This thesis reflects on how the idea of ending the war in Afghanistan was articulated within the discourse of the United States and how it was legitimised in relation to the narrative of self of the state. Through discerning changes in the discourse of the state on the conflict throughout its duration and understanding how the end to the involvement of the state in Afghanistan was legitimised in relation to the narrative of self of the state, this thesis aims to issue an alternative understanding of how the end to the conflict relates to the wider discourse on the war and how we can understand the decision to end the conflict in relation to the narrative of self of the state and its initial commitment to fight terrorism. Using Ontological Security Theory, this thesis argues that the end of the conflict was in fact negotiated over the last decade of the war, and that the changes in the discourse of the state as functioned as means for its agents to reflect on its involvement and to come to terms with its limits in the conflict. Throughout the duration of the war, this thesis finds that the United States narrows its interests in the conflict and in a gradual manner articulates that there are limits to what the state is willing to sacrifice in Afghanistan. It is therefore argued that such discursive changes functioned as means for the state to mitigate the sense of failure that could arise from ending the conflict, and that the withdrawal in this sense was a decade long negotiation in which the United States had to create meaning for an end to the war and argue how such a decision aligned with its narrative of self.