Since 2007, the UN-led operation African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has been dedicated to marginalizing the terrorist organization al-Shabaab, assisting in the establishment of a functional government, and safeguarding the civilian population. The operation has been complex in many ways during the first five operational years between 2007 and 2011. However, AMISOM achieved a relative degree of stability in large parts of Somalia after 2011. This study analyzes the various factors that contributed to the heightened level of stability in Somalia.
The purpose of this study is to broaden the understadning of AMISOM’s work in Somalia, the methods used in it, and the effects it had. The analysis is conducted through a theoretical framework from David Kilcullen’s theory of successful counter insurgency.
The results of the study shows that the major turnaround is mainly based on AMISOM's large supply of soldiers. This allowed AMISOM to move from just defending itself to being able to start fighting insurgents. In addition, the study shows how AMISOM's achieved stability and why the power of the appointed government was primarily local in the vicinity of its capital, Mogadishu.