After the 9/11 terrorist attack, The United States employed a new kind of warfare wherein special forces trained and assisted local militias in Afghanistan. One such notable case was when the green berets and the Northern Alliance triumphed against all odds during the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif where they attacked a more cohesive and numerically superior force and won.
The pupose of this thesis is to analyze the cooperation between U.S. special forces and the local militia and how they handled problems related to coordination, differences in skill and motivation during the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif. The method used was a single case study. The study found that there were considerable differences in skill and motivation between the U.S. Special forces and the Northern Alliance. The Afghans were plagued by infighting between the different warlords within the local militia. The Americans compensated for this by splitting their organization to more effectively assist the locals with close air support and tactical advice.