Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

The Russian acting during the Crimea crises has provided new fuel to the debate on new generation warfare, hybrid warfare and cyber- and information operations. However, there is also a clear link to cold war strategy and traditional warfare, and the strive to cause the opponent strategic paralysation, which could at least partly explain the actions taken during the crises.

The purpose of this study is to examine and to explain the Crimea crises in order to identify patterns, regularities and recurring connections in the Russian strategy preceding the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

This is a theory consuming study using Warden’s “Enemy as a system” and Liddell Hart’s “Indirect Approach” as theoretical starting points. With the assistance of these existing theories this study aims to explain what happened during the Crimea crises, answering the question: How can the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula be explained in a strategic context?

The study indicates that Russian strategy has had a system theoretic approach towards the adversary. Through a combination of political, economic and military means rather than applying each of these means separately, Russia has focused on political and strategic goals instead of operational and military goals. In all stages of the operation Russia’s main priority seems to have been to put influence on the leadership of the adversary.

The conclusions are that Sweden should pay higher attention to building a robust society in all necessary aspects to meet this kind of threats.