Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

In the middle of the 19^th century, the Royal Swedish Navy was in a very bad shape. However, during the years around the turn of the century, 19^th to 20^th, the Navy was able to acquire for its time modern ships. At the same time, naval officers laid the foundation for a Swedish naval strategic culture that, basically, was valid until the end of the Cold War. The main aspects of this culture were:

• Strategic defense against invasion from the sea – with a mix of offensive and defensive tactics that varied over time;

• Fleet in being using the archipelagos as protection;

• The main target was to be the enemy’s transport ships, not his main naval force;

• Strategic cooperation with the army and air force while, especially the army, saw the navy as a subordinate force;

• A vocation to defend Sea Lines of Communication that was not accepted by the Commander in Chief or by the politicians – except during the two world wars.

The thinkers of the navy have been influenced from abroad, mainly: Colomb, Corbett, Castex, and to some extent Mahan. Influent naval officers have studied at US Naval War College or its French counterpart.

Today, this culture is not valid. The navy has to develop a new culture where naval diplomacy, protection of Sea Lines of Communication, power projection, and cooperation with international and national actors are of prime importance. However, the classic strategic language – presence, sea control etc. – are still basically valid and should be used in the development of a new maritime strategy. In this context, the extreme jointness of Swedish Armed Forces is a problem. It is now necessary for the navy to, while still being part of the joint force, to reunite with the maritime world.