Since the second world war, most nations have prepared for further armed inter-state conflicts. Although this being useful, most nations have not succeeded in preparing for other types of conflicts, insurgencies being one of them. The current means and measures of best countering an insurgency have not yet been identified and the ones being used are met with hard criticism. Therefore, more theories need to be studied.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the explanatory power of Jaqueline Hazelton’s ”Coercion-theory” by applying it on two cases of counterinsurgency conflicts. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the current discussion regarding a state actors’ choice of methods within counterinsurgency. Despite the theory´s broad variables, this paper concludes that the ”Coercion-theory” is unable to explain the outcome of the second Lebanese war from 2006 and operation Cast Lead from 2008. This thesis can also be used to further underline the need for new tools for decision-makers when faced with an insurgency.