This is the second paper in a series where we try to understand what Clausewitz called the commander’s “coup d’oeil”, i.e., the ability to understand the situation on the battle field at a glance. We employ a standard paradigm from research on expertise where participants study a scenario and then reproduce it from memory. Last year we reported results consistent with other results from studies of expertise, viz., that experts recall meaningful scenarios better than meaningless scenarios whereas novices recall both types of scenarios equally badly. This year, we report four follow-up experiments. The first two study ex-perts’ and novices’ recall of scenarios after having seen how the scenario de-veloped over time and we do so under two conditions, one where the scenario develops violating constraints on how military units should move and one where they do not in an attempt to distinguish between two possible explana-tions for last year’s results: The constraints hypothesis and the pattern match-ing hypothesis. The results show that both experts perform better than novices but that both groups recall scenarios where the development did not violate constraints better than scenarios where the development violated constraints. We interpret these results as support for the constraints hypothesis. In Experi-ments 2 and 3 we vary the time allowed for inspecting static scenarios on the interpretation of these scenarios with both expert and novice participants. The results show that a short time for inspection affects the interpretation by novic-es to a greater extent than it affects the interpretation by experts, as was pre-dicted by Clausewitz. We interpret this to mean that novices and experts achieve their understanding of a military scenario in different ways.