This paper examines how the use of combined arms has changed in amphibious assaults from the 1950s until now. Since the Falkland war, amphibious assaults are far and few between, but the technological change has continued. The ships have fewer and smaller canons but have a lot more missiles. During the second world war and Korean war artillery had the task of suppressing and destroying enemy installations, a task not always well suitable for naval missiles. The paper consists of a comparative descriptive case study of the cases Operations Chromite, Operation Sutton and the US amphibious operation doctrine.
The final findings show that the principles of combined arms in amphibious operations have stayed the same since the Korean war, but how they are achieved have somewhat changed. The principle of destroying enemy fortifications and forcing the enemy to move or not be able to resupply the defending forces are still a vital part in amphibious operations. The fact that the enemy surface-surface missiles could reach the British naval ships while supporting land troops with naval artillery also changed how the British had to work around that in the Falkland War.