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Hensikten med denne oppgaven er å undersøke i hvilken grad Norges energistrategiske betydninghar fått gjennomslag i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk etter den kalde krigen, og hvordan dette kanforklares.Norge er pr 2002 verdens sjette største oljeprodusent, og verdens tredje største oljeeksportør etterSaudi-Arabia og Russland. Norge er dessuten verdens tredje største eksportør av gass i rør, og dennorske gasseksporten utgjorde i år 2001 om lag to prosent av verdens totale gassforbruk.Denne energistrategiske betydningen har tilsynelatende ikke fått noen sentral plass i utformingenav den norske sikkerhetspolitikken, noe som med stor sannsynlighet skyldes at den norskeregjeringen bevisst har valgt å ikke sikkerhetisere den norske petroleumsproduksjonen.

This paper analyses to what extent Norwegian oil- and gas production has influencedNorwegian security policy after the cold war.As of 2002, Norway was the world's sixth largest oil producer, and the world's thirdlargest oil exporting country. Norway is one of the world's major gas producers aswell, and approximately 30% of the European Union's gas imports comes fromNorway, and for some countries as much as 40% is imported from Norway. Thisgives Norway significant influence on the international oil- and gas market.Today, no industrialised country can manage to keep up its industrial production,transport or general welfare without this energy, and there are no substitute productsavailable in the short or long term to replace oil or gas. As a major petroleumproducer, Norway is therefore in a position where it must maintain production evenin times of crisis and conflict in order to keep the European Union’s economiessolvent. Norway itself could also become involved indirectly in conflicts if one of theconflict parties wants to hurt the oil market. Norwegian petroleum installations couldbe attacked by foreign military forces or, more likely, by terrorists. Norway couldeven be faced with international political pressure to control where and when toexport its petroleum. Therefore Norway needs to take this into account whendeveloping its security policy. However, the general impression is that Norway hasn'tdone so, and the question is why.This paper clearly demonstrates that oil- and gas production has not achieved anexplicit and dominant position in Norway’s security policy. To the contrary, it washardly mentioned at all until the dramatic fall of oil prices during the winter of 1997-1998. During 1998 petroleum was widely discussed by the government, by externalagencies and individuals, but in 1999 the subject again disappeared fromgovernmental papers.The most likely explanation seems to be that the Norwegian government thinks thatthe best security policy is to focus as little attention as possible on its petroleumproduction. To defend all installations against a terrorist or military attack would beextremely difficult, and in case of a traditional military attack on Norway, NATOwould be involved anyway. In case of a terrorist seizure of an oil platform, Norwayhas a military unit trained to handle that situation. Further, the risk of anenvironmental catastrophe resulting from a terrorist attack is not as high as it mightseem at first glance. The platforms are constructed to minimize damage from firesand minor explosions, and the wells are equipped with vents to shut off oil leakage incase of emergency. Through incidents during the '70s and '80s, Norway learned thatit can cope with international political pressure by strictly keeping to a commercialpolicy in the trade of petroleum, while limiting political control to the exploitation ofthe resources.All in all, the Norwegian government has developed a security policy that focuses aslittle attention as possible on oil- and gas production, and it has maintained thatpolicy almost uninterrupted through the 1990s.