COVID-19 measures, largely devised by its expert agency on health, garnered widespread international attention. Despite the global interest in the corona strategy of the Public Health Agency of Sweden (PHAS), there are currently no systematic studies on their COVID-19 policy. The present investigation focuses on the controversies that have characterized PHAS' work with reference to risk assessments, facemasks, voluntarism, testing, and the protection of the elderly during the pandemic. Overall, this inquiry demonstrates that PHAS' risk assessments were initially overly optimistic and their facemask recommendations in conflict with large segments of the scientific community for an extensive period. Yet, their voluntary measures worked moderately well. In their testing, PHAS did not manage to deliver on their promises in time, whereas several measures implemented to protect the elderly were deemed inadequate and late.
The classical realist writings of E.H. Carr and constructivist publications of Alexander Wendt are extraordinarily influential. While they have provoked a great number of reactions within the discipline of International Relations, the ethical dimensions of their works have rarely been studied at length. This article seeks to remedy this lack of examination by engaging in an in-depth scrutiny of the moral concerns of these two mainstream International Relations scholars. On investigation, it is revealed that Carr demonstrates a strong commitment to the ethical principle of fairness and Wendt a moral concern for the prevention of the use of organized violence. These concerns are shared by Rawlsians and cosmopolitans in International Relations, and these findings may thereby encourage closer engagement between these diverse communities that rarely speak to one another and strengthen disciplinary research on morals.
This article scrutinizes the assumption that friends support each other in times of war. Picking up the notion that solidarity, or 'other-help', is a key feature of friendship between states, the article explores how states behave when a friend is attacked by an overwhelming enemy. It directs attention to the trade-off between solidarity and self-help that governments face in such a situation and makes the novel argument that the decision about whether and how to support the friend is significantly influenced by assessments of the distribution of material capabilities and the relationship the state has with the aggressor. This proposition is supported empirically in an examination of Sweden's response to its Nordic friends' need for help during the Second World War - to Finland during the 1939-1940 'Winter War' with the Soviet Union, and to Norway following the invasion of Germany from 1940 to 1945.
Western use of military violence is becoming increasingly centralised, partly through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (or more commonly referred to as “drones” in the literature). Drone technology allows control and command of military operations to be put under one roof, and as military organisations traditionally have a close dependence on technological developments, procedures and regulations for centralised command and control have developed in close concert with advances in drone technology. Apart from technological innovations, there are other aspects that contribute to the growing centralisation of military violence. The increasing military sensitivity about public and media criticism regarding casualties and ‘collateral damage’ underlines the need for Western military organisations to take central control of military missions and the use of violence.
What are the characteristics and consequences of this centralisation and how does it affect military practitioners’ relation to violence? The literature on military violence has slowly become aware that something has happened in Western military organisations’ relations to the use of force and has made some attempts to answer these questions. The tentative (short) answer is that military violence is becoming increasingly bureaucratised in the wake of this centralisation, and its human consequences are lost in bureaucratic routines and procedures. But so far the research on the bureaucratisation of violence has been delimited to investigations of either the theoretical procedures themselves (e.g. analysis of military doctrines), or field studies of drone operators or airmen’s work of ‘dropping bombs’. A major gap in the literature exists as the main organisational function for retaining control and command over violence – the operational level and the staff work performed there – is largely left aside in the research. Of particular interest here is how the work at operational levels of military organisations contributes to a bureaucratic institutionalisation of violence.
This thesis aims to fill some of this gap through ethnographic investigations of operational military work and the training of ‘targeteers’ – staff officers working with the operational governance of military violence. In addition, the thesis also sets the current bureaucratisation of violence in a modern historical perspective, where the nation of Sweden stands as an example of how political incentives for military reformations form the foundation of a bureaucratisation of violence. The results of these investigations illustrate how bureaucratisation of violence leaves death and violence aside, and offers detailed insights into how the procedures, routines and the language of bureaucracy form the main points of reference for military practitioners’ view of their work. In addition, the analysis shows how military masculinity is reshaped from traditional warrior ideals to encompass norms of ‘the rational bureaucrat’. What is salient in these results is that they open up an otherwise closed off part of military practice and facilitates for public debates about military violence. Particularly regarding the central findings that some military practitioners do not regard violence as an outcome of their work, and that the bureaucratic operational work operates to reduce and even remove the (enemy) Other as a (human) point of reference in contemporary military work.
This book has four main objectives: to bring the thus far almost entirely neglected historical case of ‘the rise of Japan’ into the literature on power shifts in general and ‘the rise of China’ in particular; to propose a discourse-based conceptualization of identity for the study of economic policy that engages theoretical and methodological debates on how to overcome the dichotomy between ‘ideational’ (identity) and ‘material’ (economic) factors; to address the tendency to focus on the ‘radical Other’ in poststructuralist IR scholarship, by highlighting how heterogeneity disturbs exclusive and binary articulations of identity and difference; and to propose a method for putting political discourse theory (PDT) into practice in empirical research by drawing on rhetorical political analysis (RPA). US congressional debates on economic policy on Japan and China in 1985–2008 are analysed as examples of official US elite public discourse. The book shows that the ‘new era’ in US-Chinese relations that scholars and policymakers have been announcing since the beginning of the Trump presidency was long in the making, as it rests on longstanding discourses on the USA’s main economic competitor.
Maja Zehfuss' book War and the politics of ethics makes the claim that Western practices of war are constituted by debates and ideas of ethics, illustrated in particular through the Western wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Herein, this claim is assessed by drawing on Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brightons argument that in contemporary research, war tends to be conceived through secondary phenomena. The paper argues that research focusing on how war is shaped by secondary phenomena often falls back on a reductive understanding, in which war is represented as violent destruction. Moreover, that by seeing war as a multifaceted form shaped by military imaginaries centring on military theory, tactics, and operational art, we may gain a more comprehensive understanding of its ontology and practices.
This article analyzes how contemporary military training and exercises shape and reify specific modalities of war. Historically, military training has shifted from being individual- and experience-oriented, towards becoming modelled into exercise environments and practices. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with military officers, exercise controllers, and war-game designers, the article distinguishes between tactical training, characterized by military functions embodied through weapon platforms in a demarcated battlespace, and operational training, characterized by administrative and organizational processes embodied through self-referential staff routines. As military exercises integrate the tactical and operational dimensions into a model for warfare, they serve as blueprints for today’s battles at the same time as they perpetuate a martial viewpoint of the world. As a result, preparations for potential future conflicts constitute a fertile ground for apprehending the becoming of war.
Review of Antoine Bousquet’s book The Eye of War: Military Perception from the Telescope to the Drone and a complementary view of the battlefield in relation to the trajectory traced by the author.
In contemporary research, transparency is commonly understood to indicate and guarantee openness, in ways that make it synonymous with positive characteristics of governing. However, the allegedly benevolent link between transparency and governing has also been questioned, giving rise to arguments that transparency enables violent social control. Drawing upon this latter view, the article stages an encounter between critical debates on transparency and critical accounts of war to examine the way that they come together in the operationalization of warfare. Engaging particularly with Jean Baudrillard’s writing on transparency, the article inquires into the way control is socially manufactured and administered through military doctrines. It concludes that the operationalization of warfare is not, as many tend to argue, first and foremost about a response to practical problems when conducting wars. Rather, it consists of the potential to unveil global space and global time as an attempt to maintain and control future political becoming
This article argues that the politics of contemporary Western warfare finds an important reference point in discourses on military design. In the 2010s, military design has become a trending topic in military discourses on command and planning methodology. Since Clausewitz, warfare has been considered a phenomenon characterized by a tension between creativity and linear planning, and the ideal commander as someone with the vision to overcome this. By mapping and analyzing tactical, operational, and strategic narratives and practices, the article illustrates how they emphasize a warfare based both on experimentation and artistry and on traditional operational planning. In so doing, military design relies on reductive military concepts to push the tension identified by Clausewitz towards its extreme end-point, idealizing creativity as an objective of warfare. The article ends by asking to what extent military design risks spilling over into other dimensions of social and political life. It concludes that in pushing creativity as part of war, military design builds on and justifies transgressive political practices with the risk of becoming a vital aspect of future governing.