Historians remember 1953 for the death of Stalin and the ensuing relaxation of East-West tensions, now known as the First Detente. Based on recent Cold War scholarship supplemented by primary documentation, this comparative study looks at the Nordic reaction to the First Wtente 1953-1956 in terms of deterrence and reassurance. The results suggest that, while the Nordic governments uniformly welcomed a more relaxed international atmosphere and entertained hopes of genuine dialogue between East and West, they Often differed in their interpretations of Soviet motives and the genuineness of the post- Stalin foreign policy. The tendency to put added emphasis on reassurance (end hence less deterrence) was most apparent in the cases of Iceland and Finland. Danish and Swedish policy shared this tendency, but lacked the degree of consensus found in Iceland. Norway seems to have been the least amenable to a change in perspective. The course of the First Detente led to an even stronger emphasis on reassurance than had been the case previously. In all of the Nordic countries the invasion of Hungary had a similar alarming effect - it swung the pendulum back toward misgivings about Soviet intentions.
This article takes a new look at the crucial years in early post-war history, 1948–52, when Swedish-American security relations were established. By 1952 Sweden was firmly within the Western sphere and was considered a trusted ally in the fight against the Soviet Bloc. What had happened since 1948 that made the Swedish government go from almost pariah status to a trusted ally? Prior research has argued that this change was due to a dramatic reversal of US policy towards Sweden, and has even pointed to a very specific date for this policy change—namely February 1950. Washington, it has been said, at that time gave up its objective of getting Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT, which became NATO in 1951).In contrast, the article argues that it was not so much that the Americans changed their minds, as it was Sweden that gradually corrected its policy of neutrality to fit American hegemonic demands, specifically regarding its adherence to the CoCom trade embargo; a process that lasted longer than until February 1950. Moreover, it questions the assumption that getting Sweden to join the NAT was ever a US policy objective. There is simply no evidence to support it. It also makes the case for a reinterpretation of the Swedish-American security relations in the early cold war. The article places these events within the framework of hegemony theory, which in order to improve the understanding of this process.