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Strategic dilemmas of biosecurity in the European Union
Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (ISSL), CRISMART (National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training).
2004 (English)In: Biosecurity and bioterrorism, ISSN 1538-7135, E-ISSN 1557-850X, Vol. 2, no 1, p. 17-23Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Systems for societal/homeland security in both Europe and the United States are in flux to adjust to 21st century threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime. It is important that reforms take place, on both sides of the Atlantic that recognize the interdependence of Europe and the United States.(1) Security, including biosecurity, for Europe is strongly connected to security in the U.S. Diseases transcend borders, and their consequences can be the same, irrespective of where the outbreak occurs or whether it is a natural occurrence or an act of bioterrorism. This article examines the political and strategic dilemmas and complexities that would confront the European Union (EU) in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a naturally occurring outbreak. Although several initiatives have been taken by the 15 member states and within the EU Commission, the EU is not institutionally prepared for transnational, rapidly moving diseases that could cause grave consequences in Europe and other regions, including the U.S.(2) The prime responsibility for protecting European citizens against outbreaks rests with each member state. However, with intertwined and open European societies, the consequences would likely spill across borders. The EU Commission would have to become involved because such aspects as the internal market and freedom of movement would be affected. Responsibility, but not authority, would be pushed to the top. A coordinated EU response to such crises depends on European political leadership.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2004. Vol. 2, no 1, p. 17-23
National Category
Social Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-3920DOI: 10.1089/153871304322964309ISI: 000227358400003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:fhs-3920DiVA, id: diva2:628479
Available from: 2013-06-14 Created: 2013-06-11 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard-cite-them-right
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  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
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  • Other style
More styles
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  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
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  • nn-NO
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  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf