Any analysis of the behaviour of the pro‐Iranian Hizbollah organisation in Lebanon requires both an understanding of the movement itself, in terms of its decision‐making apparatus and internal clerical factionalism, and the mechanisms of its institutionalised relationship with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria through military and civilian channels at work within Lebanon. This article argues that Hizbollah's behaviour is principally governed by the depth and allegiance of closely forged relationships between individual Hizbollah leaders and Iranian clergy as well as the adaptability of a particular Hizbollah leader to suit the movement's activity to specific requirements within Lebanon and in the region. As such, clerical factionalism within Hizbollah can be monitored by the ascendancy or demotion of clergymen over the leadership and is also a guide to the direction of the movement in Lebanon as well as to the affiliation and loyalty of Hizbollah's leadership with clerical factions and institutions in Iran.
The internecine warfare in the former Yugoslavia has radicalised many Islamic movements in the region and facilitated close links between local Balkan groups and Middle East states as well as terrorist organisations. This article examines the spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the Balkans as well as in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Albania. The scope of linkages between Balkan Islamic movements and Iran pose serious concern for Western governments as a long‐term threat to any stability and democratisation in the Balkan region as it has intensified illegal activity throughout the area and heightened irredentist claims.
The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.