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  • 1.
    Egnell, Robert
    Departmant of War Studies, King's College, London.
    Explaining US and British performance in complex expeditionary operations: The civil-military dimension2006In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 29, no 6, p. 1041-1075Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A nation's structure and culture of civil-military relations are important and largely overlooked factors in explaining the performance of armed forces involved in complex expeditionary operations. The US model of 'Huntingtonian', divided civil-military structures and poor interagency cooperation, makes the US military less suited for complex expeditionary operations. British civil-military relations involve a Defence Ministry that conscientiously integrates military and civilian personnel, as well as extensive interagency cooperation and coordination. This 'Janowitzean', integrated form of civil-military relations makes the British military more likely to provide for the planning and implementation of comprehensive campaigns that employ and coordinate all instruments of power available to the state, as well as troops in the field displaying the flexibility and cultural and political understanding that are necessary in complex expeditionary operations.

  • 2.
    Larsdotter, Kersti
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Division of Strategy. Norwegian Defence University College, Norway.
    Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: An Unholy Alliance?2019In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 191-211Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Despite the increased use of military force in peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century, these operations are not included in traditional strategic theory. In this article, I outline the logic of four strategies for peacekeeping operations – defence, deterrence, compellence and offence – and trace the use of these strategies in two consecutive UN operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUC and MONUSCO. The article concludes that all four strategies are indeed used in the two operations, but they are neither comprehensive nor proactive, leaving the true potential of military strategy unrealised.

  • 3.
    Larsdotter, Kersti
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Division of Strategy. Norwegian Defence University College, Norway.
    Military Strategy in the 21st Century2019In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 155-170Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This special issue explores military strategy in the twenty-first century. The articles scrutinise strategy from three perspectives: the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; new areas for strategic theory, i.e., areas where the development of war has made strategy become more important, such as peacekeeping operations and cyberspace;and the makers of strategy, more specifically why states choses suboptimal strategies and how wars in the twenty-first century influence strategy makers.

  • 4.
    Larsdotter, Kersti
    Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine2014In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 37, no 1, p. 135-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.

  • 5.
    Widén, Jerker
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War2007In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 109-127Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Uppsala universitet.
    Honig, Jan Willem
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Strategy Section. Department of War Studies, King's College, London.
    Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan2012In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 35, no 5, p. 663-687Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.

  • 7.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Division of Strategy.
    Petersson, Magnus
    Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norway.
    Weak Party Escalation: An Underestimated Strategy for Small States2019In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 282-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, we develop the strategic rationale behind weak party escalation against stronger adversaries. There are, we suggest, four main strategies: to provoke a desired over-reaction from the stronger adversary; to compartmentalize conflict within a domain in which the weak party has advantages; to carve a niche with a stronger ally, and to forge a reputation of not yielding lightly. Spelling out these different logics contributes to the literature on small state strategies and escalation. It also suggests, contrary to much of the existing literature, that it can be rational for weak parties to escalate against great powers.

  • 8.
    Ångström, Jan
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Division of Strategy.
    Widén, Jerker
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Military Studies, War Studies Division, Sektionen för marina operationer (KV Marin).
    Religion or reason?: exploring alternative ways to measure the quality of doctrine2016In: Journal of Strategic Studies, ISSN 0140-2390, E-ISSN 1743-937X, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 198-212Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, we address the often ignored issue of quality standards for doctrine. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature on military doctrine, since much of previous research has focused on outlining the effects of doctrine or the causes of particular doctrinal content, rather than how we should measure its quality. The predominant way of understanding quality of doctrine is based on the rationalist understanding of doctrine as a force multiplier. However, rationalist aims do not necessarily tell us anything about the contents of doctrine. Hence, a doctrine can be seemingly of high quality, but ultimately impede or lead armed forces astray. Rather than focusing on the utilitarian side of doctrine, we suggest that doctrine should mainly be understood as articles of faith or a belief system. And thus the quality of doctrine becomes inextricably linked to military norms and military identity. Writing doctrine thus becomes part of ritual, rather than reason.

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