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Since the Helsinki Headline goals of 1999 the European Union has been trying to increase its military capability to conduct military operations abroad. The EU led operation Artemis in the Congo inspired the creation of the Battlegroup concept. The concept is intended to conduct military operations up to a distance of 6000 km from Brussels at short notice. The development of the Battlegroup differs between different member states, which have chosen different organisations. Bigger nations have better possibilities to contribute to the Battlegroup. Research indicates some nations prioritise the military aspect of the Battlegroup and other nations focus on the integration effect of cooperation. The new security challenges after the Cold War require new solutions by the old militaries and an answer to this problem is closer cooperation between European states.

The purpose of this thesis is to compare Sweden´s and Austria´s contributions to realising the European Battlegroup Concept. These two countries represent two similar countries in regards to size and historic traditions and research surrounding these two countries has not been conducted earlier.

The conclusion of the thesis shows big contributions from both countries since the start of the Battlegroup Concept in 2007. Austria began contributing to the Battlegroup later, but has developed its contribution during recent years. Sweden contributed early on to the development of the Battlegroup concept as a Framework Nation to the Nordic Battlegroup. Because of early work and bigger contributions Sweden has contributed more to realise the European Battlegroup Concept.

Historians remember 1953 for the death of Stalin and the ensuing relaxation of East-West tensions, now known as the First Detente. Based on recent Cold War scholarship supplemented by primary documentation, this comparative study looks at the Nordic reaction to the First Wtente 1953-1956 in terms of deterrence and reassurance. The results suggest that, while the Nordic governments uniformly welcomed a more relaxed international atmosphere and entertained hopes of genuine dialogue between East and West, they Often differed in their interpretations of Soviet motives and the genuineness of the post- Stalin foreign policy. The tendency to put added emphasis on reassurance (end hence less deterrence) was most apparent in the cases of Iceland and Finland. Danish and Swedish policy shared this tendency, but lacked the degree of consensus found in Iceland. Norway seems to have been the least amenable to a change in perspective. The course of the First Detente led to an even stronger emphasis on reassurance than had been the case previously. In all of the Nordic countries the invasion of Hungary had a similar alarming effect - it swung the pendulum back toward misgivings about Soviet intentions.

What is the added value of strategic theory in the understanding of Swedish securityand defence policies? By introducing a series of concepts that identify policiesthat are pursued in both peace and war such as escalation, deterrence, andweapons acquisition, we argue that strategic concepts contribute to the analysisof Swedish security policy mainly by highlighting forms of policy that do not conceptuallyrest upon the dichotomy of war and peace. Differently from mainstreamscholarly analysis that treats deterrence as one, uniform concept, we differentiatebetween four different logics of deterrence. Using this conceptual tool, we analyseSwedish policies in the 1950s and 2010s and discover that although Sweden pursueddeterrence during both this periods, her policies depend on a different logic. Bycomparison, 1950s Sweden understood to pursue deterrence understood as a wall,while 2010s Sweden understands the term in terms of a shield.

This article discusses a new form of war, ‘Hybrid War’, under inclusion of aspects of ‘cyber-terrorism’ and ‘cyber – war’ before the backdrop of Russia’s ‘Ukrainian Spring’ and the continuing threat posed by radical Islamist groups in Africa and the Middle East. It discusses the findings of an on-going Hybrid Threat project by the Swedish National Defence College. This interdisciplinary article predicts that military doctrines, traditional approaches to war and peace and its perceptions will have to change in the future.

Multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security including cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified by NATO as so called "Hybrid Threats" (cf BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010). This submission aims to introduce the audience to this form of security threat with a particular focus on "cyber" terrorism and war. This new form of conflict in the fifth dimension has a truly hybrid risk potential and warrants a new holistic counter approach: from law enforcement, counter cyber strategies to kinetic responses. The authors will present the findings of an ongoing Hybrid Threat experiment, which is being undertaken at the Swedish Defence College, with a focus on the role of cyber attacks within the wider context of asymmetric conflict and how the existing legal framework governing the use of force and the law applicable to hostilities does not necessarily reflect on this new form of threat.

Akademiseringen av officersyrket i Sverige fick sitt genombrott när Försvarshögskolan fick examensrätt 2007. Föreliggande uppsats syftar till att undersöka akademiseringsprocessen inom Försvarsmakten och, om görligt, beskriva vilka konsekvenser och möjligheter akademiseringen gav. Ett vidare syfte är att beskriva vilka bevekelsegrunder som förelåg beslutet att akademisera officersutbildningen.

Frågeställningarna är följande: Hur kan, utifrån valda huvuddokument och handlingar, akademiseringen av officersprofessionen i Sverige beskrivas? Vilka jämförelser gjordes med andra nationer och vilka effekter, vilken påverkan, fick detta för framtagandet av strukturen för Försvarshögskolans nuvarande militära utbildningar? Om vi betraktar officersutbildningen som en akademisk yrkesexamen, hur skulle då en alternativ utbildning med en civil akademisk examen och en kortare militär yrkesutbildning kunna vara uppbyggd?

Arbetsmetoden är att kritiskt undersöka innehållet i källmaterialet och som mätinstrument används statsvetaren Nils Andréns teoretiska modell för säkerhetspolitisk analys. Arbetet utgår från hypotesen att långsiktiga politiska beslut avseende Försvarsmakten grundas på objektivitet och rationalitet.

Undersökningen visar att akademiseringsprocessen löpt i två parallella spår med sinsemellan skilda motiv och tidsrymder. Vidare visar arbetet att jämförelser med andra nationer gjordes och att intryck från dessa, främst avseende att utbildningen skall vara akademisk, togs tillvara. Resultatet från undersökningen tyder också på att en civil akademisk examen och en kortare militär utbildning sannolikt inte är en lämplig modell för officersutbildning. Hypotesen visar sig kunna falsifieras, vilket tyder på att långsiktiga politiska beslut avseende Försvarsmakten inte alltid fattas på objektiva och rationella grunder.

This study examines how people handle the time constants in dynamic decision tasks, using a microworld called NEWFIRE which simulates forest fire fighting. The results showed that the participants did not adapt to the time constants, as shown by the fact that they did not discriminate between fires requiring different number of fire fighting units when varying the number of fire fighting units was a means of compensating for the time constants. If they were allowed to move units before the fire started their performance improved, suggesting that they could compensate for their problems with the time constants by restructuring the task in such a way that they did not need to consider them. It is suggested that such restructuring may well be how people handle dynamic tasks also in other circumstances, and that more effort should be put into studying what people actually do in dynamic tasks, rather than into only assessing whether or not they perform optimally.

This article focuses on the definition, implementation and testing of a model to describe Hybrid Conflict Environments. Without the need of citing specific cases or countries, it is clear that hybrid strategy and warfare are becoming more important. A hybrid strategy can affect policy makers, military operations, economics and financial trends, intelligence and legal activities as well as information and media. A conceptual model is introduced to define and to gain further insight into hybrid environments. The model is then implemented and tested by running experiments to provide evidence on its relevance. Finally, results are presented and discussed.

The Vietnam War has generated a vast literature but one which has often forgotten that the United States fought in Vietnam as part of a coalition. This article examines Washington's efforts under President Lyndon B. Johnson to recruit third country combat assistance. He and his colleagues sought military help less for practical reasons than for political ones as a way of legitimizing the war both domestically and abroad. However, no NATO countries were willing to participate, and some of the five troop-contributing countries (Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) were attracted probably more by American largesse than by idealism. In exploring the diplomacy of coalition-building, this article has a contemporary resonance in the light of the military campaigns initiated by the White House since 2003.

China's maritime periphery or ‘‘near seas’’—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—are waters through which a great deal of vital commerce flows, as China, Japan, Korea, and numerous Southeast Asian countries are all major trading nations that import the energy and raw materials that sustain their thriving economies. Since 2009 the East and South China Seas have become increasingly fraught with tension. This has generally been attributed to rising Chinese assertiveness, but not because China has started making a lot of assertions it never made before. As the authors assembled here point out in replete detail, China’s explicit claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets in the East China Sea date back at least to 1971, while it can trace its claim in the South China Sea back to the publication of the famous ‘‘nine-dashed line’’ map by the Nationalists in 1947 (at the time it contained eleven segmented lines; the victorious Communists subsequently dropped two). What has changed since 2009 is China’s more rigorous enforcement of existing claims. This too is brought out in the articles collected below: its actors have seized islands well within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of neighboring Southeast Asian nations, detained fishing boats and confiscated their catch, cut the cables of ships engaged in oil exploration, harassed American surveillance vessels, and most recently undertaken ‘‘reclamation’’ of subsurface islets in order to construct airstrips and harbors. 

In this study an attempt is made to put forward ideas about how logistic support to the Armed Forces of the future will be dealt with, based on a sur­vey of current social, military and economic trends. The aim is to identify those logistic matters, which it would be relevant to simulate within a 10 to 15-year period. The study has been carried out with the aid of NATO logis­tic doctrine and a qualitative method, which is closely comparable to idea analysis.

One of the findings of the study is that the Swedish Armed Forces could be one module, amongst many (e.g. police, rescue services and aid organisa­tions), tailor-made for a particular peace support operation, led by a national HQ. It can also be taken that civilian actors, to a much greater extent than today, will be part of the logistics system and that this system could resem­ble the “IKEA model”, i.e. small stores of equipment that can quickly be put together to meet different needs. All this will require a greater degree of specialisation and coordination, both in Sweden and in other countries.

Those logistic matters identified as being relevant for simulation within a 10 to15-year period have been brought together in a summary. The main con­clusion of the study indicates that it is of the utmost importance to simulate a model of the complete logistic chain. In the meantime, in order to carry out the simulation, the collection of experiences and lessons learned must be systemised and recorded. If this does not happen, it is doubtful that the simulation can be used as a system to support decision-making.

The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) are today in a process of transformation, with the focus changing from homeland defence to embracing a global perspective. This change is being driven by a trend towards increasing international commitments. This has created a new set of demands on SAF, which has put pressure on greater efficiency in the supply chain, not least the order fulfilment process (OFP). Today, material managers can have a significant impact on lead-time reduction, but it is often unclear as to which aspects of the process managers should focus their efforts and capital on, to bring about improvements in the supply chain and the order fulfilment process. To increase knowledge of this phenomenon, the purpose of this thesis has been to investigate factors that have an impact on efficiency when it comes to the military supply chain (order fulfilment process for Role 2) in relation to ongoing changes within the SAF.

The project is based on a case study of the medical capability (Role 2). Moreover, a model has been used, which illustrates different influential factors of a changing organisation. These are core business, strategies, competence and management culture, all of which lead to a better understanding of how the unique context might have an impact on the efficiency related to the supply chain.

The results of the analysis show that there are great similarities between the empirical and theoretical elements. Several actors in the process are well aware of what needs to be done to improve the OFP; hence, there are some implications worthy of emphasis. However, the results also indicate that the use of measurements is not considered as a key principle for the management of processes by the respondents. Nevertheless, by using measurements in the OFP, SAF could better define the actual order cycle time and indirectly improve the OFP. An overall strategy has not been identified; however there are strategic goals and a material strategy. Furthermore, it is important that many of the respondents are not aware of what is said in these documents and that it appears to be unclear how the strategy should be applied in their daily work.

With regard to the leadership culture, there appears to be a strong "bottoms-up spirit" and a weak "top down" leadership in SAF. The study indicates that efficiency in the supply chain would benefit from a better balance between top down and bottom up leadership. The main conclusion from the analysis is that competence seems to be the essential factor in increasing efficiency in the OFP, to meet the demand for the development of new military capabilities, such as the NBG. It is almost as if this factor has been forgotten or is being neglected by SAF.

This text explores the Soviet military offensive into Japanese-held Manchuria in August 1945 by looking at two narratives: the Soviet and the Japanese. The former has dominating the latter, perhaps due to the Soviet success as Japan surrendered a few days into the operation. However, by adding rather than dismissing the Japanese perspective, Soviet performances on different levels can be scrutinized. For example, faults with logistical planning and the difficulties to achieve a 'deep battle' are found. It also highlights the main difference between the two operations, namely that the Soviet operation aimed for a double pincer movement, while the Japanese operation aimed for a withdrawal into a mountain redoubt.

Background: Common dental procedures induce bacteremia. To prevent infectious complications from bacteremia in patients with specific medical conditions, antibiotic prophylaxis is considered. Recommendations are often unclear and ambiguous. In a previous study we reported wide variations in general dental practitioners' (GDPs') administrations of antibiotic prophylaxis. We hypothesized that within such a conflicting clinical area, decisions are made with a high level of personal uncertainty. This study examined GDPs' confidence in their decisions and analyzed the extent to which case-related factors might explain individual variations in confidence. Methods: Postal questionnaires in combination with telephone interviews were used. The response rate was 51% (101/200). There were no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents regarding sex, age, or place of work. The GDPs were presented to patient cases of different medical conditions, where some should receive antibiotic prophylaxis according to recommendations when performing dental procedures that could cause gingival bleeding. The GDPs assessed on visual analogue scales how confident they were in their decisions. The extent to which case-related factors, medical condition and dental procedure, could explain individual variation in confidence was analyzed. Results: Overall the GDPs exhibited high confidence in their decisions regardless of whether they administered antibiotic prophylaxis or not, or whether their decisions were in accordance with recommendations or not. The case-related factors could explain between 30-100% of the individual variation in GDPs' confidence. For 46%, the medical condition significantly explained the individual variation in confidence. However, for most of these GDPs, lower confidence was not presented for conditions where recommendations are unclear and higher confidence was not presented for conditions where recommendations are more clear. For 8% the dental procedure significantly explained the variation, although all procedures could cause bacteremia. For 46% neither the medical condition nor the dental procedure could significantly explain the individual variation in confidence. Conclusion: The GDPs presented high confidence in their decisions, and the majority of GDPs did not present what could be considered a justified varied level of confidence according to the clarity of recommendations. Clinicians who are overconfident in their decisions may be less susceptible to modifications of their behavior to more evidence-based strategies.

U.S. doctrines have introduced a third approach within Operational Art, called the design approach, which has evoked military professional and academic debate as well as influenced NATO doctrines. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning (AJP 5) states that a Force Commander should choose one out of three approaches when conducting Operational Art and conducting operational planning: a traditional (causalist), a systemic or a design approach. The difference between the causalist- and the systemic- approach concerns the clash between reductionism and holism, but the difference between the design- and the systemic- approach is methodologically vague. Hence the following question concerning methodology and Operational Art arises:

What methodological implications could constitute an argument for choosing the design approach when conducting Operational Art within a battlespace?

Neither NATO doctrine, planning framework nor previous research offer any explicit methodological argument for choosing, or preferring, the design- over the systemic- approach. This article concludes that one possible argument for preferring a design approach is adherence to value-focused thinking, but this requires that the Force Commander can and is willing to focus on stakeholders’ values within the battlespace. This conclusion is implied by two methodological implications identified and discussed in this article. If the design approach is to be a relevant option, then further conceptual development, experimentation and education is required. To conclude, NATO should review the description of their approaches within Operational Art since the argument for preferring one approach over another is lacking and this could hamper the Force Commander’s management of the battlespace.

Parts of NATO’s contemporary planning framework called the comprehensive operations planning directive (COPD), and parts of the operation-level planning process should be revised since they suffer from methodological inconsistency. This claim is defended by discussing contradicting methodological properties and heuristics applied when framing and managing a military problem in accordance with the COPD. The methodological inconsistency within the COPD; in other words, simultaneously applying contradictory methodological properties, implies one theoretical and three practical implications. The theoretical implication is summarised in a meta-theoretical framework and explained by discussing five methodological properties: non-linearity, emergence, independently changeable generalisations, invariance and boundaries. The three practical implications of methodology imply that methodology is guiding: the problem-frame, conceptual development and action. To improve military planners’ understanding and management of these four identified implications, NATO is recommended to develop a “handbook of methodology.” The purpose of such a handbook should be to emphasise the utility of methodology when planning military operations

This paper discusses and reviews some previous research concerning what we denote as ‘goal-management’, in other words how to set, apply and evaluate goals when conducting military operations planning. We aim to explain and answer the following question:

• In what way could a review of previous philosophical thoughts on goal-management, decision theory and ethics improve contemporary military operations planning concerning goal-management?

We suggest a guideline (a planning tool) for how to conduct goal-management when planning military operations and exemplify our guideline with two fictive examples concerning the development of an Operational advice and Appreciation of Rules of Engagement. The paper concludes that the application of decision theory and ethics, i.e. important parts of philosophy, can contribute to military operations planning by focusing on three perspectives: an axiomatic, an ethical and a deliberative perspective.

Builds a revisionary theoretical framework for researching intelligence knowledge and applies it to the Swedish Military and Security Directorate

Gunilla Eriksson revises our perception of intelligence as carefully collected data and objective truth, arguing that there are hidden aspects to intelligence analysis that need to be uncovered and critically examined. This twofold study investigates the character of intelligence knowledge and the social context in which it is produced, using the Swedish Military and Security Directorate (MUST) as a case study.

Eriksson argues that there is an implicit framework that continuously influences knowledge production: what kind of data is considered relevant, how this data is interpreted and the specific social and linguistic context of the organisation, surrounded by unarticulated norms and specific procedures. She asks whether these conventions hamper or obstruct intelligence assessments; an essential analysis, given that history has shown us the grave consequences basing policy on intelligence's wrong conclusions.

Sources include

• The annual Swedish Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Estimates from 1998–2010
• Lengthy and highly valuable interviews with the analysts, including managers, working at MUST, giving insights into everyday life at the institution and leading to many important results
• Participant observation carried out by the author at MUST working meetings and seminars during the production process of the 2010 estimate, and drawing on her experience from her years working as an active analyst

The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST) is a producer of knowledge, a knowledge that is fundamental for decisionmaking in foreign and security policy. The intelligence knowledge production is often held as objective, value neutral, and with the intention of ‘speaking truth onto power’. However, this study holds that such a perspective on intelligence knowledge production calls for a revision. Hence, the overall purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of knowledge in intelligence analysis and also to investigate how that knowledge is affected by the social context of its production, the military intelligence service. The source material is of three kinds; first texts and documents, second interviews with intelligence analysts and managers, and third observations of seminars and meetings during the production process of estimates.

The results are that there is a strong presence of an implicit interpretive framework that continuously influences and guides the knowledge production and thereby makes the knowledge dependent on one specific perspective contrary to the intentional objectivity within the intelligence service. Further, the study reveals that the social and discursive practices for intelligence knowledge production include a ‘logic of appropriateness’ suggesting the presence of a structured Denkkollektiv with a structuredDenkstil. The actions and choices of the individuals are transformed to create conformity to the norms within the social discursive practices. Thus, the inherited frame of interpretation, as well as the socialised norm of staying within the existing accepted frames ofthinking and acting ends up to the stability and duration of the not always accurate and fruitful Denkstil.

At the core of political science resides the question of how policy is shaped. Even though this study has focused merely on one organisation in a specific policy field in one country it brings insights to the knowledge and policy nexus.

Among those teaching a group of Swedish military officers, little is known about motivation to learn English as part of a one-year military staff course. This research therefore aims to explore possible motivational characteristics while attempting to identify ways in which they may be theoretically linked to Dörnyei’s (2009) L2 motivational self system. A particular area of interest is the officers’ view of their motivation having taken part in a one-year English course and also an international military staff exercise which was conducted in English. The study used a two phase mixed-methods design, with an interview study and a follow-up questionnaire. Qualitative data were gathered by conducting seven individual interviews using a semi-structured interview schedule. Analysis of the qualitative data allowed themes to emerge. The questionnaire used in phase two was based on these themes and enabled the qualitative data to be triangulated. Twenty-eight Swedish military officers responded to the questionnaire. A variety of key variables were confirmed and it was possible to view them using the chosen theoretical framework. The Ideal L2 self and L2 learning experience were found to be particularly important motivators. It was also found that despite the officers’ high levels of motivation, their willingness to exert effort on learning is relatively low. It may therefore be concluded that teachers could address this through a focus on motivational teaching practice. Overall, this research provides insight into L2 motivation within a participant group which has not previously been studied.

The Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program: Focus 2010 conference was held August 5–7, 2009 at the Westfields Marriot in Virginia. Hosted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) HSCB Modeling Program, the conference brought together leading scientific and technical experts from both inside the Department of Defense and other government agencies who showcased their work in the HSCB modeling arena. Focus 2010 drew over 600 attendees from the Department of Defense, other government organizations, industry, and academia and with backgrounds ranging from sociology and anthropology to computer science and engineering.