This article deals with the U.S. government’s efforts to curb the Swedish ball bearing producer SKF’s exports to the East early in the Cold War, 1950-1952, and interprets this process within the framework of hegemony theory. The period up to mid-1951 saw increasing U.S. pressure upon Sweden and SKF to consent to U.S. hegemony by abiding by the CoCom embargo. To achieve its objectives U.S. policymakers developed a flexible ‘’carrot and stick’’ approach, and the article adds considerable detail regarding the U.S. government’s handling of SKF. U.S. tolerance and flexibility was dependent upon Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe, which was received through the signing of the Stockholm agreement in mid-June 1951, a hegemonic apparatus through which Sweden’s abidance by the embargo was handled. A small amount of exports was accepted by Washington as long as the main U.S. objective, to deny the Eastern Bloc strategic technology, was adhered to by SKF. The article also reveals the lack of policy coordination in the Swedish government, and the conflicts between the government and SKF regarding the responsibility for adhering to the embargo.