Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

Terrorattentaten i Oslo och på Utøya den 22 juli 2011 är inte bara en av de mest omskakande händelserna i samtida norsk och nordisk historia. Det är också en akut situation som ställde samhällets krishanteringsförmåga på prov över ett brett och delvis oförutsett spektrum. Många lärdomar framstod som mer eller mindre uppenbara, andra som diffusare och svårare att omsätta i förändringsåtgärder. Ett sådant område var den avsaknad av varning som tvingade samhällets krishanteringssystem att agera utan någon förberedelsetid.

Var 22 juli en i raden av stora underrättelse- och varningsmisslyckanden? Eller var i själva verket Anders Behring Breivik en exponent för en i grunden förändrad säkerhetspolitisk karta där hoten inte längre låter sig kategoriseras, kartläggas och bedömas utan uppstår ur oöverblickbara processen på samhälls- och individnivå? I denna rapport från Centrum för asymmetriska hot- och terrorismstudier (CATS) vid Försvarshögskolan undersöker Wilhelm Agrell varningsdimensionen i händelseförloppet före och under terrorattentatet och diskuterar de övergripande och allmänt tillämpbara slutsatser som kan dras från de sätt på vilket frågor kring hotbilder och varning hanterades. Arbetet med rapporten är en del av det projekt kring underrättelsestudier som finansieras av Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB).

In some sense, I have written this book to summarize and clarify problems that I have been working on and researching in different ways since the beginning of the 1970s. However, the main aim, and my aspiration, is obviously for the book to contribute to an increasingly more essential awareness of and discussion on the opportunities and problems of analysis methods. The book is aimed at students and those interested with no previous experience or prior knowledge of intelligence as well as those on the analytical treadmill. At its very best, the methodological discussion has this natural universality. Wilhelm Agrell has a twin academic background in history, and in peace and conflict research. Since 2006 he is the first Professor in Intelligence analysis in Sweden. He has written extensively on military R&D, security policy, regional conflicts and the role and transformation of intelligence. He is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, and of the advisory board to the Swedish Security Service, and Visiting professor at the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the National Defence College. Sir David Omand is Visiting Professor at King's College, London. He was the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, responsible to the Prime Minister for the professional health of the intelligence community, national counter-terrorism strategy and "homeland security". Sir David served for seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee. He was Permanent Secretary of the Home Office from 1997 to 2000, and before that Director of GCHQ.

The Norway attacks on 22 July 2011 were not only one of the most horrific events in modern Norwegian and Scandinavian history but also a critical situation that tested Norwegian society's crisis management capability over a broad and somewhat unforeseen spectrum. Many of the lessons were more or less obvious, others more diffuse and more difficult to translate into reforms. One such area was the lack of warning, which resulted in Norwegian society's crisis management system having to improvise. Was 22 July 2011 one of a series of major intelligence and warning failures? Or was Anders Behring Breivik, in actual fact, an exponent of fundamentally redrawing the security map, where threats no longer allow themselves to be categorized, mapped, and evaluated, but arise from unforeseen societal and individual processes? In this report by the Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Wilhelm Agrell examines the warning dimension in the course of events before and during the terror attacks and discusses the overall, universally applicable conclusions that can be drawn from how questions about threat scenarios and warning are handled. The work on this report is part of the Intelligence Studies Project financed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Wilhelm Agrell is professor of intelligence analysis at Lund University and a visiting professor at the Swedish National Defence College. He has written a number of books on Swedish security policy and intelligence matters, including Essence of Assessment: Methods and Problems of Intelligence Analysis, published by CATS in 2012.

Syrien och Irak har kommit att bli den globala jihadismens epicentrum och personer inom våldsbejakande islamistiska extremistgrupper och rörelser som Islamiska staten och al-Qaida sprider sina budskap på sociala medier. Denna rapport syftar till att beskriva hur sociala medier används för propagandaspridning samt vilka motiv och orsaker som går att skönja i några av de svenskspråkiga Facebook-grupperna och profilerna under perioden 2012-2014.

Studien visar att Facebook används som en plattform för svenskspråkiga grupper och profiler för att (1) sprida officiell propaganda från terroristorganisationer som Islamiska staten och al-Qaida. Facebook används också för att (2) sprida inofficiell propaganda till fördel för terroristorganisationer som Islamiska staten och al-Qaida. Facebook används som en plattform för försök till rekrytering till IS.

Informationen som sprids sker dels från personer i Sverige och dels från personer som rest från Sverige till Syrien och IS-kontrollerade områden. Hyllningar till våldsbejakande islamistiska ideologer och terroristorganisationers ledare sprids genom texter, bilder, fotografier och videos. Personer från Sverige som befinner sig i Syrien kommunicerar ”hem” till Sverige genom reseberättelser från IS-kontrollerade områden.

Inom dessa profiler och grupper går att finna ett antal motiv och orsaker till varför någon sympatiserar med våldsbejakande islamistiska ideologier och rörelser, samt argument för att någon ska resa till Syrien för att ansluta sig till IS. Ett antal faktorer varvas och överlappas: humanitära, religiösa, ideologiska motiv tillsammans med martyrskap och något som kan ses som äventyr, våld, vapen och gemenskap.

Orsakerna och motiven kan inte ses som hela förklaringen till varför någon radikaliseras, väljer att sympatisera med, eller ansluta sig till, terroristorganisationer som Islamiska staten eller al-Qaida. Rapporten är dock försök till ett bidrag till en djupare kunskap om motiv och orsaker.

The conflict in Syria and Iraq has resulted in an increase in the number of violent Islamist extremists in Sweden, and a significant increase of people from Sweden travelling to join terrorist groups abroad. Since 2012 it is estimated that about 300 people from Sweden have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and, to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Even though the foreign fighter issue has been on the political agenda for several years and received considerable media attention, very little is known about the Swedish contingent.

The purpose of this study is to examine a set of variables of the foreign fighters that have travelled from Sweden to join jihadi terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq in the period of June 2012 to September 2016. Much of the statistical data analysed have been declassified and provided by the Swedish Security Service. The variables examined are: time of travel; age; gender; geographical concentration in Sweden; citizenship and country of origin; average time spent in the conflict area; numbers of individuals killed; number of returnees; number of fighters remaining in the conflict area; social media activities; and the financing of foreign fighters. The analysis includes 267 people that are or have been residents of Sweden.

36 people (first-time travellers) travelled to Syria or Iraq in 2012, 98 in 2013, 78 in 2014, 36 in 2015, and 5 in 2016. In addition, some of the foreign fighters have travelled back and forth between the conflict area and Sweden. About 80 percent are associated with IS, and more than 30 percent are associated with Jabhat al-Nusra. 76 percent of the foreign fighters are men and 24 percent are women. The amount of women has significantly changed during the period, from “a few” in 2012 to 18 percent in 2013, and constituting about 40 percent of the foreign fighters in the conflict area in 2014 and 2015.

The average age of the foreign fighters is 26, and there are no significant differences between the average age of men and women. Still, there is a great variation indicating there are very young travellers but also older ones, as the age ranges in a span of 50 years. 18 percent of the travellers (45 people) are 19 or younger, while about 60 percent (154 people) are between the ages of 20 to 29. Very few people above the age of forty seem to travel. The average age does not change over the period.

A majority of the foreign fighters, an estimated 80 percent, come from four of Sweden’s 21 counties – Västra Götaland, Stockholm, Skåne and Örebro. About one third of the foreign fighters are, or have been, registered in Västra Götaland County, one quarter in Stockholm County, and a tenth in Örebro County and a tenth in Skåne County. More than seventy percent have been residents of an exposed area (socially deprived areas hit by high criminality and low socioeconomic status). There is information that there have been recruiters in some of the areas, but social media may also have played a role in the mobilisation of foreign fighters.

75 percent of the foreign fighters are Swedish citizens, and 34 percent are born in Sweden. There are geographical concentrations to North Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, as was seen in the 1990’s and 2000’s. There are also concentrations to the Former Yugoslavia and Russia. 38 countries are represented when analysing country of birth, and most of the foreign fighters have at least one parent with country of birth outside of Sweden.

The average time spent in the conflict area is 16 months, but there is great variation where some foreign fighters have been there for only a month and others for several years. The average time spent for men is 16 months, while the average for women is 21 months.

At least 49 people from Sweden have died in Syria or Iraq. All of them are men. The data shows that there are no indications that a larger group of the Swedish foreign fighters has been killed in one single battle. Not more than three people have died during a single month. About half of those who have died are from the Västra Götaland region.

As of September 2016, 106 foreign fighters (40 percent) had returned to Sweden, while 112 (42 percent) were still in Syria or Iraq. It is estimated that 49 of the 267 (18 percent) have died in the conflict.

The international security environment has seemingly departed from a post-cold war period of everlasting peace and has instead evolved into a volatile and increasingly grey area of war and peace. Security challenges arising from both hybrid wars and hybrid threats are high on security agendas in Sweden and Europe as well as internationally. However, despite the attention there is a lack of research that addresses how such “new” wars and threats should be handled. While studies do exist on specific issues, a comprehensive approach to how hybrid wars and threats are to be handled is still lacking. This is particularly the case when it comes to the sharing of experiences between states. This workshop constituted a first step towards developing such a comprehensive approach.

The workshop’s aim was to be a bridge across disciplinary boundaries as well as between researchers and practitioners within and outside Sweden; integrating each group’s extensive experiences and knowledge into a coherent whole. Besides producing and disseminating new knowledge, the intention of the workshop was to establish a foundation for long-term collaboration; the first step in the creation of a European Network on Hybrid Warfare Capabilities that can work across borders and link state of the art of research and practice.

Although mainly a scientific workshop, a number of practitioners were invited, with a mix of presentations by academics and practitioners. This was intended to foster innovative and reflective discussions across the academic-practitioner divide. The workshop also aimed to develop new ideas associated with hybrid threats/warfare in order to facilitate future cooperation

These proceedings include a summary of the key points made by the presenters, along with conclusions and policy recommendations derived from the ensuing discussions. Conference programme and a list of abstracts for the papers and presentations can be found in the appendix.

Om behov av en nationell cybersäkerhetsstrategi.

Huvudfokus för denna avhandling är området byråkratisk förändringsbenägenhet i förhållande till omvärldsutveckling på det säkerhetsrelaterade området. Den forskningsfråga som står i centrum är: Hur kan man tidsmässigt förkorta processen från upptäckten av nya hotförutsättningar till att nödvändiga skyddsåtgärder implementerats, och var finns flaskhalsarna? Syftet är att från olika infallsvinklar studera samspelet och kopplingarna mellan de statliga institutioner som har att uppmärksamma och varna för olika former av antagonistiska hot, och de strukturer som har att planera för samhällsberedskapen genom att snabbt och smidigt omsätta dessa signaler till styrande inriktningar med motsvarande resursallokeringar till utsatta sektorer. Kravet på ökad snabbhet i denna process har ökat radikalt i och med informationssamhällets utveckling och där gårdagens rutiner inte är anpassade till dagens nya hot och sårbarheter. Därför är studier av de mekanismer som kan påverka snabbheten i högsta grad policyrelevant. En viktig hypotes som prövas i avhandlingsupplägget är att ökad pluralism – både på hot- och planeringssidan – medför ökad förändringsbenägenhet beträffande att implementera föranledda åtgärder och förändra förvaltningsstrukturer. Det kan handla om såväl olika militära försvarssystem som civila kritiska informationsinfrastrukturer kopplat till el- och telesystem. Ett särskilt förhållande här är att dessa processer till övervägande del äger rum i slutna system med kunskapsmonopol där externa inflytelser (”peer review”, marknadsmekanismer etc.) är närmast obefintliga. Hur påverkas dessa och utvecklas dessa strukturer för ”Hot” respektive ”Planering” av omvärldsutvecklingen? Finns det en ”Missing Link” här i kedjan ”hotupptäckt-policyformuleringsprocess-byråkratisk implementering”? Vad hindrar denna process från att proaktivt och linjärt antecipera nya förutsättningar?

There are a number of vulnerabilities, which are increasing in potential effects, as society grows increasingly digitised and increasingly interconnected. Critical information infrastructure (CII) is one of these vulnerabilities, which is vital for the functioning of society. Often these resources are taken for granted and can be overlooked. The period under consideration in this article and consequently its primary focus is from 1995 until 2002. Beginning with a description of the physical stakes that are at risk, the article evaluates the policy processes underpinning CII in a variety of different countries as it relates to CII protection. These processes are tracked, revealing differences and similarities in the time and path taken to secure a national policy. It is argued that a country's ability to successfully navigate the various identified phases of the critical information infrastructure protection programme implementation process is determined by a number of observable factors: constitutional structure; the character of the state bureaucracy; real and perceived threats; and effective top-down policy coordination.

Behov av samhällsövergripande operativa studier för att avgöra skyddsbehov diskuteras.

Svensk statsförvaltnings svårigheter att planera mot tvärsektoriella hot.

On why and how the main five US Think Tanks fill a gap in the national security environment and stay succesful, maintain status, impact and reputation for integrity

After the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 in the USA, it became apparent to many countries that coordination functions between intelligence and security services must be strengthened. There was a dramatic boost in the number of fusions centres. This can be explained by the increased need for cooperation between various intelligence and security services in order to meet the threat of terrorism which was perceived as increasingly acute. In 2003, Britain established the JTAC, and thereafter, several European countries followed suit. The traditional legal boundaries since the Cold War between foreign intelligence services and domestic security services needed to be reviewed in the light of the increased terrorist threat where the distinctions became increasingly obsolete.

This study examines different solutions to this challenge. It deals with fusion centres at the national level, and examines future ambitions.

Efter terrordådet den 11 september mot World Trade Center och de därpå åtföljande attentaten i bl a Madrid 2004 och i London 2005 blev det uppenbart för många länder att samverkansfunktionerna på underrättelse- och säkerhetsområdet måste stärkas för att ingen relevant operativ information skulle ”falla mellan stolarna”. Den traditionella legala gränsdragningen sedan det kalla kriget mellan utrikes underrättelsetjänst och inrikes säkerhetstjänst behövde nu ses över i ljuset av det terrorhot där dessa distinktioner blev allt mer obsoleta. Denna studie granskar de olika ambitioner och modeller som ett antal länder genomfört för att förbättra informationshanteringen i kontraterrorsammanhang.