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Distrust towards Swedish public authorities, the judiciary, and various forms of municipal activities – including social services – is not a new phenomenon in Sweden and has been particularly noted in relation to so-called socially vulnerable areas. The issue of the role of social services has also been exploited within radical Islamist circles, both nationally and internationally. In early 2022, attention was drawn to a malign information influence campaign in relation to the Swedish social services as well as the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU), which claimed, among other things, that the Swedish social services kidnap children and particularly target children of foreign origin and Muslim faith. Several different actors in Sweden initially united on social media and through in-person demonstrations, and soon thereafter the issue took on an extensive international dimension. This would later evolve into what has been called the largest information influence campaign Sweden has ever faced. In the wake of this campaign, hostility and threats have been directed against Swedish public institutions and individual social welfare officers and calls for violence and terrorist attacks have been made. Furthermore, it has been noted that actors with links to radical Islamist milieus – some violent – also have promoted and spread such narratives.

The following study presents a chronological account of the origins and development of the so-called LVU campaign, both in Sweden and internationally, as well as the links between these dimensions. The study's empirical material consists mainly of content from freely available social media, with a particular focus on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, and is based, among other things, on a daily review of a number of prominent foreign Arabic- and Turkish-language accounts – both prior to the emergence of the campaign, in 2021, as well as during its immense development in 2022. In addition to this chronological account, a narrative analysis of key themes and narratives that have emerged has also been carried out. Finally, a quantitative account of the spread of the campaign and the issue on social media is also presented, based on aggregated data from the Swedish Institute (SI). The study thus takes a holistic approach to the multiple parallel dimensions of the so-called LVU campaign, with a particular focus on domestic–international links related to information influence activities by non-state actors.

The study shows that this malign information influence campaign cannot be regarded as a distinctly foreign phenomenon, but that the Swedish and international dimensions are intertwined. The basis for the subsequent spread of the LVU issue had already been initiated in Sweden as early as the summer of 2021, with the establishment of the Swedish protest movement. Subsequent widespread international coverage of the issue can be attributed to several factors. One central aspect is the constant social media interaction established between Swedish actors and the most influential actor internationally. That is, Moustafa El-Sharqawy, better known by his username, Shuoun Islamiya. This interaction began as early as late 2021, before the campaign and the issue went viral. Since then, El-Sharqawy has continuously highlighted the LVU-issue along with a large number of specific Swedish cases, which have also been used by influential foreign actors and media outlets.

The fact that several foreign individuals and organisations, with millions of social media followers, have elected to become engaged in this issue and to place so much emphasis on it has also been an important factor in the scope and staying power of the campaign and the issue. These actorsinclude a number of preachers and religious umbrella organisations, also giving the campaign and the issue considerable weight and legitimacy. These actors have also jointly formulated proposals and made demands for specific measures, including through an international petition. Furthermore, extensive and continuous foreign media coverage has also given the issue further legitimacy and dissemination.

Another important aspect to bear in mind, with regard to the emergence and development of the LVU issue, is the almost total absence of counter forces opposing the disinformation and narratives being promoted and disseminated internationally. While certain actors have sought to respond to the disinformation and false claims circulating online, the sheer volume of content and disinformation has crowded out several good attempts to constitute a positive counterbalance and to communicate accurate information. Several of the actors pushing back against the disinformation have also been subjected to extensive hostility and threats, including representatives of Swedish Muslim organisations and congregations. In this context, it is important to emphasise that Swedish Muslim representatives have not been participating in the campaign but have instead distanced themselves from it and condemned it.

However, the LVU issue and its appeal have not emerged in a vacuum but must be seen and understood in relation to certain vulnerabilities and areas of conflict that exist in Swedish society. This includes mistrust and lack of confidence in Swedish public institutions and the exercise of official authority, as well as an inherent clash of values, such as cultural and religious expectations conflicting with legal principles in a democratic society regarding individual rights and freedoms – particularly concerning children's rights. These vulnerabilities and areas of conflict have been strategically exploited by several national and international actors to promote an overall strategic narrative and to put pressure on Swedish public administration.

The so-called LVU campaign, coupled with the Qur’an burnings of 2022 and 2023, has generated a new and intensified threat both within and against Sweden. This campaign, along with its associated issues, has resurfaced in waves, with events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine causing significant interruptions. However, the issue has clearly never completely disappeared, and we therefore cannot expect it to disappear in the near future. Instead, it is likely to reemerge in different forms and with varying degrees of intensity.

Withstanding such a phenomenon requires more than preventive measures against disinformation, nor is it sufficient to simply provide accurate information. Rather, extensive confidence-building measures are also required, which should take place in direct person-to-person contact between residents, on the one hand, and national and local government on the other. This also includes a need for greater knowledge and expertise on the part of officials regarding, for example, cultural and religious norms and values. This is required to improve their understanding of residents whom they encounter in their day-to-day social work. As such, it is important to address the underlying vulnerabilities and conflict areas that exist in Swedish society, and which form a basis for enabling such a campaign to take hold. To exclusively seek to counter disinformation, without devoting resources to long-term prevention and confidence-building efforts, would otherwise constitute an illustrative example of focusing solely on the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of the threats and challenges we face today. This will require coordinated action from Swedish public authorities and municipalities at a completely different level than is presently the case.