Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden 1939-45
2007 (English)In: Intelligence and national security, ISSN 0268-4527, Vol. 22, no 5, 722-744 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This article will survey the activities of Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Sweden during the course of the Second World War. Under the constraints of a foreign policy that sought to gradually encourage the government of Sweden to become more pro-allied rather than pro-axis and ‘non-belligerent’, SOE nonetheless entered Sweden with hopes of developing a series of contacts with groups and individuals that could be turned into active resistance if Sweden joined the axis, or if Nazi Germany either invaded or occupied Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia. Once the possibility of an axis invasion of Sweden was decisively dismissed, SOE had to find a different role. In Sweden, the successful development of SOE's intelligence gathering capabilities in the economic sphere, especially in the allied campaign against German iron-ore traffic and ball-bearings, provided the organization with a purpose that definitely took another course when compared to intelligence activities in other regions and countries. With these constraints in view, this article focuses on three major aspects of SOE involvement in Sweden. First, the article will examine SOE's role, and war aims in Sweden, linking these to the very different requirements of the Foreign Office. Second, the article will explore British and Swedish intelligence relations. Third, it will consider the Swedish security police response to British intelligence.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 22, no 5, 722-744 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-3305DOI: 10.1080/02684520701718146OAI: oai:DiVA.org:fhs-3305DiVA: diva2:585771