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  • 1.
    Alvinius, Aida
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Institutionen för ledarskap och ledning, Leadership and Command & Control Division Karlstad. Department of Leadership and Command & Control, Swedish Defence University, Karlstad, Sweden.
    Holmberg, Arita
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Political Science and Law, Political Science Division. Department of Political Science and Law, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden.
    External, non-governmental resistance in relation to interstate war: an analytical framework2023In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, p. 1-19Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, unleashed an unprecedented wave of non-governmental, external resistance directed against Russia. In many ways, previous literature on war and resistance does not capture the characteristics of this phenomenon. Besides noting the presence of civilian war protests outside of the warzone, most research has focused on internal resistance during war. In this article, we draw on a wider array of resistance literature and present an analytical framework that allows us to capture the broad elements of non-governmental, external resistance during war – including the power-resistance nexus at work. The analytical framework sorts the various kinds of resisters, it categorises the form of resistance and the targets pursued. The usefulness of the analytical framework is demonstrated through an exploration of empirical examples and illustrations drawn from media reports gathered during the first 10 days of the war in Ukraine. It is concluded that new analytical tools are necessary in order to capture non-governmental, external resistance during war as it is waged in Europe in the 2020s.

  • 2.
    Doeser, Fredrik
    Utrikespolitiska institutet.
    When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion2013In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 413-431Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.

  • 3.
    Hellman, Maria
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Political Science Section.
    Wagnsson, Charlotte
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Political Science Section.
    How can European states respond to Russian information warfare?: An analytical framework2017In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 153-170Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How can European democratic states respond to Russian information warfare? This article aims to enable and spur systematic research of how democracies can respond to the spread of distorted information as part of information warfare. The article proposes four ideal-type models representing different strategies that democratic governments can employ; blocking, confronting, naturalising and ignoring. Each strategy is illustrated by ways of empirical examples of strategies applied by European states in view of what is regarded as an unwelcome Russian strategic narrative that is spread as part of information warfare. We problematise each strategy and explore reasons for why states choose one strategy over another. We then explore how different strategies might contribute to destabilise or stabilise the security environment and how they resonate with democratic values. Finally, we contribute to theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting that the choice of strategy will influence states in their formation of strategic narratives. We thus further theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting the link between strategies and narratives, thus identifying one central dynamic in how narratives are formed.

  • 4.
    Holmberg, Arita
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Political Science and Law, Political Science Division.
    External, non-governmental resistance in relation to interstate war: an analytical frameworkIn: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

  • 5.
    Holmberg, Arita
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS), Political Science Section.
    The Changing Role of NATO: Exploring the Implications for Security Governance and Legitimacy2011In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 529-546Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Rhinard, Mark
    et al.
    Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Stockholm University, Box 27035, SE-102 51 Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hollis, Simon
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Boin, Arjen
    School of Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
    Explaining civil protection cooperation in the EU: the contribution of public goods theory2012In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 22, no 2, p. 248-269Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years the European Union has taken a number of steps towards improving civil protection cooperation in Europe. European leaders regularly declare the importance of boosting cooperation to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies afflicting member states. Those declarations have been accompanied by a flourish of policy activity, the building of new structures, and even treaty changes. On the surface, this little-known area of European integration appears to be proceeding with great success. A closer look, however, reveals significant gaps between member states' general expressions of enthusiasm and problematic cooperation in practice. We draw upon public goods theory to explain why this might be the case; more specifically, we identify likely game-theoretic obstacles to cooperation in different areas of the civil protection field. We evaluate our theoretical propositions by examining the current state of cooperation in marine pollution response, chemical contamination management, and flood response. We find that cooperation success in practice corresponds generally, but not perfectly, with the predictions of public goods theory. Our findings offer a nuanced view of civil protection cooperation in Europe and illuminate options for improved cooperation in the future.

  • 7.
    Simons, Greg
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
    Security Sector Reform and Georgia: The European Union's Challenge in the Southern Caucasus2012In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 272-293Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Security Sector Reform (SSR) holds different meanings and hence varying implications for recipients and donors. Therefore, as an initial point of departure it is necessary to offer a more precise understanding of what can the European Union (EU) offer as a donor to recipient nations in need of SSR? The empirical case of Georgia presents an interesting and challenging case for SSR. There have been a number of domestic and international conflicts in the post-Soviet era, which has left a volatile legacy. There needs to be a cautious and long-term approach that balances what Georgia needs and wants with what the EU can offer. Rather than a narrow approach to the SSR programme, a broader and more encompassing assistance needs to be undertaken in order to affect a more stable and sustainable change. This process shall require talking and offering, but also listening to what Georgian officials request and desire.

  • 8.
    Wagnsson, Charlotte
    Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies (ISS).
    A security community in the making? Sweden and NATO post-Libya2011In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 585-603Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article asks what the evolution of NATO-Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO’s and Sweden’s recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community; identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.

  • 9.
    Wagnsson, Charlotte
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), Political Science Section, Sektionen för säkerhetespolitik och strategi.
    What is at stake in the information sphere?: Anxieties about malign information influence among ordinary Swedes2020In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 397-415, article id 10.1080/09662839.2020.1771695Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Scholars, states and organisations have warned that authoritarian regimes and other hostile actors are projecting information to inflict harm upon others. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of this threat. This is mirrored in the plethora of labels in use, ranging from “disinformation” to “sharp power” and “information warfare”. In order to investigate this menace further, we turn our focus to ordinary people’s anxieties, since a better understanding of threat perceptions will also provide a better understanding of the problem. We conducted a comprehensive case study comprising focus group discussions (n: 97) and an extensive survey (n: 2046) among Swedish citizens. We asked: To what extent do people worry about information influence and why? What can this tell us about the nature of this problem or threat? The empirical results suggest that respondents were first and foremost worried about societal cohesion and democracy. They also identified a risk that information influence can undermine trust in societal institutions and the EU. Based on our findings, we suggest that “malign information influence” is an appropriate label to be used in future research. Finally, we propose directions for future systematic research on how malign information infuence is received and processed in different national contexts.

  • 10.
    Wagnsson, Charlotte
    et al.
    Swedish Defence University, Department of Political Science.
    Hellman, Maria
    Department of Economic History and International relations, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden, (SWE).
    Hoyle, Aiden
    Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, (NLD).
    Securitising information in European borders: how can democracies balance openness with curtailing Russian maligninformation influence?2024In: European Security, ISSN 0966-2839, E-ISSN 1746-1545Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The EU views malign information influence (MII) as a threat, and this has been enhanced with the Russian invasion of Ukraine resulting in a ban on several Russian media. This article adds to research on the dilemmas of democracies in combatting MII, by consulting the public on whether the ban was a proportionate and effective measure and if it stained the EU’s moral authority. Combining focus groups with a survey of the Swedish population, we found robust support for the ban – slightly stronger among women and increasing with age – and little backlash towards the EU. Respondents supported active countermeasures yet recognised problems with curtailing the free flow of information. The results indicate a need for refinement of an ideal-type model of countermeasures to MII (Hellman and Wagnsson Citation2017). We suggest a new category – “fortifying” – that highlights shared state/individual responsibility and the strengthening of citizens, authorities and the media. We conclude by suggesting a need for additional research on how to balance values of freedom and security and whether public support of bans relies on the precarious geopolitical situation resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine or if securitisation of information is an enduring trend.

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