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Since Burma’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948 the country has been characterized by a continued domestic conflict between the government and various guerrilla organisations. For nearly seven decades ethnic separatist and political guerrilla movements have engaged in an armed struggle against the Burmese military Tatmadaw. During the military junta's seizure of power in 1962, Tatmadaw revised its military doctrine to focus on counter-insurgency rather than external threats. The new military strategy, Hpyat lay Hpayt, or Four-Cuts was based on principles of denying the insurgency means of resources and interaction with the population.

While counter-insurgency is a current topic of defensive forces, not least seen with the recent op- eration in Afghanistan, research to analyse Burmese strategy focuses merely on describing the his- torical events rather than through military theory explain the operations. This essay aims to analyse Burma's Four Cuts strategy from a military theoretical aspect. Based on Roger Trinquier and David Galulas theories of counterinsurgency, this essay analyses the counter- insurgency strategy against the Communist Party of Burma in lower and central Burma between 1962-1971. The result reveals that Four-Cuts as a military strategy, like Trinquier and Galula, em- phasises the importance of the population as a factor in counter-insurgency. Moreover, the results of this essay shows that the Four-Cuts strategy in its methods, share principles that Trinquier and Galula theorise.