Logotyp: till Försvarshögskolans hemsida

fhs.se
Ändra sökning
Avgränsa sökresultatet
1 - 26 av 26
RefereraExporteraLänk till träfflistan
Permanent länk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Träffar per sida
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sortering
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Författare A-Ö
  • Författare Ö-A
  • Titel A-Ö
  • Titel Ö-A
  • Publikationstyp A-Ö
  • Publikationstyp Ö-A
  • Äldst först
  • Nyast först
  • Skapad (Äldst först)
  • Skapad (Nyast först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Äldst först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyast först)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidigaste först)
  • Disputationsdatum (senaste först)
  • Standard (Relevans)
  • Författare A-Ö
  • Författare Ö-A
  • Titel A-Ö
  • Titel Ö-A
  • Publikationstyp A-Ö
  • Publikationstyp Ö-A
  • Äldst först
  • Nyast först
  • Skapad (Äldst först)
  • Skapad (Nyast först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Äldst först)
  • Senast uppdaterad (Nyast först)
  • Disputationsdatum (tidigaste först)
  • Disputationsdatum (senaste först)
Markera
Maxantalet träffar du kan exportera från sökgränssnittet är 250. Vid större uttag använd dig av utsökningar.
  • 1.
    Bengtsson, Johnny
    et al.
    Swedish National Forensic Centre, Swedish Police Authority and Department of Electrical Engineering, Linköping University, (SWE).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde.
    The Manifestation of Chinese Strategies Into Offensive Cyberspace Operations Targeting Sweden2021Ingår i: Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Dr. Thaddeus Eze, Dr. Lee Speakman and Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, Reading, UK, 2021, s. 35-43Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People’s Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).

  • 2.
    Boschetti, Nicolò
    et al.
    (USA).
    Gordon, Nathaniel
    (USA).
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem, Avdelningen för försvarssystem.
    Falco, Gregory
    (USA).
    Commercial Space Risk Framework Assessing the Satellite Ground Station Security Landscape for NATO in the Arctic and High North2022Ingår i: 40th IEEE Military Communications Conference, Rockville, MD, USA, November 28 - December 2, 2022., IEEE , 2022, s. 679-686Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Satellite ground stations in the Arctic and High North are of strategic importance to NATO, given their ability to collect intelligence from space assets in polar Earth orbit. Commercial space infrastructure such as ground systems are increasingly dual-use, employed for both civilian and defense purposes. Their dual-use could cause them to become military targets. As such, commercial operators must strategically consider ground station placement to optimize for utility, while accounting for their security risk. This research presents a frame-work to assess the commercial satellite ground station security landscape by outlining security and performance tradeoffs given geographic location, including proximity to potential adversaries, and designates eight separate risk regions. Particularly, Sweden's and Finland's space infrastructure is of focus given their recent application to join NATO in the wake of Russian aggression. The paper concludes that, to secure ground stations and the assets and services that they enable, a comprehensive risk evaluation including positioning of ground stations is critical.

  • 3.
    Boschetti, Nicolò
    et al.
    Johns Hopkins University, (USA)..
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem, Avdelningen för försvarssystem.
    Wallén, Mattias
    Swedish Space Corporation, (SWE)..
    Falco, Gregory
    Johns Hopkins University, (USA)..
    A Hybrid Space Architecture for Robust and Resilient Satellite Services2023Ingår i: 2023 IEEE International Conference on Space Mission Challenges for Information Technology (SMC-IT), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2023, s. 114-122Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A 'hybrid space architecture' has been proposed to facilitate robust and resilient satellite data downlink, integration and analysis; however, the technical details for what may comprise a hybrid space architecture are severely lacking. Thus far, 'hybrid' principally entails the diversity of commercial providers. While diverse suppliers can contribute to hybrid space architectures, we argue that robustness and resilience will only be achieved through heterogeneous network and asset architectures. A connected satellite services ecosystem composed of the union of different networks with different characteristics would limit single points of failure, thereby generating high levels of redundancy, resilience and scalability. This research outlines parameters of a hybrid space architecture, documents satellite service reference architectures and provides a comparative analysis of the features for each architecture. Further, through a case study of existing satellite service providers, we propose how a hybrid space architecture could be piloted in Northern Europe and the High North.

  • 4.
    Boschetti, Nicolò
    et al.
    Johns Hopkins University (USA).
    Smethurst, Chelsea
    Microsoft (USA).
    Epiphaniou, Gregory
    University of Warwick (GBR).
    Maple, Carsten
    University of Warwick (GBR).
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem, Avdelningen för försvarssystem.
    Falco, Gregory
    Johns Hopkins University (USA).
    Ground Station as a Service Reference Architectures and Cyber Security Attack Tree Analysis2023Ingår i: 2023 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2023Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    As the Ground Station as a Service (GSaaS) paradigm transforms space infrastructure operations, new attack surface emerges for malicious actors. While the space community generally refers to GSaaS as a singular model, there are several flavors of these systems. After a description of the general GSaaS network's basic structure, this paper presents an analysis of four reference architectures of GSaaS. On the basis of this systems engineering analysis, a cybersecurity analysis of the critical nodes will be carried out through the attack tree method. Later the cybersecurity implication both of technical and strategic characteristic of GSaaS networks will be discussed and put in relation with the current state of space cyberwarfare landscape.

  • 5.
    Franke, Ulrik
    et al.
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI); Swedish Institute of Computer Science (SICS).
    Cohen, Mika
    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska tillämpningar (MteT).
    What can we learn from enterprise architecture models?: An experiment comparing models and documents for capability development2018Ingår i: Software and Systems Modeling, ISSN 1619-1366, E-ISSN 1619-1374, Vol. 17, nr 2, s. 695-711Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Enterprise architecture (EA) has been established as a discipline to cope with the complex interactions of business operations and technology. Models, i.e., formal descriptions in terms of diagrams and views, are at the heart of the approach. Though it is widely thought that such architecture models can contribute to improved understanding and decision making, this proposition has not rigorously been tested. This article describes an experiment conducted with a real EA model and corresponding real traditional documents, investigating whether the model or the documents lead to better and faster understanding. Understanding is interesting to study, as it is a prerequisite to other EA uses. The subjects (N = 98) were officer cadets, and the experiment was carried out using a comprehensive description of military Close Air Support capability either (1) in the form of a MODAF model or (2) in the form of traditional documents. Based on the results, the model seems to lead to better, though not faster, understanding.

  • 6.
    Gradh, Anders
    Försvarshögskolan.
    En stabs nätverkstrafik: En analys av användningen av datornätverkskapacitet i en operativ stab under övningen VIKING 112015Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    FM köpte satellitkapacitet för närmare 20 miljoner kronor under 2014 för utbildning, övning och internationella operationer. Enligt HKV räcker dock inte upphandlad kapacitet för att täcka behoven ute hos förbanden.

    Syftet med denna studie är att ta reda på mer hur kapacitetsanvändningen ser ut vid en operativ stab utifrån deras arbete och därigenom se om det finns någon militär nytta att vinna kopplad till kapacitetsanvändning.

    Utgångspunkten för arbetet är insamlad information om datornätverkstrafiken i de olika nätverken. Detta kvantitativa data jämförs med stabens arbete utifrån kvantitativ och kvalitativ data i krigsdagbok, styrdokument och deltagande studie.

    Studien visar på att kapacitetsanvändningen ej är relaterad till stabens arbete utan snarare är kopplad till när personal är på plats och personalens internetanvändning. Studien pekar på att det kan finnas en potential att få mer militär nytta, dock måste mekanismer för prioritering i nätverket införas och vidare studier avseende trafiken genomföras.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    fulltext
    Ladda ner (pdf)
    bilaga
  • 7. Hedén, Hugo
    Systems methodology for Analysis of Airborne Electronic Warfare Systems2021Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (masterexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna rapport är en av de första som undersöker hur systemmetodik kan tillämpas som ett verktyg för att underlätta en holistisk syn på stridsflygplans överlevnadsförmåga. Detta görs genom tillämpningen av en modifierad version av multiagent influence diagrams (MAIDs) som ett analysverktyg av två generiska en-mot-en-scenarier baserade på Robert E. Balls The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability, Analysis and Design. Begreppet överlevnadsförmåga har avgränsats till mottaglighet eftersom det är här ECM, ECCM och ESM verkar.

    Resultatet: tre influensdiagram för varje scenario och ett generisk MAID baserat på det första scenariot. Dessa ska inte ses som en exakt teknisk beskrivning av interaktionen mellan hot och motmedel, utan som en pilottillämpning av systemmetodik inom studieområdet. Vidare indikerar användarvalideringen att diagrammen kan förmedla komplexiteten i interaktionerna mellan hot och motmedel genom en grafisk presentation. Diagrammen ledde till en djupare diskussion om vilka influenser som är av vikt för överlevnad.

    Slutsatsen är att MAID och systemmetodik kan fungera som ett verktyg för att beskriva och hjälpa till att kommunicera de komplexa sambanden mellan element och influenser som påverkar flygplanens överlevnadsförmåga mellan olika aktörer. En förutsättning är dock att de modelleras på ett korrekt sätt.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    2FS003_Heden_22.04.13.pdf
  • 8.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    The Current State of Research in Offensive Cyberspace Operations2019Ingår i: Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2019, s. 660-667Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Cyber-attacks have increased since the 1988-Morris worm and can target any connected device from any place in the world. In 2010, Stuxnet received a lot of attention as the first cyber-weapon. Its targets were the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. Nation states are developing cyberspace capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Academic researchers have been calling for a more transparent discussion on offensive capabilities and have pointed out the positive impact researchers had during the development of nuclear capabilities. Shrouded in secrecy, the development of offensive capabilities used for operations makes it difficult to conduct research. Therefore, one way to mitigate this is to conduct a systematic review of the current state of research in offensive cyberspace operations. The systematic review method makes it possible to establish certain inclusion and exclusion criteria and systematically go through academic articles to identify the contents, thoughts and research focus of academic researchers. Six scientific databases were queried and 87 articles were read and clustered. The first insight is that, based on the results of the queried databases, research about offensive cyberspace operations is limited. The resulting clusters are a general cluster about cyberspace operations, followed by research in policy, decision-making, governance, capabilities, levels, models, training, deterrence and international affairs. These are then further grouped into: a) general cyberspace operations; b) deterrence; c) international affairs; d) modelling, simulation and training. The article concludes that research into offensive cyberspace operations is maturing as more information is becoming public. Secondly, current research lists some good basic ideas regarding effects which can be achieved through offensive cyberspace operations, how they should be conducted, and related tools, techniques and procedures. However, discrepancies in research efforts exist, with the majority of research coming primarily from the western world. In addition, secrecy and the resulting limited access to information, coupled with research being either too technically focused or too qualitatively focused, show that there still remains room for research in this field. Finally, some directions for future research are examined.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    The Current State of Research in Offensive Cyberspace Operations
  • 9.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    What is a Substantial Contribution to a Research Project in Offensive Cyberspace Operations that Merits Co-Authorship?2022Ingår i: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: State University of New York at Albany Albany, New York, USA 17-18 March 2022 / [ed] Dean Robert P. Griffin, Dr. Unal Tatar and Dr. Benjamin Yankson, Reading, UK: ACI Academic Conferences International, 2022, s. 385-394Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article reviews the question what is a substantial contribution to a research project in offensive cyberspace operations that merits co-authorship? Frustrations and conflicts may develop during research projects when researchers with different backgrounds, cultures, research fields and expertise decide to conduct research and produce and publish those results. The focus of this paper is a research project in cyberspace operations while taking into account the power-dynamics inherent in the academic system and how these can affect the co-authorship of research products. First, the purpose with doing research is presented. Next, three models of the research process are reviewed, describing their differences and similarities. Then, linguistic analysis is applied on a set of terms in guidelines for co-authorship described in some different universities in Sweden. The results present a model for a research project in offensive cyberspace operations and based on the output of the linguistic analysis, the model is used to quantify and describe what a substantial contribution is in three scenarios that merits co-authorship. 

  • 10.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    Iftimie, Ion A.
    Eisenhower Defence Fellow, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy (ITA); European Union Research Center, George Washington School of Business, Washington D.C., (USA); Central European University, Vienna, Austria (AUT).
    Toward an Ambidextrous Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations: a Theory, Policy and Practice Perspective2020Ingår i: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, s. 243-253Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the rise in state-sponsored cyber attacks over the past three decades and proposes a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. Since 1982, nation states have embarked in a fierce race to develop both clandestine and covert offensive cyber capabilities. Their intended targets range from foreign militaries and terrorist organizations to civilian populations and the critical infrastructures that they rely upon. Advancements in cyber security have, however, contributed to the discovery and attribution of offensive cyber operations, such as state-sponsored ransomware attacks, where state-built cyber capabilities have been used to attack governments, industries, academia and citizens of adversary nations. The financial and psychological costs of these ransomware attacks are today a threat to any state’s national security. This article draws from academic research, the cyber military doctrines of four countries—a total of eight models from the Netherlands, Sweden, the U.S., and the U.K.—and the authors’ operational experience to propose a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. This ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations and the associated Cyberspace Operations Canvas are needed today in order to increase the resilience of national critical infrastructures against attacks from state-developed tools. We use the WannaCry-case to illustrate how the implementation of the ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations would result in increased awareness and understanding of the prospective cyber threats, their intended target(s), the likelihood of cascading effects and the options available by nation states to minimize them.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    Toward an Ambidextrous Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations - A Theory Policy and Practice Perspective
  • 11.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). University of Skövde, (SWE).
    Iftimie, Ion A.
    NATO Defense College, (ITA); European Union Research Center, George Washington School of Business, (USA).
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University, (USA); Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, (USA).
    Designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations2020Ingår i: Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security: A Virtual Conference hosted by University of Chester UK / [ed] Thaddeus Eze, Lee Speakman, Cyril Onwubiko, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, s. 473-482Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the question ‘what considerations should be taken by cyber commands when designing attack infrastructure for offensive operations?’. Nation-states are investing in equipping units tasked to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Generating ‘deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or deceive’ effects on adversary targets requires to move from own (‘green’), through neutral (‘grey’), to adversary (‘red’) cyberspace. The movement is supported by attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations. In this paper, we review the professional and scientific literature identifying the requirements for designing an attack infrastructure. Next, we develop and define the concepts for attack infrastructure. Finally, we explain and describe the considerations for designing attack infrastructure. The research question is answered by proposing a framework for designing attack infrastructure. This framework is vital for military and civilian commands designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations. 

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    Designing attack infrastructure for offensive cyberspace operations
  • 12.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Sweden.
    Moradian, Esmiralda
    Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Sweden.
    Cyber Deterrence: An Illustration of Implementation2018Ingår i: 13th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS 2018) / [ed] John S. Hurley & Jim Q. Chen, Sonning: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2018, s. 304-311Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Cyber deterrence is a strategy to deter attackers from conducting cyber-attacks in the first place. However, several issues exist when implementing cyber deterrence, which are identified in this paper. The findings show (1) non-existence of the deterrence strategy  (2) no doctrine or decision competence to retaliate to an adversary, (3) the armed forces have no authority to retaliate when Swedish sovereignty in Cyberspace is threatened, (4) no norms or regulations exist concerning retaliation, (5) no clear governance on using offensive cyber capabilities, and finally, (6) no credibility in its cyber deterrence posture regarding how much Sweden is willing to sacrifice to protect its electoral system, which is a Swedish national interest. Therefore, this research investigates how cyber deterrence can practically be implemented in Swedish cyber security policy. So far, researchers generally focused on the human aspect of cyber deterrence. By using the case study research strategy and utilizing the Swedish electoral system as a case, this paper examines possibilities to merge the human dimensions of cyber security with the technological dimensions. Data collection is performed through documents studies and semi-structured interviews with experts in the area to identify cyber deterrence components. Further, a mathematical approach is discussed in the paper to express the relationship between an adversary and a deterrent depicting each of the actor’s risk calculus. A result of the research work performed in this paper, the deterrence components for Swedish cyber deterrence are proposed and risk calculus is performed. Moreover, measures to increase Swedish cyber deterrence posture are proposed the practical implementation of cyber deterrence in Swedish cyber security policy in order to deter attacks on the Swedish electoral system is demonstrated.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    Cyber Deterrence - An Illustration of Implementation
  • 13.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, R L
    Department of Philosophy and Computer and Information Sciences Towson University, Towson, Maryland, (USA), and Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, (USA).
    Offensive Cyberspace Operations and Zero-days: Anticipatory Ethics and Policy Implications for Vulnerability Disclosure2021Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare, ISSN 1445-3312, Vol. 20, nr 1, s. 96-109Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the question under which circumstances zero-day vulnerabilities should be disclosed or used for offensive cyberspace operations. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software and can be seen as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. The most highly sought are so-called zero-day-vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities exist but are unknown and, when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is otherwise not thought possible. Therefore, from an anticipatory ethics perspective, it is important to understand in what cases zero-days should be disclosed or not.

  • 14.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University (USA), Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore (USA).
    An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis of Offensive Cyberspace Operations2020Ingår i: 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, s. 512-520Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents the ethical issues using offensive cyberspace operations. Previously enshrouded in secrecy, and now becoming the new norm, countries are using them to achieve their strategic interests. Russia has conducted offensive operations targeting Estonia, Georgia and the Ukraine; Hamas was targeting Israeli targets; and Iran has been targeting U.S. targets. The response has varied; Estonia and Georgia struggled with the attacks and were unable to respond while Ukraine tried to respond but it was inefficient. Israel’s response on Hamas offensive operations was an air strike on a building with Hamas Cyber-operatives. Iran shot down a U.S. Drone over the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. initially intended to respond with kinetic capabilities in the form of missile strikes. However, in the last minute, the U.S. chose to respond with offensive cyberspace operations targeting the Iranian missile systems. This last-minute change of response choosing between kinetic or cyber capabilities shows a need to further investigate how offensive cyberspace operations can be used against which targets from an ethical perspective. This article applies anticipatory ethical analysis on U.S. offensive operations in the “Global Hawk”-case when Iran shot down a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Anticipatory ethical analysis looks at emerging technologies and their potential consequences. Offensive cyberspace operations present a range of possibilities, which include lowering the risk of harm to cyber operatives’ lives belonging to the responding nation. However, a response can also be kinetic. Therefore, the analysis of the “Global Hawk”-case is compared with the Israeli-air strike of the building of Hamas Cyber-operatives. The authors argue that applying anticipatory ethical analysis on offensive operations and kinetic operations assist decision makers in choosing response actions to re-establish deterrence.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis of Offensive Cyberspace Operations
  • 15.
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). School of Informatics, University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden.
    Wilson, Richard L.
    Towson University, USA), Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore (USA).
    Anticipatory Ethics for Vulnerability Disclosure2020Ingår i: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Payne, Brian K.; Wu, Hongyi, Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2020, s. 254-261Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents the ethical dilemma related to under what circumstances vulnerabilities should be disclosed. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software, and can be as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. Threat actors can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain otherwise unintended access to information systems, resources and/or stored information. In other words, they can be used to impact the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in information systems. As a result, various types of vulnerabilities are highly sought after since they enable this type of access. The most highly sought are so-called “zero-day”-vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that exist but are unknown, and when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is not thought possible. This is also why zero-day vulnerabilities are very popular among criminal organizations, states and state-sponsored advanced persistent threats. The other side of the coin is when a state identifies a zero-day, and ends up in the ethical dilemma of whether to release the news and inform the vendor to patch it, i.e. close the vulnerability, or to use it for offensive or intelligence purposes. This article employs these distinctions to apply anticipatory ethics in the Stuxnet-case. Stuxnet was a computer software that was allegedly developed by the U.S. together with Israel to disrupt Iran’s development of uranium for their nuclear program. More exactly, it was developed to disable the uranium centrifuges used to enrich uranium. To achieve this, Stuxnet exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities and, according to some experts, managed to delay Iran’s nuclear program by one to two-years, forcing them to the negotiation table. Using vulnerabilities like zero-days presents opportunities but also risks. The results of the application of anticipatory ethics to the Stuxnet case are then compared with the “Osirak”-case and the “al-Kibar”-case. Osirak was the nuclear reactor in Iraq and was bombed in 1981; al-Kibar was the nuclear reactor being built up in Syria, also bombed in 2007.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    Anticipatory Ethics for Vulnerability Disclosure
  • 16.
    Jiang, Zhihan
    et al.
    IoT Lab, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, (CHN).
    van Zoest, Vera
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem, Avdelningen för försvarssystem.
    Deng, Weipeng
    IoT Lab, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, (CHN).
    Ngai, Edith. C. H.
    IoT Lab, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, (CHN).
    Liu, Jiangchuan
    Department of Computing, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada, (CAN).
    Leveraging Machine Learning for Disease Diagnoses based on Wearable Devices: A Survey2023Ingår i: IEEE Internet of Things Journal, ISSN 2327-4662, Vol. 10, nr 24, s. 21959-21981Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Many countries around the world are facing a shortage of healthcare resources, especially during the post-epidemic era, leading to a dramatic increase in the need for self-detection and self-management of diseases. The popularity of smart wearable devices, such as smartwatches, and the development of machine learning bring new opportunities for the early detection and management of various prevalent diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, Parkinson’s disease, and diabetes. In this survey, we comprehensively review the articles related to specific diseases or health issues based on small wearable devices and machine learning. More specifically, we first present an overview of the articles selected and classify them according to their targeted diseases. Then, we summarize their objectives, wearable device and sensor data, machine learning techniques, and wearing locations. Based on the literature review, we discuss the challenges and propose future directions from the perspectives of privacy concerns, security concerns, transmission latency and reliability, energy consumption, multi-modality, multi-sensor, multi-devices, evaluation metrics, explainability, generalization and personalization, social influence, and human factors, aiming to inspire researchers in this field.

  • 17.
    Kantola, Harry
    Försvarshögskolan.
    Datanätverksattacker, trend eller nödvändighet?2011Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (magisterexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    I dagens samhälle används information till att sköta dagliga ärenden. Både militära och civila är beroende av cybervärlden i freds- och kristid. För att kunna skydda sina system måste man förstå hur de kan angripas.

    Syftet med forskningen är att finna ambitionsnivåer och metoder inom datanätverksattack-verksamheten (CNA-verksamhet) som försvarsmakten kan vidmakthålla i stater med högtek-nologisk utveckling men med låga försvarsresurser. Vilken teknologisk datanäverkattack-förmåga rekommenderas en sådan stats försvarsmakt på fem till tio års tidsperspektiv samt med vilka sätt kan man uppnå verkan?

    I arbetet används kvalitativ dataanalys. Med axial kodning, enligt Strauss "Grounded Theo-ry", kategoriseras de olika komponenterna som CNA-förmågorna består av. Dessa kategorier analyseras sedan med hjälp av Rasmussens riskteori i ett informationsteknologiskt system.

    I studien framgår det att en högteknologisk småstat bör sträva efter spetskompetens i de för-mågor som bidrar till att man kan testa och försvara sina egna kritiska och sårbara system. En sådan kompetens är förmågan att utföra datanätverksexploatering (CNE-verksamhet). Om en försvarsmakt som har förmåga till att genomföra avancerad CNE-verksamhet, så kan den genomföra behövlig CNA-verksamhet. För en stat med begränsade försvarsresurser kräver genomförandet av CNA-verksamhet dock strategiskt samarbete med olika civila partner. Av dessa är universitet och teknologiskt avancerade företag/industrier de främsta partnerna.

    Resultatet visar dessutom att den informationstekniska kunskapen är av tillräcklig nivå, men att det behövs förbättringar inom det informationspsykologiska området. Ambitionsnivån be-höver inte överstiga förmågan att genomföra CNE-verksamhet.

    Även om CNE-verksamheten är teknologiskt betonad, så åstadkoms den informationspsyko-logiska effekten med att koordinera CNA-verksamheten inom informationsoperationer. I framtiden är det troligare att uppnå en högre effekt på en motståndare via en informations-psykologisk inriktning.

    Organisatoriskt är det kostnadseffektivare att skapa "eldledningsförmåga inom CNA" än se-parata enheter som man inkorporerar i den normala organisationsstrukturen. Storleken på en CNA-enhet kan hållas låg med hjälp av strategiska partner.

    Som biprodukt framgår det att det behövs ytterligare forskning i uppdelandet ansvaret i at-tack-, exploaterings-, underrättelseinhämtnings- och försvarsförmåga (CNA/CNE/CNI/CND-verksamheten).

  • 18.
    Kävrestad, Joakim
    et al.
    School of Informatics, University of Skövde, (SWE).
    Huskaj, Gazmend
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS). University of Skövde, Sweden.
    How the Civilian Sector in Sweden Perceive Threats From Offensive Cyberspace Operations2021Ingår i: 20th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security / [ed] Dr. Thaddeus Eze, Dr. Lee Speakman and Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, Chester: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2021, s. 499-506Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The presence of state-sponsored actors executing offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) has been made evident in recent years. The term offensive cyberspace operations encompass a range of different actions, including cyberespionage, disinformation campaigns, spread of malware and more. Based on an analysis of past events, it is evident that state- sponsored actors are causing harm to the civilian sector using OCO. However, the degree to which civilian organizations understand the threat from state-sponsored actors is currently unknown. This research seeks to provide new a better understanding of OCO and their impact on civilian organizations. To highlight this domain, the case of the threat actor Advanced Persistent Threat 1 (APT1) is presented, and its impact on three civilian organizations discussed. Semi-structured interviews were used to research how the threats from OCO and state-sponsored actors are perceived by civilian organizations. First, a computational literature review was used to get an overview of related work and establish question themes. Next, the question themes were used to develop questions for the interview guide, followed by separate interviews with five security professionals working in civilian organizations. The interviews were analysed using thematic coding and the identified themes summarized as the result of this research. The results show that all respondents are aware of the threat from OCO, but they perceive it in different ways. While all respondents acknowledge state-sponsored actors at a threat agentexecuting OCO, some respondent’s argue that state-sponsored actors are actively seeking footholds in systems for future use while others state that the main goal of state-sponsored actors is to steal information. This suggests that the understanding of the threat imposed by OCO is limited, or at least inconsistent, among civilian security experts. As an interview study, the generalisability of this research is limited. However, it does demonstrate that the civilian society does not share a common view of the threat from state-sponsored actors and OCO. As such, it demonstrates a need for future research in this domain and can serve as a starting point for such projects.

  • 19.
    Larsson, Emil
    et al.
    Schibsted Media Group.
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Militärtekniska avdelningen (MTA).
    Papering Over the Cracks: The Effects of Introducing Best Practices on the Web Security Ecosystem2016Ingår i: The 30th International Conference on Information Networking: ICOIN 2016, IEEE, 2016, s. 1-6, artikel-id 15837791Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is the de facto standard for secure end-to-end web communication. However, numerous flaws discovered during recent years, such as Apple’s “goto fail” bug, and cryptographic weaknesses as illustrated by the Poodlebleed vulnerability, have brought the efficiency of the mostly self-regulated web security market into question. In this cross-disciplinary paper, the authors survey some 160.000 HTTPS-enabled servers among popular web sites over a time period of three years. The research question is what effect the introduction of best practices and vulnerability publication have on web server security in the form of protocol support. Main findings include that (i) insecure configurations, although well known, can remain widespread for over a decade, (ii) the introduction of best practices affect the decline of insecure configurations only moderately, whereas highly publicized security flaws have a significant impact, and (iii) economic incentives for website owners to provide secure services are weak, motivating such other levers of influence as legislation or blocking of noncompliant sites.

  • 20.
    Larsson, Emil
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem.
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för försvarssystem.
    Towards econometric estimation of the cost of cyber conflict2024Ingår i: 28th International Conference on Knowledge-Based and Intelligent Information & Engineering Systems (KES 2024), Amsterdam, 2024Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In the modern era, understanding the costs and implications of conflict extends beyond traditional kinetic boundaries into the cyber realm. While economic analysis has historically been concerned primarily with the state’s ability to sustain and engage in physical warfare, recent research has begun to quantify the additional societal and collateral costs. To shed light on the total costs of the use of cyber weapons and capabilities, we argue that a comprehensive analysis must be done using econometric tools. This paper describes two important tools in this toolkit, counterfactual analysis and bottom-up accounting, in the context of cyber conflict. It discusses how significant collateral costs manifest in the inadvertent aftermath of vulnerability stockpiling for use in cyber weapons, coupled with the losses and thefts of these resources. Such incidents represent not only a direct financial burden but also erode the trust and goodwill of nations who do not disclose the discovered vulnerabilities. Finally, multiple data sources and bottom-up accounting techniques are used to conduct a case study estimating the aggregate societal cost of cyber conflict in the Ukrainian war between late 2013 and 2020. The aggregate cost of the 76 recorded cyberattacks is estimated to be approximately $160M. Finally, counterfactual analysis is concluded to face significant data availability challenges preventing high quality synthesis of the two methods described.

  • 21.
    Perring, Charles
    Försvarshögskolan.
    Wargaming elections interference: A serious influence game for teaching elements of cognitive warfare2022Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (masterexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    Försvarsvilja är ett centralt begrepp i det svenska Totalförsvaret. Begreppet beskriver en individuell och kollektiv benägenhet att tycka eller handla i ett försvarsrelaterat syfte. Psykologiskt försvar skyddar försvarsviljan från främmande påverkanskampanjer som försöker urholka den. Denna uppsats syftar till att skapa ett seriöst spel för att lära ut element av försvarsvilja och drar slutsatsen att ett sådant spel är möjligt men utmaningar kvarstår i avdömningen av resultat av påverkansoperationer i seriösa spel och när det gäller att inkludera psykologiskt försvar i spelet. 

    Aktuell forskning om försvarsvilja och psykologiskt försvar är begränsad till den svenska kontexten och har inte prövats i krigföring. Denna uppsats föreslår att kognitiv krigföring är ett relevant proxy-begrepp för moderna försök att urholka försvarsviljan och föreslår att valpåverkan är en relevant proxy-kontext för ett seriöst inflytandespel som syftar till att lära ut kärnbegrepp inom påverkansoperationer som syftar till att urholka försvarsviljan. En integrerad systemmodell för valpåverkan är sammansatt av befintlig vetenskaplig forskning och dess kärnelement är uppdelade i inlärningsblock. Slutligen utvecklas ett seriöst inflytandespel och metoder för effektiv avdömning i inflytandespel utforskas. 

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 22.
    Prevezianou, Maria Foteini
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), Statsvetenskapliga avdelningen, Sektionen för krishantering och internationell samverkan.
    WannaCry as a Creeping Crisis2021Ingår i: Understanding the Creeping Crisis / [ed] Boin, Arjen; Ekengren, Magnus; Rhinard, Mark, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, s. 37-50Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter deepens our understanding of cyber crises with the help of the creeping crisis concept. The chapter shows that although emerging technologies make malicious activities in cyberspace more sophisticated, vulnerabilities enabling such threats have been inherent in cyber assets for a very long time in the form of creeping crises. The question is: was WannaCry the acute crisis or just a precursor event to a bigger explosion? It is argued that the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 should be considered a wake-up call. The chapter demonstrates how the cyber threat was lurking in the background, gradually evolving in time and space in a non-linear fashion and receiving varying levels of attention.

  • 23.
    Sigholm, Johan
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Militärtekniska avdelningen (MTA). School of Informatics, University of Skövde.
    Secure Tactical Communications for Inter-Organizational Collaboration: The Role of Emerging Information and Communications Technology, Privacy Issues, and Cyber Threats on the Digital Battlefield2016Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [sv]

    Informations- och kommunikationsteknik (IKT) har under de senaste årtiondena varit under stark utveckling. Ökad tillgänglighet av mobil teknik, såsom smarta mobiltelefoner och andra bärbara enheter med inbyggda sensorer, kraftig utbyggnad av kommunikationsinfrastruktur samt framsteg inom spektrumeffektivitet, har haft en stor betydelse för civilsamhället samt i ökande grad även för insatsorganisationer såsom Försvarsmakten. Tekniken bidrar till ökad förmåga till ledning, situationsuppfattning och informationshantering, men medför samtidigt flera utmaningar inom områden som cybersäkerhet och personlig integritet. Nya uppgifter som parallellt kommit i fokus för försvarsmakter i många länder inkluderar förmågan att kunna delta i stödjande insatser i samband med naturkatastrofer, terrorattacker, eller att kunna erbjuda humanitärt bistånd i internationella miljöer. Sådana insatser kräver vanligtvis samverkan mellan många olika heterogena organisationer, vilket medför ett behov av såväl teknisk som organisatorisk interoperabilitet. Viss information måste kunna delas effektivt mellan de ingående aktörerna med avseende på riktighet och tillgänglighet, samtidigt som känsliga uppgifter måste skyddas avseende sekretess.

    I denna avhandling studeras taktiskt användande av framväxande IKT på morgondagens slagfält, hur tekniken kan bidra till mer effektiva operationer, samt vilka förutsättningar och krav som måste uppfyllas för att tekniken ska kunna vara till nytta vid interorganisatorisk samverkan. Särskilt undersöks möjligheten att upprätthålla en acceptabel nivå av informationssäkerhet i gemensamma taktiska sambandssystem, samtidigt som dessa kan användas effektivt under påfrestande förhållanden. Avhandlingen finner att tekniker som mobila ad hoc-nätverk, mjukvarudefinierad radio och kognitiv radio, trots att de ännu är omogna, kan komma att bidra till förbättrade eller helt nya förmågor inom bland annat samband, ledning och informationsinhämtning. Vidare dras slutsatsen att ramverket Hastily Formed Networks är effektivt för samverkan mellan heterogena aktörer. För att framväxande IKT ska kunna vara av militär nytta krävs dock att flera icke-tekniska krav kan mötas. Dessa inkluderar användbarhet, tillit, legalitet, kostnad, samt att tekniken ligger i linje med rådande militär doktrin. Såväl antagonistiska som oavsiktliga hot måste samtidigt hanteras, såsom informationsläckor orsakade av cyberattacker eller insiders, samt konsekvensen av en minskad personlig integritet för användarna.

    Avhandlingen förväntas vara av intresse för såväl Försvarsmakten som organisationer med liknande förutsättningar i Sverige och jämförbara länder. Som slutsats rekommenderas i avhandlingen att framväxande IKT till stöd för nya förmågor kontinuerligt utvärderas genom såväl akademisk forskning som intern konceptutveckling, samt att en inkrementell och modulär modell bör väljas vid utveckling och anskaffning, snarare än att göra omfattande investeringar i proprietär teknik. Fokus bör även vara på att tidigt få med militära krav i civila IKT-standarder. På så vis kan utvecklingskostnader reduceras, samtidigt som militär användning av kommersiellt tillgängliga produkter förenklas. En slutsats gällande informationssäkerhet är att man med metoder som baseras på så kallad ”best-effort” kan effektivisera utbytet i ett gemensamt informationssystem, samtidigt som risken för dataläckage kan behållas på en acceptabel nivå.

    Ladda ner fulltext (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 24.
    Sigholm, Johan
    et al.
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Avdelningen för ledningsvetenskap och militärteknik (ALM), Sektionen för militärtekniska system (MteS).
    Larsson, Emil
    Assemblin, (SWE).
    Cyber Vulnerability Implantation Revisited2021Ingår i: 2021 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM), San Diego, November 29-December 2, 2021., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2021, s. 464-469Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we revisit a study presented at MILCOM 2014. Our goal then was to determine the utility of implanting a vulnerability into a cybersecurity software protocol to an actor planning to execute an offensive cyber operation. Based on a case study describing the then recently discovered Heartbleed bug as an offensive cyber operation, a model was devised to estimate the adoption rate of an implanted flaw in OpenSSL. Using the adoption rate of the cryptographic protocol Transport Layer Security version 1.2 as a proxy, we predicted that the global adoption of the vulnerability of at least 50% would take approximately three years, while surpassing 75% adoption would take four years. Compared to subsequently collected real-world data, these forecasts turned out to be surprisingly accurate. An evaluation of our proposed model shows that it yields results with a root-mean-square error of only 1.2% over the forecasting period. Thus, it has a significant degree of predictive power. Although the model may not be generalizable to describe the adoption of any software protocol, the finding helps validate our previously drawn conclusion that exploiting implanted cyber vulnerabilities, in a scenario like the one presented, requires a planning horizon of multiple years. However, as society becomes further dependent on the cyber domain, the utility of intentional vulnerability implantation is likely an exercise in diminishing returns. For a defender, however, our model development process could be useful to forecast the time required for flawed protocols to be phased out.

  • 25.
    Trimintzios, Panagiotis
    et al.
    ENISA.
    Holfeldt, Roger
    Secana.
    Koraeus, Mats
    Försvarshögskolan, Institutionen för säkerhet, strategi och ledarskap (ISSL), CRISMART (Nationellt Centrum för Krishanteringsstudier).
    Uckan, Baris
    Secana.
    Gavrila, Razvan
    ENISA.
    Makrodimitris, Georgios
    ENISA.
    Report on Cyber Crisis Cooperation and Management: Comparative study on the cyber crisis management and the general crisis management2015Rapport (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
    Abstract [en]

    The goal of this study is to provide an analysis of cyber crisis management by identifying relations between this emerging field and the better established subject of general crisis management. This includes terminology and key concepts in these fields. This study further seeks to gain knowledge and understanding of the involved actors’ perspectives on the challenges for Cyber Crisis management within the European context.

    The purpose of the study is twofold: to compare concepts from the general crisis management systems with the corresponding systems related to cyber crisis management, and to conduct a conceptual analysis of the language and terminology within these two fields. The primary aim is to analyse the similarities and differences between general and cyber crisis management, employing examples from countries and organizations within the EU.

    Based on interviews with members of key national and EU institutions, and on an analysis of the differences between their practitioner perspectives and the theories of general crisis management, the study arrives at six key areas of recommendations for future activities in the cyber security realm.

  • 26.
    Waldenström, Christofer
    Försvarshögskolan, Militärvetenskapliga institutionen (MVI), Ledningsvetenskapliga avdelningen (LVA).
    Using uncertainties as basis for evaluating plans2007Ingår i: Proceedings of the 11th international conference, KES 2007 and XVII Italian workshop on neural networks conference on Knowledge-based intelligent information and engineering systems: Part I / [ed] Bruno Apolloni, Robert J. Howlett, Lakhmi Jain, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin , 2007, s. 254-261Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
1 - 26 av 26
RefereraExporteraLänk till träfflistan
Permanent länk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf