The Russian concept of maskirovka has been misunderstood by western military scientists since the soviets coined it before the second World War. It is usually translated into deception or camouflage, terms that are unable to explain the entirety of the concept. Throughout the 20th century maskirovka has shifted in terms of focus and practitioners from the battlefields of Europe to nuclear deterrence, politics and diplomacy. The purpose of this study is to analyze the ideas expressed in recognized western depictions of maskirovka in order to initiate a higher understanding of the concept and reduce the confusion surrounding it. Two texts, Den stora maskeraden by Lars Ulfving and Soviet Maskirovka by Charles Smith, analyzed with Mats Lindberg’s model for idea analysis show indications of both different and similar ideas. Both texts stress the importance of a centralized leadership, plausible feints, deception, dividing the opponents forces and disrupting the opponents intelligence service. Among the differing ideas are the argued main purposes for maskirovka. Ulfving claim surprise to be the main purpose whilst Smith states maskirovka is a concept used to affect the opponents intelligence. It is possible, this study finds, to argue that the two purposes are similar.