Logo: to the web site of the Swedish Defence University

I den vestlige verden er en doktrine i sin enkleste form en samling av fastsatte læresetninger ellerretningslinjer for militærmaktens virksomhet som i prinsippet dekker alle krigføringsnivåer. Kortsammenfattet beskriver den grunnlaget for virksomheten, gir normative retningslinjer for hvordanvirksomheten bør utføres, og beskriver hvilke funksjoner og kapasiteter som må besittes ogbeherskes for å møte doktrinens krav. For at doktrinene skal oppfattes som funksjonelle ogtroverdige er det viktig at innholdet i de ulike nivåenes doktriner samsvarer, og at det er samsvarmellom det skrevne ord og den praktiske utførelsen. I en tid hvor både Norge og Sverigeimplementerer nye doktriner er det interessant å se hvordan USAs doktriner håndtere dette.Oppgavens hensikt er derfor å undersøke i hvilken grad den fellesoperative tankegangen(jointness) er retningsgivende for dagens amerikanske doktriner, og i hvilken grad denne også erstyrende for gjennomføringen av militære operasjoner. Studien besvares ved å granske følgendetre spørsmålsstillinger: I hvilken grad skiller de forsvarsgrensvise doktrinene seg fra denfellesoperative doktrinen? Hvilke faktorer indikerer at Operation Iraqi Freedom var styrt av denfellesoperative doktrinen, og hvilke indikerer at operasjonen var styrt av de forsvarsgrensvisedoktrinene? Hvilke mulige forklaringer kan finnes for eventuelle diskrepanser mellom de ulikedoktrinenes teoretiske innhold, og mellom dette innholdet og den praktiske gjennomføringen avOperation Iraqi Freedom?

In the Western part of the world a military doctrine normally provides fundamental principles forhow to organize and execute joint and multinational operations. Summarized it describes thebasis for the activity, gives guidelines for how the activity should be executed, and describeswhich functions and capacities the military must possess and master to be able to meet thedemands stated in the doctrine. To be acknowledged as functional and trustworthy, the doctrinesat the different levels must have the same message, and there must be consistency between thewritten word and the execution within the military services. In a time when both Norway andSweden are implementing new doctrines, it seems interesting to examine how the United Stateshandles this subject.The purpose of this study is to examine to what degree the joint thinking in the American jointdoctrine governs the different services, both in their doctrines and in their activities andperformance while executing military operations. In this work the study answers the followingthree questions:• To what degree do the Services doctrines diverge from the joint doctrine?• What indicates that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was governed by the joint doctrine, andwhat indicates that it was governed by the Services doctrines?• What explanations can be found for the identified differences between the writtenmessage in the doctrines, and between this message and the execution in “Operation IraqiFreedom”?To answer this the study starts with a comparative analysis of the three doctrines “JointPublication 3-0”, “Field Manual 3-0”, and “Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1”. That is followedby a case study of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, and at the end there is a closing discussion andreflection on the results from the two first parts of the study.Based on the three selected indicators identified in the joint doctrine, the study concludes thatthere are some differences in the written massage in the three doctrines. Factors like when thedocument was issued, experiences from the Gulf war in 1991, and a tradition of “stovepipe”-thinking within the different services can be possible explanations to these differences.In the same way the study concludes that there are some differences between the written word inthe doctrines, and the execution of the military operations in “Operation Iraqi Freedom”.Possible explanations to these differences can be the personal will of the Joint ForceCommander, positive experiences from the joint operations in Afghanistan, and the Secretary ofDefence Donald H. Rumsfeld’s concept of “overmatching power”.