This thesis examines how the Swedish threshold concept can be understood and developed at the highest political and strategic level. The problem is that understanding the threshold concept with its dynamics is in its infancy. The Swedish debate shows that a disagreement exists about the concept, in particular about the extent to which the threshold can be equated with deterrence. In addition, it is problematic to use deterrence in isolation since the theory of coercive power also contains compellence. An actor that focuses on deterrence must also be prepared to use coercive diplomacy if deterrence fails. The two concepts have the same basis but operate on different dynamics. A state with a strategy that is conceptually based on deterrence alone risks being exposed to conceptual and doctrinal surprise in the event of conflict, as the difference between deterrence and coercive diplomacy disappears in conflict. In addition, it is up to the adversary to decide which of the two concepts is governing. The dissertation argues that the concept of threshold includes more than deterrence, “defense/obstacles”, marker, alarm clock and trip wire. This is done by applying discourse analysis to Swedish official political and military strategic documents dealing with the concept of threshold. This analysis is important today because of hostile actions are now taken place in the grey zone between war and peace. By examining how deterrence and coercive diplomacy are related, the dissertation increases the understanding of the concept of threshold as a conflict management tool in the gray zone. The study concludes that the threshold concept needs to be further developed, if it is to be used as a conflict management tool in the gray zone.