Since the 1990s, proponents of a so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) have argued that the tremendous development in information communications technology (ICT) would revolutionise warfare through enhanced intelligence capabilities. This would reduce the scope of battlefield uncertainty of the kind in which Rendulic had claimed to have found himself in late 1944. The difficulty of gaining accurate intelligence of the battlefield at the time of the evacuation and destruction of Finnmark was one of the reasons why Rendulic’s action was considered an honest error. This chapter examines whether the ICT revolution has reduced battlefield uncertainty and honest errors in 21st-century warfare by examining two case studies: the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The chapter shows that the relationship between ICT, intelligence, uncertainty, and honest errors is far more complex than argued by RMA advocates and is influenced by several factors. In particular, this chapter argues that the ICT revolution has not reduced the sense of uncertainty, fear, and other psychological constraints of combatants.