Why did the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen fail despite their qualitative and quantitative advantage against their Houthi adversaries? This study seeks to answer this question by analyzing Operation Unified Protector and the intervention in Yemen using Robert Pape’s theory of coercion and comparing the results. The aim of the study is to contribute to the wider discussion of air power and explain the failure in Yemen. The results of the study identified several differences between the cases which may have had an impact on the failure in Yemen and may serve as a starting point for future research. The Saudi-led coalition were using PGMs and claimed that they were avoiding civilian targets, although the collateral damage were more extensive in Yemen than they were in Libya. The use of conventional troops in Yemen differed from Libya, where only limited number of special forces were used. The lack of a coherent strategy may have had a negative impact on the operations in Yemen. The Houthis have continuously been armed and supported by Iran, whereas Libya was completely isolated from the world. Lastly, the Houthis have been able to strike directly at the coalition members home soil, which may have influenced the coalition’s threat perception. In conclusion, this study cannot provide a comprehensive explanation to the failure in Yemen, although it has found interesting areas for further study.